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Abstract 
 
Collegiate Debating Societies in New Zealand: 
The Role of Discourse 
in an Inter-Colonial Setting, 1878-1902 
 
By Bettina Kaiser 
 
 
This thesis examines how, in New Zealand during the nineteenth century, 
debate was practised as an educative means to cultivate a standard of civic 
participation among settlers. Three collegiate debating societies and their 
activities between 1878 and 1902 are the object of this study. The discussion of 
these three New Zealand societies yields a distinctly colonial concept of debate. In 
the New Zealand public forum, a predominantly Pakeha intellectual elite put forth 
the position that public decisions should be determined by a process of 
deliberation that was conducted by educated individuals. This project was 
dominated by scientific argumentation that underpinned debate as a reliable 
means of discursive interaction. New Zealand’s intellectual elite was influenced 
by similar trends in Britain and the United States. Moreover, the concept of 
debate, that developed over the period of thirty years, carried significant 
normative connotations that rendered rational argumentation an acceptable form 
of discursive interaction. 
It is shown that nineteenth-century debating practice in New Zealand should 
be understood as a cultural phenomenon that combines the practice of debate with 
alternative forms of discursive interaction like mock trials or musical evenings. 
Mostly composed of students, these societies negotiated ideal standards of 
discourse and real encounters on the debating platform. In order to understand this 
relation of real and ideal in nineteenth-century discourse, Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action helps to identify levels of interaction that reveal the social 
structure of debating activity. In addition, this thesis discusses events of imperial 
dimension like the Boer War and the Australia Federation movement to locate 
students’ discourse in an inter-colonial setting and identify discursive patterns of 
colonial policy making. Due to the lack of rhetorical research in New Zealand, 
American scholarship on literary and debating societies in the Gilded Age era 
provide a frame of reference for this study. 
The story of nineteenth-century New Zealand was written in an inter-colonial 
web of written and oral discourse. As such, the understanding of a distinctly New 
Zealand nineteenth-century concept of debate contributes to a shift of perspective 
in New Zealand historical research towards a rhetorical interpretation of discourse 
culture. Furthermore, this study informs a reading of New Zealand’s past that 
takes into account the strategic function of public discourse and its effect on the 
creation of jingoism and grounds for national identification. 
This thesis concludes that nineteenth-century debate was an imagined and 
ideal standard imposed on the public forum as well as a lived and embodied 
experience of social interaction. While this thesis focuses on the activities of three 
debating societies, it is suggested that literary and debating societies, in general, 
were more numerous and influential that historical scholarship has acknowledged.  
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Introduction 
 
In his essay, “Televised Leaders’ Debates”, Stephen Church claims that in New 
Zealand “debate is a perpetual feature of democracy, as both precursor and reaction to 
decision making” (Church 2004, 159). Few would disagree, particularly in the political 
arena. American election campaigns, for example, employ presidential debates as 
crucial elements of their strategic pursuits. Australia and New Zealand have followed in 
America’s footsteps and have established televised leaders’ debates as a requisite 
feature of their election campaigns. As in Church’s statement, they are frequently 
promoted as part of the public “decision making” process. Undeniably, televised 
presidential debates influence the outcome of an election because of the effect they 
exert on the political decision of a mass audience. Leaders’ debates have an impact on 
voting behaviour and, as a consequence, Church suggests that in New Zealand public 
debate routinely popularises democratic values and thus lends political participation an 
appearance of credibility. In other words, political leader debates are part of New 
Zealand’s political culture because they enhance the exchange of opinions in a process 
of national decision making. 
In New Zealand, the belief in debate as a democratic means of knowledge 
production also permeates the specialised discourse of science. Pratt, for example, 
identifies processes of decision-making in public scientific discourse by emphasising 
the role of public debate. In an attempt to define how the New Zealand public negotiates 
knowledge, Pratt argues that reliable scientific truths emerge from a consensus 
viewpoint that is generated by a community that constantly exchanges information and 
opinions. He maintains that “coherent independent lines of evidence” (Pratt 2004, 223) 
in the public forum are best suited to convince the New Zealand population of the social 
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relevance of scientific studies.1 Church and Pratt are convinced that popular debate, 
whether the topic is politics or science, contributes to processes of democratic opinion 
formation. Moreover, both seem to suggest that these methods of either political 
campaigning or scientific communication are conducive to public consensus-formation 
and the establishment of universally valid public truths. 
The current positions of Pratt and Church stem from a practice of debate that was 
central to nineteenth-century New Zealand discourse formation. Late-Victorian 
collegiate debate was based on the conviction that public decisions should be 
determined by a process of deliberation conducted by educated individuals. Moreover, 
the practice of public debate in late nineteenth-century New Zealand suggests that 
scientific argumentation underpinned debate as a reliable means of discursive 
interaction. The idea of debate as crucial to the communicative mechanism of the 
colony has largely been neglected by historians in New Zealand and Australia. For the 
Australian literary and debating societies, Drinkwater observes that “[t]he contribution 
of these societies to nineteenth-century Australian political culture has been largely 
overlooked, but their records are indispensable sources for understanding community” 
(Drinkwater 1999, 393). While a few scholars of cultural history in New Zealand 
engage with theories of discourse formation, research on the significance of public 
communication and the use of rhetoric in the late-Victorian era is almost non-existent.2 
In particular, collegiate debate and the existence of literary and debating societies in 
nineteenth-century settler communities either are discussed in isolation from late-
                                               
1 The phrase “public forum” is taken from Zarefsky’s manual Public Speaking. Zarefsky denotes “a space 
(imagined, rather than physical) in which citizens gather to discuss issues affecting them” (Zarefsky 2005, 
442). In view of the critical attention paid to the concept of separate public and private spheres, I employ 
this phrase as an integrative expression. While the public forum in our century emerges in spaces like the 
internet that give it a different quality compared to the nineteenth century, communication in late-
Victorian New Zealand similarly combined physical and imagined spaces – as Tony Ballantyne has 
shown and I argue in the Introduction and Chapter one.  
2 Stenhouse 1985, 1990, 1996, 1999; Gibbons 1992, 1998, 2002; Hilliard, 2002; McKenzie 1985. For the 
twentieth century, Brookes provides a detailed study of Germaine Greer’s visit to New Zealand. Brookes 
sets languages use and audience perception in relation to cultural realities in order to understand the 
dynamics that created the Greer phenomenon (Brookes 2006).  
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Victorian club culture or are dismissed as irrelevant for New Zealand’s colonial history. 
Scholars of academic history consider debating societies as a phenomenon of student 
culture but fail to set it into the larger context of rhetorical public culture in New 
Zealand.3 Morrell, for example, merely records that the Otago University debating 
society was “founded in June 1878 with thirty-one financial members and George 
Montgomery as secretary and treasurer” (Morrell 1969, 76). Their existence is mostly 
seen as a precursor or affiliation to larger student bodies like the Associations and as a 
reflection of student life rather than an exemplification of the formation of social 
knowledge. For authors of historical biographies, debating presents but a passing stage 
in their subject’s career.4 Occasionally, literary and debating societies in the colony are 
considered insignificant on grounds of their mere number (Fairburn 1989, 181). Some 
historians of education pay attention to the potential of debating societies but see them 
as the offspring of mutual improvement societies without regarding them as discursive 
units in a web of imperial communication. For Thompson, in Adult Education, debating 
is integral to the practice of Mechanics’ Institutes, yet he fails to account for the role of 
debate in the various institutes’ syllabi (Thompson 1945). Meanwhile Dakin focuses on 
the activities of mutual improvement societies in New Zealand and unravels the British 
influences behind the founding of such societies in New Zealand. His perspective, 
however, remains restricted to education (Dakin 1986, 1987, 1991).  
Scholars of scientific discourse in New Zealand have acknowledged the significance 
of the late-Victorian societies and associations for the production of scientific 
knowledge and public information. In particular, Stenhouse and Reid discuss the 
function of scientific argumentation in colonial public discourse culture. On the one 
hand, Reid’s study focuses on the influence that the New Zealand Institute generated in 
                                               
3 Barrowman 1999, 12-13; Hercock 1994, 5; Hight & Candy 1927, 143-144; Morrell 1969, 76; Murray 
1924, 196-198; Page 1992, 108; Sinclair 1983, 65. 
4 Roth 1952, 5, 21; Lovell-Smith 2004, 34-35; Baxter 1981, 15-16. 
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order to become the dominant association of New Zealand’s scientists.5 On the other, 
Stenhouse’s analysis of Darwinism in New Zealand shows that colonial culture was 
embedded in an imperial scientific network that went beyond the communication of the 
individual branches of the Institute and into the public forum. Both convincingly argue 
that scientific discourse in the colony was as much a process of public communication 
as of political manoeuvring. As such, scientific debate permeated New Zealand’s 
discourse culture and influenced the way public knowledge was produced. Gibbons and 
Hilliard complement these studies by identifying processes of interaction among the 
different information media.6 Their work, like Stenhouse’s and Reid’s takes into 
account the significance of inter-colonial and imperial information networks for the 
creation of a public forum that sustains opinion formation among individuals. 
Other historians have added to the understanding of inter-colonial information 
processes and have extended the terminological framework beyond available resources 
of discourse analysis. In Ballantyne’s and Moloughney’s volume Disputed Histories, 
Miles Fairburn argues that “Australian, British and American stimuli …  probably made 
New Zealand the most globalised society in the world” (Fairburn 2006, 150-151).7 
Ballantyne advances this perspective by adding a distinctly Asia-Pacific perspective.8 
For him, the global perspective on colonial history allows us to conceptualise discourse 
                                               
5 Stenhouse 1985, 1990, 1996, 1999; Reid 2007. 
6 Gibbons 1992, 1998, 2002; Hilliard 2002. 
7 I agree with Fairburn that New Zealand history needs a new perspective that allows it to position itself 
in a context of world or “globalised” history. However, I do not accept Fairburn’s argument for New 
Zealand’s exceptionalism that he develops in the same essay, and which claims that New Zealand 
acquired an exceptional historical status because it was like no other country simultaneously influenced 
by Australian, British and American culture. Fairburn argues that “New Zealand’s exceptionalism, hence, 
was the product of a force that prevented distinct traditions from growing in the local soil” (Fairburn 
2006, 150). In contrast to this position, this thesis shows that New Zealanders actively created distinct 
debating traditions and that overseas cultural influences were conducive rather than detrimental for this 
phenomenon. I also do not share his early belief that New Zealanders were mostly isolated individuals 
who, as a consequence, lived in an atomized colonial society (Fairburn 1982). Instead, my research 
illustrates that New Zealand’s urban society, on the one hand, consisted of well-organised communities 
that provided a relatively stable social framework and, on the other, allowed the individual to be mobile 
and international beyond the boundaries of an English-speaking cultural sphere. 
8 Sinclair and Belich publish on Australasian issues. (Sinclair 1986, 1987b; Belich 2003) Ballantyne, for 
example, develops his argument in 2002a, 2002b, 2006a with Moloughney. 
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beyond the confines of the nation-state.9 Central to Ballantyne’s work, in sharp contrast 
to Fairburn’s understanding of “globalised” and “atomised” society, is the idea that 
different modes of discourse were “constructed out of a complex web of circulation” 
(Ballantyne 2002b, 131), in which the New Zealand intellectual community actively 
participated. In Orientalism and Race, Ballantyne interprets New Zealand’s colonial 
discourse in a context of imperial knowledge production that places the colony within 
rather than at the periphery of the British Empire (Ballantyne 2002a). According to 
Ballantyne’s suggestions, the colony had voice that was heard among many in the 
Empire. Indeed, nineteenth-century debaters themselves located their activities in inter-
colonial and even global contexts. In 1892, Professor Gilray in addressing the Otago 
University debating society in Dunedin, “emphasised the importance of such institutions 
as the debating unions or societies which are formed in connection with the universities 
throughout the world” (OW, 9 June 1892, 18). This branch of New Zealand scholarship 
adopts a perspective that sees New Zealand society functioning in Asia-Pacific and 
international contexts and effectively sets New Zealand research in a global trend in 
historical writing that departs from concepts like the nation-state.10 Recently, Thomas 
Bender has repositioned American cultural history as world history.11 Beginning with 
his work on American intellectualism and its relation to urban culture,12 Bender shows 
that the United States became part “of the larger, ever changing European work of 
empire that began in the fifteenth century” (Bender 2006, 191). Bender and Ballantyne 
are representative of a group of scholars who set out to rewrite national history in terms 
of a global understanding of cultural influences. 
                                               
9 Ballantyne 2002b, 129-131; 2005b. In 2003, Gibbons also calls for a “decentralisation” of New Zealand 
history and its re-interpretation as world history (Gibbons 2003). 
10 Ballantyne and Moloughney write in Disputed Histories that this scholarship “remind[s] us of the 
chronological, spatial, and cultural limits of the nation and that it should not be viewed as the natural site 
for historical analysis” (Ballantyne and Moloughney 2006a, 23). 
11 Bender 2006; Cinar and Bender 2007. 
12 Bender 1987, 1988, 1993. 
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Debating in nineteenth-century New Zealand was embedded in an inter-colonial 
context that requires an analytical framework that locates the colony in this global 
network and takes it seriously as discursive practice on a colonial as well as global 
level. In New Zealand, debating societies functioned as cells of knowledge production, 
which makes them a valuable source for research on New Zealand’s discourse culture. 
Not only were New Zealand debating societies embedded in an inter-colonial context, 
they were also immersed in an imperial network of similar institutions. Individual 
members were considerably mobile and commuted between Britain, Germany, America 
and Australia. Many of the students, after pursuing their research overseas and joining 
similar associations there, returned to the colony and remained affiliated to their first 
collegiate debating society. In 1898, Earnest Rutherford wrote to James Hight from 
Montreal that he would “always retain a very pleasant recollection of many Saturday 
evenings spent at the Dialectic Society” and he hoped “when I again visit New Zealand 
to renew my acquaintance with the society” (E. Rutherford to J. Hight, letter, Hight 
Papers).13 Some members transferred to other university colleges within New Zealand. 
Sir Apirana Ngata (1874-1950), one of New Zealand’s exceptional Maori scholars and 
politicians, enrolled at Canterbury and Auckland and became a member of both clubs.14  
Despite these inter-colonial connections, debating societies and universities were the 
breeding grounds of an influential intellectual elite that had an eminent influence on the 
                                               
13 Another member, Oscar J.T. Alpers, observed that “I have always been able to maintain some degree of 
connection with it [Canterbury College], to keep its memories fresh, and its friendships unbroken” 
(Alpers et al. 1923, xviii). His relation to the College resulted in the publication of Cheerful Yesterday, 
College Rhymes and Jubilee Book of Canterbury Rhymes. Alpers, after his graduation, practised law in 
New Zealand, became judge of the Supreme Court, and continued to pursue his literary interest. 
14 Ngata went to Waiomatatini Native School, followed by Te Aute College, where he prepared for 
university matriculation. The A Te Makarini Scholarship enabled him to take up his studies at Canterbury 
College where in 1893, he completed his B.A. degree. After moving to Auckland, he finished his LL.B. in 
1896. Ngata became the first Maori to complete a university degree in New Zealand. After his graduation 
he challenged the economic and social situation of Maori in New Zealand. From 1905 to 1943, Sir 
Apirana Ngata occupied the Eastern Maori parliamentary seat. Between 1907 and 1908, he sat on the 
Native Land Commission together with chief justice Sir Robert Stout. In 1927, Ngata received the 
knighthood and the following year became native minister. In 1934 he resigned from cabinet. The 
biographical account is based on Walker’s biography of Ngata 2001, Sorrenson in DNZB, Sorrenson 
1986, 1:11-38. Chapters one and four contain more information on Ngata’s role in the collegiate debating 
societies. 
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future politics, cultural representation and self-perception of the colony. Students in 
their later careers entered colonial politics, shaped the educational sphere of New 
Zealand or flocked to the law. These educated individuals acquired their argumentation 
skills in such institutions and associations. To disregard their activities as socially 
insignificant, at least in their formative years, does not give credit to the achievements 
of this generation of New Zealanders. The analysis of the proceedings of debating 
societies broadens the horizon of inter-colonial communication that draws on a global 
framework for New Zealand’s nineteenth-century history. At the same time, basic 
research of collegiate debating societies in New Zealand is, inescapably, an analysis of 
Pakeha culture rather than an attempt at locating discursive culture in a bicultural 
framework of Maori-Pakeha relations. Nineteenth-century higher education in New 
Zealand was the project of a white intellectual elite. This thesis explores how this 
project shaped debating and public discourse culture. 
While New Zealand lacks research in the history of rhetoric and argumentation 
studies, American scholarship proves that public debates, associations like literary and 
debating societies, and institutions like lyceums and Chautauqua, are rich sources for 
cultural as well as discourse history.15 Several studies confirm the educational 
objectives of these American cultural institutions. McHenry shows that societies’ 
archives provide evidence of processes of transition from written to oral communication 
                                               
15 Zarefsky studies the Lincoln-Douglas debates in relation to their ideological potential in ante-bellum 
America (Zarefsky 1990). In particular, Angela Ray establishes the significance of the ante-bellum 
lyceum movement (Ray 2003, 2004, 2005). She regards lyceums as associations designed to promote 
group identities of privileged strata of the American public. Martin shows the impact of women’s study 
clubs on American public culture (Martin 1987). Mastrangelo investigates politics of debate at Mount 
Holyoake College (Mastrangelo 1999). McHenry studies the proceedings of African American Literary 
Societies (McHenry 2002). Cerling relates the rise of debate and public speaking to the gradual decline of 
rhetoric at American universities and colleges (Cerling 1985, 189-200). Wiesepape discusses the position 
of literary and debating societies in Texas (Wiesepape 2004). Tapia traces the development of 
Chautauqua from a forum for mutual improvement to an entertainment business (Tapia 1997). Early 
research focuses on the description of proceedings without assessing the discursive implications of 
particular uses of argument, rules and topics (Cowperthwaite and Baird 1954, Harding 1971, Hellmann 
1942, Johnson 1972, Porter 1936, Potter 1944, 1954, 1963, Simpson 1976, and Tilton 1920). All agree 
that the heyday of American debate and oratory had already passed when New Zealand’s literary and 
debating societies were established. 
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(McHenry 2002). In particular, the minutes of debates record occasions of actual 
argumentation patterns by people who were not trained to appear in public but who 
pursued oratory, debate and essay composition as a pastime. According to Wiesepape, 
the American clubs produced a substantial amount of popular literary work that 
contributed to the cultivation of literary taste (Wiesepape 2004). McHenry shows that 
literary and debating clubs increased literacy among the African American population. 
She argues that “in fostering the development of a literate population, literary societies 
furthered the evolution of a black public sphere and a politically conscious society” 
(McHenry 2002, 3). As a consequence, Wiesepape and McHenry conclude that these 
societies fulfilled a vital function in the networks of American public discourse. By 
contrast, Ray portrays ante-bellum men’s debating societies as places of social 
interaction with little potential of contributing to a public pool of knowledge (Ray 2003, 
2004). Ray in particular uncovers the significance of ritualised discourse for the 
existence of debating societies. As a consequence, these studies of the rhetorical history 
of the United States identify processes of formalisation and social interaction as the two 
key dynamics that formed the practice of public debate.  
This thesis acknowledges this scholarship and propounds the argument that, in New 
Zealand, both processes— formalisation and intellectual interaction— acted upon 
debaters within a time span of thirty years and shaped debating processes in a way 
unique to New Zealand. On the one hand, students in New Zealand started their 
debating adventure on fresh grounds with British and American points of reference that 
indicated a general direction rather than specific procedures for the practice of debate. 
On the other, gradually, with the institutionalisation of higher education and with 
improved global information flows, collegiate debating in New Zealand was formalised 
to a degree that rendered it unfit for fostering communicative connections between 
students and the colonial public. While this process confined debate to the academic 
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sphere, it also preserved it as a form of specialised discourse among well trained 
participants. As a consequence, debate as a form of argumentative exchange survived as 
an additional extra-curricular component at New Zealand’s colleges while public 
literary and debating societies died a slow death in the twentieth century.  
The particular time frame of this thesis is based on two considerations. In 1878, the 
Otago University debating society was established and its first records originate from 
this year. I decided to terminate my research in 1902 because it marks the end of the 
Boer War and conveniently includes the death of Queen Victoria and the issue of the 
Australian Federation of 1901. Both events were crucial for the understanding of New 
Zealand cultural history and will be dealt with in the thesis. Between 1878 and 1902, 
debating at the colonial colleges in New Zealand developed from a relatively undefined 
and unregulated practice into a well-structured and effective feature of higher-education 
institutions but gradually lost its relevance as a means of public discourse formation. 
During their formative years, New Zealand societies promoted relatively unregulated 
deliberation with the purpose of negotiating propositions of vital colonial importance. 
Debating issues, for example, centred on question about women’s participation in the 
“learned professions” (1879), Darwin’s theory of evolution (1878) or the advantages of 
free trade (1879). By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, late-Victorian 
students produced discursive rules that were designed to generate objective standards 
for determining victory in competitions. The pursuit of certainty and formalisation 
resulted in a neglect of the diversity of debating topics. After 1890, questions of capital 
punishment and academic dress became commonplaces in the annual programmes. The 
desire to streamline debate affected the social interaction, audience relation, procedures 
of argumentation and the compositions of arguments in these societies. The 
combination of these particular influences led to a significant shift in the way 
knowledge was generated in colonial New Zealand. 
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In this thesis, debate is understood as a rhetorical and cultural concept including the 
practice of debate as well as other forms of discourse. Like American literary and 
debating societies, New Zealand collegiate debating programmes announced debates as 
well as essay readings, recitations, Olla Podridas, mock trials, parliamentary debates 
and musical evenings.16 The array of rhetorical and, to evoke a 1970s term, “nonverbal” 
forms of intercourse uncovers a concept of debate that takes into account bodily, and 
intellectual as well as unobservable features of deliberation.17 I propose that debate is 
what Ballantyne and Burton call an “embodied experience” (Ballantyne and Burton 
2005a, 409), a cultural phenomenon that in the nineteenth century not only arose from a 
friction between the ideal and real but also from confrontations of body and intellect. 
In order to reveal the interaction of ideal and real instances in nineteenth-century 
New Zealand debate this thesis demonstrates how Habermas’s theory of argumentation 
formulated in his Theory of Communicative Action can inform an interpretation of 
debating societies’ records. Habermas utilises a tripartite structure of argumentation to 
elucidate the social relevance of human communication. He associates rhetoric with the 
process of argumentation, dialectic with procedures, and logic with the composition of 
arguments. As such, his model is ideal and normative. Habermas’s theory of 
argumentation is applicable to the practical context of nineteenth-century New Zealand 
debate because it provides a terminology that describes students’ idealistic notions of 
communication. Habermas creates an explicative framework of the ideal that matches 
and transcends nineteenth-century notions of ideal deliberation. In this thesis, 
                                               
16 The OED lists two meanings of Olla Podrida, “dish of Spanish origin” and a “hotchpotch,” a “mixture 
of languages” only the latter remained in use at the end of the nineteenth century. Since the nineteenth 
century “ollapodridish” and “ollapodridical” came into use (OED s.v. “Olla Podrida”). In the debating 
context, these evenings were dedicated to readings of literary anonymous literary contributions by 
members of all genres. At the end of the evening, the audience voted for the best piece and its author was 
revealed. 
17 Olson reviews the history of the term within the broad discipline of visual rhetoric (Olson 2008, 122). 
His study is an exciting survey of the changing face of rhetorical study. Beginning with Kenneth Burke’s 
A Rhetoric of Motives, he traces the scholarship on “culturally shaped practices of seeing in their 
relationship to historically situated processes of rhetorical action” (120). I consider nineteenth-century 
debate in New Zealand as belonging to this paradigm of rhetorical study. 
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Habermas’s work is not placed in opposition to the supposedly “real” practice of 
nineteenth-century debate. Instead, his ideal perspective on argumentation complements 
and informs my research without monopolising its focus on the practice of debate.18 
Zarefsky, in assessing the possibilities of rhetorical analysis, suggests that “it is 
important to distinguish between models of ideal argumentation (normative) and studies 
of actual argumentation (descriptive)” (Zarefsky 2006, 401). He maintains that ideal and 
real cases of either dialectic or rhetoric might not resemble each other and a comparison 
of them would be a redundant enterprise. While this idea suggests a sympathetic reading 
of Habermas for this thesis, it also captures nineteenth-century debaters’ approach 
towards debate. They developed an ideal and regulative version as well as a practice 
that existed in constant friction with the normative standards they recognised. Zarefsky 
sees one goal of argumentation studies as being “to narrow the gap between the ideal 
and the real” (415). I suggest that in acknowledging late-Victorian students’ inclination 
to model debate according to ideal standards, the analysis is one step closer to 
identifying mechanisms that negotiate between the ideal and the real. Habermas’s and 
Zarefsky’s position on argumentation make visible ideal and real concepts of 
communicative practices in nineteenth-century New Zealand debate. 
In New Zealand, the tension between the regulative standards of debate and actual 
practice found its expression in the formalisation of debating procedure and the physical 
performance of deliberation. The formalisation of debate redefined New Zealand’s 
collegiate societies from “fellowships” of like-minded individuals designed to advance 
the mental culture of their members into associations aiming to develop the 
argumentative skills of students on the basis of esprit de corps. Both concepts 
interpreted differently the relation of intellectual force and physical participation. In the 
                                               
18 I am aware that Habermas develops his theory of communicative action in a context of “empirical 
usefulness”. In TCA, he dedicates an entire section to the practical application of formal pragmatics 
(Habermas 1984, 328-37). This particular side of Habermas’s research is not the focus of this thesis and 
has already been dealt with by other authors like James Johnson (1991).  
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late 1870s and early 1880s, amusing contributions like mock trials or Olla Podridas and 
rational contemplation in the form of debating evenings were separate items in debating 
programmes. In creating a sense of belonging among members, they were regarded as 
complementary items on the agenda. Members were encouraged to show their qualities 
in different media that utilised their argumentative skill as well as dramatic talent. In the 
late 1890s, the separation was abandoned in favour of a fusion of these elements into 
one concept— the debating tournament— that presented debate as a spectacle of logical 
brilliance. The new concept did not leave room for the performance of poems and piano 
solos as in the Olla Podridas and annual concerts. Members were meant to display 
intellectual prowess within the confines of deliberation. The audience was expected to 
watch. The common ground of debaters shifted towards a regulated intercourse that 
abandoned ideals of consensus formation in favour of the practicality of argumentation. 
The quest for victory redefined the practice of debate. As a consequence, the open 
concept of fellowship gave way to esprit de corps, a stricter version of discursive 
interaction. 
The modification of debating goals and forms led to a separation of audience and 
debaters. Those propounding an argument were put on stage, whereas the remaining 
members stayed passively in the auditorium. The introduction of external judges who 
assessed the debating performance reduced the level of physical interaction to a 
minimum. The audience became an entity that had to be “conducted” rather than 
engaged with and, in competitions, onlookers were left to take sides at the 
announcement of the winning team and otherwise refrained from actively engaging in 
the proceedings. By rendering the audience insignificant in the process of 
argumentation, debate in New Zealand lost a powerful rhetorical constituent. The social 
relevance of debating societies was partly generated through the open discussions at the 
end of each debate. Members acquired authority as debaters because they could engage 
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in argument either on stage or in the audience. Dunedin, for example, was the location 
of significant public debates and lectures on questions like Darwinism.19 These events 
drew large crowds not only because the topics were of interest but also because people 
felt confident to attend and join a body of listeners. Moreover, concert, drama 
productions and Olla Podridas attracted interested outsiders.  
Parallel to changes in audience perception, the procedure of argumentation 
displayed an increasingly strategic interest. Explicit and implicit rules of conduct were 
considered normatively binding for all members. Because discursive rules in late 
nineteenth-century New Zealand were entangled in controversies about “culture”, 
standards of debate were considered universal regulative ideals for the colony. These 
codes permitted rational, unemotional argumentation. They were drafted in an 
Arnoldian tradition of cultural conquest and under the influence of Darwinism. Debate 
became an instrument for establishing appropriate and acceptable forms of discussion 
within the intellectual elite of the colony.  
Eventually, the argument, the irreducible component of debating, came under the 
influence of scientific methodology. The trend of controlling deliberation resulted in the 
dominance of principles of induction over the practice of collegiate deliberation. Mainly 
influenced by professors and public scientific discourse, students adopted the ideal of 
“reliable truths” in order to justify their regulative framework.20 The popularity of 
Evolution as a topic in public lectures was crucial to the integration of the scientific 
                                               
19 Sullivan 2005; Stenhouse 1999. 
20 Hohmann identifies a similar trend much earlier in the legal argumentation of the renaissance 
(Hohmann 2002). He shows rhetoric and dialectic were neglected in favour of supposedly infallible 
logical argumentation and scientific methodology. Hohmann’s argument emphasises that legal 
argumentation was transformed by the belief in scientific certainty; the process was fuelled by a desire to 
replace the unpredictable confrontation of oppositional standpoints in court by the rational analysis of 
legal propositions: “[I]n the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the links of legal 
argumentation with both rhetoric and dialectic are in theory ever more pushed into the background in 
favour of a focus on hermeneutics that ever renews the ever unfulfilling promise of replacing the clash of 
opposing legal arguments in a controversial discussion with solitary scientific determination of legal 
meanings. Somewhat paradoxically, the concern for the political legitimacy of adjudication thus promotes 
for highly rhetorical reasons a denial of the rhetoricity of legal argumentation, and for the same reasons 
dialectic is made to deny its dialogical and probabilistic origins in favour of a monological conception of 
logic emphasizing certainty” (Hohmann 2002, 47-8). 
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method in students’ debates. In New Zealand, discussion of what was scientifically 
observable and determinable gave rise to discourse on the unobservable, the spiritual 
and unpredictable. As a consequence, scientific epistemology functioned as the 
regulative ideal for debating and served to exclude the inexplicable.  
The chapters in this thesis follow these central arguments and locate them within 
scholarship on New Zealand cultural history, American history of rhetoric, 
argumentation theory and Critical Theory. Chapter one describes the colonial 
environment in which debate surfaced at the three New Zealand university colleges and 
traces its development through to the institutionalisation of debate. The rise of these 
societies was part of a Victorian mutual improvement interest and of the concept of 
rational recreation. Both phenomena facilitated the formation of diverse colonial 
societies and helped cultivate different forms of belonging. Chapters two and three 
discuss two of these fundamental principles that were central for the self-perception of 
debating societies: fellowship and esprit de corps. Both concepts mirror forms of 
intersubjective behaviour and dynamics of consensus formation that created a common 
discursive ground among students. Both forms of belonging emerge in the context of 
invented traditions and rituals. Lakoff in Talking Power demonstrates that consensus, as 
the “closing” of debate, usually entails “openings” of the discussion that resemble 
certain rituals that structure discourse (Lakoff 1990, 45). Thus the ritualisation of 
consensus formation and of social relations in debating societies serves as a basis to 
explore the connection of audience, dialectic and rhetoric. Fellowship and esprit de 
corps echo similar community-forming qualities like consensus-formation or the 
analytical category of intersubjective behaviour. They are part of the same continuum 
that describes mechanism which lead to the creation of a discursive community and that 
are critically explored in these chapters. 
  15 
Chapter four investigates how specific circumstances changed the perception and 
function of audience in late-Victorian debate. Based on the discussion of esprit de 
corps, audience became a constituent of debate deprived of decision-making powers. 
This process shows how the discursive community changed, was reinterpreted by its 
members and reinvented in its function in the colonial public sphere. Chapter five 
elaborates on the notion of a passive discursive community and discusses the 
formalisation of debate in terms of codes of conduct. With an element of increasing 
competition and laxity in discursive behaviour, students in nineteenth-century New 
Zealand introduced universal codes of conduct and further restricted debates’ potential 
for a comparatively free means of public discourse. Chapter six concludes the analysis 
with a discussion of the significance of scientific forms of argumentation for the 
formalisation process in collegiate debate. Scientific induction exerted a growing 
influence on the construction of arguments partly because of the popularity of 
Darwinism among New Zealand’s intellectual elite. As one consequence, the 
community spirit that characterised the early years of debating societies acquired a 
detached and regulated quality. While the formalisation argument that is developed in 
these chapters explains a range of discursive phenomena that occurred in and outside 
collegiate debating societies during the last thirty years of the nineteenth century, it 
represents one way of understanding them. The conclusion points towards other 
promising approaches to interpret those discursive activities that shaped not only late-
Victorian New Zealand society but significantly contributed to the twentieth-century 
understanding of public discourse and . 
 
  16 
Chapter One 
The “Noble Mission” of Argumentation in Debate1 
 
Introduction 
The heyday of debating societies in New Zealand paralleled developments in 
countries like the United States and Great Britain. In New Zealand, the mostly middle-
class intellectual elite introduced familiar British and American forms of 
communication to the public discourse of the colony. They strove to improve and firmly 
establish norms of discursive interaction. Very early on, the New Zealand Company 
was instrumental in sketching a vision for the colony’s future that relied on the 
expansion of general education through reading. Once in New Zealand, settlers and 
missionaries set out to adapt to their new circumstances by further enforcing and 
transcending guidelines imposed on them by the “home country.” Statistical 
measurements of literacy among New Zealand’s population became the yardstick for 
scientifically confirming the government’s success in dealing with matters of general 
education.  
The educational realm in New Zealand was divided into an institutionalised sector 
of schooling and a volunteer-based sphere of further education. The United States and 
Britain provided points of references for taming an uncivil intellectual environment and 
for firmly establishing a nation-wide educational framework. Debating in New Zealand 
arose amidst influences from institutional forms of education like schools and university 
colleges as well as from volunteer organisations like mutual improvement societies and 
Mechanics’ Institutes. 
                                               
1 This is a phrase taken from Professor Haslam’s lecture to the Canterbury College Dialectic Society on 
Dialectic: “And this is what we will teach you – the art of persuasion or disputation. To convince yourself 
of some great truth; to feel, that is, that it is true for you, and to persuade all men that it is true also for 
them; what nobler mission can you have?” (Haslam 1884, 9f). 
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Those who engaged in debate in New Zealand regarded it as a perfect 
communicative tool to reach consensus and discuss matters of general interest in an 
egalitarian setting. The connection between nineteenth-century debating in New 
Zealand and Habermas’s vision of communication lies in the idealised approach 
towards argumentation both adopted. In TCA, Habermas outlines a theory of 
communication that focuses on the ability of interlocutors in an ideal speech situation to 
reach mutual understanding. The notion of rational argumentation is crucial to his idea 
of controversy and to nineteenth-century understanding of debate. Both rely on the force 
of the better argument; both approaches are highly systematic, inspired by scientific 
argumentation and informed by a social element of argumentation.  
This chapter provides the theoretical and historical background for the ensuing 
chapters and highlights the links between education, mutual improvement, debate and 
an ideal of rational discourse. Initially, by drawing on research on American debating 
societies as a framework of reference, I identify the social and cultural circumstances 
that contributed to the emergence of debate in New Zealand. Subsequently, key 
characteristics of nineteenth-century debating practice are outlined and set in the context 
of educational circumstances. Finally, Habermas’s theory of argumentation and his 
emphasis on the social relevance of communication reveal the increasing formalisation 
that corrupted essential elements of social interaction in debate. 
 
The Spoken Word, Literacy and Mutual Improvement in New Zealand 
Between 1877 and 1902, New Zealand developed an educational framework that 
combined two spheres: institutionalised instruction and volunteer adult education. After 
1877, schooling bodies were mostly controlled by the government or private investors. 
Schools, colleges and the University of New Zealand were part of this field of 
educational policy. The second arena was beyond the control of the government and 
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flourished on the basis of private initiatives, mostly driven by the Pakeha intellectual 
elite and established along the lines of British and American models. Mechanics’ 
Institutes and debating and literary societies, for example, were part of both spheres and 
permeated the entire educational landscape of the colony. Throughout the late-Victorian 
period in New Zealand, benchmarks for educational achievements included literacy, 
access to printed information, and an emphasis on elocution as the art of public 
speaking. The origins of these principles were established in the early years of 
settlement and effectively remained valid until the end of the nineteenth century. 
Between the late 1870s and the turn of the century, New Zealand’s intellectual elite 
found itself dealing with the remnants of the educational ideals of the colonization 
process of the 1840s. The availability of books and the founding of libraries were part 
of the process of white settlement in New Zealand from the start. Edward Gibbon 
Wakefield’s idea of “systematic colonisation” and the actions of the directors of the 
New Zealand Company laid the foundation for a supposedly enlightened settler culture.2 
The accessibility of printed information was instrumental to their programme. The 
initiators of the New Zealand Company profited from the British experience in the 
American and Australian colonies.3 In 1839, Wakefield suggested “the formation of a 
Public Library, with a General Museum and Scientific Institution, and the establishment 
of a Dispensary, or Hospital, for the benefit of the settlers, and the Aborigines of the 
country,” observing that “it is obvious that without the former of these institutions, a 
high standard of civilization cannot be maintained, and that it is beyond the power of 
the individual settlers to provide for it … ” (qtd. in Traue 1993, 5). He had in mind the 
                                               
2 In 1902, O.T.J. Alpers, a student at Canterbury College, together with his fellow student R. F. Irvine 
published his unfavourable review of Wakefield’s systematic colonisation: Alpers & Irvine 1902, 96-108. 
For recent scholarship see: Brooking 2004, 43-45; King 2003, 171; Belich 1996, 183 (“Organised 
Immigration”); Belich moreover connects the idea to the notion of infinite progress and the rise of 
nationalism: 1996, 292-295; for the origin of progress in British society and the Empire see: Marriott 
2003, 9-40.  
3 Brooking mentions Pennsylvania in particular (Brooking 2004, 37). 
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foundation of an alternative and improved model of civilisation that aimed at escaping 
England’s economic and educational struggles. The New Zealand Company diligently 
promoted literary instruction among its settlers and sent a selection of books along with 
them. Traue shows that the company “provided for reading classes on the emigrant 
ships and established libraries for educational and leisure reading during the outward 
voyage, with the intention that these books should then become part of the stock of the 
settlements’ public libraries” (6). He further demonstrates that even though subsidies for 
libraries decreased within a few years of their foundation, settlers secured their 
existence through private investments. Beeby records that, at the end of the century, the 
American Carnegie Foundation bestowed seventeen library buildings on the New 
Zealand public; a donation that anticipated the foundation’s involvement in New 
Zealand in the 1930s (Beeby 1988, 39).  
By the end of the century, like England and the United States, New Zealand 
enthusiastically embraced self-improvement culture. As in America, the educated 
middle class was determined to structure the educational sphere and establish 
educational traditions that would last into the next millennium. These traditions were 
based on the belief in the enlightening power of books and reading.4 In 1902, Robert 
Stout (1844-1930), in the preface to McMurran’s From New York to New Zealand 
expressed this idealising sentiment in comparing New Zealanders with Americans in 
their passion for literature: 
                                               
4 Moreover, notions of social power and dominance were linked to the understanding of literacy. Gere in 
her study of American women clubs between 1880 and 1920 shows that the improvement of literacy 
among women was central for the club movement. She argues that “literacy enabled women to address 
the various class, race, and religious constraints in their lives. They thereby enacted cultural work that 
alternately fostered and modified dominant conceptions of citizenship, capitalism, womanhood, culture, 
and English studies” (Gere 1997, 251). Because literacy was accepted as a means of discursive 
participation, in New Zealand, McKenzie explains that colonisers intended to transform Maori oral 
culture into a literate, that is, written culture. He maintains that missionaries thought to achieve “in a mere 
twenty-five years: the reduction of speech to alphabetic forms, an ability to read and write them, a 
readiness to shift from memory to written record, to accept a signature as a sign of full comprehension 
and legal commitment, to surrender the relativities of time, place and person in an oral culture to the 
presumed fixities of the written or printed word” (McKenzie 1985, 10). 
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We speak the same tongue, and we have much in common with them. We read 
American books, and I do not know if, relatively to our population, the works of 
their literary men have not been as well perused by us as by the inhabitants of 
the States. …  Many of us long for more. Will mutual knowledge not create a 
feeling of respect and brotherhood that will make future misunderstanding 
amongst English-speaking people impossible? …  If this book can in even the 
slightest way help to bring about a better understanding between Americans and 
Englishmen it will not have been written in vain. (McMurran 1904, vi-vii) 
By 1902, Stout employs the rhetoric of the “common language” to promote lasting 
relationships between the two countries. As a firm believer in educational values, for 
Stout, the printed word provided New Zealanders with a means to bridge the Pacific and 
move closer to their American neighbours. Hamer, in his biographical account of Stout 
for the DNZB relates that back in Scotland, he received a considerable part of his 
education by way of discussions with relatives: “‘No subject was barred in discussion 
…  each different family got different newspapers and magazines and these were 
exchanged …  there was variety in our newspaper literature – Whig, Tory and Radical 
views were represented.’ Reading occupied the long winter nights, and there were 
lectures on a diverse range of subjects at the Literary Institute” (Hamer DNZB). Shortly 
after his arrival in Dunedin in 1864, Stout became an active debater and lecturer at the 
local Lyceum Hall. His debating skills improved to such a level that “he sometimes 
offended less skilful debaters – in other words, most people with whom he debated – by 
the scorn with which he treated their faltering efforts” (ibid.). In 1875, Stout entered 
Parliament where his mastery of argumentation served him well. Aside from Stout’s 
personal views on the subject of “mutual knowledge,” the use of eloquence and the 
ability to access printed information were regarded as essential for settling differences. 
Literacy was seen as the one category that statistically incorporated all these desirable 
elements. Once literate, the individual was able to participate in public discourse. In 
1886, Stout, in an address to the Statistical Society, proudly remarked that “our young 
people are more advanced than their elders in education”, by which he meant their 
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ability to “both read and write” (Stout 1886, 546). Moreover, Stout listed “those things 
that tend to increase the happiness of the people – providing for their social enjoyment 
and intellectual life” (551), among which he counted museums, public libraries, art 
galleries, athenaeum halls, books, magazines, and newspapers. Above all Stout pointed 
out that “there are theatres in every town, also concert halls, musical societies, and 
debating societies, and the New Zealand Institute – an institute founded for scientific 
purposes – has no less than eight branches. A handsome volume is published every year 
giving the researches of the members … ” (552). The spirit of the New Zealand 
Company reverberated in Stout’s perception of New Zealand’s public life and 
resurfaced in the his idea of standards of public education. 
In New Zealand the emphasis of late-Victorians on literacy reflected an educational 
ideal in which progress was measured with mechanical precision. Stout, for example, in 
his 1886 address, dedicated four pages to the problem of literacy and catalogued census 
figures according to gender, age and level of education (Stout 1886, 544-548). In New 
Zealand, the problem of illiteracy was approached as “a technocratic process akin to 
making a cake” (Soler and Smith 2000, viii). Vital to this process was a strong emphasis 
on reading in order to improve writing skills. Soler maintains, for example, that in 1899 
the syllabus for primary schools in the colony aimed to overcome illiteracy by stressing 
elocution rather than composition: “Inspectors and teachers judged the ability to read by 
listening to the quality of the spoken word. Along with reading, composition was to be a 
vehicle to shape the ‘cultured’ individual who knew the ‘correct and ready use of their 
mother tongue’” (Soler 2000, 2).5 With the passing of the 1877 Education Act, literacy 
increased significantly for the next thirteen years.6 Brooking’s statement that “this made 
                                               
5 Soler further quotes the New Zealand Gazette: “Judging the quality of reading afforded the teacher the 
‘surest means of judging the intelligence of pupils, the degree of culture which they have attained’” (Soler 
2000, 3, italics mine).  
6 Brooking maintains that “literacy rose from an already 70 percent in 1870 to nearly 90 percent by 1890 
as a result of the introduction of compulsory schooling in 1877” (Brooking 2004, 72).  
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New Zealand into one of the most literate societies on Earth” (Brooking 2004, 72) is 
nevertheless slightly exaggerated. To be sure, for a young colony ten percent illiteracy 
by 1890 was a great achievement but, in fact, New Zealand paralleled America where 
rates declined steadily from twenty percent in 1870 to eleven percent in 1900 (National 
Centre for Education Statistics). Moreover, New Zealand like America experienced a 
rapid influx of immigrants that required administrative measures to secure a minimal 
educational standard for the growing and more diverse population.7 
From the initial settlement of New Zealand onwards, the intellectual elite 
determined strategies to battle illiteracy that were not palpably egalitarian. Belich points 
out that, prior to 1900, increases in literacy did not necessarily improve the degree of 
equality in the colony’s higher education. He argues that “by the 1870s, the gentry had 
succeeded in establishing a small network of secondary schools for their own children. 
…  [T]he 1877 Education Act doubled the number by 1885; and it remained roughly 
constant thereafter to 1900, when they still had fewer than 3,000 pupils” (Belich 2001, 
130). In 1900, according to Belich, “fewer than 10 per cent of primary school leavers 
went on to secondary school, and only 650 free places were provided” (ibid.).8 Belich’s 
term “gentry” mirrors McAloon’s position that the colonial middle and upper classes 
need to be understood in relation to their British bourgeois origin:  
The British middle-class ethic was one of individual effort and self-
improvement. This ethic characterised both the New Zealand upper class and the 
New Zealand middle class, with an added dimension whereby investment in 
colonial economic development entitled the individual to substantial returns. 
(McAloon 2004, 10) 
The Education Act was a piece of New Zealand colonial legislation that, on the one 
hand, aimed at improving the basic standard of general education, and, on the other, 
                                               
7 For American figures see: online Government Census. Population Table 1790 to 1990. Literacy trends 
in American and New Zealand education remain closely connected today: Cazden et al. 1992. 
8 Baldwin argues that “[b]y the 1890s, about 70 per cent of primary school leavers left school by the end 
of standard four and approximately 2 per cent went on to secondary school” (Baldwin 2005, 117). Also: 
Olssen 1992, 276-7.  
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established what I call together with Reid and Lochhead the “intellectual elite” of the 
colony.9 Members were mostly self-professed “citizens of New Zealand” and belonged 
to “the self-made middle class” (McAloon 2004, 10).10 Because they rose to positions of 
influence in late nineteenth-century and twentieth-century New Zealand, members of 
the intellectual elite moulded New Zealand’s educational system, its political structure, 
its art and its cultural representation.  
Before members of the elite proceeded to dominate New Zealand’s colonial future, 
as students they completed their schooling in a gradually maturing educational system 
that emphasised extensive and varied reading. The availability of printed information 
and thus extensive reading material, to a large extent, was secured through the 
circulation of newspapers, journals and magazines. In 1886, Arthur Clayden published 
A Popular Handbook to New Zealand and, in answering the question “What intellectual 
movement is there?,” he compared New Zealand to England:  
For one thing, the newspaper is more universal. In this little city [Nelson] of, 
say, 7,000 people, there are two daily papers, and every one reads them. …  
Every one has an opinion upon every subject. The stolid workman of the old 
country is here a keen controversialist. …  Colonists read a good deal, and are up 
to date. The booksellers take care to supply as well as create the want. …  A vast 
amount of intellectual quickening reaches us from America. The ‘Frisco mail 
service floods us with Americanism. Our newspapers are full of American 
                                               
9 Reid in reviewing the history of the New Zealand Institute also insists that “a group of socially elite 
male Europeans asserted that they could define what science was, and that it was economically useful, 
morally uplifting, and intellectually stimulating” (Reid 2007, 12 and respectively 13-14). He, for 
example, recalls that some members of the New Zealand Institute, like Edward Tregear and Walter 
Buller, lied about their professional and educational background in order to adhere to a code of 
intellectual respectability (14-15; Dunlap 1999, 33). Lochhead likewise uses the term in reference to the 
demographics of New Zealand’s scientific societies (Lochhead 1994, 14). Baldwin provides a close study 
of Dunedin’s Otago Boys’ High School. He shows that pupils came from mixed backgrounds and “boys 
from a wide range of mainly non-manual occupations did attend, indicating that even modest wealth, such 
as that accumulated by a stationmaster, teacher, small businessman or self-employed tradesman, could 
buy access to the Boys’ High School” (Baldwin 2005, 127). Baldwin nevertheless concludes that access 
to tertiary education, in particular to law, medicine and secondary teaching, was limited to those who 
could afford a secondary school and then matriculate at the university colleges. 
10 Gibbons also regards New Zealand culture as class-divided. (Gibbons 1992, 309) In 1888, Bradshaw 
described New Zealand as divided country in terms of financial means: “But although, actuated by one 
motive or another, many people with good incomes, and freed from the anxiety of earning a livelihood, 
select New Zealand as a place of residence, the great majority of immigrants must for many years to 
come, if not always, consist either of those who with a moderate amount of capital at their disposal hope 
to better their position, or of those, who, landing without capital, trust to acquire it in the colony; and for 
such as these it is most important that the advantages afforded by the colony to persons of their class 
should be clearly states” (Bradshaw 188, 173-174, italics mine).  
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humour and general news. Few things illustrate this intellectual life more than 
the avidity with which every first-class lecturer is welcomed. …  No real man 
ever gets disappointed in his audience. (Clayden 1886, 210-211) 
The circulation rate that Clayden mentions corresponded to the average urban rate in 
America. Smythe shows that, in 1900, approximately 2.61 newspapers circulated in an 
American urban household (Smythe 2003). Campbell characterises newspapers as 
“integral, even organic, to American life” (Campbell 2006, 9), a phrase that Alpers and 
Irvine might have also used in describing the New Zealand newspaper market. In 1902, 
Alpers and Irvine observed that “in a population of a little over three-quarters of a 
million there are 208 newspapers on the official register. Many of these are of course 
mere up-country news-sheets; others are trade or professional journals. But four of them 
at least will compare favourably, both as to information, tone and style, with the leading 
papers of the great Australian cities: the Auckland Herald, Otago Daily Times, Lyttelton 
Times and Christchurch Press” (Alpers & Irvine 1902, 387). In 1883, Bradshaw 
maintained that “the daily press tends to keep up the connexion” with England and “its 
columns each morning containing telegrams of the leading events of the day before in 
Europe or America” (Bradshaw 1883, 22). In 1914, Siegfried in Democracy in New 
Zealand maintained that “the newspaper has a very high place in New Zealand. 
Everybody reads it, and there are few people ignorant or old-fashioned enough not to be 
interested in the news” (Siegfried 1982, 323). America experienced a similar dedication 
to the press even though economic conditions were different from New Zealand’s.11 It 
                                               
11 Trachtenberg maintains that “a great proliferation of newspapers and journals appeared between 1870 
and 1890: existing big-city newspapers multiplied circulation several times over; the 1880’s saw the 
beginnings of such new journals as Cosmopolitan, the Ladies’ Home Journal, McClure’s, and Munsey’s 
Magazine” (Trachtenberg 1982, 122-123). The American infrastructure for the distribution of information 
was dense in a territory several times bigger than New Zealand’s and bridged the increasing distances in 
cities as well as the entire country. Mott concludes that the weekly and monthly magazines were the great 
winners of the growing media market. In 1892, for example, the Ladies’ Home Journal reached a 
circulation rate of 700,000 (Mott 1947, 507). Emery & Emery state that in 1884, under Pulitzer’s “new 
journalism” regime, within a year, the New York World increased its circulation from 15,000 to 60,000 
(Emery et al. 1987, 259). Bender illustrates that the New York’s intellectual elite made use of these 
sudden changes of the American media market (Bender 1987, 156-157). Burns analyses how the media 
market inspired American “modern artists” to take up new forms of self-performance (Burns 1996, 221-
246). Bender’s and Burns’ work make clear that for the American intellectual elite, the notion of public 
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was not until 1880 that overseas developments were made readily available to the 
majority of New Zealand papers.12 As a consequence, newspapers comprised overseas 
and national political news as well as scientific and literary items complemented by 
numerous local and national advertisements.  
The rise of the intellectual elite and a new emphasis on the cultivation of New 
Zealand literature were distinctive to the creation of a New Zealand newspaper market. 
Dawber shows that, from the 1840s, journalism and the creation of colonial literature 
were combined in a thriving print business. Moreover, “newspapermen had status in the 
community. Theirs was a serious responsibility and their motives were assumed to be 
altruistic” (Dawber 2005, 10).13 McEldowney maintains that the intellectual elite of 
New Zealand was instrumental in establishing the early New Zealand Magazine 
(published between 1876 and 1877): “The group behind this venture were the first 
professors at the University of Otago and Canterbury University College, several 
clergymen, and a business man, Robert Gillies. Contributors included some of the more 
philosophically inclined politicians. High seriousness prevailed” (McEldowney 1998, 
634). Professors at the three colonial colleges helped to establish the main vehicle for 
scientific thought in the colony: Transactions and Proceedings of the New Zealand 
Institute (first published in 1867). Reid argues that prior to the Transactions, “no 
                                                                                                                                         
performance and spectacle and educational mission to spread reliable information were ambiguously 
linked in the Gilded Age newspaper business. 
12 Day illustrates that even though in 1876 New Zealand was connected to Australia by a submarine cable 
the use of telegraph facilities remained chaotic until four years later (Day 1990, 204-230). Day relates that 
prior to 1876, “mail ship brought a backlog of news that had accumulated for up to eight days” (205). 
Only with the establishment of the United Press Association (1879) and the granting of a special wire for 
the press with the Electric Telegraph bill (1880) was this situation rectified. A comprehensive study of the 
impact of the telegraph on the management of news in New Zealand is still lacking but American 
scholarship could provide significant insights. To mention only one example, Blondheim shows how 
telegraphic communication created “the revolutionary fact that information could be moved without 
visible signs of movement” and with considerable speed (Blondheim 1994, 189). He demonstrates how 
this impacted on the American newspaper market and permanently changed the face of American 
journalism. Chapter six of this thesis explores in more detail the connection of technical innovation, 
scientific argumentation and the force of the invisible for debate and thus generates some conclusions 
about the significance of “invisible” communication for late-Victorian New Zealand. 
13 In 1861, for example, Julius Vogel (1835-1899), later Premier of New Zealand (1873-1876) and 
colonial treasurer under the Stout administration (1884-1887), set up the Otago Daily Times (Brooking 
2004, 207-208; Dawber 2005, 125-138; Day 1990, 111-115). 
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previous intellectual New Zealand society had succeeded in publishing an annual 
volume” (Reid 2007, 37). The Transactions were a fusion of scientific, philosophical 
and political papers, and as such were a compilation that reflected the late-Victorian 
general understanding of science as natural philosophy.14 Prior to publication, 
contributions were read at the regular meetings of affiliated institutes.15 The 
Transactions were instrumental in dispensing analytical thought and scientific 
methodology. In 1889, Zealandia was the first expression of a rising, distinctively New 
Zealand literary spirit in print (McEldowney 1998, 637-638). A similar, slightly more 
serious magazine, the Wellington Monthly Review, discussed topics like “Darwinism, 
biblical criticism, and the Baconian theory of the authorship of Shakespeare’s plays” 
(638) combined with specifically New Zealand information that ventured beyond the 
perspectives of Empire and Britain.  
The consumption of news made New Zealanders, first and foremost, avid readers 
but it also turned them into public critics with a “noble” purpose. This idea can only be 
fully appreciated by being compared to America, where the news market was flooded 
with “dozens of special-interest publications” (Burns 1996, 6). New Zealand’s print 
industry did not publish numerous specialised journals; instead, it cultivated a market 
for general information on politics, science, music, literature, sport and leisure. Cantor 
et al. illustrate that New Zealand resembled the British Victorian media market. They 
maintain that before the specialisation of information, “print media not only provided 
information about science and related areas of cultural debate, but also played a major 
role in shaping public attitudes towards these historically important subjects” (Cantor et 
                                               
14 I use the term with Dear who explains that “the term ‘natural philosophy’ is perhaps one worth 
reviving, precisely because it emphasizes that aspect of science which is concerned with explaining and 
understanding the world – what is often called the ‘scientific worldview’” (Dear 2006, 2). 
15 In 1878, list of affiliated institutes comprised: Auckland Institute, Hawkes Bay Philosophical Institute, 
Wellington Philosophical Society, Nelson Association, Westland Institute, Canterbury Philosophical 
Institute and Otago Institute (TPNZI, II, 1878, 577). Reid relates the history of the early affiliations of 
Auckland, Canterbury and Dunedin (Reid 2007, 40-54). 
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al. 2005, xvii). Moreover, they point out that print information was produced in “a 
highly diverse continuum of serial formats – including annuals and part-issues – which 
existed in a state of continual interaction with books and practices of monograph 
publishing” (xxiv, n3). With the help of their share of global information, the 
intellectual elite of New Zealand formed universalist opinions on their colonial and 
imperial contexts and on grand concepts like culture and truth. Mutual improvement and 
the increased literacy became what Professor Francis W. C. Haslam (1848-1924) in 
1884 called the “noble mission” of New Zealand’s intellectual elite.16 A similar 
sentiment pervaded American mutual improvement efforts. Gere makes this clear when 
she begins her study with a 1910 quotation on the significance of women’s clubs: “‘The 
club movement with its ‘common interests and noble purposes’ is accomplishing the 
work of unifying the women of the country far more quickly than a premeditated 
movement to that end could do it’” (Mary Woolley, The Woman’s Club Woman, qtd. in 
Gere 1997, 1, italics mine). Common interest and general information were crucial for 
the establishment of mutual improvement in New Zealand because they allowed the 
intellectual elite “‘to deny their own existence’” (R. J. Morris qtd. in McAloon 2004, 
10) and present their attempts to raise the educational level of the colony as an offspring 
of aristocratic virtue. In other words, those involved in mutual improvement were 
entitled to communal recognition either at institutions like colleges and schools or in 
volunteer organisations like literary and debating clubs. 
Interest in universal self-improvement, individual betterment and rational leisure 
were realised through a number of educational bodies that were beyond the reach of the 
1877 Education Act. These groups or small institutions were established on the basis of 
                                               
16 Between 1879 and 1912, Haslam was professor of Classics at Canterbury College. Haslam, originally 
born in Ceylon, came to New Zealand from England. He obtained his higher education at St. John’s 
College, Cambridge. Gardner et al. mention that Haslam promoted the Canterbury College Football Club 
and military training. He also was a prominent members of the New Zealand Institute. The biographical 
information is based on Gardner et al. 1973, 91 and Scholefield’s Dictionary 1940, 366-7. 
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private interest and volunteer subscription. Mechanics’ Institutes, lyceums and mutual 
improvement societies were at the centre of these educational associations.17 Literary 
and debating societies were part of that late-Victorian programme of scholarly progress. 
In 1904, for example, McMurran concluded that in Auckland “the social clubs compare 
favourably with those in American cities of treble the population” and “besides these 
there are working-men’s clubs, and the gathering-places of social and political 
societies” (McMurran 1904, 10). Dakin, who has made a careful study of adult 
education and mutual improvement in New Zealand, shows that Mechanics’ Institutes 
were part of the foundation agenda of the New Zealand settlement (Dakin 1986, 1987, 
1991).18 In the 1840s, these institutes were meant to encourage collective efforts at 
increasing knowledge and culture, a maxim that was subsequently adopted by numerous 
clubs and societies. Stenhouse, with reference to the Nelson Mechanics’ Institute, points 
out that “no discussion of religion or politics would be allowed” (Stenhouse 1985, 29). 
In other words, a focus of study had to be maintained that avoided contentious cultural 
issues. Instead, supposedly objective, science-related topics were discussed. Moreover, 
the institutes, like many mutual improvement societies, established their own libraries 
and “imported British papers and reviews in order to supplement the extensive libraries 
                                               
17 American associations differed in their class and gender orientation. Ray argues that in the United 
States, Mechanics’ Institutes and YMCAs were more class-specific than lyceums (Ray 2005, 4). Hilkey 
shows how, in Gilded Age America, the idea of success and social progress was linked to the concept of 
manhood, in particular in success manuals (Hilkey 1997). These volumes with such elaborate such titles 
like The Way to Win or Pushing to the Front represented a uniquely American version of mutual 
improvement that did not permeate the New Zealand book market. Hilkey maintains that “manhood and 
the character and willpower upon which it was built were not only the means but also the end in the 
search for success; the achievement of a magnificent manhood was itself success” (151). Kilmer sets this 
unique American version of success originating from the Gilded Age in relation to the twentieth-century 
American popular culture (Kilmer 1996, 158-165). Combined with virtues like self-control, the American 
version of male success reverberates in New Zealander’s enthusiasm for Arnold Matthews and his 
insistence on the regulative force of culture upon the character.  
18 Thompson unravels the story of New Zealand’s mechanics’ institutes by drawing on their British 
origins (Thompson 1945, 1-40). Moreover, he illustrates that the industrial revolution in Europe caused a 
shift towards what he calls a “scientific motive in adult education” (4), in other words, an emphasis on 
practice and the development of technical skill rather than theoretical instruction. 
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prosperous colonists brought with them, and to keep up with events ‘at home’” (ibid.).19 
These publications furthermore provided the information that would sustain the 
scholarly standard of learning. Mechanics’ Institutes served as a link between the 
remote “homeland” or “old country” and the thriving educational projects of the New 
Zealand intellectual elite. 
George Hogben, a prominent New Zealand educationalist, pursued the ideals of 
mutual improvement on an Australasian20 scale for the benefit of the New Zealand 
public. In 1881, Hogben came to New Zealand as second headmaster of Christchurch 
Boy’s High School, after having completed his higher education in England.21 A 
declared freethinker, he soon became a member of the Canterbury College Dialectic 
Society, initiated a debating society for the pupils at the school, and published a school 
magazine. He utilised available means of public communication to mould the 
perception of educational values in the colony. To extend his reach, Hogben was an 
active member of several societies in the colony that were dedicated to communicating 
rational learning and scientific advance. He became president of the Canterbury College 
Dialectic Society, the New Zealand Institute and of the New Zealand Educational 
Institute between 1886 and 1887. In 1892, his efforts finally reached an international 
stage when he attended the fourth meeting of the Australasian Association for the 
Advancement of Science in Hobart. Eventually, the meeting led to the foundation of the 
Australasian Home-Reading Union, an educational association that encapsulated mutual 
improvement ideas and was intended to improve access to further education for adults. 
Adult education in New Zealand gained a degree of professionalism and gradually 
                                               
19 Among the papers that the Nelson mechanics’ institute subscribed to were the Examiner, London 
Times, Quarterly Review, Edinburgh Review, Westminster Review, North British Review, Athenaeum, 
Blackwood’s Magazine, Punch, Chambers Journal (Stenhouse 1985, 30). 
20 I use the term in Belich’s sense as referring to Australia and New Zealand as one political and 
economic entity in the Pacific region (Belich 2001, 47). Chapter five of this thesis explores the term in 
more detail. 
21 The following information is based on Roth’s biography (1952) and Roth DNZB. 
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became embedded in an international context. Home reading courses, for example, were 
integral to the American Chautauqua movement – an adult education institution aiming 
at providing opportunities for self-advancement to mature students. The newly created 
New Zealand branch of the Australasian Home-Reading Union was also designed to 
work along the lines of the English National Home-Reading Union. Roth lists the 
central objectives of these unions: 
The Home-Reading Union was open to anybody and, as Hogben was careful to 
point out, did not intend to enter into competition with schools and universities, 
or other societies for reading or self-improvement. It was, in fact, an early adult 
education organization, with aims that to some extent anticipated those of the 
tutorial classes to be established by the Workers’ Educational Association a 
quarter of a century later. Books were chosen by the council and they were 
divided into ‘required’ and ‘recommended’. Members could study these by 
themselves, but if they lived in larger centres, they were encouraged to join a 
group or circle under a discussion leader. Subscriptions were extremely low, 2s. 
6d. a year for single members and 3s. 6d. for members of groups which entitled 
each to the free receipt of the monthly journal, the Australasian Home Reader, 
which began publication in May 1892. (Roth 1952, 67) 
After his return from Hobart, Hogben, in order to promote the idea in New Zealand, 
developed an extensive correspondence with the New Zealand Mechanics’ Institutes 
that he wanted to serve as the union’s teaching locations. The union meant to appeal to 
middle-class people who were willing to further their education by investing a little 
money.22 Eventually, the venture did not succeed due to very low membership rates. In 
1897, the union ceased to exist altogether.  
The Union’s failure can be blamed on the fact that, by the 1890s, the New Zealand 
adult education market was inundated with self-improvement societies. In the appendix 
to his study, Thompson lists forty-one mechanics’ institutes between 1870 and 1910 
(Thompson 1945, 359-360). For the same period, a combination of Dakin’s research, 
Thompson’s list and my own research produces a figure of 120 known societies and 
                                               
22 Hogben insisted in this objective in his later career as Secretary of Education in the Seddon 
Administration (Belich 2001, 130). 
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institutions dealing with self-improvement.23 In 1893, the Commemorative Issue of the 
Otago University Review remarked that “everyone who has had experience of debating 
societies (and who has not?) can supply lists for himself beginning with trial by jury 
and ending with cremation and capital punishment” (OUR, Comm. Issue 1893, 42, 
italics mine).  
Fairburn argues that in the late nineteenth-century “literary institutes, mechanics’ 
institutes, athaeneums – adult education institutions for working men … ” were socially 
insignificant (Fairburn 1989, 181). He maintains that “by 1900 some 80 remained (10.4 
for every 100,000 population); and of these most had been assimilated by municipal 
libraries or consisted merely of a room in which a handful of members played draughts 
or chess” (ibid.). Fairburn’s assumptions about mutual improvement societies are 
possibly founded on high expectations of what these societies could or should have 
done. Advertisements illustrate that societies held debates, hosted lectures and 
organised evenings of rational entertainment in the form of drama productions or 
concerts until 1902. Newspaper research shows that societies were active well into the 
twentieth century and, until 1900, new ones were regularly founded. In 1881, New 
Zealand had a European population in urban and rural areas of approximately 485,395. 
On average 194,158 people were living in boroughs or cities, taking into account that 
just under sixty percent of this population was living in rural areas.24 Mutual 
improvement societies were most active in these places. As a consequence, the average 
distribution of these groups for 1881 would amount to one per 1,617 borough and town 
people. Although mutual improvement undeniably declined in the twentieth century, 
                                               
23 I based my research on an online search of the online catalogue of the National Register of Archives 
and Manuscripts (NRAM) run by Archives New Zealand and the Papers Past platform run by the 
National Library of New Zealand. The search was based on the following phrase combinations: “literary 
societies” and “debating societies” in advertisements between 1878 and 1902. See for example: West 
Coast Times (3 May 1883, 4), New Zealand Tablet (7 December 1883, 14), Wanganui Herald (29 
September 1884, 3). 
24 Numbers exclude Maori and are taken from the historical analysis of Statistics New Zealand online. 
Mein Smith quotes a general non-Maori population of 487,280 in 1881 and 701,101 in 1896 (Mein Smith 
2005, 78). 
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this does not mean that these societies were insignificant for New Zealand’s nineteenth-
century public discourse. 
In New Zealand, societies were mostly active in urban areas like Auckland, 
Christchurch, Dunedin and Wellington and smaller town settlements like Hokitika, 
Invercargill and Wanganui.25 Dakin, in his work on the mutual improvement movement 
in New Zealand and Great Britain maintains that it “was a movement of considerable 
vitality, although lacking in cohesion, and that it constituted the most significant 
development in adult education in the period 1870 and 1915” (Dakin 1991, 243). 
Syllabi combined debates, essay writing and reading, recitals of popular literary works, 
occasional lectures, and musical evenings. Additionally, most of these societies 
compiled their own journals. Some societies were specialised like the Wellington 
Gardeners’ Mutual Improvement Society (Dakin 1986, 41). Very often, they established 
a library for the use of their members. The St. Albans Mutual Improvement Society in 
Christchurch eventually became a library (ibid.). Many of these groups were initiated by 
churches but they later became independent of their original affiliation. Some local 
Y.M.C.A. groups changed their programmes and became more liberal while continuing 
to use the rooms provided by the churches. For example, the Wesleyan Young Men’s 
Mutual Improvement Society in Wellington made Robert Stout – a declared freethinker 
– a life-long member (Dakin 1987, 24).  
In their original constitutions, at least the three collegiate debating societies, did not 
explicitly exclude sections of the New Zealand population. Low literacy rates among 
Maori and the popular sentiment of “the dying race” made it possibly unnecessary to 
put limitations on membership.26 It is not so much the idea of racism that is of interest 
                                               
25 This information is based on a newspaper search on Papers Past looking for “literary societies” and 
“debating societies” in the advertisements between 1878 and 1902. See for example: West Coast Times (3 
May 1883, 4), New Zealand Tablet (7 December 1883, 14), Wanganui Herald (29 September 1884, 3). 
26 Belich differentiates between the Black, Grey and White Maori stereotype. For Belich, 1885, marks the 
heyday of the Grey Maori: “The Grey Maori were a dying race, tragically but inevitably making way for 
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in this thesis but what made the seemingly contradictory combination of ethnocentric 
perspective and trends of integration possible in late-Victorian New Zealand public 
discourse. Without doubt, Sir Apirana Ngata’s (1874-1950) academic career was 
exceptional for his time; active participation by Maori in the New Zealand colleges was 
highly unusual.27 In the course of his education he in fact became a prominent member 
of the debating society at Canterbury College and Auckland University College. The 
extent of female participation differed from society to society; some societies remained 
exclusively male. Dakin maintains that “a serious limitation of the mutual improvement 
societies from the point of view of adult education was that their membership was 
usually confined to young males” (Dakin 1986, 49). Dakin’s statement does not entirely 
capture the situation. Even though societies like the Christchurch Forensic Club 
remained entirely male well into the twentieth century, others, like the three student 
                                                                                                                                         
the Pakeha by a law of nature. White was the most prominent stereotype to 1860, but war and the 
continued decline of the Maori population then boosted its rivals, Black and Grey. It was the Grey Maori, 
the dying race, that held the lead to 1885 and remained important into the twentieth century. But it was 
increasingly replaced by a resurgence of the White Maori stereotype” (Belich 2001, 207). Stenhouse 
analyses scientific reasoning, in particular Darwinism, that reinforced the Grey Maori myth in the New 
Zealand public (Stenhouse 1999, 81-86). Stenhouse further shows how, for example, Alfred Kingcome 
Newman in the Transactions used statistics as scientific evidence to prove that the Maori race “was dying 
out before Pakeha set foot in New Zealand” (Stenhouse 1996, 125). Chapter six deals with the 
significance of scientific argumentation in more detail but already at this stage, it is worth noting that 
Newman blamed “‘observers not trained in medicine’” (qtd. in ibid.) for accusing the Europeans of being 
responsible for the “Extinction of the Maori”. In other words, Newman’s version of the Grey Maori myth 
called on the authority of the scientific and professional observer and was the result of the dominant form 
of public argumentation in New Zealand: inductive reasoning.  
27 Sinclair lists only two Maori students at Auckland University College who also gained a degree: Ngata 
in 1894 and Henare Poananga in 1905 (Sinclair 1983, 33). Ngata went to Waiomatatini Native School, 
followed by Te Aute College, where he prepared for university matriculation. The Te Makarini 
Scholarship enabled him to take up his studies as Canterbury College where in 1893, he completed his 
B.A. degree. After moving to Auckland, he finished his LL.B. in 1896. At Auckland, he wrote to the 
Registrar “about the desirability of granting university scholarship to ‘Maori half caste youths’. Some 
students at Te Aute College had passed the matriculation examination but lacked money to attend 
university” (ibid.). At both colleges, Ngata was an active member of the debating societies. In 1892, at 
Canterbury, he won the prize essay competition with “The Past and Future of the Maori” (MBL, minute 
book, 15 Oct. 1892); a piece that was published the following year. In 1893, he won the Olla Podrida 
evening with his poem “A War Dance” (ibid., 26 Aug. 1893). Ngata became the first Maori to complete a 
university degree in New Zealand. After his graduation he challenged the economic and social situation 
of Maori in New Zealand. Beginning in 1892, he also became associated with the James Carroll, later 
minister of native affairs. In 1905 Ngata won the Eastern Maori parliamentary seat; a position he held 
until 1943. Between 1907 and 1908 he also worked with Robert Stout, then chief justice, on the Native 
Land Commission. Eventually between 1928 and 1934, he served as minister of native affairs himself. 
Sorrenson attributes to Ngata flawless debating skills: “he could fill the parliamentary galleries whenever 
he rose to speak” (Sorrenson DNZB). The biographical account is based on Walker’s biography of Ngata 
(2001), Sorrenson DNZB, and Sorrenson 1986, 1:11-38 and Ngata (1893). 
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debating societies in Christchurch, Dunedin and Auckland, accepted women from the 
beginning (Forensic Club 1990). Towards the end of the century, societies like the 
Taranaki Ladies Literary Society, exclusively for women, came into existence 
(Taranaki Herald, 1 Sept. 1890, 2). Membership rules for mutual improvement societies 
in New Zealand were relatively flexible in comparison to American clubs, where 
participation was often explicitly restricted and resulted in a high percentage of 
exclusively female societies.28 
The late-Victorian educational sphere in New Zealand was mostly shaped by an 
intellectual elite that followed egalitarian intentions. These were mainly expressed in an 
attempt to increase literacy rates among colonists. Literacy was regarded as the one 
objective indicator of educational progress. Gradually, after 1877, public intellectual 
discourse was shaped by the availability of compulsory schooling and attempts to 
establish higher education. Moreover, volunteer organisations kept discussions alive and 
made them public to a membership that could afford to pay the subscription rates. 
Maori, women and other minorities like the Chinese were not explicitly excluded from 
participating in these clubs but social disadvantages, in particular for Maori, made their 
active involvement in the volunteer sphere of education highly unlikely. Debating and 
literary societies were thriving in these societal structures.  
 
Reason and Rational Recreation: Debate and College Life in New Zealand 
Collegiate debating societies in New Zealand were established on the narrow ridge 
of institutionalised education and public adult education. Up to the 1890s, New Zealand 
                                               
28 In 1901, Texas alone had 132 registered women’s study clubs who accepted debating as part of their 
syllabus (Wiesepape 2004, 7). The Texas Federation of Women’s Clubs took charge of registration and 
Martin maintains that this number represents ten to fifteen percent of the actual number (Martin 1987). 
Waite in her study of the history of Oberlin College (in 1837, the first American college to educate 
women alongside men) relates the case of Mary Jane Patterson (1840 - 1894) who overcame two 
obstacles in pursuing her higher education: race and gender. Patterson became the first black woman to 
gain an A.B. degree in Oberlin’s college course and in 1871 became the first black principal of the 
Preparatory High School for Coloured Youth in Washington D.C. (Waite 2002, 17). Waite acknowledges 
that approximately seventy percent of Oberlin’s black students went into education to earn a living (ibid.). 
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collegiate debating societies bridged the gap between mutual improvement and 
academic training, between university and public. In contrast, American and British 
clubs were already well established as independent and separate organisations while 
New Zealand colleges in the 1870s and 1880s were attended by part-time employed 
adult students who pursued their scholarly studies by going to evening classes. As such, 
debating societies at New Zealand colleges were an expression of late-Victorian 
enthusiasm for self-improvement rather than systematic higher education. The 
intellectual elite of the colony considered them the breeding ground of future political 
leaders.29 However, towards the turn of the century they gradually became more 
formalised, isolated and separated from the urban realities that surrounded their 
members. They drifted into insignificance and in the twentieth century vanished into the 
sphere of academic collegiate debating. 
Initially, the three New Zealand colleges, Otago, Canterbury and Auckland, 
incorporated a spirit of self-improvement, social progress and passion for the read and 
spoken word.30 In the 1870s, New Zealand was still struggling to establish a coherent 
higher-education system. Indeed, a considerable controversy about the foundation of a 
New Zealand university had to be settled before any of the three colleges were officially 
acknowledged.31 Otago University (founded 1869), Canterbury College (founded 1873), 
and Auckland University College (founded 1883) were among the first to affiliate with 
                                               
29 Professor Sale of Otago University, for example, maintained in his opening address to the society: “I 
have not said a word about the advantages likely to arise from the Debating Society itself, as these are 
already felt, and there is every hope that we shall soon boast of an arena where the future Goschens and 
Gladstones of New Zealand may be trained to oratory” (OW, 31 May 1879, 15). 
30 Henceforth, the colleges will be referred to by their original names: Otago University, Canterbury 
College and Auckland University College. 
31 Morrell presents background information on the founding of the University of New Zealand and Otago 
University (Morrell 1969, 1-36). Gardner et al. and Hight & Candy investigate the development of 
Canterbury College and its relation to the University of New Zealand (Gardner et al. 1973, 17-40; Hight 
and Candy 1927, 4-20). Beaglehole provides general information on the proceedings of the University of 
New Zealand Council and the two University Acts (Beaglehole 1937, 14-108). 
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the newly established University of New Zealand.32 The foundation of debating 
societies immediately after the official establishment of the colleges indicated that 
discussion and exercise of elocutionary abilities ranked high in the extra-curricular 
canon. In contrast to the United States, neither rhetoric nor debate was ever taught as a 
subject in its own right. Otago University contemplated, at one point, the foundation of 
a chair of rhetoric but abandoned the idea.33 The practice of rhetoric, in particular 
debate, took place outside the university curriculum in mutual improvement societies or 
student associations.  
James R. Wilkinson, an early student of the college, in his autobiographical sketch, 
related that the Dialectic Society at Canterbury College, founded in 1879, was preceded 
by a “an attempt with general civilian members, young men, to form a debating society, 
but with good promise of success it early fell through on account of sudden departure of 
the long-haired Secretary and Treasurer, the funds of the society going with him” 
(Wilkinson CMDR, 27). The fate of the Dialectic Society was different. Even after 
1894, when the Students’ Association was founded, the debating society remained 
active. Gardner et al. maintain that “the great majority of the active students gave their 
first loyalty to the clubs and societies” (Gardner et al. 1973, 161). Association with 
group activities at Canterbury, for example, also resulted in the founding of the 
exclusively male Phantom Club, “an undergraduate association of studious men friendly 
                                               
32 The University was not a teaching body. It was established in the tradition of the University of London 
and conferred degrees whereas the teaching was exercised by the affiliated institutions. Galvin 
summarises the establishment of Otago University (Galvin 2005, 13-27). For Canterbury College, 
Gardner et al. acknowledge the difficulty in providing just one date because “the establishment of 
Canterbury College was a protracted and complex episode; its government, staff, classes, site and 
buildings were assembled piecemeal over a span of five years” (Gardner et al. 1973, 47). The Ordinance 
of 1873 is commonly identified with the formal founding of the college. Sinclair briefly outlines early 
developments of Auckland University College (Sinclair 1983, 20-32). 
33 The notion resulted from a controversy in 1878 between the Presbyterian Reverend Copland and the 
Professor for Mental and Moral Philosophy, Duncan MacGregor on the subject of Social Darwinism 
(Chapter six). In the course of the controversy, which was mostly conducted in the local papers, Copland 
took his personal views on MacGregor to the University Council to force a replacement of the professor. 
Otago University refused Copland’s appeal. The dispute reached a cul-de-sac and in order to resolve the 
conflict, Dr. Stuart proposed a new chair for English Literature, Rhetoric and Constitutional History. 
Copland, however, insisted on a chair for Moral Philosophy and Political Economy. As a consequence, 
Dr. Stuart’s proposal was abandoned (Morrell 1969, 53).  
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to each other, and membership by invitation” (ibid.).34 Until 1901, Auckland University 
College hosted two societies: the debating society as well as the Girls’ Korero Club, the 
latter exclusively female.35 By contrast, Dunedin’s student activities were entirely 
channelled through the debating society. 
Teaching staff at the newly founded colleges came from England, Scotland or 
Ireland. Many of them had been members of student societies during their early careers 
in Great Britain. They inspired their students in New Zealand to establish similar 
institutions at the colonial colleges. Charles Chilton, for example, credits Professor John 
Macmillan Brown of Canterbury College with the suggestion of founding a college 
debating society (Chilton 1923, 9), which, in 1879, was promptly established by 
students. James R. Wilkinson maintained that Professor Haslam gave the students the 
idea for the name “dialectic society” (Wilkinson CMDR, 27). At Auckland University 
College, in 1887, Classics Professor, Dr. Hutcheson Macaulay Posnett36 inspired 
students to establish a society. Until his resignation in 1890, he and the secretary Harold 
Bagnale shouldered the administrative work for the society. In Dunedin, the reasons for 
the founding of the club in 1878 remain unclear, although it is possible that the interest 
in rhetoric and oratory at Scottish universities played a part in the process. 
Membership subscription rates at all three societies reflected Hogben’s idea of 
affordable adult education for his home-reading project. They were comparatively 
modest. Canterbury College took two shillings and sixpence per year for each member 
                                               
34 Wilkinson further reports that members of the Phantom Club were declared freethinkers, among them 
some members of the future intellectual elite of the colony: Walter Stringer (Supreme Court Judge), 
Andrew Davis (orator and actor) and I. R. Thornton (teacher) (Wilkinson CMDR, 28). 
35 The Girls’ Korero Club is mentioned in NZH, 14 Oct. 1899, 3 and 30 May 1901, 1-2; NZIM, Nov. 
1901, 142. The Maori word korero means narrative or talk. 
36 During his years in Auckland (1886-1890), he remained president of the society. With his departure, 
meetings of the society subsided and were re-established with their former frequency in 1891. Prior to his 
appointment to the chair of Classics at Auckland University College, Posnett published The Historical 
Method in Ethics, Jurisprudence, and Political Economy (1882) and The Ricardian Theory of Rent 
(1884). In 1886, his third book Comparative Literature came into print. Posnett was an enthusiastic 
scholar and with his 1886 work made popular Matthew Arnold’s phrase. His principle entailed that “the 
influences of social evolution and the environment on the life of man and on his literature” (Sinclair 1983, 
35) could be demonstrated by his suggested methodology. The biographical information is taken from 
Sinclair 1983, 34-36 and SCUA, minute book, 1887-1890. 
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(MBL, Constitution and Standing Order, 1899). The Auckland University College 
debating society kept its subscription rate even lower at one shilling (SCUA, minute 
book, 1903, 161). Even for students who were part-time employees and who attended 
lectures in the evening, participation was possible from a financial point of view.37 
Between 1878 and 1902, attendance figures, where available, varied (Appendix 1). 
Societies in Christchurch and Dunedin reached a peak in membership during the early 
1890s when the Auckland society temporarily ceased to exist. Appeals to students to 
join the societies were published in the Reviews of the colleges and praised the 
improvement of “mental culture” and the “promotion of the fellowship of students” 
(CCR, June 1902, 21). In general, debating societies were welcomed by the 
administration of the colleges because they addressed a need to cultivate the spoken 
word beyond the classroom and this inevitably meant the acceptance of outsiders into 
the clubs. 
In their formative years, the colleges accepted matriculated and non-matriculated 
students and, as a consequence, resembled adult education institutes rather than 
universities. The situation of students at the colonial colleges was by no means ideal. 
Sinclair shows that, in Auckland, most of them earned their living during the day and 
furthered their education in the evening: 
Right from the start most of the students were part-time, working as teachers or 
in commerce during the day. Consequently most of the lectures were delivered 
in the evening. In the second term of 1883 there were only four classes before 1 
p.m., two in law and two in English. The rest were after 6 p.m. …  The students 
were far from being ‘stirrers’. (Sinclair 1983, 33)  
The same situation applied to Otago and Canterbury. Oscar T.J. Alpers, studying at 
Canterbury, recalls that “[i]n vacation I got jobs as ‘relieving teacher’ in Board schools. 
In term-time I made carbon copies of my notes of lectures and sold these to extra-
                                               
37 Nevertheless, it remains a fact that students were usually in a financial straightjacket. Gardner et al. 
show that on average, a student at Canterbury College needed at least £50 per session to live comfortably. 
As a consequence, exhibitions at Canterbury at £20 per annum were fiercely contested. (Gardner et al. 
1973, 140) 
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murals in the country whom I ‘coached’ by correspondence. When I had established 
myself somewhat by successes in the College examination, I started night-classes in 
Latin” (Alpers 1928, 53). Some lecturer, like John Macmillan Brown, held classes in the 
morning at 7.45 a.m. “so that most of his Christchurch students might begin their own 
day’s teaching at nine” (Gardner et al. 1973, 141).38 Student numbers were equally low 
and only a few were matriculated. In 1878, colleges in Dunedin and Christchurch had, 
in total, 168 students (Beaglehole 1937, 126). Students at Canterbury nevertheless 
initially intended to organise the Dialectic Society as matriculated students only.39 In 
1882, members of the society in Dunedin resolved that they would accept “students and 
ex-students of the University of Otago” without election (Hocken, minute book, 23 June 
1882). Auckland University College survived because “its regulation specified that 
lectures were not restricted to matriculated students of the University of New Zealand, 
but that anyone paying the fees could attend” (Sinclair 1983, 26). As a consequence, in 
1883, ninety-five students attended lectures in Auckland most of them without being 
matriculated.40 Due to its financial situation, Auckland University College constantly 
struggled for a good reputation. In 1901, the New Zealand Illustrated Magazine 
                                               
38 At Canterbury, the advisability of evening lectures was discussed and “it was decided that, whilst the 
circumstances of colonial life demanded evening classes, the lectures should be kept as nearly as possible 
within the hours of daylight in the interests of women and country students” (Gardner et al. 1973, 34). 
39 Chilton recalls the founding of the society and maintains that “at that time the matriculated students 
were few in numbers, but they formed a compact body, most of them had already formed close 
friendships with one another at school, they were young and enthusiastic, new students in a new College 
and they felt rightly enough that they were the students for whom the College was really founded; on the 
other hand the non-matriculated attenders at lectures, though more numerous, had no such close bond of 
sympathy, many of them were much older, they were drawn to the College to this or that special lecture 
for some particular end, and apart from that had no close interest in the work of the College or its future” 
(Chilton 1923, 10). The debate about restrictions of membership was decided in favour of matriculated 
students. 
40 In 1884, the number rose by eighty followed by a decline in numbers. In 1901, for example, numbers 
also only reached 156 (Sinclair 1983, 32-33). For 1899, the NZIM states that 239 students attended 
lectures (NZIM, Nov. 1901, 141). Sinclair argues that the university college could not have existed had it 
accepted only matriculated students: “In 1881 Auckland’s population was 30,952, while the township of 
Onehunga and some villages lay a few miles to the south. Dunedin was still larger than Auckland, with 
42, 795 people. Both Otago and Canterbury had larger European populations than Auckland Province, 
which had a European population of 100,000 plus a majority of the country’s 44,000 Maori. In Auckland 
there were 20,669 children at school. In the secondary schools there were only 550 students, had the 
College enrolled only matriculated students it could scarcely have survived. Its regulation specified that 
lectures were not restricted to matriculated students of the University of New Zealand, but that anyone 
paying the fees could attend” (Sinclair 1983, 26). 
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published a review of the colleges and Auckland scored very low. Its buildings were 
compared to “barracks” and a “boot factory” and the college could only preserve its 
dignity by being associated with the first New Zealand parliamentary government and a 
well equipped science laboratory (NZIM, Nov. 1901, 134-135).41 
Even though circumstances were difficult for students at the three colleges, 
debating, literature and the newspaper business brought them together. In 1883, the idea 
of a national New Zealand literary magazine surfaced in the debating societies at 
Canterbury College and Otago University. Initially, the secretary of the Dialectic 
Society was instructed “to communicate with the Otago University and the University 
College of Auckland with reference to the establishment of a New Zealand Literary 
Magazine” (MBL, minute book, 5 May 1883). Only Otago replied to the letter; it 
approved “the suggestion made by the Canterbury College Dialectic Society and 
pronounce[d] to give its heartiest support to the project of issuing, on the proposed 
lines, a Literary Magazine in New Zealand” (Hocken, minute book, 8 June 1883).42 
Subsequently, both societies founded committees to determine whether the “leading 
men of New Zealand” would support the endeavour as “subscribers and contributors” 
(Hocken, minute book, 20 July 1883).43 Eventually, in 1884, the committee in 
Christchurch presented its report. After “a large amount of correspondence has passed 
between your Committee and the Magazine Committee of the University of Otago 
Debating Society,” it was decided “that in the opinion of this meeting of the combined 
committees …  it would not be desirable to start a Magazine at present. Nevertheless 
they believe that a field undoubtedly exists for such a periodical and they recommend 
that members of the societies should devote themselves to such literary work that should 
                                               
41 For the review of Otago University: NZIM, Sep. 1901, 900-906; for Canterbury College: NZIM, Oct. 
1901, 49-54; Auckland University College: NZIM, Nov. 1901, 134-143; Victoria University College: 
NZIM, Dec. 1901, 224-232. 
42 Students in Auckland were yet lacking formal representation and did not reply to the inquiry. 
43 This resolution was the result of a meeting held in January 1884 at Dunedin among the members of 
both committees. Unfortunately the archival information does not reveal the list of those prominent men. 
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lead to the successful starting of a Magazine in two or three years” (MBL, minute book, 
19 April 1884). The students never launched their own literary magazine but in the 
1890s began to publish collegiate Reviews at Otago and Canterbury. The debating 
society in Auckland, under Professor Posnett’s leadership, addressed the same problem 
in different terms with a clear focus on elocution. Until his resignation in 1890, the 
secretary of the Auckland society read once a year the contributions by members to the 
“Magazine” or “Journal”.44 The “Magazine” was a special evening, rather than a printed 
periodical, devoted to an exercise of literary criticism that was meant to cultivate 
students’ taste and expertise in handling literary texts. The Auckland society also 
encouraged oratorical training like no other of its sister organisations and from its 
establishment, the society annually awarded a medal for best orator.  
Despite the discouraging letters concerning students’ literary ambitions, debating 
societies avidly utilised the press to promote their debates in and collect relevant 
information from papers like the Otago Witness, Evening Star, Lyttelton Times and the 
Herald. Even comments like Professor Brown’s that “it does not need much proof in 
this age of newspapers and fatal fluency to show that writing is often done without the 
aid of thinking” (Brown 1881, 9-10) did not stop students from consulting papers for 
valid information. In 1889, members at Canterbury contemplated the establishment of a 
magazine club in order to secure the availability of pertinent publications. In 1897, the 
CCR reminded students “of the valuable amount of direct information supplied by these 
magazines on subjects of debate at the meetings of the Dialectic Society” and 
recommended the Review of Reviews, Contemporary Review, Eclectic, Nineteenth 
Century, Fortnightly, Century Illustrated, Spectator, Field, Magazine of Art, Musical 
Times, Quarterly (CCR, Oct. 1897, 39). Advertisements published in New Zealand 
dailies afforded the societies with an opportunity to reach an audience beyond the 
                                               
44 These evenings took place, for example, in 1889 and 1890 (SCUA, minute book, 24 June 1889 and 23 
May 1890). 
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college. Part of their syllabi drew large crowds and opened their discursive sphere to 
strangers. 
One element of their programme that surfaced in the late 1890s was the debating 
tournament which was particularly well suited to attract crowds of outsiders. 
Tournaments combined competition with elements of spectacle and information display, 
especially through jettisoning the monologue pattern of lectures and giving the platform 
to two or more speakers. The audience, initially, served as a judge of performance and 
rational argumentation. Moreover, most competitions addressed topics of actual 
relevance. The Auckland debating society was involved in one of the first tournament 
competitions held in New Zealand. In 1900, the Auckland Athenaeum met with the 
collegiate debating society on the issue “that it is the duty of a state to provide pension 
for its aged citizens” (SCUA, minute book, 24 Aug. 1900). Rose Ilbert, a student at the 
college, attended the evening (accompanied by her aunt) because her tutor for 
Mathematics, Mr. Watts, was a participant. To Rose Ilbert, Mr. Watts appeared to be 
“much agitated over this evening’s debate” (Ilbert SCUA, 27 Aug. 1900). Watts was 
one of a team of seven. At the evening’s end Rose concluded that “our men were 
decidedly the most pleasing speakers. The other ranted but they won” (ibid.). Debate, in 
this instance, became a respectable show that even a young woman accompanied by her 
aunt could attend. Elements of mutual improvement and rationality guaranteed that 
debating competitions would remain within the confines of late-Victorian cultural 
norms.  
Tournaments were not the only “crowd pleasers”. Debating societies created and 
maintained other popular forms of rational discourse that legitimately entered the public 
realm. They hosted musical evenings, popular lectures and cultivated Olla Podridas and 
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Farragos.45 In 1893, the OUR remarked that “the range of subjects dealt with by the 
Society is a wide one, but, save insofar as a distinct academical section is added, does 
not differ widely from that of the commoner variety of debating societies” (OUR, 
Comm. Issue 1893, 41). Topics ranged from “one man, one vote” (Appendix 3) and the 
discussions of the moral effects of theatre (Appendix 4) to the advantages of academic 
dress (Appendix 5) and the question of women in the medical profession (Appendix 6). 
The first debate in Dunedin dealt with Darwin’s Origin of Life (Hocken, minute book, 
30 August 1878). The issue of “Free Trade and Protection” was the first topic for debate 
at the Dialectic Society in Christchurch (MBL, minute book, 5 April 1879). In 1887, 
Auckland students held their first debate on the proposition that “the payment of 
members of the House of Representatives is for the best interests of New Zealand” 
(SCUA, minute book, 29 July 1887).  
The variety of discursive forms and the array of topics contributed to what Ray in 
the American context calls the “culture-making rhetorical practice” (Ray 2005, 6) of 
discourse. Ray investigates the activities of numerous lyceums across the United States 
and focuses on the circumstances that allowed for knowledge formation and public 
representation. Ray sees the American lyceum as a “quasi-civic arena …  in which 
members of the polity performed a ritual of democratic participation through an 
enactment of public conflict” (Ray 2003, 274), a description that is valid also for New 
Zealand societies. She shows that beyond the level of topic analysis, debating societies 
in ante-bellum America were social gathering places where “individual and collective 
performance” (Ray 2004, 6) shaped rational deliberation. In New Zealand, likewise, 
these elements met in the debating arena. Reid, for example, characterises meetings of 
the New Zealand Institute as continually striking a “balance between exclusivity and 
                                               
45 “Farrago” originally had two connotations: hotchpotch of material things and persons, a medley of 
immaterial things. The nineteenth century only knew the last usage (OED s.v. “Farrago”). In the debating 
context, these evenings were dedicated to readings of anonymous literary contributions by members of all 
genres. At the end of the evening, the audience voted for the best piece and its author was revealed. 
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popularity” (Reid 2007, l44). In these volunteer societies, ideals of democratic 
participation met with forms of rational entertainment. Membership regulations 
occasionally attempted to exclude non-matriculated students, whereas societies tried to 
keep fees low to attract the majority of undergraduates. Moreover, formalised scientific 
argumentation was juxtaposed with ideas of public spectacle. In the 1870s and 1880s, 
clubs in New Zealand fused institutionalised forms of social interaction with popular 
components of New Zealand society. During the 1890s, literary and debating societies 
were themselves institutionalised, for example, in organising bodies like the Literary 
Societies Union (SCUA, minute book, 18 Aug. 1892) or, later in the twentieth century, 
in the New Zealand University Debating Council.46 By 1902, collegiate debating 
societies developed into quasi-civic arenas that institutionalised and regulated 
argumentative conflict. By the end of the nineteenth century, dissent in actual debating 
practice became only a vague allusion to values of mutual improvement and was 
submerged in a discourse of efficient and successful argumentation. Between 1870 and 
1902, debating societies in New Zealand oscillated between a tendency to formalise and 
institutionalise their organisation and a sentiment of civic tradition and relatively free, 
volunteer debating practice.  
 
Dynamics of Formalisation: Habermas and the Nineteenth Century 
From a nineteenth-century perspective debate was part of the mutual improvement 
agenda insofar as it put forth pro and con opinions on socially relevant topics and 
promoted an accepted norm of public discourse. Moreover, debate publicly negotiated 
these standpoints and as a consequence, embedded issues like Darwinism, the franchise 
or proceedings of the House of Parliament in a community-like setting. Habermas’s 
work helps to identify the ideological foundation of nineteenth-century forms of social 
                                               
46 The Council is mentioned in New Zealand University Student Press Council News Bulletin, 12 July 
1961, volume IV, no. 3, first issue, as the body who was responsible for selecting the members for the 
Melbourne Debating Tournament in 1961 (Hocken Student Association Papers).  
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organisation and processes of formalisation in debate. Eley, for example, shows that 
Habermas can be applied to an American nineteenth-century context in order to 
understand American citizens’ “universe of voluntary association” (Eley 1992, 292). 
Olssen observes that the public forum in New Zealand, as in America, was permeated 
by “spirit of organization” (Olssen 1992a, 262).47 Habermas explains this tendency of 
social association with the individual’s continual shifting between a lifeworld of real 
personalised ties and an imposed system that continually threatens to undermine the 
lifeworld with attempts at formalisation. Communication is the medium that connects 
these two spheres of social existence. In Theory of Communicative Action, 
communication and argumentation combine rhetorical, dialectical and logical elements 
to account for the complex nature of discursive interaction. This Habermasian 
framework facilitates an systematic reading of nineteenth-century debating practice 
because it suggests that formalisation acts upon either one of these three elements.48 
                                               
47 Olssen observes that this trend “pervaded all spheres of New Zealand life: public and private, business 
and leisure, family and club. To some extent the process fed on itself. ‘Organisation can be met only by 
organisation’, as William Scott, one of the architects of the New Zealand Employers’ Federation 
remarked” (Olssen 1992a, 262). While Olssen applies this idea mainly to the changing patterns of family 
life, education, religion and work in the colony in this specific essay, his work influenced historical 
research in New Zealand beyond these issues (Olssen 1992b, Olssen, Moloughney and Ballantyne 2006).  
48 In the first volume of TCA, he differentiates three interrelated perspectives of argumentation: rhetoric, 
dialectic and logic. Habermas illustrates that each discipline reveals a different aspect of argumentation. 
Rhetoric shows “the structures of an ideal speech situation immunized against repression and inequality 
in a special way” (Habermas 1984, 26). Dialectic is concerned with “the structures of a ritualized 
competition for the better arguments” (ibid.). Logic “determine[s] the construction of individual 
arguments and their interrelations” (ibid.). Habermas’s systematic understanding of argumentation relates 
to Aristotle’s distinction of demonstrative, dialectical and rhetorical arguments (Eemeren et al. 1996, 33; 
Habermas 1984, 26; Appendix 2). Habermas maintains that the three dimensions of argumentation are 
interrelated and that “at no single one of these analytical levels can the very idea intrinsic to 
argumentative speech be adequately developed” (Habermas 1984, 26). The discussion of a tripartite 
perspective on argumentation permeated argumentation theory of the 1970s and 1980s. At the Summer 
Conference on Argumentation in 1979, Zarefsky criticises O’Keefe’s opinion that argument could be 
product and process (Zarefsky 1980, 228) and Wenzel’s paper on argumentation as procedure (Zarefsky 
1980, 229; Wenzel 1980). A year earlier, Wenzel published a discussion of Habermas’s perspective on 
argumentation as procedure in the American Forensic (Wenzel 1979). Zarefsky maintained that the 
normative reading of argument (as something natural in the world) should be abandoned in favour of 
viewing argument as “point of view”: “According to this approach, our object of study would not be some 
part of the natural world but all communication behaviour. The concept of argument would be 
hermeneutic; that is, it would be a way to interpret communication” (Zarefsky 1980, 234). This critical 
reading of Habermas’s argumentation approach remains valid today. Even though, Habermas’s in TCA 
modifies his perspective and argumentation always combines rhetoric, dialectic and logic, he is not able 
to satisfyingly demonstrate that argumentation is naturally equipped to carry binding normative 
implications for a community.  
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Moreover, Habermas’s concept that communication is always intersubjective and aimed 
at consensus formation makes visible aspects of debate that were transformed by an 
increasingly competitive practice at the end of the nineteenth century. Additionally, the 
Habermasian background is enlarged by the multi-dimensional research in the field of 
argumentation theory and the history of rhetoric.49  
In Western European culture, the tendency to investigate forms of argumentation 
originates in the nineteenth century. Van Eemeren et al. point out that instruction in 
debate coincided with a new interest in the “relationship between the species of debate 
and the genus argumentation” (Eemeren 1996, 193).50 Twentieth-century critical 
perspective regards debate mostly as process, that is, as a rhetorical exercise that trains 
forms of democratic participation.51 In New Zealand, the combination of species of 
debate and argumentation resulted in an understanding of debating as a useful skill in 
educative communication.  
Three components of rhetorical theory were central to New Zealand debating: 
audience, procedure or conduct, and the argument itself. Between 1878 and 1902, 
debating societies formalised the relationship between speaker and audience; they 
prescribed a certain mode of conduct in debate; and finally they proscribed the form of 
argument accepted in debate in order to “promote the fellowship and mental culture of 
the students” (MBL, Constitution, 1879). Scobie Mackenzie (1845-1901), one of the 
                                               
49 The first International Conference on Argumentation in 1986 initiated an interdisciplinary critical 
approach towards understanding popular argumentation (van Emeren et al. 1987). The organisers van 
Eemeren, Grootendorst, Blair and Willard, in an attempt to accommodate as many disciplinary strands of 
argumentation studies as possible, differentiate between rhetorical, epistemological, cognitive and 
empirical, pragmatic, formal, and conversational perspectives. The field of argumentation theory has been 
confirmed since then. Studies like Zarefsky’s in the history of rhetoric expand the original vision and 
apply pattern of argumentation to historical contexts (Zarefksy 1990). 
50 The debate about the vices and virtues of intercollegiate debates in America illustrate this point. Kaiser 
shows, for example, how George Pierce Baker and Ralph Curtis Ringwalt contemplated the form of these 
competitions on grounds of their argumentative force and civic value (Kaiser forthcoming). Moreover, at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, American and British scholars like Baird and Nichols compared 
British and American argumentative forms of debate in order to determine which was more suitable to 
make students responsible citizens (Baird 1923, Nichols 1936).  
51 Ehninger emphasises that “debate as a process theoretically is interminable” (Ehninger 1966, 181; 
Ehninger and Brockriede 1963).  
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most avid public speakers in New Zealand, identified audience relation as the element 
that rendered debate socially and rhetorically effective.52 In 1895, he spoke to the 
members of the debating society at Otago University and insisted that immediately 
adapting to a rhetorical situation and relating to the audience were crucial to seriously 
engaging in public debate.53 Mackenzie concluded that “after all it is sincerity in the 
speaker that enables him to exercise most influence with his hearers” (Mackenzie 1895, 
133). If it was sincerity that mattered to the audience, the regulative norm for discourse 
was truth. In 1884, Professor Haslam of Canterbury College lectured to the members of 
the debating society on dialectic. In combining Platonic idealism, Socratic 
argumentation and Arnoldian sentiment, Haslam equated dialectic with a procedure by 
which debaters “search after truth” (Haslam 1884, 32). Haslam maintained “that the 
search after truth, whether absolute or relative, is mainly valuable as a means whereby 
we may establish for ourselves and others, a rule of conduct” (ibid.). In other words, in 
a combined reading of Haslam and Mackenzie, the debater profited from the situation 
                                               
52 Mackay John Scobie Mackenzie originally came to Australia from Scotland where he became an expert 
stockman. In 1870 he was offered the post of managing a big station in Otago. Five years later he bought 
his own station, Kyeburn, and prospered. Now being part of Otago’s wealthier elite, he began to be active 
in politics. He openly heralded Thomas Carlyle, Disraeli’s imperialism and was a self-proclaimed 
classical liberalist and supporter of free trade and individualism. Brooking remarks that “he developed his 
already impressive debating skills and became an effective and acerbic critic of Stout, whom he described 
as ‘a wriggling worm’” (Brooking DNZB). He gained a reputation of being the best speaker in Parliament 
but neglected his station. Financial difficulties caused him to resign from the elitist Dunedin Club. In 
1896, with the help of the press, he returned to parliament for the City of Dunedin. In 1899, he retired due 
to ill health and his defeat in the election. In the two remaining years of his life, he was an enthusiastic 
supporter of the South African War and spent much time raising funds. The biographical information is 
based on Brooking in DNZB.  
53 In his lecture, Mackenzie described the difference between debate and a set speech: “The real 
difference lies in the fact that the set speech-maker has the command of the arrangement of his subjects, 
and the order in which he shall bring them on. The debater is equally prepared on the general question, 
but the arrangement of the points of his speech depends upon the judgement he must exercise at the 
moment he gets up” (Mackenzie 1895, 132). Furthermore, debate entailed conflict and Mackenzie 
maintained that “conflict begets heat, and heat vehemence; and vehemence properly controlled appears to 
be of the very essence of the quality of oratory which attracts an audience” (133). Debate, from 
Mackenzie’s point of view, seemed to respond to the discursive potential of a situation or to what Bitzer 
later termed the rhetorical situation. Bitzer believes that all rhetorical discourse emerges as a response to a 
rhetorical situation. An audience, constraints, and an exigence are defining conditions for a rhetorical 
situation (Bitzer 1968; 1980, 26-30). Exigence is described as “an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a 
defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be” (Bitzer 1968, 
6). In other words, it is the problem that is identified as ripe for discursive deliberation by members of a 
community. For Mackenzie, debaters reacted to “imperfections” in the argument of the other and had to 
address issues that were socially relevant to those who watched them. 
  48 
that audience and social circumstances produced. S/he appeared on stage to propound 
her argument and to return a set of rules to the hearers that was normatively binding. 
Professor Frederick W. Hutton (1836-1905) at Canterbury, together with his colleagues 
Thomas J. Parker (1850-1897) at Otago and George M. Thomson (1848-1933) in 
Auckland, discussed the most reliable means for creating a valid and truthful discourse. 
In 1888, Hutton asked debaters at Canterbury “what then is the process of verification? 
What are the tests of truth?” (Hutton 1882, 7). In 1881, his friend and colleague 
Professor Parker showed members of the Otago University debating society that “the 
methods by which we arrive at all conclusions are by induction and verification” (OW, 4 
June 1888, 22). This answer remained valid in New Zealand until the end of the 
century.  
Habermas, like late-Victorian debaters, considers discourse as potentially ideal, oral, 
truth-oriented and rational.54 From Habermas’s point of view, the combined 
understanding of audience-relation, procedural pattern and logical construction creates a 
paradigm that acknowledges the scope of argumentative discourse in real social and 
cultural settings. Cronje shows that Habermas’s notion of argumentation as a “synthesis 
of rhetoric with dialectic, and logic in argumentation has a rationalising function” in 
scientific discourse because participants agree to “‘play the game’ of communicative 
rationality” (Cronje 2002, 272). Like Cronje in her study, Habermas seeks a regulative 
principle beyond the mere analytical level of discourse that addresses the 
unpredictability of what he terms “distorted communication.”55 In other words, 
                                               
54 In his lecture, Haslam in discussing Socrates praised the advantages of human speech: “But man 
possessed the divine gift of articulate speech. Were not these very objects of his search – the good – were 
not these themselves words, and were not words the expression of things. When men spoke of the good 
and necessary and the beautiful, surely they meant something; and surely it was possible to discover by 
patient question and answer, what was the thing which was meant by each of these words” (Haslam 1884, 
21). 
55 Edgar explains that distorted communication in Habermas’s theory represents the substitution of 
external with internal organisation of speech: “Put simply, an inability to deal with conflict (akin to the 
neurotic’s inability to deal with the original trauma) manifests itself in a disruption of communicative 
competence (and, specifically, an inhibition on raising the very validity claims that might make public 
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Habermas wants to address the modern corruption of meaning in discourse by 
validating his theoretical assumptions in the practical reality of communication. On the 
one hand, he takes as his point of departure the supposition that argumentation functions 
on the basis of naturally formalised patterns of language. On the other, he acknowledges 
that communication is embedded in contexts of social interaction that obscure the 
regulative power of speech.  
Habermas’s TCA combines two premises that encompass the social role of 
argumentation. He maintains that communication is always intersubjective and that it 
aims, because of its rational nature, at consensus formation. In his earlier essay, “What 
is Universal Pragmatics?,” Habermas regards consensus and intersubjectivity as 
vehicles for mutual understanding: “The aim of reaching understanding (Verständigung) 
is to bring about an agreement (Einverständnis) that terminates in the intersubjective 
mutuality of reciprocal comprehension, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord 
with one another” (Habermas 1998, 23). Habermas, in TCA, further propounds the 
argument that undistorted human communication is made possible through features of 
speech that are necessarily rational. The nineteenth-century defence of induction as the 
prime scientific form of investigation carried similar connotations. Induction was 
regarded as the most reliable and most “natural” form of scientific proof. For Habermas, 
communicative action is the realisation of the rational potential of language. He argues 
that “conflict, competition, strategic action in general – are derivatives of action 
oriented toward reaching understanding” (21). In a debate, for example, two contesting 
parties bring forth their arguments. They refrain from non-verbal and bodily actions and 
comply with a protocol that favours logical argumentation.56 In the end, ideally, the 
                                                                                                                                         
that conflict)” (Edgar 2005, 156). In other words, Habermas maintains that disruptive systemic social 
forces corrupt the natural ability to communicate on equal terms. 
56 Habermas explicitly excludes “nonverbal actions and bodily expressions” in his considerations 
(Habermas 1998, 21). Likewise, nineteenth-century debaters considered the problem of “how far 
personalities are allowable” (Mackenzie 1895, 138). Towards the end of the century, reference to physical 
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contestants and the audience have to yield to the force of the better argument, that is, to 
the argument that is logically sound, intelligible, true and morally right. Habermas 
acknowledges that the ideal case does not always apply to social realities. As a 
consequence, people sometimes have “to draw upon the means of strategic action, with 
an orientation toward coming to a mutual understanding, so as to bring about a common 
definition of the situation” (Habermas 1987, 121). They have to recur to “repair work” 
(ibid.) in order to bring the discussion back to its rational core.57  
For Habermas, a debate like that on Darwin’s work held in Dunedin in 1878, arises 
from discursive circumstances in the lifeworld. Habermas demonstrates that the 
lifeworld consists in “stored-up cultural contexts, the patterns of interpretation, 
valuation, and expression” (Habermas 1987, 125). He allows for shifting interpretative 
horizons in the lifeworld but argues that when participants “go beyond the horizon of a 
given situation, they cannot step into the void; they find themselves right away in 
another, now actualized, yet preinterpreted domain of what is culturally taken for 
granted. In everyday communicative practice there are no completely unfamiliar 
situations” (ibid.). For Habermas, the lifeworld needs to be understood from the 
perspective of culture, society and the individual person. Moreover, norms of cultural 
                                                                                                                                         
expressions was made but restricted to the mentioning of “tumultuous applause and excitement! The 
Canterbury College Maori war-cry!” (CCR, June 1903, 13). Moreover, “a grinning audience” (OUR, June 
1897, 48) and participants who “loll up against the wall” (CCR, Oct. 1897, 35) were also mentioned. 
These references were always critically tested against the standard of “gentlemanly” behaviour in debate 
and usually dismissed as unacceptable (OUR, June 1895, 56). In 1936, Nichols reviewed the “progress” 
of formalisation of American debating and dismissed British styles for their lax regulations and lack of 
discipline. He maintained that “debate as it existed in the literary societies of the colleges and in the 
lyceums and cross-road villages during the eighties and nineties …  was not an activity we call debate in 
college …  to-day. It was a desultory discussion in which opinion rather than evidence rules, hasty 
inference rather than research was prominent …  Humor and satire, indulgence in personalities, rash 
generalization, ad hominem appeal, and many of the things that still obtain in British debating were 
prevalent” (Nichols 1936, 215). Nichol’s perspective incorporates a defence of formalisation and 
regulation that at the end of the nineteenth century, was maturing and gradually claiming the debating 
space. 
57 For Habermas, this rational core is existent even in a shifting real social context. He shows that 
communication is always enmeshed in “relevance structures;” a phrase that captures the interpretative 
horizon of utterances: “Relevance structures can be conceived instead as interconnections of meaning 
holding between a given communicative utterance, the immediate context, and its connotative horizon of 
meaning, Contexts of relevance are based on grammatically regulated relations among the elements of a 
linguistically organized stock of knowledge” (Habermas 1987, 124). 
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reproduction, social integration and socialisation interact and act upon the individual as 
well as the cultural and societal settings of a given reality (144). This makes his concept 
of a shared discursive situation flexible despite his insistence on a rational normative 
foundation of human language. If the social embeddedness of the individual in the 
lifeworld is complete, “the process of reproduction [of meaning] connects up new 
situations with the existing conditions of the lifeworld; it does this in the semantic 
dimension of meanings or contents (of the cultural tradition), as well as in the 
dimensions of social space (of socially integrated groups) and historical time (of 
successive generations)” (137-138).  
Within the interaction of semantic dimension, social space and historical time, old-
turned-new knowledge arises. Mutual improvement societies in nineteenth-century New 
Zealand, for example, were not only interested in the increase of literacy among their 
members. Their objective was also to extend the intellectual horizon by reading, 
listening and composing new sets of rational discourse. In other words, these societies 
produced knowledge on the basis of available forms of public communication. For 
Habermas, producing and criticising knowledge are characteristic of communicative 
action. He argues that improvement and betterment depend “on the de facto recognition 
of validity claims that can be attacked internally, that is, shaken by critique, new 
insights, learning processes, and the like” (Habermas 1984, 192). Habermas is 
convinced that rational argumentation is the vehicle of improvement because it transfers 
beliefs, superstitions or vague inclinations into valid and certain facts. Likewise, 
debating societies were founded on the conviction that argumentation provided the 
means to improve members’ discursive skills and thus make them able participants in 
the democratic forum. In the 1880s and 1890s, democracy in New Zealand was marked 
by a “growing popular interest and participation in elections, especially in urban areas” 
(Atkinson 2003, 53). Atkinson shows that the introduction of the manhood suffrage in 
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1879, the campaign for “one man, one vote” in the late 1880s and the granting of 
women’s suffrage in 1893 gradually created democratic participation that was not 
dominated by “provincialism, personality and local interest” (78) but by national issues 
and conceptual oppositions like “town versus country, conservatism versus liberal, 
capital versus labour” (79). The urban democratic arena of the late nineteenth-century 
provided the intellectual elite with a platform for voicing their critique. As a 
consequence, late-Victorian debate in New Zealand had the potential to influence a 
widening public discourse. 
Contrary to debate’s theoretical possibilities, the interactive quality of debate in 
New Zealand was eroded by processes of formalisation. In preserving the rational core 
of argumentation through a growing set of discursive norms, students abandoned 
principles of consensus that, according to Habermas, were crucial to notions of 
collective identity. As a consequence, debate’s social relevance was limited to its 
community-establishing powers. Ray notices similar developments in ante-bellum 
American debating societies:  
Antebellum men’s debating clubs routinely were presented as free and open. Yet 
systematic exclusions from participation and recurring topics that fixed 
difference constructed an ideal citizen carefully defined as middle class, male, 
native born, white, and Protestant. …  The discourse of the antebellum debating 
clubs is thus the discourse of a permeable pubic, an emergent bourgeois public 
that simultaneously creates and subverts its own representation. (Ray 2004, 15) 
Like their American counterparts, New Zealand societies, along with their social 
potential neglected their engagement with audience and, instead, refined their 
understanding of debating procedure as social and cultural conduct. Finally, the logic of 
argumentation was reformulated as scientific deliberation and became exclusionary 
rather than integrative. In view of Habermas’s holistic view of rhetoric, dialectic and 
logic, nineteenth-century debate in New Zealand was transformed into a form of 
discourse that was not suited for mutual improvement purposes. By 1902, debate in 
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New Zealand was on its way to becoming a specialised form of argumentative discourse 
that preserved its reputation as a democratic tool in an equally formalised fashion.  
 
Conclusion  
Imposing a Habermasian reading on the development of debating societies in New 
Zealand provides answers that remain limited to the late-Victorian paradigm of rational 
discourse. Habermas’s theory explains but does not transcend the rational implications 
of formalisation. Habermas specifically excludes any reference to non-discursive 
elements in communicative action and, as a consequence, cannot be used to understand 
formalisation processes that permeated the emotional and physical sides of debating in 
nineteenth-century New Zealand. This side of Habermas’s approach has been 
challenged and the significance of physical bodies has perhaps never been as 
emphatically emphasised as by Judith Butler.58 Michael Warner, for example, reclaims 
the importance of “bodies” for the public sphere and the concept of mass audience 
(Warner 1993, 2002; Goode 2005, 52-54).59 Susan Wells in Sweet Reason juxtaposes 
Habermas and Lacan: “Habermas functions as the representative of universalism, 
rationality, and orientation to agreement and to coordinate action; Lacan, as the 
representative of desire, the unconscious, the necessarily excessive and exigent nature 
of discourse” (Wells 1996, 6).60 Wells, Warner and Robbins call for an explanation that 
                                               
58 Butler (1993) and more recently an assessment of her work in Breen and Blumenfeld (2005).  
59 After the translation of Structural Transformation in 1989, Habermas’s concept of public sphere 
continues to receive critical attention in English-speaking countries, for example, in Crossley and Roberts 
(2004), Freundlieb et al. (2004) and Goode (2005). Slightly earlier, Robbins in his introductory essay to 
Phantom Public Sphere argues with Walter Lippmann that Habermas’s view that individuals learn 
through criticism and exposure to media is mistaken: “Neither education nor the press …  could ever 
possibly teach people what they would need to know in order to participate competently in all public 
issues. ‘The usual appeal to education can bring only disappointment’ (27). It cannot be ‘assumed that the 
press should do spontaneously for us what primitive democracy imagined each of us could do 
spontaneously for himself’” (Robbins 1993, ix).  
60 Wells like Robbins criticises Habermas’s understanding of human progress by learning: “For 
Habermas, then, the capability for purposive-rational action is established once and for all as a relatively 
early developmental task, and further growth of this capability is simply a matter of accumulating 
knowledge” (Wells 1986, 261). Wells and Robbins call for a discourse that bridge Habermas’s rational 
capacity of language and his acknowledgement of the social dimension of discourse.  
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bridges Habermas’s faith in the rational capacity of language and his acknowledgement 
of the social dimension of discourse.  
Recently, the shift from Habermas’s linguistic turn towards recognition of the body 
results in a change of scholarly method. Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton address 
the necessity to explore “the body as method” in an interdisciplinary historical context. 
They suggest  
that the body-as-contact-zone is a powerful analytical term and a useful 
pedagogical tool for understanding the nature and dynamics of imperial, 
colonial, and world histories – precisely because it allows us to navigate the 
dynamic relationship between representation and ‘reality’ and to see the work of 
mediation that embodied subjects perform between the domestic and the foreign, 
the quotidian and the cyclical, the dynamic and the static. (Ballantyne and 
Burton 2005a, 407) 
Debating societies in New Zealand, apart from providing contact-zones for minds, were 
continually characterised by displays of physical presence. Morris shows that the new 
notion of clubs and societies in eighteenth-century Britain was dominated by physical 
activities like informal drinking and dining.61 Collegiate debating societies in New 
Zealand, in a similar fashion, relied on “light refreshments” to soothe debating 
behaviour. These were always dispensed by the women of the society and, occasionally, 
female debaters were compared to “Epps’s Cocoa, advertisements – grateful and 
comforting” (OUR, May 1898, 20). In connection with Habermas’s epistemologically 
centred understanding of communication, the body provides an additional interpretative 
paradigm for placing the individual into a complex of community and individual 
experiences. 
Ballantyne and Burton also emphasise the connection of body-as-method for the 
study of imperial dynamics in the nineteenth century. Sinha in the same volume 
                                               
61 Morris relates that the Birmingham Bean Club, one of the most influential clubs, was “a loyalist dining 
club in which the gentlemen of the country and the principal inhabitants came together for food and 
confidential discussion” (Morris 1990, 396).  
  55 
illustrates how club culture in colonial nineteenth-century India reinforced familiar 
discursive patterns in an unfamiliar environment: 
Although each individual club often catered to a very different and distinctive 
clientele among elite Europeans in the empire, ‘clubland’ as a whole served as a 
common ground where elite Europeans could meet as members, or as guests of 
members, of individual clubs. These clubs represented an oasis of European 
culture in the colonies, functioning to reproduce the comfort and familiarity of 
‘home’ for European living in an alien land. (Sinha 2005, 183-184) 
Debating societies also evoked notions of “home” by imitating British models and 
continuing settler ideals of education and mutual improvement. At the same time, 
students transcended categories of home and Empire by combining them with the idea 
of England as the ‘old country’. The negotiation of these specific circumstances went 
beyond the sphere of rational contemplation into the contact-zone of bodily language. In 
particular, the Boer War (1899-1902) revealed how physical expression constantly 
undermined attempts at regulating debate. Habermas’s concept of intersubjectivity, on 
the one hand, informs an understanding of debate as a means of rational explanation of 
physical violence. On the other hand, it is expanded by taking into account the physical 
presence of debaters in the context of aggression.  
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Chapter Two 
The “Gallant Defenders” of Fellowship and Home1 
 
Introduction 
A sense of community and belonging was established in nineteenth-century debating 
societies by recourse to supposedly rational and non-rational levels of human 
interaction. On the one hand spoken, well structured communication and norms of 
social conduct defined debaters’ self-perception. On the other, they established notions 
of “fellowship” on the basis of physical interaction, unstructured and even anonymous 
discourse. The formation of a group-spirit in these late-Victorian societies was based on 
physical and intellectual engagement with the other. Both strands of interaction 
contributed to what modern rhetorical theory, in particular Thomas B. Farrell, terms 
“social knowledge” which “encompasses a culture’s conventional wisdom” (Farrell 
2001, 721).2 Notions of “home” permeated and were determined by New Zealanders’ 
social knowledge. 
Debating societies contributed to New Zealand’s social knowledge by rationally 
contemplating, subverting and acting out issues of current significance. Crucial to the 
societies’ ability to add meaning to public controversies was their flexible attitude to 
elements of leisure, entertainment and amusement. Debating in New Zealand was 
rendered a publicly acceptable pastime for man and women alike because of its explicit 
element of self-improvement and education.3 These societies still integrated forms of 
                                               
1 The term is taken from the report on the Dialectic Society discussing the problem of conscription: “On 
May 28th Mr. Jupp moved – ‘That some form of conscription is desirable throughout the British 
Dominions,’ and an animated and interesting discussion followed, certain well-known ‘gallant defenders’ 
taking up the cudgels heartily on behalf of the Volunteer system” (CCR, Oct. 1898, 10). 
2 Farrell draws on Bitzer’s concept of “rhetorical knowledge” (Farrell 1976, Bitzer 1978). Bitzer links 
rhetorical knowledge to the idea of a public “that is identifiable as such to the extent that is articulates 
significant parts of its knowledge and experiences personal facts in its public life. The public that would 
maintain its identity will learn, rehearse, and celebrate what it knows” (Bitzer 1978, 88). 
3 The spread of women’s study clubs in America, for example, coincided with severe public criticism that 
accused women of neglecting their role as mothers. Stevenson quotes the Boston Transcript that declared 
“homes will be ruined, children neglected, woman is straying from her sphere” (Stevenson 1991, 55).By 
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entertainment, like Olla Podridas, which questioned dominant and accepted norms of 
public culture. The respectable reputation of societies provided a safe haven for 
applying unconventional criticism to topics like militarism, the influence of drama, the 
Boer War or the significance of Empire.  
As a consequence, debating societies in Victorian New Zealand produced a layer of 
discourse that served as an intervening space between established norms of 
institutionalised discourse like parliamentary politics or academic education, and 
alternative forms like vaudeville shows and theatre productions. The metaphor of 
intervening horizon also suggests that boundaries between rational and non-rational 
modes of discourse became blurred in the practice of deliberation. Moreover, these 
clubs were embedded in an imperial web-structure of information that connected their 
activities with similar organisations abroad. The students’ response to the Boer War 
displayed dynamics of negotiating norms of discourse, concepts of “home” and 
fellowship.  
This chapter explores the connection of Habermas’s theory of communication and 
nineteenth-century forms of debate. The identification of an intervening space between 
reason and its application in the lifeworld helps to determine types of discourse that lay 
outside the realm of the spoken word. Nineteenth-century debates established 
fellowship based on a combination of a regulative ideal of reason and an alternative 
practice of non-discursive interaction. An examination of events surrounding the Boer 
War in New Zealand provides a historical example for these dynamics. Finally, the 
sense of belonging in debate that arose from a distinctly colonial setting introduces the 
next stage of analysis: the definition of consensus-formation and the role of esprit de 
corps in debate. 
                                                                                                                                         
the time New Zealand students founded their societies the public had vanquished this particular argument 
and did not dispute female membership. Moreover, in the United States and New Zealand, faculty and 
staff welcomed the founding of debating and literary societies, whereas they routinely rejected the 
establishment of fraternities and secret societies. 
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The Intervening Horizon: Reason and the Lifeworld 
Habermas maintains that arguments, or in his words, validity claims, must be 
understood as mutually shared by those who use them because communicative 
behaviour relates to people’s “common life-relations” in the lifeworld (Habermas 1984, 
13). Intersubjective communication, for Habermas, is a form of interaction which 
overcomes the traditional subject-object model (Habermas 1987, 10) and which places 
reciprocal, communicative recognition at the centre of human existence. Debaters at 
New Zealand’s colonial colleges placed equal significance on the force of 
communication; they observed that “means of intercommunication among students in a 
young institution like our college are not so many that we can afford to overlook any 
one of them” (MBL, minute book, 14 Oct. 1882). However, Habermas advances further 
and determines that intersubjectivity is not only established through language but also 
based on rational contemplation and the force of the better argument. He prioritises 
rationality because any strategic interests that people could have need to be 
subordinated to claims of truth and validity.4 In Habermas’s model, people relate to 
each other because they share habits of rational communication and physical action.5 
Nineteenth-century debate shows that students were aware of the communicative 
                                               
4 Habermas abstains from elevating rationality to the foremost principle of communicative action because 
his theory would then run the risk of infinite regress. Such a theory would have to demonstrate that the 
distinction of rational and irrational itself would be rational in order to legitimate its operating premise. 
Instead, reason and rationality are built in the singular intersubjective structure of discursive 
communication and, thereby, in Habermas’s scheme, place first the possibility of subordinating any 
interests of human communication (in particular strategic interests) to claims of truth and validity. 
Habermas not only identifies problematic implications of strategic interests governed by the primacy of 
teleological and strategic rationality but also prevents his theory from succumbing to the inevitable 
infinite regress because he introduces a mode of action and interest that is decidedly communicative and 
intersubjective (Habermas 1984, 86). William Rasch and Eva Knodt discuss the Habermas-Luhmann 
controversy of the early 1970s and the controversy surrounding the conceptualisation of strategic and 
communicative interest (Rasch 1991; Knodt 1994). 
5 Habermas argues that bodily movements are not actions: “In a certain sense, actions are realized through 
movements of the body, but only in such a way that the actor, in following a technical or social rule, 
concomitantly executes these movements. Concomitant execution means that the actor intends an action 
but not the bodily movements with the help of which he realizes it. A bodily movement is an element of an 
action but not an action” (Habermas 1984, 97). 
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processes they participated in. Expressed in Habermasian terms, they claimed their 
‘intersubjective space’ to create bonds of fellowship. Contrary to Habermas’s analysis, 
however, they were creating this space not only by applying linguistic and rational 
means, but by venturing beyond these boundaries into the realm of emotional, irrational 
and physical appeal.  
Habermas is criticised for his emphasis on the rational basis of intersubjectivity. In 
particular, Niklas Luhmann argues that in Habermas’s work the “inter” in 
intersubjectivity is determined by rules of discourse and the validity of propositions 
(Habermas and Luhmann 1971, 319).6 Luhmann vehemently refutes this position. He 
accuses Habermas of excluding the latent role of additional interactive levels of human 
existence such as love, quarrel (Streit) or empathy (319).7 Luhmann further argues that 
speakers adhere to a code of communicative behaviour but still make themselves 
physically present. He concedes that “only under discouragingly difficult conditions” 
will interlocutors be able to claim “speaking time …  making oneself visible, exposing 
oneself” (Luhmann 2002, 158).8 Luhmann’s version of communication emphasises the 
                                               
6 In 1971, Niklas Luhmann and Jürgen Habermas published essays of their controversy in Theorie der 
Gesellschaft. Both went on to contend diverse aspects of their respective work (Luhmann 1990, 1992, 
2002). Later Edgar criticises Luhmann for his reading of Habermas: “In effect, it [universal pragmatics] 
substantiates a theme that runs throughout Legitimation Crisis: that legitimacy is not, as Luhmann 
suggests, merely a matter of the current acceptability of norms, but rather of the way in which that 
acceptance has been achieved (LC:98-9; CES: 188). The ideas of a freely achieved consensus and the 
rationality that underpins illocutionary force, both of which lie at the core of Habermas’s notions of 
communicative action and discourse, already contain in substantial part the germs of such a critical 
resources” (Edgar 2005, 153). 
7 “Die Unterstellung, Anmahnung und Kritik von Begründungen, ja überhaupt das Interesse an 
Begründungen decken ohne Zweifel nur einen Teilbereich gemeinsamen Erlebens und Handelns. Sie 
decken weder den Fall der Liebe, noch den Fall des Streites, noch den der bloßen Wahrnehmung des 
anderen, den des Ausweichens, den der praktischen Imitation, des primären Sozialisation usw. Man kann 
sehr gut zusammenleben auf Grund der wechselseitigen Überzeugung, daß die Begründungen des anderen 
falsch sind ... [The supposition, request and criticism of reasons, and in general the interest in reasons 
without doubt only represent a part of people’s shared experiences and actions. They account neither for 
love, nor for the case of conflict, mere perception of the other, avoidance, practical imitation and primary 
socialisation etc. People are very well able to live together on the basis of the reciprocal conviction that 
their partner’s reasons are wrong … .]” (Habermas and Luhmann 1971, 320, translation mine). 
8 Luhmann favours a model of communication that “sees the procedure of communication as a successful 
or unsuccessful transference of news, information, or suppositions of agreement” (Luhmann 2002, 160). 
Luhmann criticises Habermas’s systems-theoretical approach for its emphasis on clusters of rationality 
where “noting is transferred” (ibid.). Like Habermas’s tripartite structure of rhetoric, dialectic and logic, 
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separating function of physical existence. Even though he perceives humans as “living 
organisms”, his working metaphor is that of cells that “are operationally isolated” (170). 
Axel Honneth adopts Luhmann’s acknowledgement of the physical element of 
communication but transforms the understanding of communication into a “rational 
form of a successful mode of socialization” rather than a rational end in itself. As a 
consequence, communication “is now supposed to ensure only the conditions for, and 
no longer the fulfilment of, autonomous self-actualization” (Honneth 2004, 342). In 
other words, Honneth no longer considers communication as the source of social 
behaviour and democratic interaction. Unlike nineteenth-century debaters who regarded 
rational debate as the vehicle of democratic discourse and action, Honneth and 
Luhmann show that the connection of communication and social actualisation is not 
automatically initiated by the practice of rational discourse. Intersubjectivity does not 
fulfil communicative practice but, instead, makes it possible. As a consequence, 
intersubjectivity need not take the shape of rational interaction but is established by a 
combination of intellectual, irrational and physical contact zones. 
In rhetorical theory, Farrell draws out the implications of the Habermas-Luhmann 
debate. Farrell points out that Habermas does not sufficiently clarify the connection of 
formally constructed intersubjectivity and its social reality for people: “Habermas 
allows for no intervening horizon between the category of ‘form of life’ (lifeworld) and 
that of ‘speech act’ or utterance” (Farrell 1993, 203). Farrell argues that “utterances are 
occasioned and therefore ‘perform’ validity claims; they are redeemed, therefore, not in 
an abstract, generalized realm of truth, but in the practical realm of decision and 
conduct” (ibid.). Farrell criticises the separation of theoretical and idealised rationality 
and the practical enactment of these regulative norms. In order to “transfer” meaning 
and actualise the normative implications of Habermas’s discourse ethics, Farrell 
                                                                                                                                         
Luhmann regards information, utterance and understanding of an utterance as intimately related and 
inseparable.  
  61 
maintains that “they need to be performed, completed, and enacted in the world of 
practice” (ibid.). 
Wells, like Farrell, takes into account varieties of social “inter”-action that 
Habermas neglects. She revises and expands Habermas’s idea of narrative as a form of 
communicative interaction.9 Narrative is the ‘intervening horizon’ that transfers 
meaning in Luhmann’s sense. Well’s model includes varieties of intersubjective truth-
formation that disclose characteristic features of human discourse beyond conditions of 
rationality: “just as Habermas’s theory of language overlooked the work of 
interpretation, so his treatment of narrative divorces narration from reflection” (Wells 
1996, 34). In her model, people claim their intersubjective space because their rational 
capabilities are accompanied by creative features of language use. To this extent, 
intersubjectivity becomes a multi-faceted metaphor that creates meaning by use of 
invention, interpretation and reflection as well as reason. 
The “intervening horizon” of invention, interpretation, reflection and physical 
interaction permeated nineteenth-century New Zealand debate. In 1897, for example, a 
commentator for the Otago Review pointed out that students were routinely breaching 
good manners. In particular male members of the Dunedin society “while willing and 
able to announce their presence by uproarious cachinnations are inconceivably sensitive 
as a corporeal visibility” (OUR, June 1897, 48). Luhmann’s “discouragingly difficult 
conditions” under which students claimed their presence marked the rule rather than the 
                                               
9 In the second volume of TCA, Habermas discusses narrative as a mode of communicative engagement 
that takes place in the lifeworld: “In the communicative practice of everyday life, persons do not only 
encounter one another in the attitude of participants; they also give narrative presentations of events that 
take place in the context of their lifeworld. Narration is a specialized form of constative speech that 
serves to describe sociocultural events and objects. Actors base their narrative presentations on a lay 
concept of the ‘world,’ in the sense of the everyday world or lifeworld, which defines the totality of states 
of affairs that can be reported in true stories” (Habermas 1987, 136). Schrag like Wells criticises 
Habermas for perceiving narration solely as constative speech (Schrag 1992, 107-110). Schrag points out 
that “the modern epistemological paradigm resurfaces in Habermas’s tailoring of narrative to fit the 
designs of his social theory, and this in spite of his jettisoning of the primacy of consciousness and the 
sovereignty of the epistemological subject” (107). Schrag’s criticism parallels Wells insofar as both 
recognise the interpretative limitation of Habermas’s communicative paradigm. 
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exception. With annual Olla Podridas, in which students regularly performed their 
discourse, debating societies created a platform for social behaviour outside the norms 
of rational contemplation. Moreover, students satirised and mocked their own activities. 
Historical events like the Boer War were catalysts for this attitude. 
Farrell in his discussion of Habermas explains that communicative processes of the 
lifeworld divulge concepts that are understood as universal points of references in 
assessing social reality. Applied to a historical reading, these concepts, because of their 
claim to universal applicability, can be used to criticise their ideological foundations:  
What Habermas is suggesting is that the class interest and partisan base of 
bourgeois culture were able to generate and sustain a generalizable concept – 
namely, humanity – which itself transcended class interest. This same concept 
may therefore be referred back to actual practices as criteria, to show their 
deformations and distortions. Thus the institutional lifeworld is able to generate 
norms of critique that defy historical reduction. (Farrell 1993, 198) 
In other words, rhetorical contemplation is instrumental to a critical analysis of 
dominant world concepts. Farrell, following Habermas, argues that the rational basis of 
rhetoric gives rise to conventions that are then used as points of reference for further 
contemplation. Habermas shows that intersubjectivity is established on the grounds of 
“generated norms of critique,” which make possible the identification of distinctly 
historicised concepts of rational discourse. Even though Habermas does not pay 
attention to the non-rational and non-linguistic aspects of communication, they similarly 
arise among norms of critique that are conducive to understanding how debate in 
nineteenth-century New Zealand functioned. 
From a purely physical perspective, the rise of entertainment and spectacle was 
central to an understanding of performance in debate. Public culture in New Zealand as 
well as in the United States experienced a rise of entertainment that questioned the 
validity of existing patterns of communication. The dynamics of the Victorian attitude 
towards rationality and entertainment touched on debate’s essential aspects of 
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argumentation and social interaction and altered normative categories like truth, 
knowledge, reason and education.10 Even though these categories functioned as “norms 
of critique,” their meaning was nevertheless moulded into culturally applicable 
conventions for knowledge production. As a consequence, debate as a means of rational 
deliberation was affected by these specific circumstances. Because the rational 
component of the discursive relation between students was modified, debate’s social 
role was challenged. Debating, for example, integrated purely visual means like lantern 
views and dramatic elements like mock trials. Alpers mentions that “dramatic readings 
and occasional scenes,” like “‘Mr. Verdant Green is made a Mason’” (Alpers et al. 
1923, xxi) were integral part of the debating programme while he was a member of the 
Dialectic Society. Moreover, personal and satirical comments became a regular feature 
of debating practice rather than an exception to the norm. Contrary to Habermas’s 
theory, the space that connected formal speech acts with the social reality of people was, 
in the late nineteenth-century, only partly occupied by rational contemplation. It was 
rather enriched by elements outside linguistic communication and rational discourse. 
 
The Norm and Visibility of Fellowship 
Especially, during their formative years, collegiate debating societies negotiated and 
renegotiated norms of critique in order to project debate as an instrument for knowledge 
production. Original constitutions contain mission statements that primarily saw 
societies as gathering places for rationally minded individuals. Otago students in 1884 
                                               
10 If discourse is analysed on the basis of the paradigm of rationality, oppositional pairs of regulative 
concepts are bound to surface. Perelman in New Rhetoric and the Humanities, for example, establishes 
such pairs of meaning for the Romantic period: reason versus imagination, reason versus sentiments, 
common sense versus genius, artificial versus natural and abstract versus concrete (Perelman 1979, 164). 
Like Perelman, I assume that New Zealanders were given to conceptualising the world in oppositions. 
Students were exposed to Alexander Bain’s and Henry Sidgwick’s work which promoted the separation 
of mind and body by means of scientific methodology and logical argumentation. The normative 
categories of reason, knowledge, education and truth belonged to the realm of the mind. Chapter six 
investigated how at the end of the century, the opposition between mind and body was increasingly 
questioned.  
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agreed that “the promotion of the mental culture of its members by means of essays, and 
criticism thereon, debates, readings and such other means” should be central to their 
meetings (Hocken, minute book, 29 Aug. 1884). In 1893, the student G. P. Howell at 
Otago argued that one aim of the society was the support of fellowship: “Teach us to 
know, honour, and respect each other” (Howell 1893, 133). The Dialectic Society 
determined “that its aim shall be to promote the fellowship and mental culture of the 
students and for this purpose there shall be periodical meetings of the members for the 
hearing, reading and delivery of essays, debates, readings and addresses and for the 
holding of musical events and dramatic rehearsals” (MBL, Constitution, 1878). The 
Auckland society adopted the motto “nec pluribus impar” (comparable to none) that is 
most famously associated with Louis XIV, and commonly denotes supremacy and 
exclusivity (SCUA, minute book, first page).11 Despite their maxim, the society at 
Auckland followed the same universal objectives as Canterbury and Otago. It placed 
slightly more emphasis on the cultivation of debate and oratory.12 The idea of 
fellowship and mental culture was traditionally expressed in lectures and debates. 
Contributions like “Student Life” (1881), “University Life” (1882), “Dialectic: Its 
Early History and Its Place in Education” (1884), “Ourselves” (1893), “Debating and 
Debaters” (1895) and the undated poem “Our Dialec’” showed that professors and 
students were particularly interested in combining the role of higher education and 
debate with notions of belonging.13 In 1883, Reverend Thomas Flavell, president of the 
                                               
11 In view of the general promotion of fellowship in these societies, I interpret the motto as emphasising 
the society’s uniqueness rather than those of individual members.  
12 With their founding, the society established a “Gold Medal for Oratory,” which was also promoted in 
the college’s Calendar. (AUCC, 1888, cover page) In 1888, the secretary of the society called it the 
“Posnett Medal,” acknowledging Professor Posnett’s tremendous influence on the proceedings of the 
society. The medal in 1888 was awarded to Mr. Poland for being “successful debater of the previous 
year” (SCUA, minute book, undated, 22). 
13 These titles are taken from the minute books, the manuscripts in the MBL Graduate Association Papers, 
printed lectures and student essays as listed in the Bibliography. 
  65 
society, lectured on “The Art of Debate” (MBL, minute book, 7 April 1883).14 The title 
of Thomas S. Foster’s (1853-1918) lecture “The Dialectic Society as a Means of Self-
Culture” expressed tendencies of placing debating societies in a context of social 
justification.15 In 1889, the president Hutcheson M. Posnett at Auckland “gave the 
members some practical advice upon public speaking” (NZH, 18 May 1889, 5). 
Moreover, Professor Sale (1831-1922) at Otago promoted debating for its competitive 
qualities.16 He argued that “mental activity demanded full play for our combative 
instincts; these were repressed in the lecture-room, and found their proper scope in 
debate” (OW, 31 May 1879, 17). Accordingly, the virtues of debate merged with those 
of education and even added aspects that New Zealand college training could not 
address. Part of this process of self-definition was the amplification of debate as a 
means of improving rational argumentation and acquisition of knowledge.  
The value that the teaching staff assigned to reason was informed by a liberal and 
humanist intellectual framework, which considered rationality, learning and the 
understanding of truth the guarantors of a just order of society. In 1880, the recently 
                                               
14 There is not much information available on Thomas Flavell. He was born in 1838 in England and later 
emigrated to New Zealand, where he became vicar of St. Mary’s in Merivale, Christchurch. In 1891, he 
however went back to England with his wife and two children and thus, resigned his long presidency over 
the college’s dialectic society.  
15 In 1866, thirteen-year old Thomas Scholfield Foster emigrated with his parents from London to 
Rangiora, New Zealand. Until 1871, he attended Christ’s College on a Junior Somes Scholarship. He 
became assistant master of West Christchurch School and like many of his fellow students attended 
Canterbury Collegiate Union classes after work. Forster was one of the first students of the established 
Canterbury College and gained a B.A. degree and M.A. degree in 1881. He continued his affiliation with 
the college and, for example, was secretary of the CCDS in 1882 and its president between 1884 and 
1885. As late as 1894, he gave the society’s inaugural address on education (MBL, session programme, 
1894). In 1898, his friendship with the fellow (and very active) debater and teacher, Joseph Penfound 
Grossmann (husband of Edith Searle Grossmann) ended rather bitterly. Grossmann had forged Forster’s 
signature on a promissory note. The ensuing law case enabled Foster to recover his property but 
Grossmann was sentenced to two years in prison. Biographical sketch based on McGeorge DNZB; 
Roberts DNZB; Sinclair 1983, 79-80. 
16 In 1861, George Samuel Sale, originally from England, emigrated to New Zealand. On arrival, he and 
his friends “burned their top-hats and tail-coats as a gesture of contempt for the conventions they had left 
behind” (Barsby DNZB). After three months working at Lake Coleridge station, Sale became the first 
editor of the Christchurch Press. He joined the Gold rush and in 1865, was sent as government 
commissioner to the West Canterbury goldfields. He successfully established regulations for the growing 
community of miners. Because of personal circumstances, in 1868, he left New Zealand for England. In 
1871, he returned as first Professor for Classics and English at Otago University only to retire in 1908. 
Biographical information based on Barsby in DNZB. 
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appointed Canterbury College professor of biology Frederick Wollaston Hutton (1836-
1905) opened the second term of the debating session with his address “Knowledge: 
How It is Acquired” (MBL, minute book, 24 July 1880).17 In 1884, Haslam held that 
“education should be nothing else than the scheme of our lives” (Haslam 1884, 3). In 
“Student Life,” Professor John Macmillan Brown (1845-1935) maintained that 
education is life’s work, and that toiling for one’s existence should be fully embraced 
and regarded as pleasure and gratification.18 Whatever occupation a person chooses, 
“consecution of thought, freshness of imagination, and vigour and accuracy of 
expression are essentials in all professions” (Brown 1881, 26). In other words, learning, 
even though it demanded considerable effort, promised students the rewards of seeing 
beyond the surface of reality by way of cultivating the critical capacities of the 
individual: 
                                               
17 Hutton originally came from England. He began his career at King’s College, London studying applied 
sciences, and until 1858 had fought in the Crimean and Indian wars. In 1860, he rose to the rank of 
captain. Eventually, in 1866, after his marriage he decided to travel to New Zealand. By that time, he 
already had acquired a modest reputation as a geologist and promoter of Darwin’s The Origin of Species. 
Once settled in Waikato, he soon joined the Geological Survey and in 1874, was promoted to provincial 
geologist of Otago. In this capacity he began to lecture in zoology and geology at the University of Otago 
and in 1877, became professor of natural science. His lecture entitled “Origin of Life” (1878) to the 
members of the debating society is testimony to his brief influence in Dunedin and most certainly 
contained a strong defence of Darwin’s views on evolution. Because of the small number of degree 
students at Otago, Hutton moved to Christchurch and became professor of biology at Canterbury College. 
After Julius von Haast’s death, Hutton was curator of Canterbury Museum (until 1902) and continued to 
exert his influence on the study of flora and fauna in New Zealand. Hutton had a significant impact on the 
scientific advancement of New Zealand zoology and biology. This biographical account is based on 
Parton in DNZB; Thomson 1885; Otago Daily Times, 3 August 1878, 2; Hocken, minute book, 2 August 
1878. 
18 John Macmillan Brown, originally from Scotland, was appointed lecturer for Classics and English at 
Canterbury College in 1874. He became a prominent Canterbury citizen and later married one of his 
former students, Helen Connon, the first woman in the British Empire to obtain an honours degree. As a 
teacher he appears to have been genuinely liked. He entertained some of his students (among them Oscar 
T.J. Alpers) at home and his Sunday walks with students were famous. He lent students books and took 
an interest in their later professional careers. However, his colleagues give different accounts of his 
personality. For example, Arnold Wall, lecturer at Canterbury College during Brown’s time, relates in 
Long and Happy that Haslam and Brown disliked each others company. Even students noticed the 
“unacknowledged cold war” between them. (MBL, Gardner Papers, Lillian Blyth interview) His daughter 
Millicent Amiel Baxter likewise sketched a rather ambiguous picture of the man who dominated the 
teaching of English at Canterbury College (Baxter 1981). Because of serious health issues, John 
Macmillan Brown resigned the chair of English in 1895. He travelled extensively and extended the circle 
of his intellectual acquaintances through meetings with Walt Whitman, Oliver Wendell Holmes and W.D. 
Howells. Brown later devoted much of his time to the study of Pacific cultures. His work on the 
ethnology of Polynesian people and the Maori was strongly criticised by Sir Apirana Ngata, a former 
student and member of CCDS and AUDS, and by Te Rangi Hiroa (Peter Buck). The biographical 
information is taken from Hankin in DNZB. Lowell-Smith recently published an equally ambiguous but 
more personal account of Brown’s and Helen Connon’s married life (Lovell-Smith 2004, 56-74). 
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A student with such a purpose becomes reason incarnate and discerns the vulgar 
from the great; he sees beneath the appearance and can tell, maugre the hisses or 
plaudits of the world, what is eternal and what is momentary. He is alone the 
seer of the world, and in searching his own mind searches what is best in the 
world’s. (29) 
Brown advocated the view that education enables the enlightened individual to 
transcend common opinion on grounds of logical criticism and enter the realm of 
Platonic ideals. Accordingly, the educated individual was assigned the role of judge 
who identified eternal truths. Journalists in Christchurch reviewed Brown’s speech and 
placed considerable emphasis on the “patriotic ring” of his address (LT, 4 April 1881, 
5). Brown’s assertion that study was essential to individual maturity and progress and 
his advice to “‘never lose faith in the destinies of your country’” (ibid.) created a 
connection of learning and colonial identification that the press presented as the central 
tenet of the lecture. Brown promoted a version of fellowship that relied on the 
individual. Through rational contemplation in the form of logical argumentation the 
individual was able to relate to others. 
In 1895, Scobie Mackenzie in “Debating and Debaters” put forth a more practical 
and entertaining type of rational interaction in debate. He insisted that “debating a 
question is the only means known to us of finding out the truth on that particular 
question” (Mackenzie 1895, 130). His depiction of the process resembled a battle; a 
question should be stripped “of all the fallacies and falsehoods that have got entwined 
with it, tear it to bits, in fact, and the remnant is very likely to be truth” (ibid.). The 
press was sympathetic to “his witty remarks,” the speech’s “terseness, its racy 
expressions, and its supply of illustrations” (OW, 19 Sept. 1895). Mackenzie suggested 
that logical truth was the sole goal of debate. His style demonstrated that students were 
also responsible for the engaging quality of their argumentation. They were, in other 
words, experts in the art of winning oratory. Their ability to “tear” a question “to bits” 
with elocutionary force provided a unifying momentum for otherwise isolated 
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interlocutors. Like Brown with his patriotic allusions, Mackenzie wanted the students to 
understand that, in order to render logical prowess publicly relevant, it had to be 
accompanied by a social dimension like pleasure and laughter.  
There are however some subtle differences between the early understandings of 
truth in Brown’s lecture and the later ideas of Mackenzie. Brown adheres to an 
understanding of truth that, in Stevenson’s words, “referred to a divine and timeless 
world of meaning that transcends human differences” (Stevenson 1991, 139). Brown’s 
speech transformed the debater into a “seer” who had the right kind of perception in 
order to make sense of his environment. As is explained in Chapter six, nineteenth-
century debate acquired a reliance on scientific observation that was conducive to 
attitudes like Brown’s. Brown’s concept is exclusive; it is the result of a scholar’s 
secluded contemplation and observation of the world.19 Practical elements were at play, 
when Mackenzie formulated his ideas of truth in public discourse. It remained a 
universal concept but by no means isolated from the influences of his fellow New 
Zealand citizens. Mackenzie placed debate in the context of what a student in 1899 
termed “the practical nature of colonial intelligence” (Natural Conditions, 1899, 112). 
Mackenzie as a person was deeply rooted in the political realities of New Zealand and 
dependent on the benevolence of his voters. His version of the function of truth and 
logical argumentation in debate was informed by a reliance on a commonly shared 
acknowledgement of the other and her ability to actively engage in rational 
deliberation.20 
                                               
19 Brown did not entirely subscribe to a Platonic world of ideas in which the philosopher was the only one 
able to “see”. In the same lecture he maintained that the student “sits with his face to life and is not like 
the unphilosophic crowd in Plato’s cave who study the mere shadows thrown by the passing realities 
behind them. He knows that the world, however old, is still young and flexible” (Brown 1881, 17). As a 
result, Brown’s vision of the scholar was embedded in social and historical contexts but remained highly 
individualistic.  
20 Stevenson and Bender discuss the self-projection of intellectuals in the American context (Stevenson 
1991, 137-155; Bender 1993, 3-15). The term “intellectual” came into use only in the twentieth century. 
The mid-nineteenth-century American public used the term as an adjective to describe a quality of mind 
rather than a person. However, the use of the term carried positive connotations of authority and 
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Mackenzie’s versions of rational fellowship dominated the way debaters perceived 
the role and purpose of debate in New Zealand. The truly great person required others to 
join her in the quest of reason. As a consequence, to relate reason to the world and to 
best profit from the learning that the university had to offer, professors recommended 
communication with fellow students. Education and debate were therefore deemed 
essentially social experiences. In 1882, Professor Cook in “University Life” advocated 
the establishment of clubs to nourish the community spirit among New Zealand 
students. From Cook’s point of view, learning pursued in utter solitude did not enhance 
the true virtues of college life because a student is “a living member of a living world” 
and should not solely be concerned with books (Cook 1882, 3). Moreover, each member 
of Canterbury College, he held, “has important relations with other dwellers in the same 
world, [as one] who influences them and is in turn influenced by them” (ibid.). 
Eventually, Julius von Haast (1822-1887) in his 1883 presidential address associated the 
fundamental purpose of education with moral and intellectual duties and responsibilities 
of citizenship:21 
[T]he great aim of all education should be not to make only wiser, but better 
men and women, to elevate their moral and intellectual sense, to open their 
minds to all that is great and noble in nature and mankind, to make the heart and 
intellect, the emotional and the reasoning faculties, form a close union. (Haast 
1883, 7) 
                                                                                                                                         
distinction because their influence depended on their interaction with their publics. Without them they 
could not maintain their status. Their participation in (rather than their invention of) public discourse 
secured their stance. The intellectual of the late nineteenth century was “obliged to make a public instead 
of finding one ready made,” as Herbert Croly, founding editor of the New Republic, expressed it in 1909 
in The Promise of American Life (qtd. in Bender 1991, 144). 
21 Julius von Haast, originally from Germany, arrived in New Zealand in December 1858, when he 
incidentally met the Austrian geologist Ferdinant Hochstetter and began to explore the Western colonial 
territories. In 1860, he came to Canterbury when he was called upon to examine the area of the proposed 
tunnel between Lyttelton and Christchurch. He subsequently settled in Christchurch and extensively 
surveyed the Canterbury provincial district including the harsh Mount Cook area. In 1862, he founded the 
Philosophical Institute of Canterbury. In 1861, he had started a modest museum, which obtained its own 
building in 1870. The next year, von Haast was among the group of people who promoted the idea of 
Canterbury College, an institution for higher education affiliated to the University of New Zealand. In 
1876, he eventually became the college’s first professor of geology, a position he held until his death. In 
the following years, his scientific reputation spread and several honorary degrees were conferred upon 
him. He died in Christchurch in 1887. The information is based on Maling in DNZB, Heinrich von 
Haast’s account of his father’s life (1948), and Bickerton (1884). 
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Von Haast seized the opportunity to introduce the students to the traditional Socratic 
combination of civil participation, education and the art of public speaking, which also 
significantly fed into an understanding of consensus. Von Haast’s concept of an 
educated man or woman, moreover, stood out because it adhered to a humanist ideal 
that integrated emotions and perceived individuals as a genuine combination of intellect 
and feeling. Cook and von Haast confirmed Mackenzie’s practical approach towards 
debate. They formulated a version of debate that considered the promotion of fellowship 
a civic duty in a world beyond the confines of the university. 
Debaters at Canterbury College, Otago University, and Auckland University 
College recognised their professors’ emphasis on rationality as the underpinning of their 
social existence. They moulded notions of intellectual maturity and civic responsibility 
into their own version of acquisition and contemplation of knowledge and public 
involvement. Their topics never lacked ambition. In 1879, the debating society in 
Dunedin read essays on such normative issues as “Truth” and “What is the chief end of 
man” (Hocken, minute book, 12 Sept. and 15 Aug. 1879). In 1882, a Miss Edger read an 
essay on “The Ethics of Debate” before the Canterbury College Dialectic Society 
(MBL, minute book, 22 April 1882).22 The same year, debaters in Otago listened to a 
contribution entitled “Literary and Debating Societies and the Duties of Their 
Members” (Hocken, minute book, 13 Oct. 1882). In subsequent years, essays on the 
merits of debating and education were discussed occasionally. In 1891, the Auckland 
debating society addressed the question: “Does Education add to Human Happiness?” 
(SCUA, minute book, 19 Aug. 1891). Taking the final vote, all members agreed that it 
did. After the first period of actively contemplating the worth of debate, more topics of 
immediate civic interest dominated the programmes. Yet some members noticed the lax 
debating discipline in the maturing years of the societies and deplored the absence of 
                                               
22 In 1882, according to the original constitution Lillian and Kate M. Edger were members of the society. 
It is not clear, which one of the sisters wrote the essay. 
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“quality and spirit” (OUR, June 1895, 56). A certain “Wellwisher” welcomed Scobie 
Mackenzie’s lecture, hoping that it would “bear rich fruit next year, and will make our 
debaters more what they should be” (ibid.).  
Students expressed dissatisfaction with the adumbration of worthiness and would 
forcefully expatiate on the value of education and deliberation. In 1893, G. P. Howell in 
his prize-winning essay for the Dunedin debating society professed the opinion that 
members of the club should acknowledge their duty to humankind: “Let us then as 
human beings remember the part we have to play in life; and how, in the youth and 
beauty of our manhood and womanhood, let us begin our strivings to reach that high 
ideal of manly perfection that approaches to the nature of eternal beings” (Howell 1893, 
132). The unattainable ideal of human perfection is extrapolated from and maintained 
by the art of speaking, the possibilities that accompany it and the responsibilities 
ensuing from one’s public station. In other words, members of the debating society 
prepared themselves “to be speakers, preachers, lawyers, and orators, who are destined 
to …  govern the fate of their country” (134).23 Howell’s spirited defence of the powers 
of eloquence is the corollary of an idealised tradition of public debate and oratory that 
harkens back to his teachers’ lessons. Howell employed expressions of warfare when he 
specified the means by which he intended to obtain this influential place in society: “Let 
us show our courage in the war of words, and learn to use our logical weapons with 
deftness and skill” (133). Amidst the reality of competition for a limited number of 
socially influential positions in the colony, Howell defended the communal spirit of 
debating societies with the assertion that “care for the feelings of others is a mark of true 
esprit de corps” (134). Ray in the American debating context shows how ambiguous 
this notion of collective experience becomes when set into a competitive framework of 
                                               
23 “Preachers” and “lawyers” were the only practical professions in Howell’s list and it is significant that 
lawyers and not politicians were meant to “govern the fate of their country.” Stone illustrates that this 
preference was not particularly extraordinary, giving that the profession and its practitioners flourished in 
the colony (Stone 1988).  
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debating. The “esprit de corps” only intensifies the impression of debating “as an 
entertaining display of rhetorical skill” (Ray 2004, 6) because the victory of the debater 
is achieved among proficient and scrupulous judges.  
Thus, the nineteenth-century perspective on debating in New Zealand and the 
United States pays tribute to a humanistic ideal of education that confers on the 
normative aspects of argumentation the probative force of collective experience. 
Members’ genuine debating experience consists of a combination of combative and 
languid moments that never questioned their essential grounding in rational 
understanding. In Habermas’s words, students of debate are able to communicate 
despite the boundaries of their diverging lifeworlds because they base their discourse on 
the perspective of a world that is mutually shared. A claim to truth is seen as universal 
because it emerges from the unconditional validity of their utterances (Habermas 2001, 
24). It is, thus, the latent use of the term truth as criticism that reveals the structural 
basis of intersubjective communication in the nineteenth century.  
The idealised belief in the force of mutually shared reason constitutes one aspect of 
“inter”subjectivity in late nineteenth-century New Zealand debating societies. In 
academic discourse, truth and rationality were routinely juxtaposed with faith and 
emotion. Professor Haslam explicitly contrasts the Greeks’ superstitions with the 
nineteenth-century perspective on critical knowledge. Socrates’ Greece “was an age of 
faith. Men had not learnt to be critical. They judged by their feelings only. Whatever 
impressed them with its novelty, or beauty, or majesty, at once commanded from them 
that allegiance which we are accustomed to give only to the irresistible claims of 
reasoned truth” (Haslam 1884, 8). In 1897, Mackechnie in a similar fashion exemplified 
how deeply engrained this belief really was among the New Zealand intellectual elite. 
Before the New Zealand Institute, he emphasised that the conviction of reaching reliable 
forms of truth would eventually elevate a person: 
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We frequently fail – fall short of what we intended; but the ideal remains before 
us; and if we are true to our better selves we as repeatedly strive again. These 
attempts to rise in the scale of being – the very discipline of life – have an 
educational and elevating force. They are not opposed to, but sanctioned by, 
reason, and tend to raise us to a higher level than that of mere animal life. We 
reach this end …  by individualism, ever developing higher resolves and a nobler 
personality. By this means we attain, if we ever can attain, the highest 
expression of humanity – its ideal perfection. (Mackechnie 1897, 118) 
Mackechnie’s belief in individual betterment by means of the normative quality of 
reason combined with his practical idea of achievement among fellow citizens and 
deeply rooted beliefs in liberal education gave rise to an ideal of practical humanity. 
Debating thus grounded became a highly normative exercise for late-Victorians; it 
provided a test for their social relevance and competence.  
That relevance was understood within the regulative framework of public 
respectability and culture. Bailey in reviewing Britain’s public culture observes that 
respectability “primarily enjoined moral rectitude, but in addition, it also demanded 
economic continence and self-sufficiency” (Bailey 1998, 33). Members of debating and 
literary societies because they practised a legitimate pastime activity, conformed to the 
social and moral demands of their immediate community. However, respectability’s 
“attainment was a matter of independent individual achievement through an ongoing 
process of self-discipline and self-improvement” (ibid.). New Zealand’s intellectual 
elite embraced these values and put forth an Arnoldian version of all-round practical 
culture. As early as 1884, Professor Black opened the Dunedin debating session with a 
lecture on “Allround Culture.” The same year, students at Canterbury College discussed 
the impact of Matthew Arnold’s perspective on the cultivation of high culture. In 1901, 
James R. Wilkinson, a former member of the CCDS and still associated with the 
college, propounded the argument that students had to embrace culture as “one purpose, 
end and aim of higher learning” because contemporary definition of it included 
“Science, Art, Ethics, and …  (the intellectual part) of professions, pursuits and 
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livelihoods” (Wilkinson 1901, 7-8). Culture for Wilkinson comprised what Kett 
described in the American context as “a body of knowledge …  and the personal 
qualities elicited by the acquisition of culture” (Kett 1994, 142-3). He, like Black in 
Dunedin, demanded: “let us be Universalists, and vastly all-round” (Wilkinson 1901, 9). 
Wilkinson’s statement was uttered with the confidence of the New Zealand intellectual 
elite which sought to create universal cultural standards for the New Zealand colonial 
public.24 
At the end of the nineteenth century, this rather ambitious understanding of 
deliberation increasingly proved insufficient in the face of colonial actualities. Farrell 
suggests two solutions when “validity claims of normative reason …  intersect with real 
practices of speech” (Farrell 1993, 199). On the one hand, Habermas’s and the late-
Victorians’ ideal suppositions might intersect with everyday institutional practices; on 
the other, these claims might come to function only in a “rarefied realm in which the 
equally rarefied argumentation paradigm is applicable (science and perhaps legal 
reasoning)” (ibid.). Farrell’s second answer is rather limited in its scope. A paradigm of 
argumentation does not only function within a specific discipline. This “rarefied realm” 
might permeate a practical space such as debating. As Professor Haslam and his 
students would have it: “We are accustomed to give only to the irresistible claims of 
reasoned truth” (Haslam 1884, 8). At the same time, this rational framework possibly 
enables at once respectable but also amusing forms of argumentative discourse. The 
Canterbury student club “Chichelian Senate” aimed at mimicking parliamentary 
                                               
24 Like McAloon, Gibbons argues that “those classes which had most power – the gentry, the urban haute 
bourgeoisie, and the lower middle class – established the hegemonic values for the whole society; that is 
to say, the ruling classes successfully projected their particular ideological views to the extent that the 
subordinate classes had little influence” (Gibbons 1992, 309). I believe that Reid’s and McAloon’s term 
“intellectual elite” better captures what Gibbons describes. His depiction of the haute bourgeoisie as more 
refined than the lower middle class is not conducive to an understanding of New Zealand’s public culture 
because it tends to exclude transitions between these supposedly separated groups. I however agree with 
Gibbons that those in power – be it intellectual, financial or political – attempted to transform their values 
into regulative norms for others. 
  75 
strategies.25 Its members’ performances incorporated everything regarded as culturally 
“universal” and sincere and yet undercut the display of rationality through mockery: 
“Subtle in its reasoning, practical in its issues, scholarly in its style, it [the Governor’s 
speech] was the brilliant climax of one who was at once a man of affairs, a philosopher, 
a classic, and a rhetorician” (CCR, Oct. 1898, 39). As a consequence, Farrell’s analysis 
is feasible insofar as the two solutions are regarded as a genuine whole. I suggest that 
rarefied realms of discourse give rise to new forms of discursive interaction by engaging 
“with everyday institutional practices”. By this standard, nineteenth-century debate 
encouraged the formal as well as social contextualisation of reason and truth. Maurice 
Charland echoes this emphasis when he criticises Farrell’s position as being still 
logocentric. Charland instead reasons that “rhetoric does not only occur in the polis, the 
political community of consensus and mutual respect, but also in the pagus, the outlying 
regions of civil society” (Charland 1994, 342). In other words, formalised debate that 
heralds scientific argumentation enters civil society because it is still exercised in the 
boundaries of a traditional discursive paradigm that is valid in public. The introduction 
of Olla Podrida evenings represented this subversive effect of a combination of 
respectable discourse and supposedly uncivilised elements of social interaction.  
Clubs, associations and societies, from the time of their creation in the eighteenth 
century, incorporated elements of amusements. Literary and debating societies belonged 
to the Victorian sphere of ‘rational recreation and leisure’ and education.26 Professor 
                                               
25 There is no mention of the group in any other records. According to the one source, it was founded in 
1891 to formalise the usual gatherings of the “College House” at Study No. 2. Sir William S. Marris, Sir 
Apirana Ngata, H.B. Watson, Sir Earnest Rutherford, G.G.S. Robinson, T.W. Cane, Mr. Northcote and 
the Atkinson brothers were among the members. Notably, all of them were also enrolled in the debating 
society. 
26 Borsay in his history of British leisure argues that ‘rational recreation’ was taken as ‘serious’ leisure. 
“Such pastimes often ‘mimic’ work or education. This has the advantage of legitimizing leisure in a 
society in which work and learning are dominant ethics” (Borsay 2006, 7). Borsay develops this argument 
by pointing out that rational recreation does not necessarily exclude elements outside its paradigm of 
seriousness: “An evening class might be both educational and recreational, charitable work both a branch 
of civil life and a pastime” (ibid.). Debating societies in New Zealand were part of education, leisure, 
work and civic life. Like Borsay and Cunningham, I do not understand leisure as “the time which is left 
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Sale considered debating a university “attraction” that ideally combined academic 
instruction and leisure because in England “the amusement of the place [college] had as 
much to do in fitting one for the world as the work in the class room had” (OW, 2 July 
1896, 13). At the end of the nineteenth century, the significance of amusement for these 
clubs changed because entrepreneurs strove to provide middle-class friendly 
entertainment.27 A debating evening was often “pleasantly spent in social intercourse; 
with songs, music, and recitations kindly contributed by various members and friends” 
(SCUA, minute book, 30 Sept. 1891). Debating societies extended their syllabi by 
including Olla Podrida and Farrago evenings, “In Memoriam” essay readings, drama 
productions like “Much Ado About Nothing”, singsongs and public concerts. 
In particular, Olla Podridas made visible the fellowship among debaters by utilising 
the anonymity of the author, humour, satire, audience participation and the acting out of 
written texts. Entertainment’s separate status within the debating programmes was 
subverted and both debate and amusement began to merge and even to be 
commercialised. Mock trials, parliamentary debates and intercollegiate debating 
tournaments heightened the amusement aspect of the fortnightly sessions. In 1892, the 
Otago University debating society bought a piano to upgrade the quality of their 
                                                                                                                                         
over after work” (Cunningham 1990, 279); instead, I regard leisure as an integral part of late nineteenth-
century New Zealand public culture that permeated public and private life. In England, Morris shows that 
the Masonic Order and the Freemasons very early provided the necessary social discipline to stage 
subscription concerts or organise dances. Where the public failed to raise money or create an air of 
respectability and prestige, voluntary organisations stepped in (Morris 1990, 402). In New Zealand, 
McAloon regards the Christchurch Savage Club in a similar light. It was “essentially a social club, with 
the attraction of affording its members a respite from domesticity” and the sphere of the socially familiar 
(McAloon 2000, 206). 
27 Ashby in his study of American amusement reviews Phineas T. Barnum’s strategies “to refashion 
theatre audiences along middle-class lines” (Ashby 2006, 49). Barnum’s plan was to create a norm for 
middle-class rational entertainment; the lecture room was paramount to this endeavour. “As Barnum said: 
‘My plan is to introduce into the lecture room highly moral and instructive domestic dramas, written 
expressly for my establishment and so constructed as to please and edify while they possess a powerful 
reformatory tendency’” (50). In New Zealand, acceptable bourgeois amusement was just as much 
characterised by a “reformatory tendency” as Barnum’s creations. As a result, in New Zealand, a range of 
high and low amusement was available to an interested audience. 
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meetings (OUR, Comm. Issue 1893, 41).28 The introduction of lantern or limelight 
views increasingly improved the display of opening addresses and made them attractive 
and visible to a large audience. In the 1890s, attendance at public events organised by 
the three collegiate societies frequently reached 150 or 200. As Borsay says, these 
events “mimicked” education and as a consequence contributed to a body of “serious 
leisure” that provided an atmosphere of respectability for the intellectual elite of New 
Zealand (Borsay 2006, 7).  
Despite being presented as innocent student amusements, entertaining features 
already contained aspects that altered notions of infallible truth and uncontested 
primacy of reason. In 1887, the Dialectic Society introduced Olla Podrida evenings. The 
Otago University Review in his commemorative issue of 1893 related the fact that in 
1889, Dunedin adopted the concept and termed the evenings “Farrago”.29 By 1897, the 
Auckland University debating society frequently practiced Olla Podridas (NZH, 6 Oct. 
1897, 5). Whereas “In Memoriam” evenings were abandoned after a short time, all three 
societies kept Olla Podridas on their programmes because of their popularity. The first 
evening of this sort in Christchurch consisted in the reading of twelve humorous 
contributions of prose and poetry. In later years, the contributions were divided into 
essay writing and speaking competitions. Strict anonymity was preserved in the 
presentation of the texts. After all contributions had been read, the meeting would vote 
on the best piece and those who submitted a text would disclose their identity. 
Sometimes contributors refused to acknowledge their authorship and remained 
anonymous.30 Many of the contributions were subsequently published in the Reviews of 
                                               
28 Pianos were one of the most important musical instruments in New Zealand settler communities. 
Stenson and Olssen point out that “[b]y 1901, nearly 4000 pianos were imported annually, enough for 
every fourth occupied building” (Stenson and Olssen 1997, 308). 
29 “‘Farrago’ was borrowed from our sister Society in Canterbury College. Although a humorous writer in 
the Review took great exception to the name bestowed in this new development, it proved a signal 
success” (OUR, Comm. Issue 1893, 40). 
30 In 1893 in Dunedin the identity of the winner could not be determined: “Nine items, complying with 
the conditions of originality and brevity, were presented on the first evening, and in order to preserve the 
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the colleges. Olla Podridas created a sense of belonging without identifying gender, age 
or the duration of membership. In 1899, “Almamatriculus” investigated for the Olla 
Podrida “The Present State of Polite (and Impolite) Laughter in Australasia” 
(Almamatriculus 1899, 29) which revealed a varied landscape of “common or garden 
laughs,” “silent laughs” and other “species”. In the end, the author wished to “bid 
farewell, merely offering my sincerest condolences to the man of humour (I speak in the 
common gender)” (30, italics mine). Only towards the end of the century did societies 
begin to dispense refreshments at the end of the evening, which were usually prepared 
by the female members of the society and thus re-introduced a gendered element to the 
fellowship experience.31 Apart from this additional recreational element, originality, 
brevity, literary merit and humour were the bedrock of an Olla Podrida’s success. 
Questions of truthfulness did not determine the merit of each contribution. Acute 
argumentation only hindered the triumph of the contestant. Instead, intelligent wit (not 
sarcasm) and an instinct for the ridiculous in daily collegiate routine secured large 
appreciation for the submitted piece. Mr. Norris, for example, “struck a rich vein of 
twenty-four-carat humour in his winning contribution” (CCR, Oct. 1898, 11). Even 
though Olla Podrida meetings did not abandon gender stereotypes, they attempted to 
create a sphere of participation that was potentially egalitarian. 
Audience participation and anonymity were of crucial importance to the concept of 
Olla Podrida and generated a moment of obscurity and suspense in electing a winner. 
Compared to the later popular debating contests, the entire audience still voted on the 
basis of what they had heard and seen performed by the secretary or other members. 
                                                                                                                                         
desired anonymity, were read by the secretary Mr. J.R. Macdonald. The vote taken at the close decided 
that the ‘Capping Song’ was the most meritorious, but the prize-winning author declined to reveal his 
identity” (OUR, Comm. Issue 1893, 40). 
31 “At the close of the programme light refreshments were dispensed by the ladies” (NZH, 12 Dec. 1902, 
6). In 1893, the Otago University Review remarked that tea and cake “may have influenced the 
attendance” at the society’s meetings (OUR, Comm. Issue 1893, 41). In the 1880s the introduction of 
refreshments during the intervals became popular in theatres. Students might have adhered to this practice 
for Olla Podrida gatherings.  
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The charisma and presence of the author was not relevant. The element of disguise 
allowed them to be daring in their criticism. Seizing the opportunity of questioning 
cultural norms in the safe realm of the amusing, students embraced the task 
wholeheartedly. Students W. L. Scott and E. J. Parr won the Olla Podrida of 1900 with a 
short piece entitled “The Pantechnicon.” Therein, they prognosticate the future state of 
Canterbury College: “Intellectual enlightenment is now compulsory, and no man or 
woman may be married without the prior attainment of a degree” (Parr and Scott 1900, 
29). They describe the pandemonium that was to result from providing higher education 
“free, gratis, and for nothing to all honest sons and daughter of toil” (28). Scott and Parr 
chose to reveal their identity. In 1901, an anonymous writer upheld the act and stuck to 
his nom de plum. He described a fictional royal visit to Canterbury College. The story 
ridiculed the Premier by letting him utter a most unfortunate speech, thus, branding him 
an appallingly bad orator: 
He [the Premier] then stated that it was extremely gratifying to note that the 
number of young persons attending the University was increasing year by year, 
and pointed out the singular fact that the number of criminals and lunatics was 
increasing in the same ratio. By a happy allusion to the seal of the College, he 
showed that the sheep and the plough went hand-in-hand with education. 
(Newspaper Cutting, 1901, 34)  
The author’s irony is particularly acid when taking into account that in the previous 
issue of the Review, Wilkinson had heralded culture with the motto “Here’s is to my 
Spade, emblem and type of the Real, of bare Utility, and of naked Truth” (Wilkinson 
1901, 9). The urge to lampoon college culture and its emphasis on the useful insinuates 
that it was something ostensibly characteristic of New Zealand public culture; that it 
was something the collegiate Olla Podrida audience would instantaneously recognise as 
familiar and typical.  
McAloon demonstrates that in late-Victorian New Zealand culture, values like 
education and work were typically promoted by the colonial rich who exerted most 
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influence, politically as well as economically.32 “With their high degree of visibility and 
leadership,” they created realities for colonial life that effected students as much as 
other members of the public (McAloon 1996, 60). As a consequence, the identification 
of prominent public figure with money, influence, work-ethics and educational interests 
was part of what Farrell terms “social knowledge”. Based on their confidence in the 
argumentative paradigm of mutual rationality, students could undermine propositions in 
favour of liberal education or respectable culture without threatening the foundation of 
their beliefs. Nineteenth-century college students were not constantly striving for 
inclusion in a well-informed, truth-oriented rhetorical community; rather they 
established settings where reason and truth could be addressed through laughter. Most 
of the Olla Podrida contributions were almost devoid of serious content; they were 
composed as fun items and were perceived accordingly. 
Laughter and jokes were welcomed as beneficial recreation by the students’ body. In 
1901, “Gravitas” called for more jokes for students because s/he believed that “a good 
hearty laugh” would “brighten his brain, expand his chest and make him a new man” 
(Gravitas 1901, 27). For “Gravitas”, jokes were the necessary counterpart to rational 
education. If both could be combined a graduate “will have become a peaceable, law-
abiding citizen, with a rather select taste in puns” (28). As a consequence, fellowship 
among debaters was established along the lines of rational discourse as well as 
incantations of non-rational texts. The non-rational and humorous element was regarded 
as the physical relief from mental work. At the end of the nineteenth century, the sincere 
belief in the infallibility of rational argumentation created a paradigm which by its 
confrontation with “everyday institutional practices” corrupted its own supposedly 
                                               
32 McAloon argues that New Zealand’s rich were “effectively a British bourgeoisie” combined with an 
almost fanatical work-ethic: “The rich justified their wealth by their role in promoting and leading the 
economic development of the colony. The whole purpose of colonization had been to civilize the 
wilderness and make it economically productive, to bring these South Pacific islands into the orbit of 
British commerce and society” (McAloon 1996, 60). 
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invariant standards. As a consequence, New Zealand debate functioned as a specialised 
form of argumentation as well as a method to transcend colonial conventions. This 
modus operandi specifically surfaced in students’ performance of an “us” sentiment 
during the Boer War. 
 
The Boer War and the Performance of “Us” 
The Boer War (1899-1902) is often connected with a rising national sentiment 
among New Zealanders at the end of the nineteenth century. Scholarship of New 
Zealand history commonly associates the Boer War with the first hesitant attempts of a 
war-enthusiastic New Zealand public to formulate distinctly colonial New Zealand 
virtues (and vices).33 It is beyond the scope and outside the field of interest of this thesis 
to comprehensively discuss levels of New Zealand nationalism, the idea of the nation-
state or the implications of nineteenth-century understandings of empire. Instead, I will 
restrict myself to the investigation of those issues within the assumed paradigm of 
fellowship. Among students, the Boer War instantiated a search for home and 
belonging. The end of the war, gave New Zealanders in general an opportunity to 
welcome their soldiers “home” to New Zealand.34 New Zealanders engagement in 
Africa also allowed them to associate “Home” with England or the Empire. Students 
during the war performed their ideas of “us” either during public celebration in New 
Zealand or as soldiers overseas. In confrontation with the Boers, students could locate 
elements of the “Other”. In 1894, the student D. A. Strachan was convinced that New 
Zealand would rise to become a great nation in its own respect: “for greatness consists, 
not in individuals but in relations; things small in themselves become great by their 
relation to circumstances” (Strachan 1894, 101). The ensuing discussion illustrates how 
the performance solidified a notion of fellowship among debaters that emphasised 
                                               
33 Mein Smith 2005, 118-119; King 2003 and 2004, 285-93; Crawford and McGibbon 2003; Belich 2001, 
78-81; Belich 1986, 125-142; Sinclair 2000, 227-33; Phillips 1996, 132-158. 
34 Tuapeka Times, 7 June 1902, 2; Otago Witness, 4 June 1902, 27; 11 June 1902, 28. 
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relations rather than individuals. Mackenzie’s belief in practical truth and elocutionary 
appeal to a sympathetic crowd were manifest in students’ discussion. According to 
Strachan, New Zealand should imitate Rome, “a warlike people, a more practical” with 
a “popular form of learning” (99). Debaters’ notion of “us” arose to equal parts from a 
prescribed civil norm as well as the performance of fellowship in and beyond debating 
societies. 
Much of nineteenth-century New Zealand’s public culture was determined by its 
position in the Empire. Contemporary discussion of these terms is fraught with 
difficulties and slippery terminology. Often they can only be defined contextually. Tony 
Ballantyne has made available for further deliberation the trans-national and trans-
imperial understanding of British Empire. Ballantyne explains that “we can conceive of 
the empire as a series of archives, each arising out of local concerns, but braided 
together, however imperfectly, by institutional exchanges, webs of personal 
correspondence and shared bodies of knowledge” (Ballantyne 2002a, 8). He establishes 
this “series” as a complex of “webs” that “underpin the operation of the empire’s 
economic system, enable the transplantation of legislation between colonies, facilitate 
the dissemination of scientific information across national borders and mould the 
discourses that structured the British Empire” (Ballantyne and Moloughney 2006, 71). 
MacKenzie follows a similar line of argument when he analyses the activities of 
imperial institutions as “preventing imperial propaganda from becoming institutionally 
ossified. Each new society represented not so much a dissipation of effort as a fresh 
infusion of energy at critical moments” (MacKenzie 1986, 148). Like Ballantyne, 
MacKenzie locates the force of imperial information strategies outside London and the 
Imperial Institute. Ballantyne emphasises that empire fostered multiple colonial centres 
that were part of a complex vibrant network of influences and counter-influences 
(Ballantyne 2002a, 2005a). This interpretation echoes Anderson’s formulation of “print 
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capitalism” (Anderson 1991, 40) and nineteenth-century monopolisation of written 
documentation and scientific inquiry in cementing imperial reality. Without the 
enormous increase of print commerce, the progress of communication infrastructure, 
writing activities (private and public) and the belief in the reliability of scientific 
inquiry, local and imperial superimposed webs would have atrophied. Ballantyne points 
out that New Zealand’s geographical location possibly slowed information flow but did 
not isolate it from the “complex intellectual traffic that operated over great distances 
within the empire” (Ballantyne 2005a, 96).35  
Implications of Ballantyne’s imperial communication networks are indirectly 
referenced in Attridge when he argues that discourse as form “can undermine function 
and that there are discrepancies between form and particular representations, which can 
undermine the ideological function of the work” (Attridge 2003, 11). In other words, 
Attridge adduces that imperial structures during the Boer War were ubiquitously shaped 
and consolidated by the ambivalent relation of discourse and the validity of values and 
ideas. Habermas emphasises the intersubjective nature of rationality that enables 
communication; debate similarly relies on a highly structured method of communication 
that facilitates (as well as “undermines”) discursive processes. Benoit et al. and O’Keefe 
propose that debate facilitates “collaborative argument production,” which denotes that 
participants jointly produce an argument in a dialogic process.36 “Intersubjective” in a 
late nineteenth-century context implies that not only layers of individual argumentation 
made possible the production of opinions, but that further imperial, inter-colonial webs 
consolidated this process of conceptualisation because they established a connection 
between individuals, institutions and volunteer groups. On a micro-level, centres of 
                                               
35 Ballantyne highlights that exchanges between individuals and institutions “moved freely across both 
modern nation-state boundaries and the analytical units (e.g. settler colonies vs. military-garrison 
colonies) that historians use to order their work, and played a fundamental role in the history of imperial 
knowledge production and the cultural lives of many individuals within the empire” (Ballantyne 2005a, 
96). 
36 Benoit et al. 1992, 12; O’Keefe 1992, 79-90; Jackson and Jacobs 1992, 681-705. 
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knowledge production in the form of debating and literary societies confirm the 
analytical metaphor of “webs.” Morris, for example, illustrates that in nineteenth-
century England: “the structure of the voluntary society network served and exploited 
local community and urban identities and at the same time moulded them into national 
identities” (Morris 1990, 414). In New Zealand, ideas circulated back and forth between 
members and societies in Dunedin, Christchurch and Auckland. Moreover, these 
societies participated in and contributed to an international information flow. They 
reinforced structural requirements that formalised public discourse and as a 
consequence, coalesced ideas of empire and home that rendered nationalist sentiment 
intelligible to the majority of the New Zealand society. 
Sinclair argues that “for many New Zealanders ‘Home’ became a passion” that was 
mainly concerned with England (Sinclair 1986, 94). The idea was entangled in an 
almost impossible “complexity of New Zealand feelings abut the Motherland, the 
Empire, or the British Commonwealth of Nations” (ibid.). Students employed exactly 
this array of ambiguous terminology. Staff and students at the colonial colleges 
repeatedly contemplated their perception of imperial politics. As early as 1890, 
Canterbury students asked whether “England is justified in resisting further advances 
being made by European nations in Africa” (MBL, minute book, 27 Sept. 1890); the 
result was a universal no. Empire, for the students, also described New Zealand’s 
aspirations in the South Pacific.37 In 1894, Strachan at Otago sketched the future of the 
colony as the dominant nation in the southern hemisphere: “New Zealand has taken up 
the sceptre of empire; for its is already an empire in embryo. Around her, like sentinels, 
her colonies are standing” (Strachan 1894, 132). As a consequence, the dichotomy of 
colonizer and colony provided a frame of reference in the global network of the British 
Empire and served as a model for dominance for New Zealand in the South. Definitions 
                                               
37 McIntyre 1992, 342; Sinclair 2000, 226-227, Belich 2001, 236-237. 
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of “home” as old and new were central to students’ attempts to positions themselves. In 
1902, former Canterbury students Alpers and Irvine pointed out that “the New 
Zealanders have so far remained more distinctly English than, perhaps, is the case in 
some of the larger colonies” (Alpers and Irvine 1902, 429). They regarded the particular 
New Zealand attitude as a result of the country’s natural size and believed that “all 
classes, whether immigrant or native-born, habitually speak of the United Kingdom as 
‘Home’” (ibid.). Britain as a consequence, was redefined as “mother country,” “old 
world” or “old country”.  
Boundaries between the terms, even though constantly shifting, preserved a core 
reference to the natural conditions of New Zealand and elsewhere. The Otago debating 
society prize essay of 1899 profoundly illustrated this point. The anonymous writer 
freely transgressed from one term to the other without actively questioning her use of 
terminology. In favourably comparing the climate of New Zealand with that of England, 
the author concluded that it “does not sufficiently differ from that of the Mother 
Country, to affect, in any considerable degree, the bodily or mental constitution of the 
colonists or their descendents” (Natural Conditions, 1899, 84). By contrast, the 
“estrangement from Nature” in the colony “must be trivial in comparison with the state 
of affairs in the large cities of the Old Country” (85). The author never impugned New 
Zealand’s affiliation to Britain but always utilised it to define the “home” as either kin 
to or alienated from Britain’s natural setting. “Old Country” became coterminous with 
unsuitable and alien. “Mother Country” delineated degrees of familiarity. Depending on 
argumentative convenience, the understanding of “home” was located somewhere 
between overseas’ European Britain and local South Pacific New Zealand.38 The Boer 
                                               
38 Understanding nature caused New Zealanders to engage in a process of identification – physically as 
well as intellectually. Nature provided a point of reference to mould, influence, protect or destroy 
environment. Ballantyne and Bennett suggest that nature, landscape and community remind “us that New 
Zealanders’ sense of place, their attachments to particular landscapes, and their sense of identity are 
created in a variety of geographic contexts, both ‘at home’ and overseas” (Ballantyne and Bennett 2005, 
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War reflected this ability to live in two worlds. It not only strengthened New 
Zealanders’ ability to determine elements characteristic to their own country but at the 
same time entangled them in the exercise of their imperial loyalty. New Zealand’s 
involvement in South Africa added a new quality to students’ search for belonging and 
ideas about fellowship. 
The significance of popular entertainment and physical exposure for the 
identification of “us” in the midst of the Boer War has been largely omitted from recent 
scholarship. Phillips briefly discusses the connection of the Boer War, a growing 
entertainment business and the rise of rugby in New Zealand culture. Daley points out 
that, in 1902, Eugene Sandow’s show of muscle display took place in New Zealand in 
the midst of a controversy on the physical fitness of young New Zealanders to join the 
overseas war action.39 National sentiment found an expression in the physical that was 
preferably exhibited in public performance. The New Zealand public during the war 
engaged in what Hobsbawm calls the use of “symbols and semi-ritual practices” in 
which crowds utilised flags, banners, music and ceremonies (Hobsbawm 1996, 12). 
These exercises of patriotism created grounds for identification for soldiers as well as 
those remaining in New Zealand.  
Music was paramount in inspiring feelings of belonging among New Zealanders. In 
1900, Arthur H. Norris the former secretary of the Dialectic Society welcomed the 
                                                                                                                                         
16). Dunlap describes how national sentiment was associated with nature in colonial circumstances: 
“National nature had been an obvious thing, a few visible or distinctive plants and animals or striking 
features of topography or climate. Now it was coming to encompass a wider range of creatures and to 
emphasize immediate experience” (Dunlap 1999, 218). Apart from the perspectives on land and nature 
that arose from an Arcadian vision of the colony, students in New Zealand used “nature” to capture 
degree of “home”/ “Home” (New Zealand / England). The idea of Arcadia is described in Mahar 2005 
and Fairburn 1989, 29. 
39 Daley argues that Sandow, “international strongman and physical culture advocate,” used concerns 
over the “quality” of New Zealand’s population to set his “entertainment vehicle” in motion and gather 
public support. She maintains that Sandow’s “show and his system of physical culture focused on how to 
change the body: the future and newness, not the past was important. The body could become modern if 
new technology and a scientific approach were taken” (Daley 2000, 241-2). After seven weeks, Sandow 
became a “household word …  that captured the complex interplay of modernity, leisure and 
consumerism” (256).  
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familiar tunes played by a military brass band in his war camp in South Africa.40 The 
music complemented an already quiet day: 
To-day is a perfect day, warm sun and a cool breeze. Close by are the white tents 
of the troops camped here – Marshall’s Horse, 2nd M.I., and a foot regiment, 
whose band is playing at the present moment. It is the first brass band we have 
heard since we left Wellington, so you can imagine our delight. They have just 
finished playing a favourite hymn tune. ([Norris?] 1900, 19) 
The military brass band combined familiarity with amusement infused with a touch of 
religious reverence.41 Before the war, G. P. Howells described the element of music in 
the debating syllabus as a form of entertainment that unified listeners in a particular 
way: “sweet enchantress of the inner feelings and deep emotions of our breasts, long 
reign as an imperious queen within our halls; continue ever to transport us to Elysian 
fields of bliss, or bear us mid the din of war, the rattle of musketry, and the deep 
booming of cannon. Let us feel a martial enthusiasm pervade our bodies, till we fancy 
we are marching, while the lusty bugles sound, to a glorious victory” (Howells 1893, 
135). As a consequence, for Norris, the experience of hearing a brass band in South 
Africa evoked feelings for home but likewise stimulated his sense of belonging; an 
attitude partly cultivated in the debating societies.  
The Boer War experienced a variety of public entertainments that drew massive 
crowds and created an “us” sentiment among New Zealanders. On October 21st 1899, 
                                               
40 Hight and Candy’s register lists Norris as born in England. After a B.A. and M.A. in English and 
French he joined the Second Contingent as corporal during the Boer War. During his time at Canterbury 
he was the Review’s editor in 1899 and 1900. In 1901, after his return from South Africa, he was ordained 
Deacon of Church of England and became a Priest in 1903. Between 1902 and 1923 he was Chaplain to 
the Forces and “active member of various War Societies” (Hight and Candy 1923, 221; CCR, June 1900, 
30).  
41 Attractions like vaudeville shows, music halls, the Theatre Royal, the popular brass bands and art 
galleries provided people with opportunities for diversion (Wilson et al. 2005, 225-45, 249-252; Gibbons 
1992, 316). Simpson regards “Opera was one of the most admired forms of colonial entertainment” 
(Simpson 1993, 62) and sees it as part of an Australasian entertainment industry. Moreover, Clarke 
illustrates that, for example, royal celebrations “held immense importance for contemporaries, and were 
among the most prominent and colourful events in nineteenth-century Otago” (Clarke 2002, 138). John 
Innes of Canterbury College, for example, divided his spare time equally between associations and clubs 
and occasional public events. As a young student he was not only a member of the dialectic society but 
also frequented meetings of the Philosophical Institute of Christchurch and the Young Men’s Association. 
In 1882, he went several times to the International Exhibition in Christchurch (Innes CMDR, 13, 14, 32-
33). 
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40,000 people were present when the first Boer War contingent left Wellington. Richard 
Seddon, Lord Ranfurly and John Blair (then mayor of Wellington) gave addresses to the 
enthusiastic and large crowd. Bands on steamers filled Wellington with patriotic music. 
When the third contingent was sent off from Christchurch 30,000 were present in 
Lyttelton and 15,000 in Hagley Park. Students at the University of Otago and members 
of the debating society immediately planned to form their own contingent the moment 
the war broke out and the government had ensured that New Zealanders would join the 
troops in South Africa. Richard Seddon secured Parliament’s and public consent before 
New Zealand was formally called upon for reinforcement of the imperial troops.42 In 
October 1899, the Dialectic Society had to postpone a particularly interesting debate 
because of “the rejoicings over the relief of Mafeking” (CCR, Oct. 1899, 14).43 The 
same day, the college “contributed a squad of 40 students in cap and gown to the 
procession” in Christchurch (30). A year later, the Dunedin Evening Post announced for 
Wellington the release of moving pictures on the war action: 
Mr. Montgomery's popular company will reopen at the Opera House this 
evening with the new kinematograph films that arrived by last week's Frisco 
mail …  Amongst the latest picture importations are films of Lord Roberts' entry 
into Pretoria, General French on the way to Kimberley (a particularly interesting 
film), H.M.S. Powerful's return to Portsmouth, bringing out wounded, Boers 
around Kimberley, and many other scenes of interest. The managers promise 
one of the best picture exhibitions yet placed before the Wellington public. 
(Evening Post, 6 Aug. 1900, 4) 
                                               
42 Belich notices that “he was almost successful in getting New Zealand troops to South Africa ahead of 
those other settlement colonies, but was bilked by a few New South Welshmen who had cheated by 
starting from Britain” (Belich 2001, 79).  
43 ‘Mafeking Night’ became known as the end of the siege of the British by Boer troops at Mafeking. The 
siege had lasted 217 days (1899-1900) and when news of the British victory reached England, the streets 
in London and elsewhere exploded with nationalist sentiment. Subsequently the term ‘to maffik’ briefly 
came in use. (Holmes 2001, 530) Its fame lasted well into the twentieth century. In 1908, notably Baden-
Powell, the hero of the siege, extended William Smith’s Boys’ Brigade idea, and formed the Boy Scout 
movement, using his reputation to promote the association. The Boy Scouts are today seen as a result of 
the late nineteenth-century rise of nationalist spirit and creation of societies. Morris maintains that 
“scouting wove together imperialism, the concern for national efficiency and the growing enthusiasm for 
the cleansing effects and moral regeneration of contact with the ‘outdoors’.” (Morris 1990, 423) Belich 
states that in New Zealand, the Boy Scouts were established the same year and became tremendously 
successful. By 1911 approximately 15,000 boys were members. (Belich 2001, 365) 
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The war spectacle was omnipresent in New Zealand and students actively participated. 
In Christchurch, Peace Day, on the second of June 1902 was marked by spontaneously 
assembled groups on Cathedral Square where members of the debating society and 
prominent townspeople gave speeches accompanied by music of the local brass band.44 
In the late nineteenth-century, music was increasingly utilised by the military to 
enhance public approval. MacKenzie shows that “military and other brass bands were 
increasingly used as entertainment in public parks, at civic ceremony, at the departure of 
ships and even in churches” (MacKenzie 1992, 13). The Boer War celebrations and 
ceremonies were part of an arsenal of public leisure activities that were firmly rooted in 
New Zealand’s public culture. 
The approval extended by New Zealand’s students to the military spirit of the Boer 
War period had its origins much earlier. By the time the war broke out, the New 
Zealand public was already familiar with the depiction of military scenes in popular 
entertainment. It was based on not only an intellectual but also a very physical 
experience of warlike power. McNaughton’s description of New Zealand drama 
suggests that early shows frequently used war scenes (preferably placed in the period of 
the Land Wars between 1845-72 and with Maori performers) to amplify the sensational 
aspects of a play. One review of Philo Maori, or New Zealand as it Is (1870) observed 
critically that such massacres were “too recent a memory …  to be burlesqued” 
(McNaughton 1998, 324). War was not to be mocked instead it was regarded as a 
character-building experience that enhanced rather than diminished one’s personality. 
Phillips shows that in the 1870s and 1880s, volunteer corps were preoccupied with 
ceremonial display rather than actual military engagement. Parades and sham fights 
were among the more common forms of military public amusement in New Zealand. In 
1877, the sham fight at Forbury supposedly attracted a crowd of 7,-8,000 spectators 
                                               
44 Recollections of that day in “Peace Day” (1902). 
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(Phillips 1996, 138). Such a large attendance suggests that military entertainment was 
respectable for the majority of New Zealanders. Moreover, central virtues of the New 
Zealand soldier such as chivalry, pioneer spirit, modesty and hardiness that were 
initially taken to characterise New Zealanders’ distinctive performance in the imperial 
forces overseas, later came to describe the best qualities of New Zealand rugby 
players.45 
Students merged this exposure to military themes with their debating practice. In 
1885, in response to Russia’s attack on Afghanistan and expectations of an English-
Russian war, students and professors at Canterbury College resolved to form a corps: 
“The University Rifles.”46 Support for this motion was strong and the responsible 
committee successfully secured the signatures of seventy students, many of them 
members of the debating society. In 1901, in the midst of the engagement in South 
Africa, the endeavour was proudly recalled: “Professor Hutton was elected captain, with 
Professor Haslam and Mr. F. G. Stedman as his lieutenants” (Ohinemuri 1901, 19). 
Students were so much in earnest that they sent an application for enrolment to the 
Defence Department. This however was declined. In 1884, the first AUCC stated that 
“the Senate will be prepared to consider applications from candidates for nomination to 
one Cadetship at the Royal Military College at Sandhurst” (AUCC, 1884, 82).47 
Students eligible had to be between seventeen and twenty-two years old to qualify for 
admission. The heightened interest in patriotism and military display among students 
                                               
45 Phillips provides details on the connection of rugby and the South African War (Phillips 1996, 213-4; 
151). Sport, especially cricket, tennis, rugby and cycling also rated highly among pastime activities. In his 
reminiscences, James Reeves Wilkinson favourably recalls his enthusiasm for cricket and bowls in his 
Christchurch student days (Wilkinson CMDR, 17). In 1900, Professor Scott gave a very well received 
public lecture to the members of the Dialectic Society on “The History of the Cycle” (1900). 
46 In 1885, Britain engaged in a war with Sudan. Contingents from Canada and Australia joined the 
British forces overseas and, for the first time, formed an imperial army. In 1885, John Ballance, Minister 
of Defence in New Zealand, was not in favour of sending colonial troops to Sudan even though New 
Zealanders throughout the country volunteered. McIntyre relates that later in 1885, “when Russia 
appeared to threaten Afghanistan, and Britain stood poised to resist, the Cabinet offered a battalion of a 
thousand men” (McIntyre 1992, 340).  
47 Also AUCC, 1887, 125-126; Sinclair 1983, 38. 
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was part of a general public phenomenon in New Zealand. In 1885, James Anthony 
Froude observed that “the patriotism of the colonists was inflammable as gunpowder” 
(qtd. in Sinclair 2000, 227). In 1887, the “Russian Question” was again discussed by the 
Dialectic Society in Christchurch to little or no avail. Beginning in 1889, topics 
focusing on the state of defence of the colony were occasionally addressed. That year, 
students in Auckland determined that the defences of the colony were both necessary 
and efficient. In 1897, in Christchurch they resolved that “the present system of NZ 
defences is wholly inadequate” (CCR, Oct. 1897, 35), and in 1902, they advanced 
arguments on the question whether “the present outburst of military spirit is detrimental 
to the best interest of the Empire” (Debating Programme, 5 June 1902). Between 1899 
and 1901, students in Auckland agreed that military spirit endangered the commerce of 
the colony and that it most certainly exerted a bad influence on art.48 In 1903, after the 
Boer War had concluded, the same students were convinced that war was in fact 
“elevating to mankind” (SCUA, minute book, 17 Feb. 1903). A result of this sentiment 
might have been the growing number of volunteers in the colony. Between 1897 and 
1902, numbers in New Zealand increased from 5,000 to 18,000.49 Clarke shows that in 
1897, during the Queen Victoria’s diamond jubilee celebrations in Dunedin, “despite 
the cold wet weather … , crowds gathered to watch a military procession. A large 
number of volunteers turned out, including several corps from the country districts” 
(Clarke 2002, 146). The following year, the Canterbury College Dialectic Society 
defended the Volunteer system on grounds of liberty and freedom of choice, leading to 
the motion “That some form of conscription is desirable throughout the British 
Dominions”. The motion was lost but a number of “‘gallant defenders’ [took] up the 
cudgels heartily on behalf of the Volunteer system” (CCR, Oct. 1898, 10). The 
                                               
48 SCUA, minute book, 14 July 1899 (art), 6 June 1901 (commerce). 
49 Numbers quoted in Belich 2001, 79. 
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volunteer system enjoyed such widespread interest because it cultivated civil 
responsibilities, physically as well as mentally, in small groups of like-minded men. 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the idea of military service was intrinsically 
related to the issue of civil duties and respectability. In 1894 and 1901, students at 
Otago University rejected the notion that civilised nations should disarm. Even though 
both debates were won by the negative their conduct was slightly different. In 1894, the 
debate was judged “very interesting” and described as the exchange of opposing ideas: 
A very interesting discussion took place, in which the cost and absurdity of the 
present military system and the desire for disarmament on the part of the 
European nations themselves were urged on one side; and the dangers of 
disarmament and the difficulty of enforcing obedience to the awards of 
arbitration were emphasised on the other. …  The vote, which was taken at the 
close of the debate, resulted in the negative side being carried by 18 to 16, but 
many refrained from voting. (OUR, May 1994, 22)  
In 1901, the question itself was felt to be almost redundant: “The result of the contest 
was a comparatively easy victory for the negative side. Notwithstanding the apparent 
onesidedness of the statement under debate [That Civilised Nations Should Disarm], the 
debate was unusually exciting and interesting” (OUR, August 1901, 80). Whereas in 
1894 students still “discussed” the question; in 1901, they engaged in a “contest.” The 
author of the brief account of 1901 appeared to assume that the question, which was 
exactly the same in 1894, was later not at all likely to cause considerable controversy. 
The outcome confirmed his prediction. His surprise at the unexpected liveliness of the 
discussion mirrored the conviction that military power was a corollary of national 
strength, influence and even respectability, and in the midst of bellicose engagement not 
an issue to be disagreed upon.  
Opposition to the war, like enthusiasm, employed metaphors of bodily engagement 
to call into question the superiority of the imperial soldier. The disapproving perspective 
on the war rarely entered the Reviews. Significantly, between 1889 and 1898, students 
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in their debates frequently regarded arbitration as a cure to combative action abroad.50 
When criticism was voiced, it called for a balanced view on the Boers and the individual 
soldier’s experience. “Colonial” argued that he “did not intend for a moment to praise 
Johnny Boer” but insisted that “Englishmen, above all things, like to consider 
themselves sportsmen, and, therefore, let us give our foe his due, and not run him down 
because he has so sorely tried our vanity” (Colonial 1901, 23). Accounts from the front 
never questioned the soldiers’ loyalty to New Zealand or the Empire. Even in the most 
critical accounts, regard for the Empire was constantly professed and rarely doubted. 
During the war, the Review published pieces of genuine battlefield experience. In 1900, 
one of the first and longest depictions of a soldier’s engagement in South Africa was 
printed. In the diary-like article, the writer evokes the impression of a man in doubt: “As 
you know there has been a terrible amount of sickness during the wonderfully fine 
weather we have had during the last few months, and with the season of rain and fever 
upon us, one does not like to think of the future, if the war is still to drag on” ([Norris?] 
1900, 16). Doubt manifested itself in the physical exposure to dreaded natural 
conditions and uncontrollable diseases. In hindsight, Robert Malcolm Laing (1865-
1941), an esteemed biologist of his time and a sympathetic member of the Dialectic 
Society since 1882, still considered military ideology a physical phenomenon in New 
Zealand’s culture that was spreading like a disease: “‘the wretched Boer has inflamed 
our militarist ardour, and, in one way and another, it has been maintained at fever heat 
since then’” (qtd. in Crawford 2003, 210).51 Laing’s statement points towards a deep 
suspicion of public sentiment and popular belief. Students were concerned about public 
                                               
50 Results of these debates were always in favour of arbitration: MBL, minute book, 24 Aug. 1889, 
Programme 1897; SCUA, minute book, 6 June 1890, 17 June 1897, 5 July 1898.  
51 In 1886, Laing became master at Christchurch Boy’s High School (a position he held until his 
retirement) and an active member of the Canterbury branch of the New Zealand Institute. Even though his 
contributions to the Dialectic Society and Philosophical Institute suggest an interest in Spiritualism and 
Mesmerism, he devoted much of his time to the inquiry of New Zealand’s marine algae which culminated 
in the well received Plants of New Zealand (1906). He opposed the compulsory military training scheme 
introduced in 1910 and published Shall War only a year later. The biographical information is based on 
H. H. A. 1943-44; Crawford 2003, 210.  
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opinion and their notion of fellowship and home depended on their trust in the 
reliability of the press. 
Sinclair argues that the newspapers during the war stimulated national sentiment. 
Almost anticipating Anderson’s arguments in Imagined Communities, Sinclair 
concludes that newspapers “enable us to sense – to feel that we know – what the other 
members of our community, quite unknown to us as individuals, are doing. …  We feel a 
fellowship” (Sinclair 1986, 138). The creation of “fellowship” through the press was by 
no means genuine during the war. Especially the rise of jingoism and New Journalism 
questioned rational norms of community. Krebs shows that the critical attitude towards 
jingoism originated from a deep suspicion of journalism’s ability to create public truths: 
“Jingo journalists are a new breed during the Boer War, an important part of the style of 
New Journalism. Jingo did not mean patriotic – all major British dailies would have 
considered themselves patriotic, even the very few who opposed the war. Jingo was, 
rather, a class-inflected concept. The jingo journalist, with screaming headlines and rah-
rah attitude, was the press equivalent of the music hall song-and-dance act” (Krebs 
1999, 10). In fact, students were aware of the disturbing influences of journalism on 
general public opinion. Beginning in 1888, students discussed the ambiguous role of the 
press each year, always deciding in favour of its freedom (SCUA, minute book, 6 July 
1888, 7 June 1889, 13 April 1891, 8 Jan 1903; MBL, minute book, 8 Oct. 1892). As a 
consequence, students’ idea of fellowship began to hinge upon questions of the 
reliability and truthfulness of the readership. In 1901, Colonial commented on the 
fickleness of public opinion in the colony:  
We ourselves, filled with the idea that the Colonial Contingent was rather good, 
composed as it was of amateurs, perhaps overlook the fact that even we 
enlightened New Zealanders may also have made a few mistakes, and may have 
had a few of our delusions swept away. We may overlook the fact that we shared 
in the common mistake of supposing that the war was to be over in six months; 
…  and that our First Contingent was merely going away for a picnic. (Colonial 
1901, 21)  
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The same author continued to lament that a “good man has practically to face popular 
disfavour because the public had let their patriotism and popular sympathy override 
their average good discernment;” and this not only because initially information came 
“from Home,” that is, England; but “when we come to matters pertaining more closely 
to ourselves, it is questionable whether our judgement was any the more accurate” 
(ibid.). Colonial saw himself as part of the corrupted mass of New Zealanders. The 
same year, another contributor to the Canterbury College Review under the suggestive 
name of “Pax” observed that “public feeling seems to have reversed engines in fickle 
parts of the colony” (Pax 1901, 15). In adopting the role of soldier-just-come-home, the 
author positioned himself outside the sphere of a misinformed readership. He distanced 
himself from the people at home who believed “screaming headlines” while abandoning 
first-hand proven information from their “pals” stationed overseas (14). The idea of 
fellowship and the location of a feeling of “us” were obscured by the corruption of truth.  
Before the war, Strachan and Howell in Dunedin did not have any difficulties in 
defining fellowship with reference to New Zealand as a nation with a particular 
landscape and “richness of natural beauty” (Howell 1893, 133). For Strachan a rising 
sense of “us” was nourished by war, battle, New Zealand’s countryside and the myth of 
the dying race: “patriotism grows; and, to the patriot, the booming surges become sweet 
melody; the snow-capped mountains, pregnant with inspiration; and the forest robes of 
the hills whisper the romance of Maori traditions” (Strachan 1894, 130). The South 
African war, anticipated by Strachan as a means to confirm national identity and notions 
of fellowship, questioned the rational foundation of this version of patriotism. Among 
debaters, fellowship and mutual respect were required virtues, prescribed by societies’ 
constitutions. During the war, these imposed values were undermined by suspicions 
about the supposedly reliable and respected role of the press. During the war, students 
were also able to publicly perform their sense of fellowship in a forum that was 
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sensitised to the display of community spirit and national sentiment. Consequently, 
students’ notion of fellowship was brought into a sphere of physical engagement that 
tightened their bonds. On the one hand, the need to identify subversive forms of 
information flows, created a bond among students that set them apart from the Other, 
the mass. On the other, debate no longer remained confined to the academic sphere with 
well-circumscribed norms of rational interaction. The Boer War took part of students’ 
rhetorical action out on the streets in the form of public celebrations. While these events 
provided an opportunity to venture out of the college, they also further separated the 
academic sphere from the urban public forum.  
 
Conclusion 
The “inter” in nineteenth-century New Zealand debating practice consists in a 
notion of fellowship that is entwined with ideas of home, rationality, reliability, Empire, 
and rational recreation. Habermas conceptualised the function of mutual rationality on 
the basis of symbol use in spoken language as the normative rationale for human social 
interaction. Debating practice in late-Victorian New Zealand functioned as an 
“intervening horizon” between the realities of the lifeworld and the normatively 
confined realms of education. Students moulded debating programmes to accommodate 
aspects of rational recreation and leisure. During the Boer War years, the significance of 
fellowship changed as a consequence of a heightened suspicion about the reliability of 
public opinion and the corrupting force of spectacle. New Zealanders, mostly inspired 
by Britain, were harnessed to the adventure of imperialism and nationalism. Students at 
once negotiated a distinctly New Zealand perspective as well as a larger imperial 
outlook on the occurrences overseas. The fusion of these apparently very distinct 
attitudes into one was made possible only by the set of discursive patterns already in 
place at the outbreak of war. 
  97 
Students debaters in New Zealand shared a common physical space at their 
respective colleges that was conducive to creating a sense of belonging. The fortnightly 
Saturday meetings aimed at “ennobling ourselves and elevating mankind” (Howell 
1893, 132). To realise these objectives students had to define what “mankind” entailed. 
In other words, debaters had to clarify whether “mankind” remained a regulative ideal 
or whether their activities should be placed in a non-academic context. Wittenberg 
observes that “being part of a public – being in public – is potentially always a being-
out-after-curfew” (Wittenberg 2002, 430).52 During the formative years of the debating 
societies, students revised the form of their mission to “elevate mankind” and redefined 
the way they would present themselves “in public.” 
The tentative notion of fellowship represented only the first stage in the 
transformation of debate in New Zealand. The Boer War helped to consolidate as well 
as challenge notions of belonging but it likewise propelled New Zealand debaters onto 
the next stage of contemplating the meaning of esprit de corps. The notion of fellowship 
that surfaced during the formative years of New Zealand debating societies and in the 
period prior to the South African War was imagined in the regulative boundaries of 
academic education and intellectual enlightenment. Debating, even though a legal and 
political form of deliberative discourse, was used as a means of communication among 
students to create an “us” feeling. Its political aspects hardly surfaced and were merely 
present in the prevalence of the topics that were discussed. During the war, the political 
validity of issues changed. The physical and often public exposure of debaters added to 
an already present sense of civil responsibility. Habermas’s idea of lifeworld and system 
                                               
52 Wittenberg in his article reviews Michael Warner’s Public and Counterpublics, which draws on 
Habermas’s definition of the public sphere. Warner defends a highly discursive understanding of the 
public that assigns regulatory force only to discourse itself. Wittenberg grounds Warner’s approach in 
bringing in the concrete aspect of physical participation that enables the individual to actually be in 
public. Wittenberg does not intend to provide an analytical tool for historical analysis. Instead, his 
criticism points out an important component of late-Victorian New Zealand public life and rhetorical 
culture, that is, the increasingly (often intentionally) physical exposure of the individual to an audience. 
The physical, emotional and the intellectual coalesced in New Zealand debating. 
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provides a mechanical framework in explaining discursive interaction. Debate in the 
Boer War years became a discursive means used to negotiate what Laclau terms the 
“constitutive outside”.53  
For Laclau, political and structural changes in society are determined by the 
hegemony and contingency of circumstances and conceptualisation of the real. Laclau 
argues that there is always a necessary “undecidability inscribed in structure” because 
something outside of the paradigm constantly challenges the validity of the system 
(Laclau 1996, 89). In other words, when Colonial and Pax learnt through wartime 
experience that external influences on the colony did not necessarily imply constant 
betterment, they simply experienced the surfacing of constantly shifting norms. For 
Strachan in 1894, these norms were still intact. When he maintained that New Zealand’s 
future as a colonial power would be determined through its “relation to circumstances” 
(Strachan 1894, 101), he assumed that the influence of the outside was pushing New 
Zealand in the direction of nationhood, progress and continual improvement. The 
“constitutive outside” in the form of the Boer War did not yet exert its influence on 
New Zealand’s public. When it finally did, various discourses tried “to fill the structural 
gap” (Laclau 1996, 93). Students, as a consequence, re-interpreted fellowship in the 
context of debate. In view of shifting norms of discursive reliability, in particular with 
regard to the press, fellowship began to be described in terms of conduct and conformity 
to rules. Incidents of physical interaction likewise became the object of criticism. The 
individual, who Brown praised as the responsible secluded scholar, was increasingly 
controlled by the binding norm of the “group”. The concept of esprit de corps was the 
                                               
53 Laclau 1988, 1996, 2000; Laclau and Mouffe 1987. Laclau’s proposed construct of a political system as 
an “open system” admittedly constitutes logical problems but it remains a useful metaphor for 
understanding discursive dynamics in situations of political and cultural upheaval (Laclau 1996, 92-94). 
Laclau argues that a political system is never stable because an unknown outside force will always 
undermine the objectives of that system. I use Laclau’s concept as a metaphor for nineteenth-century 
debate. The Boer War presented such a constitutive outside that challenged existing norms of debate. 
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result of tendencies to control discourse. As a consequence, collegiate debating societies 
gradually lost their function as cells of knowledge production.
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Chapter Three 
How to Close a Debate: Consensus, Conflict and Esprit de Corps 
 
Introduction 
In defining the vices and virtues of debate, ancient and modern scholars have 
continually emphasised the element of political participation and consensus formation, 
which have lent debate its high status in democratically organised communities. 
Habermas in the twentieth century elucidates this well-established significance of 
consensus for democratic discourse by locating a dynamics of consensus formation in 
the three-fold structure of subjective, objective and social world. In Habermas’s model, 
debate as an element of democratic discourse shares this analytical framework. As an 
alternative to Habermas, Jon Elster analyses political debate on the basis of the tripartite 
relation of argument, bargaining and voting. Both models are crucial in coming to terms 
with the implications of nineteenth-century consensus formation in debate. 
New Zealand students during the formative years of their societies promoted the 
ideas of fellowship and fair discourse. Their procedures were influenced by the 
parliamentary handbooks of Britain and New Zealand. Voting, the central form of 
determining consensus in debate was highly formalised and depended on the authority 
of the chairman. Towards the end of the century, forms of bargaining in debating 
situations became spontaneous and daring; voting processes were undermined by 
disruptive behaviour. As a consequence, strict norms of discursive conduct were 
enforced in order to control debate. The rise of esprit de corps was the result of this 
trend.  
The emergence of debating contests emphasised pivotal aspects of esprit de corps. 
Moreover, in a colonial context, the founding of tournaments represents a transformed 
and invented tradition to incorporate notions of “us”. A strong sense of competition 
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surfaced in the discourse surrounding the establishment of tournaments. Competition 
was meant to be a mirror of the social realities of the students and thus a crucial element 
of their education. The cultivation of competition had long-term consequences for the 
exercise of debate. The audience, for example, was disenfranchised and voting was no 
longer practised. Bargaining likewise lost its ground in the increasingly formalised 
procedures of debating contests.  
This chapter first examines the implications of Habermas’s ideal notion of 
consensus. Elster’s model provides the framework for an initial analysis of the voting 
practice of New Zealand societies. Voting and bargaining are set into the context of a 
maturing notion of esprit de corps in the colony. Eventually the practice of debating 
contests is discussed in greater detail to fully comprehend the significance of the 
transition from fellowship to esprit de corps. 
 
The Power of Consensus in Debate  
Nineteenth-century debaters in New Zealand preferred consensus formation by final 
ballot and bargaining. Discussion of this routine was influenced by the social context of 
debate, that is, by paradigms of moral, normative and political discourse, private as well 
as public. All three paradigms are mutually entwined and cannot be understood 
independently of each other. Consensus formation has always been subject to questions 
of truth and moral virtue with a particular focus on the authenticity of agreed-upon 
propositions. Furthermore, the majority principle with its norms of conduct has been 
and still is the target of suspicions about the feasibility of consensus in general.1 As a 
                                               
1 Recent scholarship in political theory, in particular Gundersen (2000), Kahane (1999) and Bickford 
(1996), questions the idea of consensus and promotes learning as the pivotal aspect of debate. Consensus 
is discredited because of its regulative nature, that is, its tendency to discourage change and diversity on 
grounds of a majority-minority vote. In other words, objectors to consensus-theory (and Habermas in 
particular) defend a revisionary concept of deliberation that favours learning over mutual agreement. This 
perspective on the function of consensus is based on a general distrust in majority-determined truths that 
rely on audience choice. Instead, the favourable view on education is characterised by a faith in the 
unremitting nature of human discourse.  
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consequence, a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of nineteenth-century 
debate in New Zealand hinges upon two constituents and their educative implications: 
the final ballot and bargaining. Habermas arrives at the concept of argumentation, 
bargaining and voting through a careful elaboration of the tradition of deliberation 
starting with the Sophist v. Plato. The Introduction showed that debate in New Zealand 
is regarded as a means that teaches the individual to act as a responsible citizen. This 
reputation partly originates from the perception that debate trains people in 
argumentation and voting behaviour. Protagoras, credited with the invention of 
antithetical deliberation, also explicitly ascribed a social relevance to debate by 
amalgamating debate, Athenian education and the notion of the good citizen. Protagoras 
thought that the Athenian education system aimed at “teaching the art of being a good 
citizen” (Sihvola 1989, 89). In other words, education was regarded as the cradle of 
civic responsibility.2 By creating a sphere of application, debate under Protagoras 
infuses its social setting with formal rules of conduct and notions of political and moral 
virtue. 
Protagorean debate with its binary model of discussion (the defence of two contrary 
views) was immediately criticised for its competitive nature:3 “Young men, when they 
first get a taste of disputation, misuse it as a form of sport, always employing it 
contentiously, and imitating confuters, confute others. They delight like puppies in 
pulling about and tearing with words all who approach them” (Plato Republic 499b). 
The phrase “seeking victory in argument” captures the essence of Plato’s and Socrates’ 
disapproval. They did not welcome pursuit of public argumentation for the sake of 
                                               
2 Schiappa defends this interpretation and maintains that “for Protagoras, logos was the means through 
which citzens deliberated and came to collective judgements. Protagoras contributed to the theoretical 
defence of consensual decision-making, and he may have been the first to provide rules to facilitate the 
orderly conduct of debate and discussion” (Schiappa 1991, 199).  
3 Plato’s views on Protagoras’ teachings are best displayed in his Protagoras and Theaetetus. However, 
Plato mingles his own views with Socrates’ interpretation and scholar of Greek philosophy commonly 
acknowledge that Plato “was certainly an artist writing dramatic philosophical fiction and not a historian 
of ideas in his portrayals of Sophists and other opponents of Socrates” (Sihvola 1989, 81). 
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triumph on stage; they rejected it as an inappropriate standard for civil engagement. 
Instead, the wise citizen aspired to the realm of ideas, which should also find its 
expression in reason and argumentation, that is, preferably in dialectic. In 1884 in New 
Zealand, Professor Haslam shared Plato’s sentiment when making students at 
Canterbury College familiar with the Sophists: “[I]n their desire to persuade they lost 
their touch of the art of convincing men. They called in the emotions in their aid, and no 
longer appealed to reason alone. They neglected to develop the positive side of 
Dialectic, and applied themselves to the cultivation of Rhetoric” (Haslam 1884, 10). 
Haslam, by invoking Plato’s writings, relied on human faith in reason and consensus 
rather than competition in bringing about understanding (24). Suspicion of emotional 
appeal in rhetorical deliberation was a common element in nineteenth-century New 
Zealand debating practice. Plato, moreover, conveyed the impression that procedural 
patterns of discourse were to be preferred to forms aiming at singular results in the form 
of rhetorical victory. Aristotle likewise associated the Sophists’ method of disputation 
with motives of publicity and financial gain. He regarded both orientations as 
undesirable for political deliberation. 
Greek philosophy established the traditional dichotomy of consensus versus conflict 
with its spectrum of moral, normative and political implications. Admittedly, Plato 
imposed regulative ideals on moral and political conduct and despised rhetoric for its 
ambiguous values, while Aristotle relied on the theoretical force of ethics. Protagoras 
favoured practical access to general knowledge without restricting its application in life 
to any specific moral framework (Sihvola 1989, 130). Despite the considerable 
differences of Protagoras, Plato, Socrates and Aristotle, they shared ideas of civic duty 
and education that transcended apparent divisions. They agreed, for example, that civic 
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virtue and social equilibrium are realised only within an educated public, a vision that 
resonates in modern argumentation theory.4  
In contemporary theory, consensus is defined as the confirmation or rejection of a 
set of norms, propositions or opinions, which are legitimised by mutual agreement or 
the majority vote. Indeed, rhetorical theory knows three types of consensus: theoretical 
consensus (on truth), practical consensus (on correctness), and pragma-dialogic 
consensus, which commonly deals with theories of consensual contracts. The majority 
principle either based on reason and validity (for theoretical and practical consensus) or 
on interests (in the case of pragma-dialogic consensus) is the common backdrop for all 
three approaches. The contemplation of antithetical viewpoints is rooted in 
“collaborative” argumentation that combines a moral, normative and political reading of 
consensus for rhetoric.5 The three forms of rhetorical consensus constantly 
communicate the social dimension of the individual-audience relation and of constructs 
like community and public. 
The dichotomy of emotion and reason proves crucial to the discussion of consensus 
formation in social settings. Students in late-Victorian New Zealand were frequently 
confronted with “sentimental” and scientific arguments. During a debate on the 
advantages of cremation, “arguments from science and fact were well brought out; on 
the other, the sentimental aspect was strongly presented” (OUR, June 1901, 39). Chaim 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in The New Rhetoric pursue a revisionary approach to 
Aristotle’s writings and the binary opposition of emotion and reason (Perelman and 
                                               
4 In contemporary rhetorical studies, the conspicuous reputation of Sophists has been critically revised. 
Dietz calls for a revision of sophist methods that would place their work in closer proximity to Aristotle 
and Plato without sustaining the traditional division (Dietz 1992, 1414). Kastely also favourably reviews 
the Socratian tradition with a particular reference of post-modernity (Kastely 1997). Moreover, Derrida in 
“Plato’s Pharmacy” points towards the propinquity of technique between that of the Sophists and Socratic 
dialogue in Plato. As such, he places the Sophist discourse within a post-modern context. Sophists as well 
as Socratic dialogue depend on the capacity to adopt contrary points of view and both share a distrust of 
writing over memory (Derrida 1983). I am grateful to Huw Griffiths for bringing this last point to my 
attention.  
5 Böhler and Rähme provide a detailed discussion of the theoretical framework and origins of consensus 
theories (Böhler and Rähme 1992, 1256-1265). 
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Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969).6 Perelman continues the project in The New Rhetoric and the 
Humanities and argues that people are capable of following argumentation precisely 
because they are willing to accept certain premises that render speech valuable to 
listeners (Perelman 1979). The combination of reason and emotion is central to 
Perelman’s work. He maintains that forensic and deliberative discourses examine the 
subject of debate based on reason; epideictic discourse contemplates the integrity of the 
speaker and thereby solicits sympathy from the audience:7  
Yet it can be maintained …  that the epideictic genre is not only important but 
essential from an educational point of view, since it too has an effective and 
distinctive part to play – that, namely, of bringing about a consensus in the 
minds of the audience regarding the values that are celebrated in the speech. 
(Perelman 1979, 6) 
Consensus, for Perelman, gives rise to and is based on values which a specific body of 
people identifies as emotionally as well as rationally acceptable. He advances rhetorical 
thinking because he acknowledges the significance of emotions for consensus 
formation. Perelman thus reinvigorates Protagoras’ insistence on the relevance of 
emotional persuasion. 
Elster has recently applied Habermas’s concept of socially embedded consensus 
formation and Perelman’s integration of emotion to his interpretation of deliberative 
argumentation in a democratic context (Elster 1998a, 1998b).8 He shows that in 
                                               
6 The origins of this approach are noticeable in Perelman (1963). 
7 The distinction of deliberative, forensic and epideictic discourse is also taken from Aristotle’s argument 
in On Rhetoric, where he differentiates between these forms. For Aristotle the audience mostly 
determines the type of speech that is given. “If the audience plays the role of judge, the orator presented is 
either forensic or deliberative. It is forensic if the issues in focus arise from the past and deliberative if 
they involve the future. …  In epideictic discourse the audience plays the role of spectator or observer 
rather than judge” (Enos 1996, 228f). 
8 Elster is not alone in his attempt to develop a theoretical approach to deliberative democracy and 
rhetorical tools. Gunderson aims at a similar goal and emphasises the educational nature of deliberative 
discourse. Crosswhite focuses on the understanding of the social and political significance of argument 
and choice and the function of empathy in this process. Farrell (1993) follows in Habermas’s footsteps 
and derives from his work political implications that endorse rational deliberative discourse. Black 
investigates the relation of shared social knowledge and political systems and likewise subscribes to 
rational argumentation as democratic means. Elster thus writes in a critical tradition that focuses on 
deciphering the innate mechanisms of deliberative discourse and eventual consensus formation. Perelman 
in the 1970s and Elster in the 1990s also acknowledge the critical potential and significance of 
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deliberative democracy, discourse is essentially constructed through the triple-formation 
of argumentation, bargaining and voting. An undecided assembly striving for agreement 
will return to these three principles to resume contemplation and eventually arrive at 
consensus. Elster’s ideas are conducive to an understanding of nineteenth-century 
debating because they combine procedural as well as spontaneous elements in an 
analysis of consensus-driven discourse. He maintains that the choice of using 
argumentation, bargaining and voting depends on the motives of those who partake in 
discussion. In other words, the course of deliberation is saturated by passions, reasons 
and interests of those who claim the stump (Elster 1998a, 6). The concept of bargaining 
is the most elusive and probably the most revealing aspect of his theory. Elster states 
that bargaining is characterised by an intricate exchange of “offers and counteroffers” 
which are governed by “the resources that enable them to make credible threats and 
promises” (ibid.). Bargaining features prominently in debate because it marks the 
transition from the initial stages of posing an argument to the final results of voting. 
Elster’s understanding of political deliberation emphasises a distinctly strategic process 
of consensus formation. He is interested in political dynamics beyond the level of 
formal impartiality (Elster 1998b, 101-104) In other words, Elster enhances Habermas’s 
concept of formally regulated argumentation and acknowledges, for example, the 
possibility that “passion and prejudice, too, may dress themselves up as reason” (103).9 
Nineteenth-century debating was characterised by an assemblage of opinion-building 
exercises in which forms of bargaining diverted argumentation from its ideal course. 
                                                                                                                                         
Habermas’s ideas (Perelman 1979, 89). Habermas, too, recognises Perelman’s work in connection with 
Toulmin’s Uses of Argument. (Habermas 1984, 50). 
9 With a focus on voters and audience, Elster develops categories of constraint that determine the 
intelligibility of public discourse. He discusses the function of consistency constraints, imperfection 
constraints and plausibility constraints that potentially undermine the credibility of a political statement if 
the self-interest of a speaker does not correspond to the ideal general interest of the public (Elster 1998b, 
104-105). Accordingly, Elster adopts the Habermasian ideal of “the force of the better argument” in order 
to demonstrate the dynamics of discursive interaction in the political arena. 
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Habermas’s fundamental principle of consensus is grounded in an ideal 
understanding of rational acceptance of the other and the normative function of truth 
(Habermas 2001, 83). Burleson and Kline assert that in his early writings, Habermas 
creates an atmosphere of consensus that is prevalent in his subsequent work: “That is, 
the possibility of routine communication is dependent on the implicit reciprocal 
imputation by social actors that the other is intelligible, truthful, sincere, and behaving 
according to appropriate social norms. Such assumptions, when fulfilled, form what 
Habermas calls a “background consensus” (Burleson and Kline 1979, 417). According 
to Habermas’s idea of communicative reality, social norms do not have to be accepted 
through a formal contract. Instead, Habermas in TCA combines theoretical with 
practical consensus.10 Owen points towards Habermas’s synthesis and supports his 
universal approach.11 Habermas relies on the normative and structuring force of reason 
to bring about a consensus on truth and correctness that is universal and binding. 
Because, in this model, reason generates a practical as well as a theoretical consensus, 
the results of a Habermasian mutual understanding have a bearing on the actual social 
reality of participants.  
Habermas favours rational consensus formation whilst being aware that realised, 
empirical consensus in the unreliable medium of language is unlikely to permeate every 
aspect of his ideal setting. He identifies fundamental social elements that best 
incorporate his regulative ideal: the fundamental possibility of disagreement, a Kantian-
like emphasis on the wellbeing of the other, the binding force of the majority and the 
inclusion of civic responsibility. This process of inculcating civic responsibility through 
                                               
10 In Habermas’s work the difference is made clear by means of the German terms Wahrheit (truth) and 
Richtigkeit (correctness).  
11 Owen maintains that “it is important to distinguish rational consensuses from merely de facto 
agreements. The idealizing presuppositions of speech function as just this sort of criterion. To the extent 
that any actual, empirical consensus is reached in accordance with the idealizing presuppositions of 
speech (that is, the rules of discourse), it is rational. And insofar as any given consensus is rational, its 
products are true or right” (Owen 2002, 49). Like Elster, he points out the Habermas’s ideal version of 
consensus does have an application in a social context because it reveals other forms of agreement that 
merely pose as consensus. 
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an acceptance of the possibility of contradictory arguments was already crucial to 
features of nineteenth-century New Zealand debate. So, in 1883, von Haast paraphrased 
the combination of education, civic participation and responsibility for the students at 
Canterbury College and reinvigorated the Greeks’ connection of education and 
citizenship: 
On leaving school, the future citizen ought to know his duty towards mankind. 
He should feel that by participating in the blessings of civilisation he has to live 
up to the state of general culture surrounding him, and to assist in advancing it to 
the best of his abilities. In one word, there should never exist a contrast between 
life and school. (Haast 1883, 6) 
Von Haast’s statement was exemplary for the generally liberal or humanistic perception 
of education. Even though, by the end of the century, New Zealand professors 
demonstrated a more practically oriented utilitarian notion of academic instruction, the 
objective of civic participation permeated ideas on how public consensus was to be 
understood.12 
Deliberative bargaining, for Habermas, is fundamentally grounded in the possibility 
of discursive disagreement and the human ability to criticise. Consensus is made 
possible because individuals first disagree on both the theoretical as well as the practical 
level of a given state of affairs. Moreover, they relate their subsequent choices to their 
social context(s) and are able to learn in the process of deliberation. Habermas 
conceptualises consensus as the final agreement that crosses a yes-no divide through 
informed and rational dialectical discourse and, at the same time, negotiates the social 
background of the participants. From his point of view, the interlocutor arbitrates two 
extremes of a conundrum to eventually decide, after an exhaustive process of 
                                               
12 E.L. Brown, member of the Dunedin debating society and winner of the essay competition, 
contemplated the use of higher education and divided the answers into “the humanistic and the utilitarian, 
or the liberal and the commercial” (Brown 1898, 100). In the subsequent issue of the OUR, Professor 
Gilray published his assessment of the society’s prize essays and argued that “the majority of the essayists 
take too utilitarian a view of education and fail to distinguish clearly between the function of Arts 
education and professional education” (Gilray 1898, 130). Between 1878 and 1902, the issue of liberal 
and utilitarian education was continually discussed among students in New Zealand (Hocken, minute 
books, 25 June 1880; MBL, minute book, 17 April 1880, 10 April 1886, 13 April 1889, CCR, June 1898, 
11; SCUA, minute book, 12 Aug. 1887, 19 Aug. 1891, 29 April 1901). 
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contemplation, in favour of one of the options. The final result of this painstaking 
procedure is mutually shared because reciprocal education and emancipation and the 
binding effect of social circumstances allow for only one possible outcome. 
Habermas’s consensus draws on the mandatory force of the majority. The individual 
(very much in the Enlightenment tradition) contemplates the logic of opposing positions 
in the midst of the individual-community dichotomy and is accordingly embedded in a 
complex of social relations. Habermas’s understanding of consensus at once confirms 
and is in need of the collaborative characteristics of argumentation. He formulates a 
notion of consensus that draws on the Greek dialectical method and its emphasis on 
mutual agreement among members of an audience. Habermas foregoes regulation by 
external judges or any competitive element because he believes that individuals are fully 
capable of generating liberal consensus without external interference. In a political 
context, Habermas and Perelman share the belief that every individual in possession of 
her rational capacities can enter into discourse and contribute to the final vote in the best 
interests of the community.  
Finally, Habermas stresses that the social norms of dialectical discourse are dictated 
by reason. He maintains that although “the actual course of the debates deviates from 
the ideal procedure of deliberative politics … , presuppositions of rational discourse 
have a steering effect on the course of the debates” (Habermas 1996, 540). His 
argument leads to the conclusion that public awareness of consensus is an outcome and 
regulative norm of the practice of debate. By being practised, debates fuel the actual 
application of rational consensus. Habermas’s faith in human deliberation is therefore 
distinctly optimistic, a quality he shares with Protagoras. Both philosophers place 
rational truth at the centre of democratic models and at the discursive culture that 
underlines them. Both further conclude that human progress is inseparably linked to the 
universal application of reason.  
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Sihvola later supported by Schiappa concludes that Protagoras’ theory is the nearest 
equivalent to a conception of historical progress and human betterment in ancient 
Greece (Schiappa 1991, 199). Habermas also defended an argument of historical 
evolution.13 New Zealand nineteenth-century debaters heard a similar review of the 
essentials of human historical conduct.14 In 1884, Professor Haslam foresaw “the 
establishment of a rule of conduct for man that shall not be stereotyped; but shall have 
in it a principle of progress, and a principle of quiet growth” (Haslam 1884, 33). He 
envisaged a political system that “will need no periodic convulsions in the shape of 
reformation, revolution, or repentance” (ibid.). Haslam observed that even though 
upheaval purified a society, it inevitably left it blemished. He placed complete trust in 
the progressive force of reason and a universal principle of “right and wrong” and that 
these are essentially “historical developments in obedience to certain laws” (34).  
Debating societies at the end of the nineteenth century merged these facets of 
consensus formation when adjourning the meeting. This chapter shows that arguments, 
sentiments or even misconduct and bad behaviour characterised the continuum of how 
consensus was created through argumentation, bargaining and the final vote. 
Nineteenth-century debaters in the protected environment of their clubs combined the 
force of public moral consensus and saw their final agreement as a practical means to 
terminate discussion, that is, as a formalised procedure that would lead their discourse 
to a tangible result. Towards the end of the century, they began to externalise voting in 
                                               
13 Habermas’s idea of progress is welded onto a defence of the evolutionary emergence of rationality. He 
describes the dominance of reason as the transformation of human thinking from mystic belief in 
superstitions to logical analysis of the environment (Habermas 1979; 1984, 262-298; Owen (2002) for a 
critical analysis of Habermas’s idea of historical progress). 
14 Professor Haslam in his lecture to the Dialectic Society quoted the Professor of Moral Philosophy at 
King’s College: “‘However form may be our persuasion of the divinely-guided progress of our race, the 
fact of a general forward movement in the steam of history is not inconsistent with all sorts of eddies and 
retardations at particular points; and before we can be sure that such points are not to be found in our own 
age, we must have some knowledge of the past development of thought, and have taken the trouble to 
compare our own ways of thinking and acting with those that have prevailed in other epochs of 
humanity’” (Haslam 1884, 5-6). Haslam illustrated that the idea of historical progress was based on a 
revisionist attitude of the past. The revisionist project fundamentally consisted in the identification of 
“eddies and retardations” in previous eras and the avoidance of them in the present. 
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debating competitions and assigned the task to judges, who were not part of the society. 
This removed arguments from their normative value and correctness because it divided 
the function of arguer and judge and separated debaters from the interactive processes 
of consensus formation. Socrates saw that the practice of debate might lead to the 
externalisation of judgement and consensus formation: 
We might answer Thrasymachus’ case in a set speech of our own, drawing up a 
corresponding list of the advantages of justice; he would then have the right to 
reply, and we should make our final rejoinder; but after that we should have to 
count up and measure the advantages on each list, and we should need a jury to 
decide between us. Whereas if we go on as before, each securing the agreement 
of the other side, we can combine the functions of advocate and judge. (Plato 
Republic 348 a-b) 
Habermas wants to preserve the synthesis of advocate and critic in the individual to 
create a responsible public being. The core attribute of rationality and a competent 
interlocutor, from Habermas’s point of view, is that rational propositions can be 
contemplated and challenged. 
In the nineteenth century, final voting as the expression of consensus in collegiate 
debate was well-established. The process imitated parliamentary procedures. I argue in 
the remainder of the chapter that voting in students’ debate paralleled trends towards 
formalisation in politics. With the introduction of debating competitions, voting was cut 
off from its political roots and a new tradition that integrated procedures of show was 
established. Consensus formation and education as goals of nineteenth-century 
collegiate debating slowly disintegrated and debating in general lost its societal 
relevance. In the nineteenth-century debating sphere, the phrase esprit de corps acquired 
a specific meaning that mirrored this process. Previously embedded in the 
undifferentiated sphere of rhetoric and oratory, competitive deliberation established a 
new category for debate, which distanced debate from the moral, normative and 
political paradigms of participants. Argumentation, bargaining and voting no longer 
created a sense of belonging. Voting remained a part of the culture and procedure within 
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the societies, but disappeared from intercollegiate sessions. Nineteenth-century debate 
relinquished its focus on bargaining and voting. Eventually, debate became a formalised 
spectacle rather than an arena for critical contemplation. 
 
Processes of Consensus Formation: Argumentation, Bargaining, and Voting 
Passion for truth manifested itself in the deeds of students and the structural 
framework they created around them. Debating societies combined a rule-abiding 
routine with detailed constitutions and standing orders that ensured proper deliberative 
procedure. Every new member had to sign the constitution, thus, accepting its catalogue 
of rules. Nineteenth-century constitutions of debating societies reveal that requirements 
for reaching consensus were meant to be strict and static. On the one hand, students 
aimed at adhering to an ideal of consensus that was influenced by the Victorian zeitgeist 
marked by public responsibility and forms of political participation. On the other, 
debating practice in student circles transcended this ideal by mocking democratic rituals 
such as parliamentary deliberation and by questioning the routine of franchise. 
In 1895, Rev. Bates in his lecture On Democracy formulated this ideal of a well-
informed and progressive New Zealand public capable of reaching universally 
applicable decisions: 
[T]he community at large becomes a kind of parliament. Political topics and 
measures are discussed and criticized from a hundred points of view. The spread 
of education and consequent enlightenment of the people, tending as it does to 
equalise social conditions, is also a contributor force in the same direction. 
Acted on by all these agencies, the civilised world itself seems to be in process 
of unification. (Bates 1895, 106) 
This ideal suffered various violations in actual debating situations. Students resisted 
attempts at unification. As a consequence, the element of spontaneity in debate was 
checked by rules meant to bring the regulative ideal closer to its realisation.15 Attempts 
                                               
15 I understand spontaneity as a part of creativity that materialises in sudden emotional outburst, physical 
and intellectual expression. Brown understood the term as purely intellectual spirit: “He [the scholar] 
knows that the past of the world is based on the spirit of man, and that it needs but the spirit of man to 
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to counterbalance the creative moment in debating, however, resulted in the neglect of 
central social dynamics of consensus formation. Debating societies’ efforts to formalise 
structures eventually led to the externalisation of evaluation and to the gradual 
disappearance of forms of participatory consensus. 
Debating societies in New Zealand gradually accepted the final vote as the most 
conspicuous and tactile manifestation of consensus. The Dialectic Society began to 
enforce the idea in its year of founding. Otago waited until 1881, when it adopted the 
practice.16 For students at Auckland University the final vote was an integral part of 
their practice. Voting took place by counting raised hands. Members could but did not 
have to explain their opinions. Standing orders and constitutions suggest that the 
societies’ chairmen were pivotal to administering discursive procedures. In the booklet 
of 1899, the chairman had the right to decide “all questions of order not herein provided 
for;” the debate was to be suspended until the chairman had resolved situations of 
disorderly conduct; s/he had further to decide whether or not the audience should vote 
on the time allowed every speaker, in case a speech was to extend twenty minutes 
(MBL, Standing Orders, 1899, 4). The chairman could invite friends of the society to 
take part in the discussion.17 Speakers’ Rulings, the New Zealand manual for 
parliamentary debate, forbade members to “read comments by persons outside” and 
urged them to “deliver their own opinions on the subject of debate” (Speakers’ Rulings 
1898, 104:231). Like parliament, debating societies relied on the authority of the 
chairman to accept non-members’ active participation. S/he also oversaw the 
                                                                                                                                         
make it live again; and he gives the spirit in him full play – the spontaneity of his nature” (Brown 1881, 
18). 
16 The minute book simply mentions that “Mr. Hodge then gave notice of the following motion: ‘that a 
vote be taken at the close of each debate’” (MBL, minute book, 24 June 1881). Unfortunately, the record 
does not give any reason for this introduction. 
17 Every member of the Dialectic Society could bring friends to the fortnightly meetings. However, 
friends could not vote but were allowed to join in, in which case the chairman had to give her permission. 
The minute book of the Dunedin society states “that members may bring their friends, but that non-
members be not expected to take part in the proceedings, unless invited to do so by the chairman” 
(Hocken, minute book, 14 June 1878). 
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administration and presided over resolutions relating to the business of the society. The 
most important aspect of the mantle of chairman was his casting vote: 
9. A question being put shall be resolved in the affirmative or in the negative by 
the majority of voices, or, on a division being called for, by a show of hands. 
The Chairman shall have a deliberative as well as a casting vote. 
10. The Chairman shall state whether in his opinion the “Ayes” or the “Noes” 
have it. Unless a division shall be called for, the Chairman’s decision shall be 
final. (MBL, Standing Orders, 1899, 3) 
Depending on the circumstances, the chairman obtained the right to overrule an entire 
meeting in order to secure an unambiguous outcome of the discussion. The audience, 
according to the rules, was urged to reach a majority of votes to retain the power of 
decision.  
Subscribing to the principle of majority and granting the chairman a casting vote 
replicated parliamentary procedure. In 1886, Alpers at a meeting of the Dialectic 
Society moved that “that the Committee draw up a set of rules to regulate the debates of 
this society – such rules to be founded on May’s book on Parliamentary Procedure and 
that the committee submit these rules to the society for consideration” (MBL, minute 
book, 1 May 1886). Alpers referred to May’s Treatise, the common handbook for 
parliamentary procedure in Britain. For students in New Zealand, Speakers’ Rulings and 
May’s Treatise provided precise rules for the regulations on a speaker’s casting vote 
that were adopted for collegiate debating procedures. S/he could tip the balance either 
“in favour of advancing a Bill a stage further” or “so that the existing state of things 
shall continue” (ibid., 1900, 111:297). Atkinson relates the case of the Motueka Petition 
of 1871, when the one of the candidates had to be “declared elected on the casting vote 
of the returning officer” in parliament because the popular vote resulted in a draw 
(Atkinson 2003, 56). Political norms provided a frame of reference to students in New 
Zealand to draft rules for their proceedings. 
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The final vote in nineteenth-century debating, besides being influenced by 
parliamentary protocols, was determined by the simply reality of time. Evenings were 
normally two hours long, although on rare occasions the audience agreed to extend the 
duration of the argument. More frequently, discussions were brought to an end by vote 
when members began to leave the room. If students were not able to come to a 
conclusion, the duties of the chairman extended to the closing of debate and to reporting 
the outcome. Occasionally, the rule that a result had to be obtained at the end of a 
debate caused undesired extremes. At an Otago parliamentary debate in 1900, it was felt 
that the chairman corrupted the discussion: 
Not satisfied that the Opposition candidate had had the immense advantage of 
the ‘last word,’ he [the chairman] proposed a vote of thanks and proceeded at 
once to take a poll; thus blocking all chance of questioning and criticism to 
which the candidate had laid himself so open, and which had been freely given 
to the opponents of the other two candidates. Such conduct, excellent in strategy 
though it be, is highly reprehensible and cannot be excused on the plea which 
was given, of the lateness of the hour. (OUR, Sep. 1900, 93) 
This was one of the rare occasions when the chairman was openly censured for his 
manipulation of the proceedings. The incident highlighted that nineteenth-century 
debaters had to acquiesce to worldly circumstances like the porter’s demands for sleep, 
the painful absence of any heating device in winter, or the biased conduct of a chairman. 
Habermas’s ideal supposition that mutual agreement follows orderly rational and 
potentially unconstrained discussion did not apply to nineteenth-century debating 
conditions. In 1882, members of the Dialectic Society in Christchurch simply resolved 
to terminate the debate on “What are Metaphysics?” due to the late hour; they had 
already argued for three hours. Debaters in Auckland were more practically inclined and 
accepted that members might have to leave prior to reaching agreement. In 1888, the 
society carried the motion “that members leaving the meeting before its close, and after 
9 o’clock, be allowed to leave their proxies” (SCUA, minute book, 8 Sept. 1888). This 
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certainly secured the ballot but also corrupted the discussion because the force of the 
better argument was relinquished in favour of the routine exercise of vote taking. 
The final counting of the “ayes” and the “nays” was an adopted parliamentary 
instrument and reflected a long tradition of inclusion in volunteer societies.18 At 
Canterbury College, the already mentioned “Chichelian Senate” was deliberately 
established with a parliamentary structure to create “a more orderly method” in which 
“sharp skirmishes of wit and argument might be cultivated” (CCR, Oct. 1898, 38). The 
routine of final ballot as part of this “orderly method” was well established in New 
Zealand debating societies in subsequent years. Stalemate situations were highly 
undesirable and were made almost impossible by the sanctioned intervention of the 
chairman. There is only one recorded incident from any of the three collegiate debating 
societies when “opinion was equally divided” (OUR, Aug. 1891, 150).19 Unlike the idea 
of rationality or leisure, the concept of consensus registered by a final vote was never 
conceived as problematical. The final ballot was a formalised traditional constituent of 
debaters’ practice with roots in parliamentary proceedings. 
Actual accounts suggest that individual members did form opinions on propositions 
despite the regulations that merely aimed at counting the votes. Students’ assessment 
usually targeted argumentative as well as emotional tactics of persuasion and 
conviction. In 1901, the Otago University debating society decided in the negative when 
considering “whether the efforts of the Commissioners on the Medical School had been 
                                               
18 Morris traces back the proliferation and growing significance of volunteer associations in Britain to the 
years following 1780. “A whole new series of words came into common use in the English language, 
often changing or adding their meaning – the association, the society, the chairman, the agenda, the 
membership, the rules and constitution and the annual report” (Morris 1990, 395). He further explains 
how voting was perceived: “The characteristic institutional form of this network of voluntary societies 
was the subscriber democracy. Money was collected from members. The funds were distributed and 
activities organised by a committee and officers elected by the subscribers at the annual general meeting. 
One subscription, one vote was the general rule and uncontested elections the normal practice” (412). In 
1903, the Auckland debating society included the “one subscription, one vote” concept in its constitution. 
Members were only allowed to vote if they had paid their subscription (SCUA, minute book, 7 May 
1903).  
19 The discussion dealt with the significance of Latin for the acquisition of the B.A. degree. 
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abortive” (OUR, Sep. 1901, 99). The Otago University Review maintained that “we 
think the decision in this case was quite justified by the arguments” (OUR, Sep. 1901, 
100). At the turn of the century in Christchurch, Mr. East “was unable to prove to the 
satisfaction of the Society that the capital city of a State should not be represented by 
Parliament” (CCR, Oct. 1900, 12). Proceedings of the debating society published in the 
college Reviews, on a regular basis, called for more knowledge and reason and hence 
more reliable arguments: “Our meetings would be much improved if some of the 
members of the ‘Back Seat Gang’ would not so far forget themselves as to interrupt the 
speakers; moreover, some of the speakers would do better if they put less pretended wit 
and more sensible reasoning into their speeches” (CCR, June 1902, 16). In 1901, the 
secretary of the Otago University debating society hoped that the society on this 
occasion would decide that modern civilisation was a failure based “on the merits of the 
arguments brought forth by the respective sides” (OUR, Sept. 1901, 138). He further 
suggested that if the audience voted on grounds of the presented arguments, then— even 
though “things are in a very sad plight”— the society’s standpoint was acceptable for the 
moment and reversible at a later stage (ibid.). 
Comments on argumentative merit were not detrimental to the process of final 
voting. Much more frequent were unfavourable allusions to the emotional or even 
sentimental involvement of the audience and, as a consequence, the alteration of 
debate’s outcome. It was noted that the audience was biased towards certain 
propositions, as happened in the case of the topic “that the tendency of modern 
inventions is to induce an inclination to physical inactivity.” Not wholly unexpectedly, 
the discussion turned towards the advantages of the bicycle. The Canterbury College 
Review noticed that “after a glance at the bicycle shed, however, an observer would not 
be surprised that the motion was lost” (CCR, Oct. 1897, 34). The same year, the debate 
on New Zealand’s inadequate defences was somewhat sidetracked but eventually 
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carried when the “gallant defenders” present made it a more local and personal event 
and “the broad basis on which the mover rested his argument was thrown into the 
background” (35).  
In 1898, the involvement of women in debates revealed an interesting facet of 
formalised norms of consensus formation. In Dunedin, students held a debate on the 
question “was America justified in intervening in the Cuban dispute, apart from the 
Maine incident?”20 Miss Randle, at the last moment, decided to join the opposition:  
Speaker followed speaker rapidly, and the interest never flagged, though the 
‘House’ sat till an unusually late hour. The voting resulted in a majority for the 
affirmative. When the ‘ayes’ were called for, nearly all the men held up their 
hands, but very few of the ladies. The negative were in high spirits – the ladies 
were, of course, going to support Miss Randle. But, alas for those who place 
reliance on the ways of the uncontrollable sex – whose conduct obeys no known 
laws, and the secret of whose nature has yet to be discovered – when the ‘nays’ 
were called for only one or two of the ladies voted. (OUR, June 1898, 50) 
The author assumed that the women present would side with Miss Randle, the one 
female student who got up and faced the audience. Particularly in Dunedin, debates 
were held with either entirely male or female participation. The occasion when a woman 
teamed up with fellow male students was expected to cause other women to sympathise 
with Miss Randle. The author expected to detect a supposedly sentimental element in 
their women’s voting behaviour. Atkinson identifies a similar idea in the discourse that 
led to women’s suffrage. He argues that “men supported suffrage for a variety of 
reason” and among those was “an expedient calculation that female voters would favour 
their particular faction or causes” (OUR, June 1898, 86). In 1891, the issue of women’s 
suffrage in the public arena circled around the question how women would vote if they 
had the right (90).21 Nothing of the sort came to pass. The article showed that by 1898 
                                               
20 Canterbury held a similar debate, only in April, and by chance four hours after the United States had 
declared war (MBL, minute book, 16 April 1898). 
21 Atkinson shows that, between 1891 and 1893 considerations of women’s electoral behaviour were 
central to parliamentary debates on the issue. (Atkinson 2003, 90-94). He quotes Sir John Hall who 
argued that “suffrage would ‘be a great gain for us’, as it would ‘increase the influence of the settler and 
family man, as against the loafing single man who held a great voice in the last elections’” (90). The 
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the regulative force of emotion was commonly accepted as a probative force for 
arguments. In particular, the social aspect of bargaining acquired considerable meaning 
for the expression of personal preferences and companionship. 
Contemporary debating manuals for parliamentary use also had something to say on 
the issue of social or personal bias. Luther S. Cushing, author of one of the oldest and 
most influential debating manuals in America, stated that interlocutors should refrain 
from referring to any particular member by name and, instead, address people by their 
function or simply address them with “the previous speaker.” Cushing also provided 
good reasons for this procedure: personal feelings, dislike, disturbances and most 
importantly sympathy were to be avoided in order to ensure the orderly running of 
debate (Cushing 1851, 61, §206). In 1895, Mackenzie in his lecture on debating style in 
New Zealand alluded to the same concern when he argued that “anything approaching 
to vulgar and offensive personalities are, of course, to be avoided” (Mackenzie 1895, 
138). In 1903, the Auckland University magazine Marte Nostro pointed out that 
debaters were not abiding by the rules: “Another general fault is the habit of mentioning 
the names of previous speakers when referring to their arguments” (MN, Oct. 1903, 8). 
Students’ behaviour in deliberation was opposed to what Cushing and Mackenzie 
identified as the predominant style of American and English political discourse and 
what debaters aimed at enforcing in New Zealand. 
Towards the end of the century, the subversion of rules acquired a physical element 
beyond the reference to personalities. In 1898, debaters in Dunedin contemplated 
whether the colonials were paying too much attention to sport.  
A vote having been taken, the chairman declared the ‘ayes’ victorious by one 
vote. The decision was, however, challenged, and the negatives claimed a 
majority of five. Some enthusiastic sportsmen, however, held up two hands and 
a walking stick – sheer physical inability prevented them holding up more. If the 
counting was inaccurate, the voters are probably to blame, and the chairman 
                                                                                                                                         
observations of the student debater in 1898 were embedded in a political discourse that asked similar 
questions and generated almost identical answers. 
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naively remarked that as some of them were wearing gloves he could hardly be 
expected to see their hands. (OUR, June 1898, 50) 
Emotions overwhelmed some debaters. More striking was the complete unreliability of 
the final counting, which stood in clear contrast to traditional procedure. The scene 
reverberated with an eagerness that parallels a session in Christchurch eighteen years 
earlier: “At the close of the concert three cheers were given for the Professors for their 
share in the brilliant success of the college at the hands of the London Examiners” 
(MBL, minute book, 12 June 1880). In 1895, the Otago Review mocked the ingenious 
method of a prominent debater of drawing attention:  
The correct thing now is to stride across the intervening desks, even though you 
are the possessor of a weak ankle. Fashion is inexorable. Having made a bow of 
the wooden-doll order, gracefully gather the books in your arms, gather yourself 
together for a leap of three feet on to the front desk, and return to the bosom of 
your admiring friends by the before-mentioned ‘desk route.’ (OUR, Sep. 1895, 
113) 
These expressions of partisan spirit for fellow debaters fell into the register of 
bargaining in deliberation. At the end of the century, hardly anyone took amiss the 
application of passionate behaviour to a presumably sincere occasion. The account of 
1898 is written in a sympathetic and bemused rather than a reproachful tone. In the 
1880s and early 1890s, the minute books of the three societies are void of accounts of 
disturbances. In those years, Rev. Thomas Flavell expressed one truly grave concern in 
1882, when he lamented the lax punctuality among members (MBL, minute book, 2 
Sept. 1882). Towards the turn of the century, the filing of more serious interferences 
increased and so did critical comments on social conduct and formal protocol. Minor 
emotional outbursts that stood in contrast to the regulative ideal of rational discourse 
were, however, increasingly accepted at the same time.  
The Otago University and the Canterbury College Reviews regularly betrayed the 
true nature of debates. In 1894, in Dunedin a participant remarked: “Why don’t the 
witty interjectors of funny remarks at the debating society get on their feet and allow 
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their victims a chance of throwing remarks at them?” (OUR, Sep. 1894, 112). In 1896, 
an anonymous critic was ready to order “a fire hose as part of the equipment of the 
Honorary Secretary of the debating society” (OUR, June 1896, 42). Debating societies 
began to tighten their hold on discipline when the “populus” was increasingly hard to 
control. The force of convention ceased to be effective and had to be replaced by a 
detailed set of norms in order to regulate or even exclude bonding strategies, 
exclamations of team spirit or plain larrikinism. Contrary to Habermas’s assumption 
that reasonable discourse provided the normative grounds for structured discussion, 
debating societies at the end of the nineteenth century faced a different reality. Debates 
increasingly consisted in articulations of what Elster terms “credible threats and 
promises” (Elster 1998a, 6). In other words, students used alternative bargaining 
strategies that did not draw an reason and norms to persuade the audience but employed 
colloquialisms, emotional appeal and physical presence to reach spectators. In order to 
balance this trend, those in charge of the organisation of debate enforced structure and 
social norms to guarantee a rational and well-regulated discussion. 
Records prove that stricter social convention did not lead to clearer decisions. On 
the contrary, the numerical outcome was occasionally replenished by additional 
commentary. As was customary procedure, meetings were adjourned after the final vote 
had been taken. At Otago University Dr. Colquhoun, who served as chairman for the 
evening, seized the opportunity to comment on the subject of “cremation or interment” 
and “at the close of the debate …  kindly consented to give some remarks on the subject” 
(OUR, June 1901, 39).22 In 1894 in Dunedin, Alfred Richard Barclay acted as chairman 
for the debate: “Is the Social Life of Our University Satisfactory?”23 The audience was 
almost unanimously of the opinion that it was not. “At the same time it was admitted by 
                                               
22 Daniel Colquhoun was Lecturer in the Practice of Medicine at Otago University (Morrell 1969, 62). 
23 Alfred R. Barclay had been on the debating committee since 1878 and in 1881, became the society’s 
vice-president for the first time.  
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all that the social spirit of the University was greatly increasing – a fact to which the 
chairman himself an old student, said he could bear testimony” (OUR, Aug. 1894, 52). 
At Canterbury, on the topic of technical education in New Zealand state schools 
“everyone seemed to agree as to the desirability of technical education, but all could not 
agree to its introduction into state schools” (CCR, Oct. 1898, 10). In Auckland, students 
decided to complement their initial resolution “that the power at present possessed by 
the Press should not be curtailed” with “that it would be undesirable and dangerous for 
the Press to have absolute power” (SCUA, minute book, 7 June 1889). The need to add 
comment to the final ballot shows that the counting of ayes and nays did not suffice to 
express the society’s choice. In particular, the chairman seized the opportunity to 
expound his or her personal views. Other even more detailed accounts imply that the 
significance of closing a debate was more complex than formal procedures suggested.  
On the fiercely disputed questions of woman joining the medical profession, the 
verdict certainly did not indicate closure. In 1885, students in Dunedin discussed this 
question and resolved it in the affirmative. It was one of the rare occasions when the 
debate was extended over two evenings. In 1891, closing the debate on the same topic 
only demanded one night but then, the final decision became slightly noncommittal:  
On a vote being taken, it was found that a majority were in favour of admitting 
women to the medical profession; but a second division – the result of a 
suggestion by Mr. Sidey – proved conclusively that the prospect of having lady 
medical students at the University is not viewed with much favour by the 
majority of students. (OUR, Aug. 1891, 87) 
Another source stated that admission of women should “be postponed till the system of 
the Medical School was remodelled” (OUR, Comm. Issue, 1893, 41). These two reports 
were to a certain extent inconsistent. In the first instance, students opposed even the 
possibility of female enrolment; in the second reading, the audience rejected the notion 
only on grounds of the structural problems that the Medical School was experiencing. 
The discrepancy demonstrates that the final ballot was far from expressing the 
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members’ complex perspectives. It merely served as a benchmark for their diverse 
views.  
The outcome of debate was still significant, but it is doubtful whether the mere 
figures had any effect on the society other than providing room for the simple recording 
of results. Nineteenth-century debating societies employed voting as one constantly 
undermined expression of their consent. Their practice was increasingly characterised 
by a dynamics of bargaining in order to mould the society’s opinion. It was this 
tendency that eventually revealed the spontaneous aspects of consensus formation and 
that allowed for the corruption of strict written patterns of voting. These socially 
pertinent elements were gradually formalised and assimilated when a new tradition 
arose: debating tournaments. The idea of esprit de corps appropriated the social 
connotations of bargaining and proved conducive to the establishing of debating 
contests.  
 
Esprit de Corps and the Emergence of an Invented Tradition in New Zealand  
To determine the particular influences that contributed to consensus formation in 
nineteenth-century New Zealand debate, I explore the invention of a new tradition at the 
end of the century, the debating tournament and the corresponding systematic 
transformation of esprit de corps. Hobsbawm observes that the creation of new 
traditions “is essentially a process of formalization and ritualization, characterized by 
reference to the past, if only by imposing repetition” (Hobsbawm 1996, 4). Hobsbawm 
expects the invention of traditions to take place “more frequently when a rapid 
transformation of society weakens or destroys the social pattern for which ‘old’ 
traditions had been designed” (ibid.). New Zealand debate fused “old” traditions 
originating from England or America and “new” colonial ones. Students in New 
Zealand occasionally articulated the assumption that the relatively limited range of old 
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traditions furthered these transitory processes. In 1899, the winner of the prize essay 
was convinced that “vested interests and unquestioned traditions do not here offer such 
serious obstacles to the progress of so-called ‘Liberalism’ as they do in older countries” 
(Natural Conditions, 1899, 113). Consensus in debating was formalised to extinction by 
a heightened sense of individualism and the conviction that new tradition should fill the 
vacuum of late-Victorian New Zealand discursive culture. The same motivations 
provided a justification for abandoning the audience’s active role in decision-making 
processes in debate. The introduction of inter-collegiate debating tournaments in New 
Zealand denotes what Hobsbawm termed “invented tradition” (Hobsbawm 1996, 4). It 
came with the entire paraphernalia of late-Victorian colonial spirit. 
New Zealand debaters were conscious of the colony’s lack of tradition and of a 
national past. Towards the end of the century, they eventually embraced an alternative 
proactive position that focused on the active creation of traditions. James Hay’s 
statement of 1887 was perhaps the most pertinent for an earlier cautious yet not less 
optimistic view: 
It is an easy thing, and perhaps more pleasant, to be born in good traditions than 
to be at the making of them. But it is a circumstance inseparable from the 
conditions of a young colony’s existence that its traditions belong to its future 
and not to its past, that the character of its institutions shall be according to the 
condition in which we have received them. And in this lies the greatness of our 
responsibility. (Hay 1887, 1) 
In 1894, Alexander Wilson in analysing the Georgian novelists in his opening lecture 
rather melancholically pointed out that “one of the privileges denied to us, expatriated 
colonists, is association with a venerable past – the privilege of sitting occasionally in 
the midst of ruins” (Wilson 1894, 43). The same year, the Otago student D.A. Strachan 
regarded the absence of ruins as an undeniable advantage for the future prospect of New 
Zealand. In building on the traditions of Britain, New Zealanders would forge their own 
history and future: “[W]e have the story of our motherland to recall until we show one 
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of our own” (Strachan 1894, 129). After the formative years of the societies, students 
began to locate their roots in New Zealand. For one student at Canterbury College the 
beginnings of the debating tradition coincided with the activities of the Chichelian 
Senate. He recalled the members of the club with much reverence and assumed that 
“their hearts will ever lie buried with the past ”.24 In 1894, Cane was confident that 
Britain’s past provided a point of orientation for the young intellectual elite of New 
Zealand: “The genius of the people that has given to the world so many poets and 
thinkers cannot be dead. Per chance with a new century and new generation of men that 
genius will rise again Phoenix-like from the ashes of a past time” (Cane, manuscript 
1894, MBL, 27). The future of New Zealand depended on a new generation of young 
colonials who strove to produce genuine colonial traditions that transcended their 
English heritage. Collegiate debating societies with their youthful enthusiasm provided 
an environment conducive to the invention of colonial traditions. 
Esprit de corps is the term that emerges from the archival sources and epitomised 
efforts made to consolidate old and new ideologies that were permeated by national 
sentiment and feelings of fellowship. Originally a military expression, by the mid-
nineteenth century, esprit de corps denoted a “regard entertained by the members of a 
body for the honour and interests of the body as a whole, and of each other as belonging 
to it” (OED, s.v. “esprit de corps”). By the end of the century, the term was evidently in 
wide use and equally severely attacked in New Zealand as well as on the European 
continent. In New Zealand esprit de corps was immediately associated with education 
and debating. In 1879, Professor Sale in Dunedin “said that students should learn to 
love their alma mater, and cultivate esprit de corps” (OW, 31 May 1879, 17). In the 
middle of the Boer War, a short letter entitled “Esprit de Corps” reached the editor of 
                                               
24 The entire quotes reads: “Though the good wishes of all early senators always follow the Senate’s 
progress, their hearts will ever lie buried with the past. A new king arises who knows not Joseph, and be 
the present debates more profound and eloquent that they were of yore the memories of that dozen or so 
pioneers will ever lie in happy cluster around the spot known as Study No. 2” (CCR, Oct. 1898, 40). 
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the Canterbury College Review. The author called for more enthusiasm among the male 
students of the college: “They are regular nonentities, they have no personality” (CCR, 
Oct. 1901, 41). The idea of esprit de corps enjoyed a wide application in New Zealand, 
but it was also in common use in Europe.  
In 1899, George Palante (1862-1925), a French professor of philosophy inspired by 
socialist ideas, published a comprehensive and severely critical essay: “Esprit de 
Corps”.25 Palante distinguished between two senses of the term: a narrow meaning 
which referred to the solidarity of a professional group and a broader sense that 
“designate[d] the spirit of solidarity in general, not only in the professional group, but in 
all those social circles, whatever they might be (class, caste, sect, etc.), in which the 
individual feels himself to be more or less subordinated to the interests of the 
collectivity” (Palante, Palante Archives, 1). In the latter understanding, Palante held the 
liberal educated professions responsible for forming esprit de corps co-operations. He 
identified core aspects of the social phenomenon: intellectual and moral conformism, 
rivalry and competition, the cultivation of superiority, the control of private and public 
formal conduct and expansion of influence into the wider public. In addition to these 
negative attributes Palante issued further reprimands. Esprit de corps suppressed 
innovation and talent in individuals and instead was interested in “perfectly disciplined 
beings” (7). Behaviour in accordance with the demands of a co-operation was 
“sometimes decorated with character” (6).  
Palante’s essay invokes the impression that esprit de corps was an elitist, 
conformist, competitive and fundamentally middle-class phenomenon that corrupts 
                                               
25 George Palante was recently discovered by scholars of nineteenth-century European culture and history 
of ideas. In 2004, his complete works were published. The defence of the individual against the 
corrupting forces of the modern society constituted the central theme of his teachings. Even though 
nineteenth-century students in New Zealand possibly never heard of Palante, his article identified cultural 
implications of esprit de corps that set into perspective New Zealanders’ use of it. Onfray provides a 
concise summary of Palante’s work in Palante (2004). The essay originally appeared in La Revue 
Philosophique in 1899 and was reprinted in Palante (2004). A careful English translation is available on 
the internet under www.marxists.org/archive/palante/1899/ esprit-de-corps.htm in the online Palante 
Archives and will be quoted forthwith. 
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basic social principles of humanity and solidarity. In contrast, Palante admitted that 
individual members of societies and clubs possibly acted out of conviction and in “good 
faith” (Palante, Palante Archives, 7). He nevertheless emphasised the detrimental social 
effect of esprit de corps, which was mistaken by some (he cited Durkheim and Dromer) 
for the mediator between state and individual and as such, for a regulative force which 
guided the individual in his social reality. Palante strongly disagreed and argued that 
“the individual cannot ask from a corporate group his law and his moral criteria” (9).26 
Palante endorsed the proposition that an individual should be allowed to contribute to 
numerous causes at the same time:  
The individual, while he is in a certain sense a tissue of general properties, can 
be regarded as the point of interference of a more or less considerable number of 
social circles whose moral influences reverberate within him. The individual is a 
harmonious and living monad whose vital and harmonious law is to maintain 
himself in a state of equilibrium in the midst of a system of interfering social 
forces. (11) 
He thus granted the individual the innate capacity to manage the multi-faceted 
challenges of social existence. In other words, he entitled a person to be fully 
responsible for her social conduct and entirely independent of externally imposed 
standards. Palante’s critical version of esprit de corps anticipated the twentieth-century 
suspicion of the dominance of the Victorian intellectual elite for the determination of 
universal social standards.  
The application of ritualised practices like consensus formation or poll taking in 
debate to a New Zealand nineteenth-century cultural context has been largely neglected 
and has not yet been connected to critical studies of the invention of tradition. Atkinson 
investigates New Zealand’s electoral system from a historical point of view but does not 
reflect on elements of political practice that were ritualised constituents of New 
                                               
26 Palante argued: “In our eyes the value of the individual’s moral activity is in direct relationship with the 
freedom of which he disposes. The corporate group dominates the individual through interests too 
immediate and too material for this liberty not to be hindered. It can, in fact, suppress the means of 
existence for an individual refractory to its moral discipline” (Palante, Palante Archives, 9). 
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Zealand’s franchise system in the nineteenth century (Atkinson 2003). Leslie Lipson 
and Raewyn Dalziel contribute to the understanding of the vote as a historical concept 
in New Zealand culture but remain confined to a linear historical perspective (Lipson 
1948, Dalziel 1989).  
Palante’s analysis highlights every aspect of Hobsbawm’s invented tradition. Esprit 
de corps amalgamated formalised elements, aspects of ritual and references to the past, 
which aimed at incorporating a regulative sense of belonging. In the early 1880s, New 
Zealanders were not yet using the phrase in the context that Palante targeted in his 
essay. Instead, the exclusionary quality of the term slowly surfaced at the turn of the 
century. In 1882, Professor Cook, for example, coupled it with rather positive 
connotations of “social life” and “friendly spirit” when relating his experience of 
student life at Cambridge.27 James Hay, in 1887, likewise endowed the term with an 
overall positive sentiment of “tradition” when he foresaw the lasting existence of the 
College’s debating society:  
I congratulate you upon your success in having kept up the efficiency and the 
esprit de corps of this Society, which has now survived the first seven years of 
its infancy, and I hope that by the time it attains its twenty-first year it will have 
acquired traditions which will secure its existence as long as the college lasts, 
that is will have sent forth men into the world who will have made their mark in 
the various departments of life in which they shall have engaged, and who will 
at all times be proud to have been connected with this college. (Hay 1887, 1)  
In 1888, the Otago University Review was launched. The editorial ended with an entire 
section on the state of esprit de corps among the student body. The author pointed out 
that “our students, it must be confessed, are sadly lacking in esprit de corps” and 
assumed that “of the social life that forms so great a part of the educational value of the 
Home universities they have no idea” (qtd. in Jones & Southgate 1972, 8). Moreover, 
                                               
27 Cook maintained: “Now I am far from thinking that a University should convert itself into fashionable 
lounge, but I do think that these young idlers derive a great deal of good from residence at the University, 
good which is not represented by the book learning which they acquire, and that, in return, they contribute 
very much to the social life of the place and to the esprit de corps of the whole body of students” (Cook 
1882, 20). 
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the editor expressed the wish that the Review would add to the spirit already initiated by 
the debating society and the football club (ibid.). The sentiment that was prominent in 
Hay’s address and the Otago Review’s editorial extended beyond the boundaries of 
Canterbury College and acquired a slightly more proactive tone in Hawkes Bay. In 
1896, William Colenso the then president of the local branch of the Philosophical 
Institute called on the esprit de corps of his members to sustain the work of the society. 
He did not miss the opportunity to invoke a sense of competition among the different 
branches of the institute: 
Our society is both smaller and poorer than other kindred ones in this North 
Island. …  We here in Hawke’s Bay must feel it, and therefore it is more 
imperative upon us, as a determined and devoted though small band, devoid of 
those large blessings which our elder sisters enjoy – in rich endowments, 
princely gifts, resident learnt scientific men, extensive libraries and museums – 
to be active, to be penetrated with that genuine esprit de corps which not 
infrequently more than makes up for the want of everything else. (Colenso 1896, 
131) 
At the dawn of the twentieth century, the phrase esprit de corps touched on a range of 
New Zealand sensibilities that collided to form a sense of belonging that was pivotal to 
the zeitgeist of the colony.  
Formalised practices like poll taking and the exercise of bargaining strategies in 
debate united individuals on grounds of common or social knowledge; they also divided 
them. This was Palante’s central criticism of esprit de corps. In 1883, Professor von 
Haast in Christchurch observed the same phenomenon. He recalled the early career of 
the German scholar Paracelsus and defended his method of teaching in German instead 
of Latin: “It can easily be imagined how deeply his colleagues were shocked by his 
want of esprit de corps, and what a howl of pious indignation was raised against him, 
for using such a vulgar tongue as the German language, spoken by the common people” 
(Haast 1883, 4). Von Haast made clear, like Palante, that insistence on common 
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procedures for the sake of preserving an outdated pattern of belonging, had hindered 
German education in previous centuries.  
Contemporary scholarship provides numerous historical instances of the same 
ambiguous dynamics of formalised political and social engagement. Mares shows that 
debates on correct forms of protest caused dissent and tension among radicals in 1870s 
Britain instead of providing an opportunity to identify common grounds (Mares 2006). 
Morris observes that British clubs and societies “by the end of the eighteenth century 
were spreading into the countryside where some of them lasted well into the twentieth 
century often providing a focus for community, identity and ritual” (Morris 1990, 399). 
Ray invokes equivocal interpretations of ritual and debate in nineteenth-century 
America when she dissects the confined pattern of lyceum debating not as a “ritual of 
discussion or compromise seeking” but rather as a “ritual based on a cooperative 
framework” (Ray 2005, 28). She holds that debating did not foster compromise but 
simply formalised final voting processes by adhering to established strategies. As a 
consequence, she acknowledges the power of formalisation to acquaint individuals with 
certain procedures but points out the possibility that these procedures were not 
inevitably conducive to the creation of social knowledge and shared meaning.  
Decisions in debating societies in New Zealand were based on written norms and 
governed by processes of reshaping these regulations lending them a flexible quality. 
The opinion-building constituent of debate was initially subverted in an attempt to 
create what nineteenth-century debaters termed esprit de corps. Some students 
predominantly criticised the physical expressions of this form of group identification as 
disruptive behaviour. Bargaining, the pivotal element in the New Zealand debating style 
of the 1880s and 1890s, is characterised by spontaneous outbursts of passion, appeals to 
reason and the interest in fellow members. In other words, bargaining falls partly into 
the category of rhetoric that Plato criticised for its interest in mere victory and Aristotle 
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rejected as financially motivated publicity. Bargaining cannot be circumscribed by 
written guidelines. It instead provides the ideal point of departure for any attempt to 
mould and influence the dynamics of consensus formation. Obstreperous occurrences 
became part of a distinctively collegiate way of debating. By the end of the century, no 
report went by without commenting on students’ irritating behaviour. It is ironic that 
this nonconformist conduct at once articulated a maturing sense of partisanship and 
paved the way for a concept of belonging that negated the irregularities of students’ 
behaviour. The latter even further imposed principles of conformity by coupling these 
with moral and normative values like character, responsibility and care for the other. 
Loyalty of each member to the cause of the society characterised the late nineteenth-
century version of debating societies in New Zealand. 
Criticism of these occasions demonstrated that they became indispensable to the 
continuation of debating at New Zealand colleges, however annoyingly they were 
portrayed. The contentious issue of academic dress contained the entire range of 
arguments on old and invented traditions. In 1899, for example, an ominous “Observer” 
noticed that the Dialectic Society held a prominent place among students for its 
disregard of etiquette and academic tradition: 
I would like to draw your attention to the habit which seems to be growing upon 
students of late years, namely, that of not wearing cap and gown within the 
precincts of the College. …  The laxity referred to is very noticeable at meetings 
of the Dialectic, numbers of students even speaking there without gowns on. 
(CCR, June 1899, 40) 
Despite this palpable tendency to go against university custom, the question of 
collegiate attire was debated five times. Otago University students always rejected the 
idea of compulsory academic dress; Auckland instead defended the concept. G. P. 
Howell at Otago chose the issue as a typical example of a “well argued and keenly 
contested” debate that showed “signs of honest feeling, of deep principle, of love of 
freedom, and of desire for patriotism” (Howell 1893, 134). The discussion was also 
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“illuminated by spirited allusion, sarcasm, and intermittent humour” (ibid.).28 In fact, 
customs like academic dress codes served as grounds of identification for students’ 
debating spirit. Howell significantly concluded that if gowns would “inflict pain upon 
sensitive natures” it would “be better to sacrifice personal appearance and the dignity of 
the awe-inspiring mortar board, than injure the feelings of a fellow-student, for care for 
the feelings of others is a mark of true esprit de corps” (ibid.). Howell was the first 
student who employed esprit de corps as an argument in its own right. Previous lectures 
and essays exclusively utilised the term as a metaphor for the formidable progress of the 
debating societies. In Howell’s essay, the concept, on the contrary, provided a reason 
for abandoning academic dress in compliance with the wishes and sentiments of the 
group. Palante’s analysis comes to mind and his position that esprit de corps produced a 
formal code among members that commonly accentuated the exclusive nature of a club. 
By the end of the century, Howell’s innocent remarks on “care for the feelings of 
others” only applied to a selected few.  
In order to succeed in moulding the societies’ will in the final vote, interlocutors had 
to address their fellow students in their social web-like context of individual, debating 
society, college and the respective local community and utilise patterns of common 
knowledge and emotional appeal. Kenneth Burke in Rhetoric of Motives called this 
social web “identification”.29 For Burke, the term entails that “a person might think 
himself as ‘belonging’ to some special body more or less clearly defined (family, race, 
profession, church, social class, nation, etc., or various combinations of these). In brief, 
he may identify himself with such bodies or movements, largely through sympathetic 
attitudes of his own” (Burke 1973, 268). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, this 
                                               
28 Notably, Howell did not render inexcusable the use of humour and sarcasm in debate. Howell’s 
criticism confirmed the argument (put forth in Chapter two) that humour and amusement were well-
established elements of debating practice as long as they succumbed to the parameters of respectability.  
29 Burke observes that rhetoric “is rooted in an essential function of language itself, a function that is 
wholly realistic and is continually born anew; the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing 
cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols” (Burke 1950, 43).  
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process of identification was expanded and challenged by the notion of a New Zealand 
community that was increasingly influenced by its unique position in the British Empire 
and the resulting benefits of communication technology as tools for public opinion-
formation. Students tended to place themselves at the centre of the British Empire by 
progressively identifying unique colonial merits. Tournaments of all sorts including the 
annual collegiate debating competitions became invented traditions that promoted and 
cemented the ideas of national identification. 
 
Debating Tournaments: The Manifestation of Esprit de Corps 
American and New Zealand collegiate debating societies invented a form of 
deliberation, intercollegiate debating, that subverted principles of participatory 
consensus formation and eventually rendered processes of bargaining and final voting 
redundant. Argumentation was the only one of the three constituents which remained 
relatively intact for the conduct of debates. Debaters did not have to court the 
audience’s good will and opinion. They likewise could afford to lose bargaining force 
and concentrate instead on the purity of argumentation and style. As a consequence, the 
binding dynamics of speaker and audience interaction needed to be replaced by 
something that still furnished individual members with a sense of belonging to one and 
the same society. At the end of the nineteenth-century, esprit de corps especially in its 
practical form of competitive debate encapsulated diverse moments of identification. 
By the 1890s, American colleges had successfully established the practice of 
intercollegiate debating.30 Since 1897, the university debating society in Auckland held 
tournament debates with the Athenaeum, the Girls Korero Club or even the local 
                                               
30 Opinion on the exact date of the first American intercollegiate debate differs. However, that American 
colleges invented the tradition is certain. Nichols records that between 1892 and 1902, the tradition of 
debating tournaments was established in America (Nichols 1936, 217). Harding mentions an 
intercollegiate debate between Shurtleff College, Illinois and the University of Chicago literary societies 
before 1876 (Harding 1971, 288). Zarefsky maintains that the debate between the Hinman Society of 
Northwestern University and the Tri Kappa Society on the 29 November 1878 was the first intercollegiate 
debate (Zarefksy 2001, 196). From these different sources it is safe to conclude that the Havard-Yale 
debate of 1892 was not the first competitive debate ever carried out in America. 
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Auckland YMCA on a regular basis (SCUA, minute book, 24 Aug. 1897, 18 Aug. 1899; 
NZH, 25 Aug. 1897, 5.).31 These modest beginnings did not yet fully realise the 
American concept of intercollegiate competitions. However, they already relied on the 
external judgement of three referees, which matured into a characteristic feature of 
debating contests in general.32 The assessment of prize essays by former members or 
friends of the society was common practice, whereas the separation of the final vote and 
the audience represented a new stage in the development of debate in New Zealand. In 
1901, the colleges in Otago and Canterbury arranged their first intercollegiate debate in 
Dunedin. The contest was repeated in 1902 and included Dunedin and Christchurch, 
Auckland and Wellington.33 The 1902 competition was held in Christchurch and hosted 
seventy students from four colleges. The occasion stands out among previous and 
following ones because the enactment of the debating contest led to the discussion of 
rules of deliberation by tournament judges and stirred considerable discontent among 
students and members of staff.34 By 1903, the controversy had quieted down and the 
contests were resumed. The same year, the tournament took place in Auckland, and the 
Canterbury and Otago participants had to brave a two-day journey by boat and train, 
meeting the third party of students on their way in Wellington (CCR, June 1903, 12-13). 
The debates were commonly part of the Easter intercollegiate tournaments, which were 
composed of tennis matches and athletics competitions with one day dedicated to a 
                                               
31 The tournament debate held in August 1897 is thus the first known competitive debate in New Zealand. 
32 In 1897, three referees presided over the evening: Messr. Upton and Cooper and Prof. Egerton (NZH, 
25 Aug. 1897, 5). 
33 Victoria College began teaching in 1899 as the last of the four colonial colleges. As at the other 
colleges, most students were full-time employees (Hamilton 2002, 12). In contrast to the other colleges, 
the debating society was initiated by the Students’ Association (both founded in 1899). Hamilton shows 
that in 1904, “sixty students attended the Debating Society’s AGM” (13). Barrowman argues that Victoria 
College excelled in debating “because of its comparative strength in law” (Barrowman 1999, 84). 
Wellington, before 1929, also won the Joynt Scroll Tournament twelve times. Debating at Victoria 
College went the way of competition when, in 1905, they inaugurated the Plunket Medal for oratory and 
the Union Prize for best debater (85, n26).  
34 Societies also slowly revised techniques for inner-society competitions. The minute book of the 
Auckland University debating society contains a motion to specify the exact proceedings of these inner-
society contests. The emergence of inter-collegiate tournaments quite naturally triggered an increase in 
practising this particular brand of debate. Guidelines and objectives accordingly had to be made very 
clear (SCUA, minute book (notice of motion), separate typescript, 1902). 
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debating contest. Due to the numbers of participants, the event involved extensive 
transportation arrangements, venues and accommodation. The press coverage of the first 
intercollegiate debate in 1901 was modest compared to the expectation leading up to the 
tournament of 1903 that would again unite all four New Zealand colleges and involve 
more than eighty participating students.35 
In 1901, the panel of three judges from Dunedin consisted of Alexander Wilson, F. 
R. Chapman (who was a member of the first hour) and Reverent Dean Fitchett (OUR, 
Aug. 1901, 79; CCR, Oct. 1901, 18-9, Appendix 7).36 The custom of selecting the 
tournament committee from former members and present academic staff was continued 
in ensuing years. However, in 1902 students had to accommodate the unique situation 
that the extramural judges aimed at reforming the familiar and fledgling structure of 
tournament deliberation. Reverent Alfred Averill (1865-1957), Mr. Charles Edmund 
Bevan-Brown (1854-1926) and W. H. Triggs served on the committee and subsequently 
forged new criteria (CCR, June 1902, 7).37 The dead heat of the Wellington-Auckland 
debate in the first round of the tournament might have fired the judges’ enthusiasm and 
made them confident of their proposal. Possibly, the weak performance of the four 
colleges in general caused the panel to believe that the propositions would be 
welcomed. In fact, the Otago University Review resolved that the debate had lacked 
vigour and precision and that, therefore, the judges had “had great difficulty in deciding 
                                               
35 The Dunedin Evening Star commented on the 1901 tournament with a detailed account of the judges’ 
decision (OUR, Aug. 1901, 79). 
36 In 1889, Alexander Wilson had given the opening lecture on Fiction as a Fine Art, which was 
subsequently published by the society. F. R. Chapman had been an active member in the early days of the 
society between 1878 and 1882.  
37 Nothing is known about Mr. Triggs. However, Reverend Alfred Walter Averill was appointed canon to 
the Christchurch Cathedral and only one year later became archdeacon of Akaroa. In the clerical 
community he was an influential but similarly controversial personality. Averill was an outspoken 
advocate of the ecumenical understanding of faith. Limbrick concludes that “he sought to relate the 
Christian faith to peace, social justice and responsible citizenship” (Limbrick DNZB). From 1883 until 
1920, Charles Edmund Beavan Brown served as headmaster of the Christchurch Boys’ High School. He 
rarely appeared in public except in his support of the Young Citizens’ League. Foster maintains that 
“Bevan Brown believed that the principal aim in teaching should be to build character and that scholastic 
attainment was not the only criterion of a person's educational standing. He attached immense importance 
to religion and religious observance and personally superintended the instruction of his senior classes in 
that subject” (Foster, Te Ara - Encyclopaedia of New Zealand).  
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between Auckland and Wellington” (OUR, Aug. 1902, 77). As a consequence, the 
committee advised the re-introduction of the final ballot by audience. The new guideline 
outlines the tournament as a combination of, in total, six debates among twelve 
delegates. The purpose of competition was to be “to persuade the audience present” (79) 
in order to secure the closing ballot. The Otago University Review concluded that “the 
judges evidently felt that it was not desirable that the speakers should be advocating 
positions to which their convictions did not incline them” (OUR, Sep. 1902, 86). The 
judges also added that “a little co-operation instead of all competition in the gatherings 
of students might be advisable” (OUR, Aug. 1902, 79) and imparted to their report a 
moralising tone. 
The first tentative reaction by students concluded that the propositions would initiate 
the “abandonment of the tournament idea” (OUR, Aug. 1902, 79). In consecutive issues 
of the Otago and Canterbury reviews, the discussion acquired a more passionate tone 
and made clear that the “tournament idea” mainly referred to the virtues of competition. 
The Dunedin editorial was very sensitive to the referees’ closing comment on friendly 
co-operation:  
It seems to us that, if these meetings are to constitute a focus for the best that the 
University of New Zealand can produce, it can only be upon the basis of the 
strenuous competition of all the colleges. The best way of securing ‘co-
operation’ in a common effort to make the contests a success is to stimulate the 
‘competition’ among the parts. (OUR, Sep. 1902, 86) 
This argument failed to see that the spirit of contest was possibly detrimental to the 
stimulation of fellowship. The editor’s opinion invoked the late nineteenth-century non-
judgemental, that is, scientifically objective Darwinian view of conflict and competition 
as conducive to the progress of the human race; a position that, in the course of the 
controversy, found its way into the motto esprit de corps. 
The reaction in Dunedin was provoked by the existence of two diagonally opposed 
perspectives on the value of community at university colleges as well as in colonial 
  137 
society. The judges— students of the developing New Zealand colleges of the late 
1870s— promoted a forthright humanistic ideal of education that regarded knowledge 
and truth as rewards and consensual communication as the means to procure them. In 
other words, truth and knowledge were not the result of competitive pursuit but 
practical hard labour that sought its application in the New Zealand community. In 
1881, Professor Brown in his address “Student Life” identified “friendly combat” as the 
first goal of the College’s debating society: “friendly combat, where it cannot 
degenerate into altercation or quarrel, is one of the best schools of thought and speech” 
(LT, 4 April 1881, 5). In 1882, the student Hogben in his essay on Thomas Carlyle 
blamed competition “cloaked under due laws of war, named ‘fair competition’” for a 
society that was “in reality the totalest separation, isolation” (Hogben 1882, 21). In 
1884, Professor Haslam warned students in Christchurch that “it is our duty as members 
of a society like this, not to endeavour to gain dialectic or rhetorical victories over each 
other; but to aid one another in forming opinions carefully, and maintaining them fairly” 
(Haslam 1884, 32). The early advocates of debating still saw a divide between ideas of 
combat and the concept of friendly fellowship. They instead endorsed an ideal of 
communication that promoted fairness and equality. 
Students at the beginning of the twentieth century challenged and reinterpreted this 
ideal and eventually arrived at a notion of conflict- and competition-seeking discourse 
that no longer separated “friendly” from “quarrel”. Their explicit goal was to win 
debating glory for their academic institution and by means of a competitive atmosphere 
unite their team members under the auspices of the college. In 1894, Alexander Wilson 
of Otago University, one of the first tournament judges in 1901, alluded to the 
increasingly competitive atmosphere among people in general. He maintained that “we 
dare not rest; we must be pushing, and sticking our elbows out, and competing the 
livelong day and the livelong year” (Wilson 1894, 2). Remarkably, Wilson’s 
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sentimentalism did not delude him. He clearly realised that he belonged to a different 
generation and that his students might wholeheartedly embrace their daily struggles: 
But I am afraid that in this advanced colony, city, and university I need expect 
no one to join with me in my sentimental regret for the days that are gone – 
when an honest fellow could be something out of nothing. Probably you young 
people will even enjoy the fight for existence, if the fight happens to be 
successful; but, perhaps also, if it is not so successful, some of you may look 
back with a wistful regret to the age of ‘Beer and Skittles.’ (3) 
In 1898, Professor Gilray’s remark that “it is impossible to get rid of competition” 
(Gilray 1898, 133) followed the same line of argument. The College’s responsibility to 
equip students with the best practical education was his justification for combining 
competition and education. “Life, itself, is to the vast majority a competition; and, if 
educational institutions are to prepare the young for life, they cannot afford to overlook 
so prominent a feature of daily life as competition” (ibid.). In other words, the 
integration of competition in debate mirrored the daily struggles of students. Debating 
contests were meant to become a training ground for the realities of public life in the 
colony. 
It did not come as a surprise, that in 1902, Professor Black (1835-1914) of Otago 
University accused the Christchurch panel of turning the “Debating Tournament 
champions into some of an intellectual hotch-potch” (OUR, Sep. 1902, 89).38 In his 
letter to the Review, he formulated an idea of community that evolves from competition 
and compared to its American origins: 
We must create and maintain a strong esprit de corps feeling among the best 
students of our colleges; and these inter-collegiate contests [sic] is just the way 
to do it. In the United States, where these inter-university debating contests have 
originated and grown up into most interesting and exciting national events, 
looked forward to and prepared for quite a year in advance, the elected 
champions think not of travelling two or three thousand miles to meet each other 
                                               
38 In 1871, James Gow Black came to New Zealand as the newly appointed professor of natural science. 
After 1877, he became a professor of chemistry and mineralogy. Eventually, with the founding of the 
School of Mines, he was appointed to the chair of chemistry, a position he held until 1911. Fenby 
maintains that the “practical application of science was the central focus of his [Black’s] career” (Fenby 
DNZB). On his extensive lecture tours through New Zealand, he promoted his concept of technical 
education. The biographical information is based on Fenby in DNZB.  
  139 
in intellectual battle array. It is always university against university. (OUR, Sep. 
1902, 89) 
Black was not aware that American scholars were far from being unanimous supporters 
of the concept of competition.39 His sentiments resonated strongly with New 
Zealanders’ increasing awareness of themselves as a colony and as an indispensable 
constituent of the British Empire. Professor Black ended his comment by 
metaphorically comparing the New Zealand debating tournaments with football 
matches, “in which each side was composed partly of New Zealanders and partly of 
New South Welshmen, instead of the usual ‘colony against colony’ match” (ibid.). In 
the latter case, he maintained, an overwhelming audience would follow “every kick and 
turn, scrum and scramble – big with the fame of a nation” (ibid.).40 In his argument, the 
university paralleled in structure and in function the inner workings of a nation. Black’s 
comparison well illustrates that only a selected few were meant to actively play the 
game of nation-building, whereas the majority should be content to watch and cheer 
those who were striving for victory. Black’s debating society and audience were no 
longer Bates’ parliamentary community of 1895. The debating society was there to 
produce a few leading speakers not a mass of competent orators. Black significantly 
emphasised the role of strife and difference for any kind of esprit de corps. Bates placed 
his confidence in the commonality that emerges from a consensus-driven rhetorically 
competent audience. 
Students’ criticism of the panel’s report further aimed at reshaping the individual. 
The Reviews in Dunedin and Christchurch, still discussing the tournaments, disparaged 
the assumption that debaters “should take part as individuals” (OUR, Sep. 1902, 86) and 
                                               
39 Chapter five discusses the American controversy between Baker and Ringwalt on intercollegiate 
debating. 
40 Black alluded to a friction between Australia and New Zealand. In 1901 the issue of an Australian 
federation reached a new level of immediacy with the founding of the Australian Commonwealth. Since 
1883, students had repeatedly discussed imperial federation and Australian federation in particular. In the 
majority of debates on these two political issues students decided in favour of federation. In 1897, for 
example, the first recorded tournament between Auckland University and Auckland YMCA addressed 
this issue (NZH, 25 Aug. 1897, 5). Chapter five explores in more detail the issue of Australian federation. 
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resented the fact that if “any one speaker [is] adjudged the winner, the honour of the 
occasion is with that one individually, and does not go to his College” (CCR, Oct. 1902, 
3). The Reviews proposed that the purpose of New Zealand debating tournaments was 
not to identify the better individual; it was rather to create a sense of belonging to the 
superior college.  
The students at Canterbury further added to the controversy by pointing out that an 
element of spectacle and entertainment would necessarily surface if the unusually large 
number of speakers were allowed only five minutes each: 
In the first place, there would be in all twelve speakers …  able to debate for five 
minutes at all events, on this topic, no matter what it might happen to be. …  
[T]he competition would be worked on somewhat the same lines as the Olla 
Podrida evening at the Dialectic Society. This evening from the point of view of 
the audience is exceedingly amusing, but we fail to see how the debating 
faculties of the competitors would be shewn [sic] in a debate held on these lines 
between the Colleges at the annual tournament. (CCR, Oct. 1902, 3) 
Their grounds for caution lay in the fact that proper opinions could only be displayed 
during lengthier intervals and with fewer speakers, that, more precisely, the purpose of 
the competition was the proficient display of the participants’ debating powers and not 
the amusement of an audience. The battle of arguments, in other words, was a serious 
endeavour and not to be confused with such light diversions like Olla Pordidas and 
mock trials that already featured judges and attorneys in obscure situations.  
The argument from the Canterbury College Review further employed the audience 
as an excuse for rejecting the number of speakers and assuming that listeners should not 
be exposed to numerous speeches: “If those suggestions were carried into effect, the 
audience would probably have to listen to a repetition of the substance of the first three 
or four speakers, as it is not likely that among twelve speakers there would be twelve 
entirely different speeches” (CCR, Oct. 1902, 4). It seems remarkable that criticism 
acknowledged the right of the audience to be well entertained and, at the same time, 
disenfranchised the same body of people and rendered them mere observers. Not one 
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contribution to the controversy commented on the changes relating to the process of 
nominating the champions, which is striking if one considers that the body of judges 
had made itself redundant with its proposal and would have placed responsibility in the 
hands of the debaters and/or onlookers. By the end of the century, the transformation 
from Bates’ parliamentary public to Black’s university-against-university display was 
complete. 
Students in Dunedin accordingly proclaimed that alteration of the tournament 
practice “would mean the death of all interest in the contest” (OUR, Sep. 1902, 86). 
They did not expect that entitling the audience to vote (despite other changes), allowing 
for more speeches or loosening the spirit of competition would suffice to secure the 
success of the evening. From a members’ perspective, the success of a debate was 
characterised by the undivided attention of the audience and people’s anticipation of an 
argumentative duel. Because practice of the final ballot was a common, formalised and 
quite unspectacular procedure and the introduction of Olla Podridas and mock trials 
already provided a forum for short amusing contributions, no one regarded the 
committee’s suggestions as remotely promising. Debating tournaments were envisaged 
as outstanding public displays of collegiate excellence. As a consequence, the 
controlling body that organised the tournaments never abandoned the idea of external 
jurors.  
The power of the vote never returned to the audience, who were eventually 
restricted to watching the display of debating skill. Collegiate debating tournaments in 
New Zealand, especially after their nascent years, borrowed aspects of American 
intercollegiate contest and presidential debates. The resemblance is perceptible when 
Zarefsky describes the Lincoln-Douglas debates: 
People arrived early, held picnics and parades, and greeted the arrival of their 
candidate with frenzied enthusiasm. The debates themselves were carefully 
managed, however. Timekeepers were strict, and audience demonstrations of 
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anger or applause were discouraged lest they consume time allocated to either 
candidate. (Zarefksy 1990, 51) 
As in America, debating in New Zealand became well-managed rational amusement. 
The bargaining moment of standard debate effectively disappeared from tournaments 
and as training for these inter-collegiate events demanded more attention in societies’ 
individual syllabus, exercises of extempore speeches, intermittent argumentation and 
even emotional appeal decreased. The audience at tournaments— even though in the 
majority competent debaters— observed but did not interfere. In 1902, their contribution 
consisted in performing “numerous cheers and a Maori War-cry for the winners” (CCR, 
June 1902, 7) and in singing the National Anthem. Consensus formation, on as well as 
off stage, was no longer of interest; instead, the display of competitive dominance was 
pivotal to debating.  
Thus, in the New Zealand controversy about the structure of debating, the discussion 
of audience and external judgement functioned as surrogate for a more profound 
question: the position of individual and college in the larger context of university and 
nation. The controversy about the structure of debating contests helped to articulate an 
emerging collegiate identity, which united students of one institution but separated 
individual colleges. Professor Black implied that the ambience of competition provided 
structure to an otherwise chaotic and “intellectual” process of deliberation, suggesting 
that humanistic and liberal conceptions of co-operation relied on unstructured, that is, 
illogical and immeasurable ideals of argumentation. His article disclosed a bifurcation 
between persuasion relying on intellect and conviction based on logical argumentation. 
The latter made possible standards of assessment on grounds of difference and 
antithetical viewpoints, which systemised the individual contribution in a context of 
community, regulation and belonging. The former created a heterogeneity of rhetorical 
means and opinions controlled only by the innate rational capabilities of the individual. 
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Of course, the strenuous (and occasionally also entertaining) attempts at consensus 
formation in regular debates were not prompted by gold medals or trophies.41 The well-
structured and athletically understood debating contests rectified this situation and 
bestowed medals on those who had proved themselves worthy. They added a ritualised 
element to a newly installed tradition and created a secure foundation for future 
reference. New Zealand intercollegiate debating tournaments matured into an invented 
tradition with its own customs and ritualised practices as well as emotionally charged 
signs. By 1902, it had just begun its existence. 
 
Conclusion 
Nineteenth-century debaters developed a version of consensus that initially 
incorporated educational, civic and democratic values. Towards the turn of the century, 
it integrated yet another purpose— competitive deliberation. New Zealand debating 
societies were aware of the advantageous heuristic effect of their chosen pastime; 
students in the colony were very able negotiators of opposing views. Final ballot, 
argumentation and bargaining moulded consensus and were conducive to the social 
quality of a debate. However, the specific circumstances under which consensus were 
formed eventually resulted in the redundancy of its practice and the introduction of an 
element of competition. 
Habermas’s work provides a final clue to understanding the essential consequences 
of these nineteenth-century circumstances. In his defence of reason he distinguishes 
between normatively regulated, dramaturgical, teleological and communicative action 
(Habermas 1984, 85-6). The combination of the three worlds – subjective, objective and 
                                               
41 The committee in 1902 suggested abandoning the tournament idea and refraining from awarding a palm 
to any particular college. Students in Otago then proposed to give gold medals to the delegates of the 
winning college. The students in Christchurch poured scorn on this suggestion. “The Otagoites are 
evidently not content with honour and glory, but thirst for gold. ... The proposal if carried into effect, 
would give the honour rather to the individual than to his college, as is the intention of the competition” 
(CCR, Oct. 1902, 4).  
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social – is crucial for communicative action and renders it preferable to the other three 
forms of action. Normatively regulated action relies on factual norms (objective world) 
which acquire social validity by intersubjective acceptance. From Habermas’s point of 
view, norms, however, do not relate to the subjective world of the individual (88-9). 
Only dramaturgical action negotiates between the subjective and objective spheres to 
create an ontological dimension of people’s existence because dramaturgical action 
manifests its significance on grounds of the reflexive character of human self-projection 
and justification (90-1). Communicative action penetrates all three worlds by means of 
language (94-7). Every form of human action and the corresponding specific 
relationship of actor to world are, from Habermas’s point of view, suffused with 
communication. “In the cases of normatively regulated and dramaturgical action we 
even have to suppose a consensus formation among participants that is in principle of a 
linguistic nature” (94). 
Nineteenth-century consensus formation in debate and its previously illustrated 
practice traverse the gap between normatively regulated and dramaturgical action 
without ever fully realising its communicative heuristic potential. Herein lies the 
interpretative paradigm for nineteenth-century debate. From intersubjectively accepted 
norms articulated in the final ballot, consensus in New Zealand prospered as a highly 
dramaturgical form of communication that did not succeed in establishing a social 
relevance for its objectives because it remained confined to the objective and subjective 
context of the individual. Instead, instigators of tournaments and interlocutors had to 
call on the cultural authority of traditions to establish a link between their practice and 
the thriving New Zealand society. Indeed, Habermas maintains that “evaluative 
expressions or standards of value have justificatory force when they characterize a need 
in such a way that addressees can, in the framework of a common cultural heritage” 
(Habermas 1984, 92). As a consequence, the emergence of intercollegiate debating only 
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addressed the need of a maturing society to create its own grounds for identification. 
Habermas, in the second volume of TCA, agrees that “traditional, habitual forms of life 
find their expression in particular group identities marked by particular traditions that 
overlap and overlap one another, compete with one another, and so on” (Habermas, 
1987, 108). Esprit de corps articulated the specific characteristics of a new debating 
tradition. New Zealand debating tournaments epitomised a transformation process that 
amalgamated social concepts of belonging like nation, colony, community, college and 
even individual.  
The disappearance of consensus formation in the form of the intimate relation of 
ballot, argumentation and bargaining proved fatal for debate as a communicative model 
in late nineteenth-century New Zealand. First and foremost, reason and rationality – the 
commonly valued Victorian constituents of deliberation – lost their social, that is, their 
educational connotation. The controversy surrounding New Zealand debating 
tournaments is exemplary in this regard. The objective quality of reason was utilised to 
create measurable standards for the determination of the outcome of competitive 
debates. Secondly, the closing of debate increasingly nurtured a subjective element. 
Speakers acted for their college as individuals, relating to their institution by means of 
representation, show and spectacle. The judge’s duty likewise promoted individual and 
final opinions without resorting to any elements of painstaking negotiation or argument. 
Finally, debating was increasingly incapable of generating any objectives traditionally 
ascribed to its practice: rational discussion, educational advance, civic participation and 
cultivation of the principle of majority. When debaters began to neglect processes of 
consensus formation they simultaneously jettisoned debate’s social relevance. Civic 
participation, democratic practice, acceptance of the other were no longer an integral 
part of debate but were transferred to the notion of esprit de corps, which gradually 
grew more dominant in debaters’ language and for the self-definition of the audience.  
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Chapter Four 
“Screeching, Screaming Hyenas”1 
The Debating Audience of Late-Victorian New Zealand 
 
Introduction  
The previous chapter contained striking examples of actual physical participation in 
New Zealand debates, in particular during a period of political antagonism. It would be 
tempting to argue, based on these observations, that student audiences were largely 
characterised by a straightforward interest in unruly behaviour and by a lack of 
reasonable discourse. In fact, students operated with several concepts that attempted to 
capture the variety of debater-audience relationships. The idea of the hooligan, 
cultivated in Britain predominantly in the discussion of Kipling’s poetry, assisted New 
Zealand students to critically identify a group of unwanted individuals that verbally and 
physically disturbed debating procedure: the Barrackers’ Brigade. Women debaters 
established another section of audience that, on the one hand, demanded strict adherence 
to social codes and, on the other, found itself in constant defiance of discursive norms. 
The existence of these two groups within the New Zealand debating audience 
emphasised the friction between conceptions of an ideal audience and real debating 
encounters. The chapter argues that the tension between ideal and real audiences shaped 
the perception of New Zealand’s university colleges in the colonial city.  
Habermas’s concept of universal audience in relation to Chaim Perelman’s work 
provides a starting point to detect nineteenth-century expectations of an intellectual and 
well-meaning audience. Nineteenth-century New Zealand discourse on the function of 
audience essentially hinged upon notions of literary audience. Ideas of readership were 
frequently linked to issues of good literary taste and the detrimental effect of vulgarity. 
                                               
1 The quotation is taken from OUR, June 1901, 38. 
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The terminology arising from the discussion of these aesthetic, social and moral norms 
helps to describe the function of individual students disturbing the proceedings of the 
societies. Moreover, Alexander Bain and Richard Whately influenced the understanding 
of rhetoric in New Zealand. Their work promoted a form of rhetorical discourse that 
considered the debater-audience relation as predictable. Their theoretical framework, to 
a large extent, was determined by scientific methodology and as a consequence, 
debaters could “conduct” their audience according to patterns of input and reaction. The 
appearance of women on the New Zealand debating stage challenged these guidelines. 
The understanding of audience was further complicated by the relationship of city and 
academe. Eventually, encounters with audiences outside the safe realm of the collegiate 
debating club lead to a constant redefinition of patterns of seclusion and integration.  
 
Meanings of Audience: The Universal and the Particular 
Late-Victorian debaters regarded their audience as dynamic— constantly changing in 
quality as well as quantity. By the end of the century, pejorative notions of “mass” 
audience gained ground, a development, which coincided with the disenfranchisement 
of the listeners in debating tournaments. Before this rejection of audience participation 
as unreliable, New Zealand debating displayed very diverse ideas of what an audience 
was meant to do, how it ought to be composed, and most importantly, how it might be 
swayed. An understanding of audience evolved around pivotal questions such as 
whether it was acceptable to refer to a congregation as “jackasses” or whether women 
enjoyed being compared to cocoa advertisements in their capacity of listeners.2 The 
literary audience was paramount to these discussions. Jarvis describes trends towards 
particularisation that register changes within the concept of audience:  
                                               
2 In 1898, the Otago University Review compared female debaters with the soothing effects of 
advertisements: “The influence of ladies always puts one in mind of Epps’s Cocoa, advertisements – 
grateful and comforting” (OUR, May 1898, 20). 
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Efforts to formulate a proper definition of the term have resulted in the labelling 
of particular groups with certain characteristics as ‘audience’ and the exclusion 
of all other groups of auditors. Groups that have not met these criteria are 
labelled by some as ‘mobs,’ ‘small groups,’ ‘crowds,’ ‘aggregations,’ or the like 
and are excluded as objects of audience analysis. (Jarvis 2001, 60)  
Students in late nineteenth-century New Zealand were in the middle of this process of 
renegotiating the continuum of the public.3 The chapter describes students’ struggles 
with a terminology that aimed at providing points of reference for the unclear category 
of debating audience. 
The division into opposite points of view is intrinsic to an audience in debate. The 
affirmative challenges the negative and vice versa. Debate does not aim at bridging the 
divide among participants by introducing benevolent speakers. Instead, the key debaters 
commonly draw the listeners into either one of the two available argumentative 
strongholds. A debating audience accepts contrary positions as pivotal to its discursive 
activity. Rhetorical phenomena do not rely on a homogenous audience; rather, they 
create sympathetic listeners and ideally foster mutual understanding among them. In 
rhetoric, the birth of an audience coincides with the existence of a rhetorical situation in 
which an exigence causes interested people to address an issue, often with the 
leadership of one or more speakers.4 Debate takes exception to this practice by 
                                               
3 The phrase “continuum of public” acknowledges Habermas’s concept of public sphere and its criticism. 
I understand the public as an empirical entity incorporating what Fraser terms “counter-publics” (Fraser 
1992, 116f). In “Transnationalising”, Nancy Fraser makes clear that the public sphere needs rethinking to 
integrate trends that see discourse beyond boundaries of nation-state. (Fraser 2005) I adopt Goode’s view 
that the public sphere “is an arena in which the possibility of understanding and agreement is tested …  it’s 
the extent to which the procedures allow for the possibility of an uncoerced consensus” (Goode 2005, 47). 
Efforts of argumentative negotiation are not restricted to publics or counter-publics, states, nation-states 
or empires. The ability to address issues of discursive behaviour is based on a continually changing group 
of participants and places. The public, therefore, represents a continuum. 
4 The idea of the rhetorical situation was originally formulated by Lloyd F. Bitzer in 1968. He writes: “the 
rhetorical situation may be defined as a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an 
actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into 
the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of 
the exigence” (Bitzer 1968, 6). The three constituents of exigence, audience and constraints are key to 
Bitzer’s understanding. Because an exigence is rhetorical only if it can be modified, a rhetorical audience, 
for Bitzer, must consist of individuals who are “capable of being influenced” and are “mediators of 
change.” In other words, an audience must be willing to negotiate and listen to a speaker’s arguments 
regardless of circumstantial constraints that might influence or hinder debate. Bitzer acknowledges, for 
example, that history might have produced traditions that are beyond the control of a rhetorical audience 
and that channel their discourse. As a consequence, Bitzer envisions an audience that is not free of social 
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sustaining its binary structure. Debate aims at convincing and persuading the majority 
of listeners. It builds on human partiality and, as Ehninger maintains, does not and 
cannot provide any final resolutions. He argues that, if debate were to resolve binaries, 
it would cease to exist as a concept:  
Because debate as method lacks natural termini and does not approach through 
progressive stages a point which by common consent constitutes a complete and 
final resolution of the problem which motivates it, debate of itself does not 
supply answers or decisions which men need not observe and record. (Ehninger 
1966, 182) 
Debate, as a consequence, relies on the critical attitude of an audience or of external 
judges, “so that ultimately it is always man himself who must ‘judge’” (182). Debating 
is an evolutionary method of rhetorical deliberation because it spurs its participants into 
moulding presented arguments and resisting unifying tendencies. Decisions are not 
taken by a universal audience but by the individual who applies arguments that have 
been brought forward in discussion. 
Modern American debating manuals always contain a chapter on audience analysis 
because, today, the judges’ decision in a tournament differs widely from the 
expectations of a media-educated audience. Freeley and Steinberg, for example, 
highlight an incident from the Bush-Dukakis presidential debate in 1988, where 
Dukakis was confronted with the common issue of the death penalty. Asked whether he 
would sentence a rapist of Kitty Dukakis to death, he replied in the negative. Freeley 
and Steinberg conclude that in a tournament “the judges would nod with approval and 
note that the respondent had kept his cool and calmly and dispassionately addressed the 
issue. But the debate did not take place in a tournament round; it took place before a 
national TV audience of 62 million viewers, most of whom were not aware of the 
requirements of tournament debate” (Freeley and Steinberg 2005, 270). Freeley and 
Steinberg emphasise that audience analysis is crucial to a successful debate, if success is 
                                                                                                                                         
and cultural contexts but that is apt to be moved into action by the discourse it engages in. Bitzer’s 
audience thus does not resist dynamics of discursive change. 
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determined by an emphatic response from either external judges or a public. Nineteenth-
century debaters in New Zealand stood at the threshold of these modern developments 
in audience perception. They were already aware that audience was by no means a 
homogenous and reliable constituent. They realised that a debating audience continually 
revised cultural settings of rhetorical situations. New Zealand students gradually began 
to negotiate the extent to which the public resisted any generalising concepts. 
Contrary to Freeley and Steinberg and nineteenth-century students’ attitudes, 
twentieth-century argumentation theory formulates an ideal of audience that is meant to 
express the need for mutual agreement among reasonable individuals. Chaim Perelman 
terms this notion the “universal audience.” In The New Rhetoric and the Humanities he 
maintains that individuals will always be part of several audiences as well as the 
universal audience: 
A rhetorical philosophy takes note not only of the existence of differing 
conceptions of the universal audience but also of the fact that each reasonable 
person is a member of a plurality of particular audiences, to whose theses he 
adheres with variable intensity, as well as being a member of the universal 
audience. It is always important to know with which of these particular 
audiences any concrete individual is going to identify himself in case of conflict. 
(Perelman 1979, 49) 
Perelman seems unable to perceive of audience as a continuum without a universal core. 
Like Habermas in his Theory of Communicative Action, Perelman perceives of the 
universal audience as a normative key element for human discourse. He argues that “[i]t 
is no longer enough to assume the agreement of the universal audience; we must rather 
be effectively assured of it. Only the discussion of opposed theses, in a spirit of mutual 
understanding, will make it possible to locate the elements of the discourse on which an 
agreement can eventually be reached, provisional though it may be” (48).  
Habermas’s formulation of argumentation as a process, in other words, as rhetoric, 
invokes Perelman’s theory. Habermas maintains that argumentation as rhetoric “can be 
conceived as a reflexive continuation, with different means, of action oriented to reach 
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understanding” (Habermas 1984, 25) and that “the fundamental intuition connected 
with argumentation can best be characterised from the process perspective by the 
intention of convincing a universal audience and gaining general assent for an 
utterance” (26). He goes further than Perelman in insisting on the normative relevance 
of audience. Perelman only wants to be assured of the possibility of such an audience 
because, for philosophy, rational discourse with a normative outcome has to remain a 
possibility. Habermas, instead, identifies the universal audience as the primary 
motivation for a speaker to employ rational arguments in order to gain common assent. 
In other words, Habermas’s universal audience provides the necessary backdrop in 
rhetoric for any decisions on truth values. For him, it was unacceptable that rhetoric— as 
a concept— should not only be formally but also contextually void of definite 
resolutions. Nineteenth-century debating practice in New Zealand showed precisely 
this: neither the debating audience nor the process of debating was perceived as a 
reliable basis for final motions. Late-Victorian debaters embedded their discussions in 
certain notions of an ideal audience, which they utilised to criticise the conduct of their 
contemporaries. In actual discourse, students did not presume to address a universal 
audience; they were highly sensitive of the fact that their fellow debaters formed a 
complex audience. 
The literary audience was paramount to the idealist notion of audience that 
nineteenth-century New Zealand students entertained. In the discussion of proper 
literary consumerism, they struggled with terms like mob, hooligan and mass audience. 
The rhetorical theories of Alexander Bain and Richard Whately were integral parts of 
students’ lectures. By the end of the century, these theories were already outdated and 
provided little assistance in students’ efforts to evaluate phenomena of popular mass 
culture. Students’ perception of debating as a club activity as opposed to being a public 
event was marked by a lack of confidence in their position in the colonial society. 
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Debating was seen as an opportunity to perform before a friendly audience of like-
minded students. The debating society provided a safe haven for discourse. The wider 
public was always regarded with scepticism. In other words, students by the end of the 
nineteenth century had learnt that “the correct answer in a tournament round is not 
necessarily the correct answer for a public debate” (Freeley and Steinberg 2005, 271). 
They were also in the process of determining what a literary audience should be and 
should expect from the products it was confronted with. 
 
The Literary Audience: The “Barrackers’ Brigade” and the Intellectual Reader 
The anxious definition of norms of conduct that dominated students’ rules of 
consensus was reflected in their views on literary audience. The term “vulgar,” coupled 
with contempt for personal reference in debate, alluded to the entire range of undesired 
discursive behaviour.5 A debater was considered wise who did not underestimate the 
intellectual level of her audience. In 1895, Scobie Mackenzie, himself a forceful 
political speaker and in tune with the desires of his audience, excluded all vulgar 
expressions, but allowed for personal allusions in orations and debates: 
Now, when public speaking takes the form of encounter, as of course it must do 
in debate, the question will arise as to how far personalities are allowable. Most 
people would tell you at once that they are to be rigidly and absolutely avoided, 
and as a general sentiment it sounds very well indeed; but I am not so sure that, 
without qualification, it is such a good advice. Anything approaching to vulgar 
and offensive personalities are, of course, to be avoided; they are bad in 
themselves, and they injure alike the cause and the reputation of the speaker. But 
it seems to me that a man ought to be careful not to become an oratorical prig – 
for there are oratorical prigs just as there are social prigs. The man who never 
commits a fault as a speaker, like the man who never commits a fault in any 
other direction, may be excellent in the abstract, but I should think decidedly 
insipid. (Mackenzie 1895, 138) 
Students heeded Mackenzie’s advice and employed more daring forms of personal 
reference, even though, as has been pointed out in the previous chapter, the general 
                                               
5 Attridge, for example, emphasises that “vulgar” was “a key term in responses to Kipling. The ideal 
reader is posited as a frequent image of referral, whose jarred sensibilities can only be recuperated 
through a refinement of style in accordance with prescribed literary requirements” (Attridge 2003, 75). 
Vulgar was the direct opposite of the ideal and circumscribed the encounter with the real. 
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application of Christian names was still deemed inappropriate by some. In 1900, a Mr. 
Fleming in Dunedin perfected the art of personal allusions by referring “to Socialists as 
‘jackasses’ and ‘screeching, screaming hyenas,’ and other similarly complimentary 
epithets” (OUR, June 1901, 38). The audience appreciated his smart comicality but 
regarded his other assaults as “somewhat too personal” (38).  
By avoiding the vulgar, MacKenzie knew, the orator acknowledged the quality of 
his or her audience. Especially in debate, the contestants were usually also members of 
the audience and hence found themselves on a par with those assembled. At the end of 
the nineteenth century, students, through the work of Arnold, Carlyle, Mill and Spencer, 
were familiar with the controversial issues connected with the rising popular culture. 
The mass and the mob were quintessential to students’ writing. Prize essays and other 
items bear witness to students’ awareness of Arnold’s and Carlyle’s critical attitude 
towards popular taste and the corruption of public opinion. Discussion constantly 
renegotiated the relation between individual and public and the regulative force of the 
romantic idea of genius. In 1882, Thomas Carlyle inspired George Hogben to hold the 
individual responsible for the conduct of the masses: “We hear such phrases as 
‘regeneration of the masses,’ ‘growth of the masses’ (in intelligence etc.): Carlyle would 
remind us that there can be no regeneration or growth of the mass apart from or which 
does not consist in the regeneration or the growth of the individuals of which the mass 
is composed” (Hogben 1882, 6). In pursuit of genius as a guiding light for the 
degenerating masses, Hogben quoted the transcendentalist Emerson: “’There are many 
that can discern genius on his starry track, though the mob is incapable … ’” (16).6 In 
                                               
6 American Transcendentalism, as expressed by Emerson and Thoreau, focused on the individual. 
Emerson’s notion of the individual as the creature of “reason” had been well established before the Civil 
War. Reason for Emerson and Thoreau was opposed to understanding. The former described the 
individual’s “innate capacity to grasp beauty and truth,” the latter was confined to “the use of intellect in 
the narrow, artificial ways imposed by society” (Brinkley 1993, 306). Mastery of reason became the 
noblest faculty of the individual. It is remarkable that Hogben would quote Emerson at a time, when his 
philosophy was already in decline in America. As the reality of the Civil War was creeping into the 
American consciousness, transcendentalist romantic notions lost their leading role within the American 
  154 
1892, only ten years later, the Otago Review, when commenting on Robert Stout’s 
policies in New Zealand, entertained no sentimentalism about the taste of the masses: 
Again ‘Addresses were meant not for the students, but to educate the public with 
reference to the benefits of higher education.’ Oh, Sir Robert! You begin at the 
wrong end. What you have to do is to educate the public up to the point when 
they will go to such meetings or read such addresses. The only information with 
reference to the benefits of higher education that the public recollect from last 
year’s capping are the cartoons exhibited and the songs sung. (OUR, June 1894, 
48) 
In other words, the ordinary audience of New Zealand college cities were drawn only to 
entertaining occasions like graduation ceremonies or national celebrations. Clarke 
shows that the New Zealand “public” at the end of the nineteenth century was familiar 
with commemorating public events. In 1887, royal holidays, for example, resulted in 
one or two jubilee holidays that gave almost everyone the opportunity to join 
processions or watch the fireworks (Clarke 2002, 147).7 
Apart from the late nineteenth-century perception that, in an audience, the individual 
determined general opinion, actual debating circumstances created quite radical, 
supposedly more realistic variations of this ideal. Part of the debating society consisted 
                                                                                                                                         
middle class and New England aristocracy. A more down-to-earth approach was called for in order to 
deal with the legacy of the great turmoil. Hogben seemed to be under the influence of an American 
ideology that was already challenged by the realities of American late nineteenth-century culture. Only 
one year after Hogben, Rev. James Gibb gave a lecture on “James Russel Lowell, Poet and Prophet of the 
New Era”. Gibb maintained that “very few of the poets [Wordsworth, Browning, Tennyson] have 
excelled or even equalled him in his feeling of ‘the sympathies, the hopes, the moods that make man truly 
man,” or have seen so clearly the Devine ideal of manhood, ‘the shrine of reverence and love’ which the 
Most High desires to make the human soul. …  He [Lowell] was not only America’s representative man of 
letters; he was one of the best known and most esteemed citizens” (OW, 21 May 1896, 53). Emerson, 
Thoreau and Lowell were representative of an American era when “literature stood above all in the 
hierarchy of social values, but it was not before all. Material needs were primary; the reformer must not 
offer poetry to the indigent” (Bender 1987, 149). Flanagan shows that when Gibb and Hogben discussed 
the impact of Transcendentalism and Individualism in New Zealand, America had already moved on to an 
age of progressivism, where Jane Addams spoke out “against rampant individualism, uninvolved 
government, the lack of protection against social and economic dislocation, and about the threat of 
radicalism” (Flanagan 2007, 9). New Zealand academic teachings were quoting authorities which might 
have reflected the idealistic spirit with which the colony had been set up but that elsewhere had already 
become outdated. 
7 Clarke also makes clear that the rural population of New Zealand cultivated harvest festivals as a form 
of public celebration (Clarke 2005). I deduce from Clarke’s conclusion that harvest festivals incorporated 
religious elements that the perception of public and audience in rural regions was influenced by people’s 
self-perception as a congregation or parish rather than an intellectual group. This might prove a fertile 
starting point for studying rural audiences. Veeder discusses the relevance of the mystic experience in 
relation to the social relevance of romantic rhetoric in forming a congregation, that is, an alternative 
audience beyond the factual and reliable. (Veeder 1997, 312-6) In Chapter six, the relation of mystic and 
factual is discussed in more details. 
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in students occupying the seats in the back who usually, to say the least, “were apt to be 
discourteous to speakers” (OUR, Oct. 1899, 131). By the Centennial, these students 
commandeered the rest of the audience. One evening in September 1899 in Dunedin, 
“none of the ‘Barrackers’ Brigade’” were present, a phrase that referred to the rowdies, 
“the betes noirs of every chairman and earnest debater” (OUR, Sept. 1899, 102). Their 
presence, at the time, was accepted as an indispensable element of collegiate debating.8 
At one point, in 1899, the “standing contingent at the back of the hall” (OUR, Oct. 
1899, 131) were even portrayed as guardians of the intellectual merit and the lesser of 
two evils. The unknown author argues that “they were a terror to praters; and lately I 
have wished for their presence to suppress the praters of to-day” (OUR, Oct. 1899, 131). 
This, it is safe to say, was a singular position and in general, the occupants of the seats 
in the back did not excite enthusiastic praise.9  
The reference of “Barrackers’ Brigade” to Kipling’s collection of poems in Barrack 
Room Ballads (1892) and to military terminology can be regarded as intentional 
allusion to the late-Victorian idea of the hooligan. It perfectly represents the fusion of 
different modes of discourse: the critical contemplation of readership and norms of 
public taste and conduct. Attridge points out that by 1908, the book had seen twenty-
five editions (Attridge 2003, 200 n1). Kipling was very popular in New Zealand in 
general and, in 1892 and 1897, college students in Auckland and Christchurch reviewed 
                                               
8 In the US of the 1850s William Dean Howells uses a similar metaphor to describe the intellectual 
environment in which he grew up. He recalled that, in his father’s printing office in a small Ohio town 
about 1850, “‘there was always a good deal of talk going on. …  When it was not mere banter, it was 
mostly literary; we disputed about authors among ourselves and with the village wits who dropped in. 
There were several of these who were readers, and they liked to stand with their back to our stove and 
challenge opinion concerning Holmes and Poe, Irving and Macaulay, Pope and Byron, Dickens and 
Shakespeare.’” (qtd. in Bender 1993, 8). Uses of the term “back” appear to have been common physical 
references to those parts of the audience who challenged the norm— in America as well as New Zealand. 
9 “We shall, however, say nothing more than remind students that our debaters are not hardened political 
speakers. This being so, the constant interruptions from the back benches not only seriously impair the 
efforts of the leaders, but also deter new men from getting to their feet” (OUR, June 1901, 38). 
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his work, in particular his poetry.10 The use of the term “Barrackers’ Brigade” in New 
Zealand coincided with the publication of Robert Buchanan’s essay “The Voice of the 
Hooligan” in the Contemporary Review of 1899, a critical article that amalgamated 
Kipling’s oeuvre with the controversial term ‘hooligan’ and the patriotic atmosphere of 
the Boer War.11 New Zealand students very likely knew Buchanan’s critical 
contribution to the debate on the culture of the hooligan. In 1897, the Canterbury 
College Review recommended the Contemporary Review as fundamental reading 
material, especially for use in the meetings of the Dialectic Society (CCR, Oct. 1897, 
39). 
Very early, the pervasive terminology of the late nineteenth-century Empire found a 
way into debating jargon in New Zealand, even though the South African experience 
had yet to exert its influence on the New Zealand public. Discussion of public culture, 
in particular the insecure territory of mass and popular culture, aided the critical 
contemplation of Kipling’s poetry. Buchanan associated the increasing influence of the 
mass with the emergence of imperial sentiment: 
The Mob, promised a merry time by the governing classes, just as the Roman 
mob was deluded by bread and pageants— panem et circenses— dances merrily 
to patriotic Wartunes [sic], while that modern monstrosity and anachronism, the 
Conservative Working Man, exchanges the birthright of freedom and free 
thought for a pat on the head from any little rump-fed lord that steps his way and 
spouts the platitudes of Cockney patriotism. (Buchanan 1899, 776) 
                                               
10 In 1891, Kipling went to New Zealand. During his visit, newspaper coverage was considerable. Based 
on his observations in New Zealand, he wrote the short story “One Lady at Wairakei”. In the story, a 
presumably ignorant New Zealand tourist is convinced by the lady Truth that despite his prejudice, New 
Zealand will prosper and aspire to nationhood. Truth eventually scolds the traveller for assuming that 
New Zealanders will produce a distinct colonial literature. New Zealand will instead experience a 
literature for and by the people (Kipling 1992, 27). Kipling’s popularity among nineteenth-century 
students might well be attributed to the favourable picture that he created in “One Lady at Wairakei.” 
Moreover, Kipling’s acquaintances in New Zealand included Professor Haslam of Canterbury College. 
Gardner et al. recalls that “[i]t was from Haslam that Rudyard Kipling took the character of King in Stalky 
and Co. (1899)” (Gardner et. al 1973, 91). Wall writes in his memoirs that Haslam “had been a an 
assistant master at Westward Ho when Kipling was there a pupil, and he appears in Stalky and Co., a fact 
of which he was very proud” (Wall 1965, 89). 
11 Attridge provides a thorough insight into the dynamics that led to Buchanan’s article (Attridge 2003, 
70-106).  
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Buchanan openly accused Kipling of deliberately fuelling lower-class “Cockney” 
ignorance at a time when England had to cultivate high-brow culture. Buchanan’s 
statement also showed that the perception of audience was more and more suffused by 
discussions of respectability and the intellectual merit of the individual. In other words, 
the role of spectator and even interlocutor became less strictly circumscribed as well as 
being exposed to a variety of new forms of audience participation because the tension 
between individual responsibility and mass anonymity opened a void. Kipling’s 
Ballads, as Attridge makes clear, negotiated these unclear boundaries of self-definition 
in the military context of Empire: “In the 1890s the critical problem which the Ballads 
posed was the extent to which they should be considered as part of a popular, or mass, 
culture, rather than an exclusively literary one” (Attridge 2003, 73). Kipling had fused 
influences from music-hall songs, slang and dialect not simply to invoke realism but to 
create a “defining structure of his work” (74). Buchanan particularly aimed at Kipling’s 
preference for dialect by using the phrase “Cockney patriotism” for the supposedly 
worst type of mass frenzy. Buchanan thus failed to notice Kipling’s sympathetic 
perspective on the lower strata of British society, a perspective that made the Ballads 
unique in their time. 
New Zealand students’ lines of argument were fairly similar to Buchanan’s railing 
against Kipling’s shortcomings as a responsible author. Buchanan, in his article, 
lamented the loss of the humanistic ideal in Kipling’s writing as well as in society at 
large: 
At that time, the influence of the great Leaders of modern Thought was still felt, 
both in politics and literature; the gospel of Humanity, as expressed in the 
language of poets like Wordsworth and Shelley, and in the deed of men like 
Wilberforce and Mazzini, had purified the air men breathed; and down lower, in 
the humbler spheres of duty and human endeavour, humanists like Dickens were 
translating the results of religious aspiration into such simple and happy 
speeches as even the lowliest of students could understand. (Buchanan 1899, 
775) 
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In 1894, the Christchurch student Thomas W. Cane12 used almost identical language to 
voice his contempt for the literary audience of his time: “It was in vain that Scott and 
Dickens and Jane Austen purified literature and gave it a loftier tone. Their work is all 
undone by such authors as Hardy & Gissing & Rudyard Kipling” (Cane, manuscript 
1894, MBL, 17). He maintained that the late-Victorian literary audience had acquired 
all the negative connotations of a gossiping, low and unrefined public: “Every 
magazine, nearly every newspaper has its serial stories running from mouth to mouth. 
As soon as one is done with, another fills its place, and the stream of books is ever 
unceasing, so vast is the audience and so insatiable its hunger for more” (1). He 
pessimistically claimed that “we have no time to wait for genius today” (2) and 
explained that authors had to concur with popular taste to secure their survival: “There 
is no such thing as “fit audience though few”— the publishers see to that. They are the 
middle-men in the new trade of novel-writing. It is the business of the authors to feed 
their many-headed monster with food that is acceptable” (3). Cane’s opinion is 
exemplary of late-Victorian middle-class scepticism. However, he surprised the reader 
at the end of his essay by maintaining that not all was lost for the literary public. A 
young and educated author, he professes his faith in freedom of speech and public 
criticism, despite his occasionally presumptuous style: 
We are freeing ourselves from the old chain of convention. If many things are 
written and read which would not have been countenanced 50 years ago it shows 
that we are becoming more tolerant of opinion. If it is importunate that art 
should be made the channel for social criticism it is a sign of freedom that such 
criticism is tolerated. There must be freedom of speech and discussion. Thus the 
modern novelists, even if their work is sometimes revolting, are doing a little 
towards furthering the happiness of the race. (27) 
                                               
12 Hight and Candy list Cane as enrolled in 1891. Cane was originally from Sussex, England. In 1892, he 
obtained his B.A. from Canterbury College. The following year, he successfully completed his M.A. and 
became Assistant Master at the Cathedral School in Christchurch. In 1895, he became President of the 
Dialectic Society. Between 1911 and 1920, he was Assistant Lecturer at the College in Latin and English. 
(Hight and Candy 1927, 204) 
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Cane’s conviction stems from an almost unremitting belief in the power of progress, 
possibly combined with a young man’s inclination to approve of the world one way or 
another.  
The same year in Dunedin, Alexander Wilson (1849-1929) opened the debating 
session with a lecture on the Georgian novelists.13 In comparing the literary audience of 
his day to earlier centuries, he considered that it was less patient with aspiring writers; 
“the general reader,” he lamented, demanded brief and inspired plots: “Nowadays there 
are so many books clamouring for notice that an author’s only chance of enforcing 
attention is to come to the point at once, sans phrase” (Wilson 1894, 5). Wilson further 
added an ounce of the ideal to complete the recipe for an acceptable pastime. In 1889, 
he addressed the Dunedin debating society on the composition of fiction. In his lecture, 
Wilson emphasised the need for an educated and well-informed audience: 
[A]ll good art should, in the first place, be interpretative, by which I mean that it 
should afford that sort of moral and intellectual pleasure that comes of the 
perception of truth; and, in the second place, that it should satisfy a certain 
human longing after something other or more than we possess – in other words, 
that it should satisfy an ideal. (Wilson 1889, 12) 
His view of wide-spread literacy and readable literature evoked Carlyle’s belief that 
popular taste depended first and foremost on the individual and her inner “genius”, even 
though “human longing” presupposed a regulative ideal common to most readers. 
Wilson acknowledged that the New Zealand readership was able to distinguish between 
good and bad prose. Wilson and Cane agreed that the novel’s objective was to entertain 
                                               
13 Alexander Wilson was born in Scotland and grew up as a son of an architect. In 1869, he graduated 
M.A. from Aberdeen University. He spent 1870 in Germany, and until his immigration to New Zealand, 
earned his living by private tutoring in London. In 1874, he came to New Zealand. He was immediately 
employed as part-time English master at Otago’s Boys’ High School and ten years later, became acting 
rector of Otago Girls’ High School, the only male principal in the school’s history. Wilson was an active 
defender of women’s higher education, even though he maintained that girls should learn cooking and 
sewing and did not regard higher education as the goal of the majority of women. He also made physical 
education compulsory twice a week. Page maintains that he was also “a devoted gardener, specialising in 
bulbs. Invited to launch a debating club in Lawrence, he spoke on daffodils, taking bulbs and flowers with 
him, which led to extensive planting in the district” (Page in Southern People 1998, 550). In 1906, 
Wilson left New Zealand for England but eventually settled in Inverness, where he died in 1929. The 
biographical information is based on Dorothy Page’s article in Southern People 1998, 549-50; Page 1992, 
105. 
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readers. Cane, however, almost gave up his contemporaries as a hopeless and uncritical 
mob. 
In a newspaper review of Wilson’s lecture of 1889, the author concluded that “[t]he 
paramount function of the novel is to be recreative and amusing. …  The one 
unpardonable sin in a novel is dullness. …  To give emotional pleasure is the first duty 
of fiction as it is of the other fine arts. Let it teach special lessons if it can, but it does so 
at its peril” (OW, 6 June 1889, 28). A few years later, the earlier mentioned Rev. Gibb 
in his lecture on James Russell Lowell struck an entirely different tone. For him, 
Lowell’s work was thoroughly “didactic” (OW, 21 May 1896, 53). What Wilson saw as 
detrimental to the quality of a literary work, Gibb regarded as an ideal. He considered 
literature without an orientation towards public education and refinement as “a veritable 
emanation from the devil” (53). As a consequence, on the one hand, debaters in 
Dunedin were confronted with a view of the literary audience that emphasised its moral 
and intellectual elevation through art. Moreover, this perspective did not consider the 
New Zealand public fit to be a critical audience. On the other, students listened to 
Wilson who did not see the need for art to “teach special lessons” (28) and emphasised 
the relaxing qualities of the genre. 
A discussion of Thomas Hardy’s novel Tess of the D’Urbervilles exemplified these 
contrasting views on the worth of the reading audience. In 1895, the Dunedin student 
George F. K. Adams won the prize essay competition with his contribution “The 
Modern Novel.” While heralding Olive Schreiner as the outstanding modern novelist, 
Adams reserved his praise for Thomas Hardy. Tess of the D’Urbervilles, from Adams 
point of view, was Hardy’s “finest work” and “one of the most beautiful creations of 
modern literature” (Adams 1895, 101): 
It tells its tale of sorrow, of suffering, of the fruit that turns to ashes between the 
teeth, in a way that elevates by its purity and chastens by its terror and pity. In 
his preface Hardy says: ‘The story is an attempt to give artistic form to a true 
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sequence of things’; and how successful this attempt has been we leave the 
reader to judge. Not a trace of indecency or of pruriency can suggest itself to a 
pure mind; we might even say that ‘the winds of heaven blow along its pages.’ 
(101) 
By contrast, Cane abhorred Hardy’s work and regarded it as “immoral and revolting” 
and “strongly prejudiced” (Cane, manuscript 1894, MBL, 16). Cane used Tess of the 
D’Urbervilles to point out one of the lowliest creations of modern writing. In his essay, 
Cane accused Hardy of being “quite unconcerned” because “he knows that modern taste 
is not easily shocked” (17). He mentioned Hardy and Kipling in one breath with Gissing 
and eventually resolved that “[b]ooks must be written to sell and nothing can enhance 
their chances of success more completely than their treading upon forbidden ground” 
(17). Even though Adams in general agreed with Cane that the modern novel had a 
deplorable moral effect on its readers and that its “artistic effect is a blot”, he made 
Hardy and Schreiner exceptions and, like Wilson, raised the reader to the rank of critic. 
Cane, like Gibb, could condemn the modern novel in its entirety because he discarded 
the idea of the reader as an able judge of popular taste. Instead, he promoted the modern 
author, whom he had condemned earlier, as the catalyst of intellectual improvement, 
happiness and freedom of speech. 
Hogben, Cane, Gibb, Wilson, Adams and Buchanan engaged in a discourse that was 
representative of late-Victorian efforts to define norms of public and audience culture. 
Their arguments were restricted by traditions of audience perception. The role of the 
individual as genius dominated their efforts to locate discursive responsibility in an 
audience. Cane, Gibb, Hogben and Buchanan placed their trust in the capabilities of the 
author. Their scepticism was symptomatic of late-Victorian disenfranchisement of the 
audience in general. Student debate today does not require an audience; it demands a 
judge. Zarefsky maintains that “the final essential component of a debate is the decision 
maker or judge” who is “sometimes isomorphic with the audience” (Zarefsky 2001, 
  162 
193). Cane’s, Gibb’s, Hogben’s and Buchanan’s contributions represent the beginnings 
of this position and, in Habermas’s thinking, the shift of debate towards argumentation 
as a procedure rather than a process. Adams and Wilson were inclined to rely on the 
decision-making powers of the audience. The literary public, from their point of view, 
was not defined by static norms. They conceived of it as a heterogeneous mass that 
determined popular tastes in a continuous process of revision. Adams did not judge 
Hardy according to preconceived ideas of middle-class taste. His perception of Tess of 
the d’Urbervilles is immediate and spontaneous. Translated into Habermasian 
terminology, Adams’ and Wilson’s audience continued to inhabit the realm of rhetoric, 
in other words, of argumentation as process in which the audience moulded the 
concerns of the day.  
 
Alexander Bain and Richard Whately: Rhetoric as Science  
Students in New Zealand had access to works by the renowned English and Scottish 
authors of rhetoric, Alexander Bain and Richard Whately, who had investigated the 
nature of rhetoric as composition. Their teachings were part of a new school of rhetoric 
which emphasised style and popularised rhetoric as the art of correct writing.14 James A. 
Berlin and Sharon Crowley term it “current-traditional rhetoric” and criticise its focus 
on the correctness of language and its neglect of components of argumentative 
                                               
14 Berlin observes that current-traditional rhetoric embraced a scientific approach of discourse. He 
concludes that “current-traditional rhetoric is the triumph of the scientific and technical world view” 
(Berlin 1984, 62). The concept neglected processes of invention as the focus consisted in the reporting of 
arguments not in their creation. Moreover, audience was a significant component only insofar as it could 
be “conducted” and effects could be reproduced (63). In the 1890s, the introduction of the paragraph to 
composition studies at university colleges in America and New Zealand was one outcome of Bain’s 
current-traditional textbooks (68). Crowley, Berlin, and Nan Johnson trace the origins of American 
current-traditional rhetoric back to the British New Rhetorics: Whately, Priestley and Campbell (Crowley 
1990, Berlin 1984, Johnson 1991, 19-63).According to Crowley, current-traditional rhetoric represents 
that fusion of discourse theory, logic and psychology (Crowley 1990, 12). In New Zealand, because of his 
stress on logic and psychology, Bain became part of the curriculum of Mental Science. In 1880, for 
example, applicants for the New Zealand University senior scholarship had to answer the question: 
“Examine the sufficiency of this expression of the Law of Causation: - ‘Every event that happens is 
definitely and uniformly connected with some prior event or events, which happening it happens, and 
which failing it fails’ (Bain)” (NZUC, 1880, lxxxix). Bain’s influence on teachings in logic is analysed in 
chapter six of this thesis. 
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invention.15 Bain and Whately became the representatives of current-traditional rhetoric 
in New Zealand. In the colony, rhetoric presumably was no longer considered the art of 
public speaking but a subcategory of composition in the English curriculum. It is not 
surprising then that Bain and Whately ascribe a rather limited role to audience. Their 
methods defended an empiricist model of emotional and rational appeal. In other words, 
if a speaker mastered the art of composition, s/he would be capable of conducting her 
audience through an evening by evoking certain emotions through corresponding 
stylistic patterns. 
In 1882, Professor Brown at the University of Otago required his students to read 
Alexander Bain’s English Composition and Rhetoric (OUC 1882). In 1891, he offered 
an advanced class on “English Composition and Rhetoric” which still listed Bain as the 
primary reference. Brown’s course was designed to be “a systematic study of the rules 
of correct writing and the principles of Rhetoric and Literature. Under this head notes 
will be given in expansion and illustration of the matter supplied by the Textbook” 
(OUC 1891, 51). In 1899, an unknown author in her prize essay for the dialectic society 
at Canterbury College mentioned Bain as one of the great “educational philosophers” 
(System of Education, manuscript A, MBL, 2) of the times. Alexander Bain (1818-
1903) was one of the most prominent scholars of Scottish Utilitarianism. His books on 
rhetorical theory were exemplary of a thoroughly practical approach embedded in 
scientific psychology. His English Composition and Rhetoric was the result of revision 
of his earlier publications.16  
                                               
15 The term was coined by John F. Genung in 1886 (Connors 1985, 56) and Daniel Fogarty (Stewart 
1990, 162). There were alternative theories that challenged current-traditional rhetoric, for example, Fred 
Newton Scott (Berlin (1984) ch. 7) and Henry N. Day’s rhetoric of explanation (Connors 1985), but they 
did not gain enough footholds on the market.  
16 I specifically refer to the following textbooks: Higher English Grammar (1863), An English Grammar 
(1863), Manual of Rhetoric (1866), A First English Grammar (1872), Companion to the Higher 
Grammar (1874). 
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Bain combined structural components like the number and order of words, rules for 
the composition of sentences and paragraphs, and elements of speech with an 
extraordinarily detailed analysis of emotions. English Composition’s second volume 
dealt exclusively with the “emotional qualities of style,” whereas the first volume was 
dedicated to the “intellectual qualities” of composition. Bain, in his textbooks, drew on 
examples from literature and philosophy. In English Composition, these were the stock 
authors of an English education of the time: Wordsworth, Burns, Scott, Byron, Shelley, 
Tennyson, Shakespeare, Spenser, Mill, Carlyle and Matthew Arnold. For Bain, rhetoric 
aided literary composition by inserting (according to specific rules) emotional reference 
in written passages. He, for example, assigns the “rhetorical arts of eulogy” to “the 
poetry of the moral sublime” (Bain 1887, 1:7). The re-classification of figures of speech 
in rhetoric was one of Bain’s goals: “the ancient authors of the Rhetorical art not only 
originated a considerable part of our critical vocabulary, but discussed many of the 
fundamentals of style and composition. Their enumeration of Figures in detail was 
voluminous, while the classification of them was imperfect” (vi). Bain omitted to use 
the traditional constituents of rhetorical composition— description, narration, exposition 
and oratory— to clarify for his readership the modes of rhetoric. Instead, he adopted an 
entirely new system which integrated elements of each of the four modes. He, for 
example introduced the “Picturesque,” which dealt with issues of description (263-277). 
Bain’s intention in writing English Composition was “to arrive at a definite code of 
prescriptions for regulating the Intellectual Qualities of composition” and “to mark out 
the department as a fit subject for school discipline, at the proper stage; not to mention 
its direct bearing upon the valuable accomplishment of writing well” (vii). Buchanan’s 
and Cane’s metaphorical associations of good British literature with “purified air” and 
“purified literature” come to mind when considering the standards Bain professed for 
composition. Bain, Buchanan and Cane wanted to raise the supposedly low standards of 
  165 
Victorian writing by “purifying” everything that was considered confused, lax or even 
morally detrimental. Regarding late nineteenth-century American society, Bender draws 
a similar conclusion when discussing the Americans’ opinion of the lyceum movement: 
“[s]uch words as flatness, superficiality, sentimentalism, ineffectual, confused, lax, and 
simplification recur in historical writing about the period’s thought” (Bender 1993, 11). 
Bain intended to counterbalance what he saw as weak literary habits by enforcing a 
rigorous structure on rhetorical composition and a method that predicted the audience’s 
reactions. 
The prize essay for 1899 of the Otago University debating society, “The Influence 
of Natural Conditions in New Zealand on the National Character” revealed that a part of 
the student body was familiar with the theories of Richard Whately (1787-1893), 
another practically inclined rhetorician: 
Archbishop Whately, in his work on rhetoric, deals very strikingly with the 
effect of numbers in swelling the emotional susceptibilities of an audience. 
Often that which can send a thrill of fervour through a vast concourse of people 
would, if addressed to one or a small number, appear as mere hyperbolical rant. 
The strength of personality behind each utterance is augmented by every person 
present, for every one is conscious that the whole fathering is moved similarly to 
himself. There is thus an echoing and re-echoing of feeling, a kind of mental 
resonance, which intensifies the effect. (Natural Conditions, 1899, 110) 
The statement alludes to an emotional and mental quality of rhetoric, which was 
considered to create a genuine audience on the basis of shared sentiments. Whately’s 
works were thoroughly pedagogical textbooks with a “practical bias” (Berlin 1980, 12), 
an emphasis he had in common with Bain that also might explain his popularity in New 
Zealand.17 Professors in the colony favoured textbooks for their teaching because costs 
were lower and their application almost universal.18 Whately uniquely combined a 
                                               
17 The significance of Whately at New Zealand university colleges is not surprising if his popularity at 
American colleges is taken into account. Berlin and Kitzhaber point out that Whately’s Elements of 
Rhetoric was in use at American colleges as late as the 1880s (Berlin 1980, 10; Kitzhaber 1990, 87-89).  
18 Lillian H. Williams, a former student and member of the Dialectic Society recalls in an interview that 
“we [the students] had to rely almost entirely on text-books. I still remember with horror Morley’s 
‘History of English Literature’ which we all had to use! …  Because of this great reliance on text-books 
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strong sense of rational argumentation with a defence of the separation of logic and 
rhetoric.19 He constructed a very technical rhetoric which presupposed a one-to-one 
correspondence between stylistic input and audience reaction. Unfortunately, in 
contemporary scholarship, the implications of Whately’s ideas (like presumption, 
burden of proof or “natural” delivery) are still relatively unexplored. Zappen illustrates 
that Whately’s work is part of the tradition of psychological-epistemological rhetoric, 
“so-called because they were concerned with the adaptation, selection, and expression 
rather than the discovery of proofs” (Zappen 1991, 151).20 Lillian H. Williams, a 
member of the Dialectic Society, remembered her irritation at this method, which she 
saw as leaving “very little room for originality” (Williams interview, Gardner Papers, 
4). 
The role of genius in rhetoric was pivotal to Whately’s theory. He maintained that 
“genius begins where rules end” (Whately, 1965, xxv). Berlin observes that rhetoric for 
Whately was a “rule-governed procedure having to do with arrangement and style” 
(Berlin 1980, 13). These themes were at the centre of nineteenth-century New Zealand 
debate. From his predecessors, Whately adopted a perspective on audience that would 
assist the composition of an intelligible and well-argued speech.21 He did not however 
                                                                                                                                         
we were left very little room for originality and I personally found this most irritating. The only other way 
we could learn was through lectures” (Williams interview, Gardner Papers, 4) 
19 Zappen shows that Whately’s work provided “a system for classification of proofs: a division of the 
forms of arguments and rules for their use for the purpose of conviction (35-168) and a division of the 
‘Active Principles’ of human nature – including both the passions (emotions) of the hearer and the 
character of the speaker – and rules for their use for the purpose of persuasion” (Zappen 1991,151). 
20 Connors describes this school of rhetoric and Whately’s theory as “rhetoric of explanation” (Connors 
1985). Connors argues that in particular Bain furthered the “growth of explanatory pedagogy” (55) and 
that his “category of exposition …  was confined to scientific exposition and not concerned with any sort 
of popular explanation” (54). Zappen shifts the focus of analysis away from the didactic purpose of 
Whately’s and Bain’s rhetoric towards their methodological orientation. Despite his different use of 
terminology, he draws the same conclusion as Connors: Whately’s rhetoric focuses on formalised 
scientific methodology. 
21 Ehninger (1963) as well as Berlin (1980) confirm that Whately responded to the writings of Hugh Blair 
(1970) and George Campbell (1963) who placed the audience at the centre of their rhetorical theory 
because they see a direct relation between “the faculties of the auditor and the ends that a speaker 
attempts” (Berlin 1980, 13). These ends are “to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to 
move the passions, or to influence the will” (Campbell 1963, 1). Moreover, Whately was convinced that 
he wrote in the tradition of Aristotle; a position that has since been emphatically contradicted in the works 
of Berlin, Ehninger and most significantly in Perelman’s revision of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. 
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clarify how students should arrive at the propositions which would underpin these 
demonstrations of oratory. In other words, Whately left everything beyond the rules of 
rhetorical construction and delivery to the vague idea of “genius.” Within the catalogue 
of rhetorical rule, Whately was considerably precise. Whately determined that any 
subject that interested the students would serve for discussion. He preferred 
composition of argument to content-related questions and emphasised techniques that 
would allow an aspiring rhetorician to compose rather than invent a sound argument.22 
In 1828, with the publication of his Elements of Rhetoric, Whately favoured deduction 
rather than induction as the most precise and effective rhetorical device for constructing 
logical argumentation.23  
Rhetorical instruction at Otago University promoted analytical utilitarian notions of 
speech composition.24 Whately and Bain defended the empiricist idea that a linguistic 
input could produce a predictable effect in the persons addressed. In The Emotions and 
the Will, Bain analysed deliberation (in other words, debate) as a “voluntary act” which 
                                               
22 Invention features prominently in American research on the teachings of rhetoric in the nineteenth 
century. Berlin explains that the notion of invention almost disappeared (Berlin 1981); Crowley discusses 
the function of memory and maintains that invention still existed in nineteenth-century rhetoric (Crowley 
1985 and 1990); Halloran argues that invention underwent conceptual changes during that time (Halloran 
1982, 257-263). Crowley argues that invention prior to current-traditional rhetoric was a process of 
discourse in a community, in which knowledge production was linked to language. Under the influence of 
Bain and Whately, invention became a mechanical tool of rhetoric that practically supplied “speakers and 
writer with instructions for finding the specific arguments that are appropriate to a given rhetorical 
situation” (Crowley 1990, 2). From a theoretical point of view, invention denoted “all the possible means 
by which arguments or proofs can be discovered and developed” (ibid.). In New Zealand, complaints 
about “cram” were typical student reactions towards the didactic methods of current-traditional rhetoric. 
In 1898, Miss Brown, author of the prize essay at Otago accused university teaching of cramming. In her 
discussion she emphasised that “[k]nowledge that is to be of permanent value must be slowly assimilated” 
(Brown 1898, 103). She also was of the opinion that university courses should be specialised and limited 
in scope. Professor Gilray, the examiner of the prize essays, remarked that “[t]here is no subject 
connected with education on which so much nonsense has been written and spoken as cram. Some people 
use cram as a synonym for all memory work” (Gilray 1898, 132). The professor concluded that “nothing 
pays better with a skilful examiner than excellent method, arrangement, and composition; and these can 
certainly not be crammed” (ibid.). 
23 Chapter six analyses in more detail the relation of induction and deduction for late-Victorian methods 
of argumentation in New Zealand. 
24 Professor Macmillan Brown at Canterbury College instructed his students in Composition. Only in 
1878, examinations included rhetoric. The Canterbury College Calendar of 1879 listed under English: 
“examinations on the General History of English Literature, on special works or pieces of old authors, 
and on the rules of Rhetoric and Composition” (CCC, 1879, 66f). Composition for Brown amounted 
mainly to teachings of syntax, grammar and philology. The examination questions in Greek and Latin 
make clear that students had to be familiar with the works of Plato and Aristotle.  
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negotiated between two extremes: “no amount of complication is ever able to disguise 
the general fact, that our voluntary activity is moved by the two great classes of 
stimulants; either a pleasure or a pain, present or remote, must lurk in every situation 
that drives us into action” (Bain 1888, 411). Emotionally, according to Bain, a debating 
audience oscillated between the painful and the pleasing experiences that were 
connected with an issue. In nineteenth-century New Zealand, the role of the debaters 
demanded that they safely conducted the audience through this journey of emotional 
upheavals. Language was considered the most effective means to achieve this end. 
When Howell wrote of the art of oratory as having “entire command over the minds 
of your hearers” (Howell 1893, 135), he aspired to an ideal rather than a version of 
rhetoric that the twentieth century would call propaganda.25 Reviews of debating 
evenings frequently used the expression “to conduct” to describe a speaker’s command 
of her audience. In 1894, professor Gibbons “conducted the audience through the largest 
towns of Northern Italy …  and under the able guidance of the lecturer, the audience 
were carried along with an interest that never flagged” (OUR, Aug. 1894, 78). In 1895, 
a journalist summarised Scobie Mackenzie’s lecture with the words: “The way in which 
the lecturer conducted his hearers behind the scenes in regard to ‘impromptu’ speaking 
was much appreciated – his own experiences very much so” (OW, 19 Sept. 1895, 20). In 
1879, John Innes in his diary recalled a political speech given by Sir George Grey in 
                                               
25 Propaganda differs from rhetoric insofar as it strives to manipulate common opinion by spreading one 
dominant point of view. Rhetoric, by contrast, is based on the principle of speech and counter-speech. 
Rhetoric always accepts the possibility of a perspective, which might be entirely opposed to the one put 
forward. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the development of propaganda. Ueding 2005, 
266-290 and Enos 1996, 566-569 provide information on this point. The OED makes clear that at the end 
of the nineteenth century, the term propaganda was used for “any association, systematic scheme, or 
concerted movement for the propagation of a particular doctrine or practice” (OED s.v. “propaganda”). 
Doering-Manteuffel demonstrates that the nineteenth century provided the basis for the twentieth-century 
phenomenon. She identifies seven key reasons for the emergence of propaganda: the aggressive use of the 
term for political ideologies; the creation of pamphlets and flyers as written manifestation of any political 
scheme; the emergence of societies, associations, political parties etc.; the creation of a theory of the 
“masses;” the increasing availability of mass communication means; the improvement of transportation 
and infrastructure; the use of specific slogans and catchphrases in a political and ideological context 
(Doering-Manteuffel 2005, 277). In New Zealand, nineteenth-century students did not yet distinguish 
between rhetoric and propaganda. 
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Christchurch. Part of the audience made an unexpected and violent move at the platform 
and the orator had to defend his physical presence at the political event: “The gentlemen 
seated on the platform (including Prof. Cook!) rose quickly from their chairs and began 
to move towards the back of the platform. Sir George stood straight; and said ‘I never 
turned my back yet.’ And the rush stopped before it reached the platform” (Innes, Diary, 
30 July 1879). As early as 1884, debate was styled “the art of persuasion and 
disputation” by Professor Haslam. In other words, to debate meant “to convince 
yourself of some great truth …  and to persuade all men that it is true also for them” 
(Haslam 1884, 9). The credibility of the entire persona of the speaker aided her cause. 
Howell concluded that “nothing is so productive of spirit and liveliness as earnestness; 
nothing so delightful to the audience as to become aware that the whole speaker’s soul 
is thrilling through his words, and making them flow, like the speech of aged Nestor, 
more sweetly than honey” (Howell 1893, 134). Howell and Haslam suggested that the 
audience was not lured into believing improbable chimera but had to be persuaded of 
the truth of the speaker’s claims by a combination of his personal integrity, physical 
presence and the force of the better argument. Late-Victorian New Zealand students 
believed that the impact a debater had on her listeners depended on the command s/he 
had over the emotional and intellectual faculties of her audience. The credibility of a 
debater derived from the responsibility s/he accepted in guiding other students.  
Ordinary debates in New Zealand fell into the realm of argumentation and rhetoric 
as science. They traditionally intrigued by their argumentative force not by their 
expository nature. Whately formulated a theory that reduced rhetoric to the management 
of argumentation and saw it in a binary relation to logic (Zappen 1991, 151). Bain 
accepted the significance of emotions for rhetorical composition but only after reducing 
emotions to mechanical descriptions of psychological and physical phenomena. In other 
words, debate in the context of New Zealand rhetorical theory was regarded as a highly 
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analytical and scientific endeavour. As a consequence, exposition was palpably 
excluded from Whately’s canon. Bain likewise jettisoned exposition (along with 
oratory, description and narration) as an outdated rhetorical system. Debate as the 
sphere of creative explanation and the invention of arguments lost its eminence in 
rhetorical theory. As a consequence, it gradually required an audience well-versed in the 
systematic routine of public speaking, advocacy and logical thought. Furthermore, 
listeners had to be able to appreciate the quality of logical style, that is, the correct 
application of norms. Especially, by the end of the century, debates were evaluated on 
the basis of soundness of argument and pureness of composition.  
 
The City and the College: An Audience of Active Men and Fashionable Women 
In their attempt to create a culture of esprit de corps, students at the New Zealand 
colleges identified the college as an isolated institution within the colonial city. 
Auckland, Christchurch and Dunedin promoted their colleges as prestigious institutions 
and left the development of student culture on its own. The result was a gradual 
separation of city and college. At the founding of the universities, the relation between 
the wider and the academic public was relatively undefined. Towards the end of the 
century, the partition of city and college was complete.26 The common prejudice that the 
universities actually welcomed this separation dominated students’ and urban 
discussions. The colleges were perceived as training grounds for teachers, lawyers and 
other more technical professions. The image of the university was however more 
complicated than this. Morrell and Hall propose that “university education in New 
Zealand was first aimed at creating wide opportunities for study rather than at achieving 
a standard of excellence in the pursuit of learning and truth” (Morrell and Hall 1962, 
223). Their statement obscures the fact that students and professors unrelentingly 
                                               
26 Hight and Candy argue that, at Canterbury College, the annual inaugural lecture delivered by the 
professors of the college was an “important link between the College and the Community” until it was 
abandoned in 1885 (Hight and Candy 1927, 58). 
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referred to learning as the pursuit of truth even though they also acknowledged the 
importance of practical instruction. Contrary to Morrell and Hall’s idea that the colleges 
were practically inclined institutions with limited regard for truth and a desire to attune 
their degrees to the demands of the colony, the beginnings of the colleges suggest a 
different conclusion. Colleges in New Zealand were struggling with objectives which 
were mainly dictated by the colonial and imperial government, the local communities 
and academic opinion abroad. Students had to position themselves as a close-knit group 
in the complex educational ideology of the colony and Empire. Their desire to precisely 
delineate membership and the sphere of influence for their societies corresponded to this 
search for belonging.  
Students hardly ever hesitated to style themselves as an educated, literate and 
academic ‘lot’. In retrospection, Oscar T.J. Alpers confessed that “our efforts …  to 
create a university atmosphere were rather absurd … ; but we at least were deeply in 
earnest about it all” (Alpers 1928, 52). In 1893, Howell confidently proclaimed: “here 
meet from day to day, to study under able professors, a number of young men and 
women; and these are ‘ourselves’” (Howell 1893, 133). He maintained that it was not 
becoming in an ardent debater “only [to] be an interested listener, but to strive to 
cultivate in himself the time-honoured art of speaking” (133). The quality of a member 
of a debating audience was characterised by the reverence s/he showed in presenting 
and listening to speeches. Awareness of the requirements of membership became 
crucial. In 1900, the Auckland University College debating society carried a motion that 
distinguished between active and associate members on grounds of their readiness to 
speak: “Members shall be either active or associate. Active members shall be those who 
speak at least once a term. All others shall be associate members” (SCUA, minute book, 
30 April 1900). As a consequence, this distinction carried administrative force and 
excluded associate members from voting on matters concerning the society. 
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Nineteenth-century debating membership, from the establishment of the societies, 
was always restrictive. Students created an audience that deliberately excluded non-
academic citizens and even initially declined attendance of the majority of the student 
body. Canterbury debaters, for example, were not sure, when establishing their society, 
whether only matriculate students should be allowed to join. In 1923, Charles Chilton 
(1860-1929), professor of palaeontology and biology and a founding member of the 
Canterbury College Dialectic Society, recalled the complex discussion that resulted in 
the exclusion of non-matriculate students. Because the assembly could not arrive at a 
unanimous decision, the chairman had to give his casting vote. Chilton, in hindsight, 
argued that the matriculate students formed a closely knit community whereas the non-
matriculated students were more or less floating members of the college and “had no 
such close bond of sympathy” (Chilton 1923, 10). In other words, the society enforced 
and acted within given parameters of belonging, which separated it from the public. As 
a consequence, the audience of these societies was a well-circumscribed and safe body 
of individuals who all shared the same foundation, that is, their college association. In 
1882, the students at Otago University resolved that “the Society shall consist of 
students and ex-students of the university of Otago to be admitted without election and 
such members of other recognized universities as the society shall by ballot in the usual 
manner choose to admit” (Hocken, minute book, 23 June1882). In 1884, debaters in 
Christchurch similarly permitted a limited number of honorary members to join the 
society. They thus extended their membership regulations only within accepted 
conventions. 
The three colleges were founded to provide New Zealand’s education system with 
teachers who were desperately needed. Advancing the colony’s intellectual and 
academic life was only a secondary aim of the colleges. Hercock points out that 
“students of the AUC and their college did not form part of the day-to-day life of the 
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city, but hovered on its margins, emerging only occasionally into the public gaze” 
(Hercock 1994, 3). In her analysis of the student association in Auckland, Hercock 
nevertheless makes clear that students’ activities exhausted the possibilities of college 
life and extended beyond academic boundaries. In A History of the University of 
Auckland, Sinclair’s treatment of late-Victorian student activities acknowledges the 
significance of the University College for Auckland’s city life.27 McAloon in his study 
of the Canterbury elite ascribes a pivotal role to Canterbury College in forming a close-
knit body of men and women who shaped the public culture of Christchurch (McAloon 
2000). In Dunedin, the University became part of urban culture through a number of 
scientific debates on Darwinism (Sullivan 2005; Stenhouse 1990, 1999: 69-71).  
Thomas Bender, who studies the relationship of urban and intellectual culture in 
America, is an unremitting advocate of the history of the city. His ideas contextualise 
McAloon’s analysis of elite culture in Christchurch. Bender maintains that mid-
nineteenth-century intellectual elitism did not remain at the outskirts of popular urban 
culture:  
Elite cultures depended upon and extended popular culture. It was possible for 
intellectuals to speak to the pace of local thought and still address serious issues 
in a learned tradition that was at least vaguely familiar to their local community 
of auditors or readers. Yet this intellectual community was fragile. It was 
vulnerable to the changes in scale, the calculation and ambition, and the cultural 
diversity that emerged over the course of the nineteenth century. (Bender 1993, 
11) 
The educated elite, among it the students of New Zealand colleges, only shaped colonial 
realities because they were inseparably tied to them. Even though, as Bender argues, 
“neither personal knowledge nor clear social categories were available to organize and 
                                               
27 One of the differences between Auckland and Canterbury and Otago was the former’s status as state 
university. In comparing Auckland with the United States, Sinclair observes that “the establishment of a 
state college was a recognition that the provision of higher education was a vital function of societies and 
of the view that the most suitable agency to provide this function was the state, not religious or private 
groups” (Sinclair 1983, 26). As a consequence, at least the governing body of the Auckland region 
acknowledged the need and their responsibility for a higher education institution. Graduation processions 
through Auckland physically brought college life to the city. They were introduced in 1900 and Sinclair 
records that the tradition was copied from Sydney (69). Canterbury students began their processions in 
1899. 
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discipline intellectual life” (12), the educated classes in New Zealand created categories 
of audience and public on the basis of ideas, rituals and theories that were available to 
them.  
All three colleges had matriculated as well as non-matriculate students. Matriculated 
students attempted to earn an academic degree. The wider public could attend classes 
depending on special interests and consequently formed the body of non-matriculate 
students, which in the formative years of the colleges constituted the larger part of the 
academic population. Non-matriculate students could not complete a specific academic 
programme. Auckland students were no exception: 
By 1890, 147 students were attending lectures at the college: sixty-three men 
and eighty-four women. Around two thirds of these students had not passed the 
matriculation examination. Until they did so they could attend lectures and sit 
the college’s own ‘terms’ examinations, but could not take ‘finals’ which were 
marked in Britain, nor progress to degrees. (Hercock 1994, 4) 
In other words, the college partly served as an institution for adult education. Moreover, 
all students, regardless of their enrolment status, had to earn a living unless they were 
fortunate enough to win one of the scholarships or exhibitions.28 In 1902, Alpers and 
Irvine (themselves graduates from Canterbury College and members of the Dialectic 
Society) pointed out that the colleges were “‘popular’ institutions” recruiting their 
students mainly from the “lower and middle classes of the people” (Alpers and Irvine 
1902, 379). In the early days, Canterbury College and Auckland University College 
taught evening classes to allow students to attend after their day’s work. Students were 
integral to the city’s civic and social life insofar as they actively contributed to its social 
and economic landscape. Contrary to Hercock, I maintain that students exerted an 
influence on urban life that was limited only by the small number of students (relative to 
                                               
28 Scholarships and exhibitions usually meant extra examinations for applicants. The New Zealand 
University offered the University of New Zealand’s Junior (Entrance) Scholarships and the Senior 
Scholarships. Auckland University College, for example, created the Sinclair Scholarship for zoology and 
botany and the Gillies Scholarship in chemistry and physics (Sinclair 1983, 32). The Canterbury College 
Board established six Exhibitions worth £20 per annum (Gardner, Beardsley and Carter 1973, 140).  
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the overall urban population in New Zealand) and not by their affiliation to an academic 
institution. Instead, their status as educated and professionally trained individuals 
granted them access to the highest political offices that the colony had to offer. It 
enabled students like Apirana Ngata and Kate Edger, despite common prejudice, to 
direct the public policies of New Zealand in the early twentieth century.29 
Eyewitness accounts relate that the Christchurch community was at odds with the 
college. In an interview of 1961, Professor Wall (1869-1966) states that “the university 
was always a bit of a mystery to the community. There was very little contact between 
the university and the townspeople” (Wall Interview, Gardner Papers, 4). L. P. Symes 
(1879-?), a laboratory assistant in 1894, confirms Arnold Wall’s opinion: 
There was never a very close relationship between the university and the 
community. Individually university people had their own circle of friends and 
there was a good deal of criticism of ‘the product of Canterbury College.’ The 
university was really only a school for teachers. (Symes Interview, Gardner 
Papers, 3) 
The colony, especially in the 1870s, needed teachers. Bowen’s Education Act of 1877 
prompted parents to enrol their children at schools in unprecedented numbers. Between 
1875 and 1886, special regulations of the University of New Zealand allowed school-
teachers to directly proceed to B.A. examinations without previous enrolment 
(Beaglehole 1937, 113).30 A large number of graduates, especially women, were or 
                                               
29 From 1905 to 1943, Sir Apirana Ngata occupied the Eastern Maori parliamentary seat. Between 1907 
and 1908, he sat on the Native Land Commission together with chief justice Sir Robert Stout. In 1927, 
Nagata received the knighthood and the following year became native minister. In 1934 he resigned from 
cabinet. Stout, for example, completed his degree as one of the first students at Otago University. 
Between 1873 and 1875, he lectured law at the University College. In August 1875, he became the 
Caversham member of the House of Representatives. Under the George Grey government, he became 
attorney general and minister for lands and immigration. From 1899, he acted as chief justice until his 
retirement in 1926 and decided over 1,400 cases. Another outstanding reformer, George Hogben, formed 
the New Zealand Educational Institute and provided a professional organisation for New Zealand’s 
teachers. Kate Edger, later Evans, was the first woman to graduate in New Zealand. Throughout her 
career, she continued to exert an influence in the suffragist movement and through the founding of the 
Nelson College for Girls. During the First World War, Kate Evans worked for two years at the New 
Zealand Department of Education. Biographical information obtained from Sorrenson, Hamer, Roth, and 
Hughes, DNZB. 
30 Beaglehole reports that “teachers in affiliated institutions and ‘certified teachers of good repute, of at 
least five years standing,’ might on the recommendation of the Chancellor or Vice-Chancellor be 
admitted immediately to the final B.A. examination, without the regular nine terms’ study demanded of 
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became teachers. Morrell observes that at Otago, “in 1887, 68 out of a total of 167 
University students were teachers” (Morrell 1969, 104).31 These students exerted a 
considerable influence on the next generation of New Zealanders. Even if their 
immediate impact on the wider public as students can be considered small and 
occasionally even unwanted; their effect on New Zealand education as professionals 
was significant. In 1901, the article College and Culture proposed that “an up-to-date 
College, jarring though the thing and its name may be to those conscious of older ideals, 
is no longer a scarcely tolerated intrusion, but is become an element in the content of the 
public demand” (CCR, June 1901, 6). In 1902, an anonymous writer in the same review 
contended that “the society referred to is one link between the academic life of a student 
and that outer, larger world in which he ought to take a useful place when his collegiate 
course is complete” (CCR, June 1902, 22). Students noticed changes in public 
perception and were also aware of their influence on public opinion. Helen Connon 
(1859/1860? – 1903), for example, became principal of Christchurch Girls High School. 
Her sisters were assistant teachers under her supervision.32 Caroline Freeman 
(1855/1856? – 1914) opened Girton College in Dunedin and later another school under 
                                                                                                                                         
others. (Beaglehole 1937, 113). He concludes that “[t]eachers, clearly, were able to acquire degrees on 
easier terms than the ordinary student” (128-9). 
31 Towards the end of the century, these numbers were decreasing: “in 1901, out of a roll of 237, there 
were ‘not more than 25, including pupil-teachers, Training College students and teachers engaged in 
public school work’” (Morell 1969, 104). As a consequence, Otago University’s curriculum began to 
accommodate the practical needs of teachers. In 1904, Education, under the influence of George Hogben, 
became a academic course in its own right (ibid.). In the case of Auckland University College, Sinclair 
makes clear that an equally high numbers of students came from the Teachers’ Training College (Sinclair 
1983, 33). He compares New Zealand with British higher education and observes that “British civic 
universities were mere vestibules of the teaching profession, mere machines producing graduates with 
qualifications which would enable them to earn a living. In a New Zealand or a British context it could, of 
course, have been contended that this situation showed that the universities were relating to, and in this 
way satisfying the needs of, their local communities” (ibid.). 
32 Helen Connon was born in Australia but her parents emigrated to New Zealand only four years after 
Helen was born. In Dunedin, Helen was tutored by the young Robert Stout. In Hokitika she was allowed 
to enrol at the local boy’s school. In 1874, the family moved to Christchurch and Helen became the first 
women to enrol at Canterbury College. In 1881, she graduated with an M.A. with first-class honours and 
became the first women in the British Empire to win a degree with honours. In 1882, she accepted the 
post of lady principal at Christchurch’s Girls’ High School. She promoted scientific education alongside 
physical tuition. She continued to work as principal even after her marriage to Macmillan Brown in 1886. 
Eight years later, she resigned from her post. The biographical sketch is based on Lovell-Smith 2004, 
Hankin, DNZB.  
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the same name in Christchurch.33 Even besides these very prominent examples, there 
are numerous intriguing stories. James Hendry of the Dunedin debating society began to 
work for the education office in Invercargill (TPNZI 1889, 572). Charles Thomas, after 
graduation eventually became assistant master at St. John’s College, Auckland. He 
served in the South African War and on his return, taught at Nelson College and finally 
became headmaster of King’s College in Auckland. Page, in her detailed study of the 
first women graduates at Otago University, shows that most of the fifty-eight graduates 
worked as teachers and principles in one of New Zealand’s girls schools (Page 1992). 
The didactic focus of Bain’s and Whately’s texts on rhetoric and composition possibly 
created points of reference for these future teachers. With regard to this high turnout of 
teachers, debate was practically applied rhetorical didacticism and as such a desirable 
addition to the otherwise highly theoretical teachings at the colonial colleges in New 
Zealand.  
The public significance of students’ later professions did not stop at education. 
Many male students, like Oscar T.J. Alpers (1867-1927), pursued a career in the legal 
profession, in which deliberation and advocacy were important assets.34 Students went 
                                               
33 In 1858, the family of Caroline Freeman came from England to New Zealand. During 1873 and 1877, 
she taught at Caversham School in Dunedin. The principal at Caversham encouraged Caroline to pursue 
higher education and, in 1878, she became the first matriculated women to enrol at Otago University. Her 
schedule as a student was overwhelming as she walked seven miles home after the lectures. Professor 
Sale added to the strenuous situation with open hostility towards female students. In 1881, Caroline 
Freeman passed the B.A. examination. Her success in New Zealand’s higher education system was 
marked by her lack of a structure secondary education. The biographical sketch is based on Page, DNZB 
and 1992, and Gough, Notable Girls’ Schools, manuscript CPL. 
34 Oscar Thorwald Johan Alpers was one of the early members of the society and possibly John 
Macmillan Brown’s most prominent student. In the absence of the professor, Alpers substituted for his 
teacher. Coming to New Zealand as the son of Danish immigrants, Alpers did not speak a word of 
English and faced significant challenges in obtaining a tertiary education. Before attending the 
Christchurch Training College and Canterbury College in 1884, he had already taught his own night-
classes and had been a teacher at various district schools. In 1887, he graduated from Canterbury College 
with a B.A. only to obtain an M.A. in 1889. While in Christchurch, Alpers contributed several satirical 
articles to the Press. Arnold Wall recalled that this involvement might have prevented Alpers from 
succeeding Prof. Brown to the chair of English. In 1903, he completed his LLB degree and subsequently 
joined the legal profession. During his career, he served as judge of the Supreme Court. In his later life, 
he was an ardent speaker, engaged in public debate and continued the acting he had started at an early 
age. Among the books he published are The Jubilee Books of Canterbury Rhymes (1900), The Progress of 
New Zealand in the Nineteenth Century (1902), College Rhymes (1923) and his final biographical work 
Cheerful Yesterdays (1928).  
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into parliament and became successful politicians, a domain of discursive engagement 
that collegiate debate strove to imitate. Sir Apirana Ngata, for example, was a member 
of the Canterbury College as well as the Auckland University debating society. 
Frederick E. Baume (1862-1910) became one of Auckland’s most eloquent politicians. 
Others later began to capture public attention as artists: William H. Montgomery (1866-
1958) after studying for the Bar in Oxford became an artist in his own right in New 
Zealand, as did Charles Frederick Goldie (1870-1947). All of them were university 
students and members of debating societies. 
Lillian Harriet Williams, like Arnold Wall and L.P. Symes, remembered that the 
community perceived the university as an institution that had little if nothing to do with 
the town: “It was very proud of Misses Connon and Edger, but in the main I feel that it 
thought going to university was a rather faddy, although harmless, sort of thing” (Blythe 
Interview, Gardner Papers, 5). Bender in his work on American intellectuals and the city 
suggests that at the end of the nineteenth century, clear points of reference for the 
assessment of intellectual institutions were missing: “Neither personal knowledge nor 
clear social categories were available to organize and discipline intellectual life. 
Intellectual distinctions were blurred, and the identity of audiences became rather 
diffuse” (Bender 1993, 12). Given that Canterbury College was tolerated rather than 
wholeheartedly accepted, students’ cultural initiatives like the yearly concerts and 
drama productions became an integral part of the city’s cultural life. Social activities, 
rational recreation and outstanding individuals enabled the urban New Zealand 
population to relate to the college and find grounds for approving the intellectual 
training there. 
In 1882, the debating society at Canterbury College produced its first play “Much 
Ado about Nothing.” The performance received wide public attention and resulted in an 
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invitation to the International Exhibition in Christchurch the same year.35 The students 
were meant to perform “in the presence of the ministers and members of both Houses of 
Parliament” (MBL, minute book, 17 June 1882). However, students declined the offer 
because they “were not disposed to take part in so public a programme” (ibid.). At 
Otago University Professor Brown’s suggestion to hold a public debate was welcomed 
by members. His motion was opposed only by one vote (Hocken, minute book, 4 July 
1884). Dunedin’s citizens were generally interested and supportive of the idea. The 
endeavour still had to be abandoned on financial grounds (Hocken, minute book, 25 July 
1884). Public interest in the programme of the debating societies was sustained in 
subsequent years. In 1889, the Canterbury Dialectic Society had to limit the number of 
concert tickets because the community had, over the years, shown an interest in the 
private event that exceeded the actual seating capacity of the Great Hall (MBL, minute 
book, 12 Oct. 1889). The following year, the society introduced a rule restricting 
visitors at the general meetings because the Mathematical Lecture room proved too 
small (ibid., 11 Oct. 1890). The societies in Christchurch and Dunedin, even though 
largely composed of students, nevertheless entertained people outside the collegiate 
boundaries. Rational amusement proved to be a powerful means to make transparent the 
proceedings of collegiate societies. 
The flexible relation of intellectual sphere and urban life in New Zealand paralleled 
an American development approximately thirty years earlier.36 Thomas Bender in his 
                                               
35 The Exhibition was a private venture by Jules Joubert and R.E.N. Twopeny. The Christchurch City 
Library records for its picture collection of the Exhibition that “temporary buildings were erected in 
Hagley Park to house the exhibits that had been gathered from various countries. The Exhibition ran for 
14 weeks and attracted crowds of 226,000 between April and July 1882. (Christchurch City Library, 
Heritage Photograph Collection 2008) 
36 In The University and the City Bender and his colleagues show that these dynamics are discernable in 
nineteenth-century European and American cultures to different degrees. The volume provides an 
excellent overview of Bender’s project. In the same volume, Louise L. Stevenson investigates the 
relationship of city and university in New York. She suggests that “[i]n the college’s classical curriculum 
and extracurriculum of literary-society debates and independently pursued activities, students found an 
entryway into the newly forming middle class” (Stevenson 1988, 151). Recently, Bender explored the 
conceptual basis of the city as an urban space. His and Cinar’s arguments inform an interpretation of the 
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study of intellectualism and the American city identifies the fundamental traits of the 
mid-nineteenth-century transformations:  
Knowledge and competence increasingly developed out of the internal dynamics 
of esoteric disciplines rather than within the context of shared perceptions of 
public needs. This is not to say that professionalized disciplines or the modern 
service professions that imitated them became socially irresponsible. But their 
contributions to society began to flow from their own self-definitions rather than 
from the reciprocal engagement with general public discourse. (Bender 1993, 
10) 
Bender explicitly states that the city as a social structure no longer “provided an 
effective audience” (11). In other words, the discourse that students and academic 
professionals could offer to townspeople differed widely from what the city expected 
from the college. The role of the responsible intellectual that was embedded in her 
community was replaced by a more distanced scholar who was occupied with creating 
and claiming a professional niche.37  
Women in New Zealand still had to claim their professional space. They were 
however exemplary of all that was innovative in debating at the end of the nineteenth 
century. Reviews of their conduct mirrored students’ ability to accept new forms of 
rhetorical practice and as a consequence, the emergence of an audience that necessarily 
differed from ideal concepts. Female debaters made the debating audience 
unpredictable. Women, because they were perceived as exotic appearances on the 
debating and oratorical platform, very often drew the attention of the wider public. 
Their appearance established— like debating tournaments— a link between the local 
                                                                                                                                         
relation of intellectual sphere and city. Cinar and Bender illustrate that the “urban experience” is “an 
ongoing contest over terrain”— physical as well as economic and intellectual— “[t]he result is the constant 
making and remaking of urban culture as local, private, or public concerns are brought to the broader 
terrain of public culture” (Cinar and Bender 2007, xvi). Davison deals with the function of public 
celebrations for urban colonial life in New Zealand, Australia and the United States and thus places urban 
colonial culture in the context of “remaking” urban spaces, but his study remains confined to the 
boundaries of nation-state (Davison 1990). Placed in this context, nineteenth-century New Zealand urban 
spaces were constantly remodelled by the intellectual elite in its relation to the urban population. As a 
consequence, the relation of the student body and the public only revealed trends of perception that were 
constantly changing.  
37 Debating societies in New Zealand were recurrently discussing the university curriculum, weighing 
arguments for and against the arts or sciences. Chapter five analysis this aspect of New Zealand’s 
educational discourse.  
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population and the collegiate sphere. They were admired, like Helen Connon, mocked, 
like Miss Randle or, like Miss Montgomery, simply accepted as exceptions to a rule.38  
Women, even though slowly and frequently confronted with ignorance and 
prejudice, eventually claimed the debating platform as partners in deliberation alongside 
men. Women in Dunedin and Christchurch debated alongside men and from the very 
start of the societies addressed women-related issues.39 As early as 1887, the year of the 
founding of the Auckland society, Miss Gifford and Miss Shrewsbury argued whether 
the “franchise should be granted to women” (SCUA, minute book, 7 Oct. 1887), a 
debate that was decided in favour of extending the franchise.40 Part of the early 
engagement of women in debate was the genuine attitude that “the mere presence of 
women, would automatically effect some reform in the male character” (Phillips 1996, 
52). In 1898, for example, the Otago University Review marvelled at the effect that 
women’s presence had on the general mood and conduct of an audience: “The influence 
of ladies always puts one in mind of Epps’s Cocoa, advertisements – grateful and 
comforting” (OUR, May 1898, 20). Scepticism concerning the oratorical and 
                                               
38 Murphy, for example, traces this “rule” in non-canonical literary texts of the late-Victorian era. Her 
analysis makes clear that the image of women was to a large extend moulded by scientific public 
discourse. Women’s higher education and their participation in the public sphere were characterised by a 
supposedly scientific contemplation of their emotional rather than rational dispositions and intellectual 
capacities. Murphy shows that late-Victorian scientific discourse buttressed the traditional confinement of 
women to the private sphere. (Murphy 2006) 
39 Hercock’s analysis of the Auckland University debating society contains correct points of reference but 
also a number of false comments. She, for example, states that in 1910 an oratorical contest was added to 
the programme (Hercock 1994, 19). The idea of a prize for best orator was introduced by Dr. Posnett who 
actually inspired the founding of the society. The Auckland University Calendar of 1888 announces on 
the first page that the “Gold Medal for Oratory,” which in 1887 was awarded to Mr. Poland. Likewise, the 
introduction of parliamentary debates does not date back to 1910. The minute book of 1906 shows an 
entry that mentions “annual Parliamentary Debates.“ As early as 1898, the NZH reports an “open 
evening” that took the form of a mock election of parliamentary candidates (NZH, 11 March 1898, 4). I 
do not agree with Hercock’s conclusion that the Auckland debating society was gravely biased against 
women. In 1887, Miss Shrewsbury was one of the most active debaters in the society and Miss Gorrie 
was also elected to the executive committee from its earliest beginnings. In 1891, Miss C. D. Grant 
became vice-president of the society. Women in Christchurch had to wait for several years before they 
were elected to these positions. Even though the number of female members might have been small in 
Auckland, this alone should not lead to the conclusion that men caused this development. 
40 Hercock maintains that “it was not until July 1911 that women were given a debate of their own, when 
they argued with the aid of two men speakers ‘That the Rose should take precedence of the Cabbage’, a 
proposal which, unsurprisingly, enticed only a ‘fair’ audience”. (Hercock 1994, 19) Hercock’s statement 
fails to mention these earlier women debates. 
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argumentative abilities of women persisted; but satire made way for acceptance because 
of women’s unrelenting efforts to conquer the rhetorical space that was available to 
them. In 1892, the New Zealand Herald published an account of a debating evening at 
the Auckland University Debating Society, in which the chairman of the meeting 
regretted the “departure of Miss Grant for Wanganui” and without irony called for “a 
vote of thanks …  to that young lady for the many valuable services that she has 
rendered the Society and the University” (NZH, 17 June 1892, 5).  
Newspapers found the attendance of women on debating evenings always worth 
mentioning. As early as 1879, the ODT reported on Caroline Freeman’s Bowen prize 
essay. She delivered it in front of “a large audience, mostly ladies” and “remarked, 
before reading her essay, that she considered the mere fact of standing where she did to 
be a mark of advance of the age; and thanked the students generally for tolerating 
women in their ranks” (ODT, 7 June 1879, 2). Despite an openly professed disregard for 
women’s higher education at Otago University, Freeman’s comments allowed the 
Dunedin public to feel good about their innovative academic institution. In August 
1888, the New Zealand Herald explicitly recalled “that the lady members of the society 
mustered strongly” (NZH, 11 Aug. 1888, 5). The author of The Commemorative Issue of 
the Otago Review resolved that “the adjective ‘fashionable” is specially to be noted 
because it imports that there were a large number of ladies present” (OUR, Comm. Issue 
1893, 35). Women excited the interests of the wider public because their position in the 
late nineteenth-century rhetorical culture was still ambiguous. 
Women’s passivity in deliberation was very often subject of criticism in university 
Reviews. Howell in “Ourselves” dismissed the women’s silence by emphasising other 
female virtues: 
Let the ladies, too, consider my words. What a power they might exercise in our 
society if they would break their long-preserved silence! How we would rejoice 
to hear the liquid sweetness of their melting voices. …  Theirs, too, is the greatest 
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share in providing the melody that enlivens our meetings, that soothes our 
troubles spirits, and strikes the chord of harmony in our souls. (Howell 1893, 
135) 
In 1890, the president of the Dialectic Society expressed the desire “that the lady 
members should continue to speak at the meetings of the society” (MBL, minute book, 
31 May 1890). The same evening, Miss Rendall read an essay on Robert Browning. In 
1903, the secretary of Auckland debating society remarked, possibly without fully 
noticing the irony of his statement, that “[i]t is regrettable that the ladies do not speak 
more often at the debates, although they attend well, and recently most hospitably come 
forward very often by entertaining the other members at supper” (Marte Nostro, Oct 
1903, 8). 
Women were far from being impassive about these comments. Where opportunities 
were lacking, women created their own platforms. Female students at Canterbury 
College published their own remarks on their fellow students’ in the “Cloak-Room 
Notes.” Women at Otago University did the same in the “Ladies Notes.” In 1898, the 
Cloak-Room Notes published the following reply to the relentless criticism of women’s 
lacking debating skills:  
Again, at the present stage of advancement, it is curious to hear it said that 
women will not add ‘brilliancy’ to the debates. For even those that are most 
forward to exult in the supremacy of a man’s intellectual strength over a 
woman’s, for the most part allow this: that a women’s intellect is characterised 
by a certain quickness and a certain grasp of details that a man’s intellect lacks. 
(OUR, Sep. 1898, 115)  
In Auckland, Mona M. Brown, Marion Metcalfe41, Winifred Scott and Marjorie 
McMaster initiated the student magazine Marte Nostro.42 Occasionally, men proposed 
changes to debating procedures that were meant to promote female participation. In 
                                               
41 Metcalfe and Brown were members of the debating society. Metcalfe took an active part in an 
impromptu debate of 1902. 
42 Sinclair records that “in 1903 a squabble between the women and men hockey players led to the 
establishment of a new journal. The women already had a club, the A.U.C. Hockey Club, with Lady 
Ranfurly as Patron. Now the men started what was said to be the first men’s hockey team in Auckland 
and demanded the right to the ladies’ club’s names. The women were indignant and refused …  . The 
women, the so-called ‘militants’, then decided to start another journal, run entirely by themselves, and 
elected a female committee” (Sinclair 1983, 66). 
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1891, the recently married Joseph Penfound Grossmann (his wife was the New Zealand 
writer and feminist Edith Searle Grossmann) suggested that the constitution should be 
altered to allow for two lady members on the Society’s committee.43 He argued that the 
number of women participating was steadily increasing and that this fact should be 
acknowledged accordingly. The motion was carried and the Christchurch debaters 
thereafter elected two women to the executive. 
Emma Hilda Keane (1873-1970), a member of the Auckland University debating 
society, helped to establish the Girls’ Korero Club which encouraged debating and 
writing among women.44 It is impossible to trace the reasons for this particular choice of 
name. Possibly, the Grey Maori myth was not the first incentive for female debaters to 
adopt a Maori term. Tony Ballantyne counts korero in Maori culture among the 
“combative forms of historical consciousness that encapsulate the competitive spirit at 
the heart of kin-group dynamics” (Ballantyne 2002, 150). It seems likely, that white 
female students drew on these implications to emphasise their intention to separate their 
activities from their male fellow debaters. The club attracted the attention of the New 
Zealand Herald, which published accounts of the meetings. Several members of the 
                                               
43 Grossmann was the only New Zealand graduate with triple honours (English, Latin, political science 
and mental science). He was later notoriously known for being found guilty of fraud in 1898, among the 
injured parties were Prof. Haslam as Canterbury College and Thomas Scholfield Foster. Between 1896 
and 1898 he was part-time lecturer in English at Canterbury College. Later, he took up a teaching position 
in Auckland and became professor of mental science, economics (1906-1926), history (1906-1932) and 
commercial geography (1906-1920). In 1932, he was eventually dismissed from his professorship. 
Sinclair writes of Grossmann: “Grossmann was a remarkable man. He had been first president of the 
Students’ Association at Canterbury and a prominent rugby player. He was for many years one of the best 
tennis players in Auckland. He was good looking. He had quite extraordinary charm, and a magnetic 
personality” (Sinclair 1983, 80). During his time in Christchurch, he remained an active member of the 
debating society. Between 1885 and 1894 he delivered at least seven papers. In 1894, he also reviewed 
the prize essays. Once settled in Auckland, he published numerous articles in the Star. The biographical 
account is based on Sinclair 1983, 79-84; Grossmann, manuscript, MBL, 5 May 1894; Hight 1927, 72. 
44 Keane was born in Auckland. After graduating from Auckland University College, she briefly taught in 
Dunedin where she attended additional lectures at Otago University. In 1899, she began to publish articles 
in the New Zealand Herald. In 1902, she returned from the South Island to Auckland to become assistant 
editor at the New Zealand Illustrated Magazine. During her career as journalist, she contributed 
extensively to overseas magazines and journals like the New York Sun, Britannia, National Review and 
Empire Review. She also joined the London Lyceum Club, founded by Edith Searle Grossmann. Keane 
became one of the most successful female journalists of New Zealand. The information is based on 
McCallum, DNZB. 
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Korero nevertheless were also active in the university’s debating society. Since 1899, 
the women held annual debating contest with the Auckland University debating society. 
From time to time, women claimed the attention of not only the collegiate listeners 
but a wider audience in quite a different way. In 1878 in Dunedin, the first woman 
presenting a literary essay in public came from the university debating society. 
The essayist was Miss Montgomery, the subject, ‘Thackeray,’ and the delivery 
of the essay was the first occasion in which a lady had appeared in public in this 
city in such a character. One or two lecturers had been heard in Dunedin before 
– one an immigration agent, and one a revivalist preacher – but Miss 
Montgomery was the first to adopt the role of an essayist in literature. The 
meeting was largely attended by the outside public, and caused some little stir in 
the then contracted literary circle of the town. (OUR, Comm. Issue 1893, 42) 
The evening attracted an audience “outside” the typical realm of collegiate debaters.45 
Miss Montgomery’s presentation mirrored the later incident of 1898 of Miss Randle’s 
brave encounter on the debating platform. Both women caused irritation among the 
male-dominated audience. Miss Randle in particular elicited the expression of prejudice 
regarding female social behaviour that, in 1898, should no longer have been 
appropriate. Miss Montgomery by contrast crossed these social and public borders by 
embracing the opportunity that the debating society provided. In other cases, female 
debaters were oblivious of the position to which they were confined. In 1881, Helen 
Connon, the pride of Canterbury College and idol of many colonial women, participated 
                                               
45 Miss Montgomery’s appearance was not the last event when women excited the attention of 
“outsiders”. Bradshaw in New Zealand of To-Day related an incident for the B.A. examination that urged 
him to confess his personal view on women’s higher education. Adelphi and Heauton-timoroumenos by 
Terence were placed on the canon for the B.A. at Canterbury College and this offended some “who were 
jealous for the modesty of the female students, which the plays were said to outrage” (Bradshaw 1888, 
324). In particular, the YMCA appealed to the Canterbury Board of Governors to remove the books. 
Bradshaw maintained that the books should have remained on the list. He commented on the entire affair: 
“And for what reason? That a few young women, most of whom had far better be learning how to manage 
their future households, may dabble in partial truth side by side with students of the opposite sex” (325-
6). He maintained that deciding against the plays would have been to decide against the truth and 
instruction of history: “History cannot be made other than it is; and from history men gather experience” 
(325). In other words, women’s higher education and the moral issues related to it stood in the way of 
objectivity and factual historical knowledge. Bradshaw essentially argued that women’s presence at 
college, under the given circumstances, corrupted the validity of academic knowledge. Beaglehole and 
Roth recall the same incident without Bradshaw’s sentiment (Beaglehole 1937, 160 n49; Roth 1952, 33). 
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in a debate on women’s higher education. Edith Searle Grossman (1863-1931)46, in her 
biography of Helen Connon, described her impressions of the incident: 
In 1881 she led a debate in the Students’ Dialectic Society on behalf of the 
higher education of women, but she trusted entirely to setting forth the reasons 
logically before the audience, under the very erroneous impression that they 
wished to know the facts and the justice of the case. The debate was lost, and it 
seems that she resolved not to argue but to try to use her own life as an example. 
(Grossman in Baxter 1981, 15f) 
Grossman’s statement was coloured by her own feminist background. Debating for 
women could be a frustrating experience given their fellow debaters’ condescension. 
Female debaters, if they voiced their opinion, were still regarded as obscure variations 
on the norm of public speaking. Their exceptional status often transformed their public 
appearances into a performance or spectacle that attracted academic audience and urban 
outsiders. Women, because of their status, brought together town and academe. In other 
words, women debaters experienced par excellence what Bitzer describes as constraints 
in a rhetorical situation. As a consequence, women became an indispensable part of the 
formation of a debating audience because they had to transcend the traditional 
limitations of the rhetorical culture of their time.  
 
Conclusion 
New Zealand students formed an active debating audience that was representative of 
the white intellectual elite of late-Victorian New Zealand. Membership was strictly 
regulated and exclusionary. Intellectual refinement was regarded as one of the entry 
conditions and the requirement of active participation was meant to prevent the 
lowering of debating standards. Their records suggest that they adopted regulatory 
                                               
46 Edith Searle was originally born in Australia. In 1878, her family emigrated to New Zealand. At 
Christchurch’s Girls’ High School, under the tutelage of Helen Connon, she became head girl. A junior 
scholarship enabled her in 1880 to take up her studies at Canterbury College. In 1885, she graduated with 
an M.A. She married Joseph Penfound Grossmann and taught at Wellington Girls’ High until 1890. In 
1897, she tutored university classes. Eventually, she settled down in Europe, away from her husband, and 
pursued her writing career. Between 1890 and 1910, she published four novels. Feminist ideas permeated 
her novels. She was a founding member of the London Lyceum Club and the Women’s Institute in 
Christchurch. The biographical information taken from Moffat, manuscript, 2007; Stafford 2006, 171-
200; Robert 2006. 
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frameworks that were traditionally associated with the founding of clubs and societies 
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Furthermore, collegiate debating 
societies were confronted with a division between university and city, which created 
boundaries that were transcended by means of extraordinary appearances of women on 
stage or the disrupting behaviour of the Barrackers’ Brigade. 
The audience in New Zealand debates was envisaged as an ideal and universal entity 
(parallel to Perelman’s universal audience) and was practically influenced by notions of 
the literary audience, the rise of the mass audience and such derogatory terms like 
hooligan. At the same time, student audiences were partly composed of members of 
“counter-publics” like women and Maori students. Within this paradigm, debating 
generated an “emancipatory potential” (Fraser 1992, 124) because it was not only an 
exercise of rational deliberation but a display and even spectacle for an audience. With 
the flexibility of participants came the danger of compromising debating standards and 
reducing the quality of the debaters’ audience. 
Students had to relate to this reality and could not exclude the fact that “the mob” 
was among them. Their reaction varied, but in general, rowdies were met with 
contempt. Truth and intellect were always on the side of attentive listeners:  
On many subjects of possible discussion the agile mind is not so safe a guide as 
the somewhat sluggish; and it is often the case that what fails to appeal to the 
‘healthy stupidity’ of the mass of men has, however plausibly it may be set 
forth, lost the heart of truth which alone can give it power. The danger of ease in 
debating power leading to artificial refinements in argument and to love of 
overcoming without a single eye for the truth, is a serious one. There are few 
things more hurtful to character and more likely to lessen one’s public influence 
than the spirit of the professional debater. Fortunately, we are in some measure 
protected by a body of students who do not aid the Society directly, but who 
give scant encouragement to the over-refinements of irresponsible intellectual 
free-lances. (OUR, June 1898, 39) 
The debating audience had to aspire to a standard that was worthy of their status as an 
educated group. They could only protect the society from the ignorance of the masses if, 
among them, they found representatives of this class. In the course of determining what 
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differentiated them from the rest of the public, they eventually came back to the 
traditional values of truth and refinement. Authenticity of character, purity of style, 
emotional stability, acute reason and voluntary participation were the characteristics of a 
brilliant debater and her audience. Laziness, ignorance, blindness to reason and 
vulgarity defined the other end of the extreme. Thus, to be part of a debating audience 
carried a status that propelled the individual to loftier heights of knowledge and 
wisdom.  
John Durham Peters, in his criticism of Habermas’s project, propounds the argument 
that “[i]deals of participatory democracy often go together with a distrust of aesthetic 
representation …  Habermas prizes conversation, reading and plain speech as worthy 
forms of discourse for a democratic culture and is frankly hostile to theatre, courtly 
forms, ceremony, the visual, and to rhetoric more generally” (Peters 1993, 562). Even 
though Peters is right in pointing out Habermas’s bias, late nineteenth-century New 
Zealand debating illustrates the dynamics of integration, however painful and limited 
they were. The debating audience at New Zealand colleges epitomises a compromise of 
participation that calls into question established notions of processes of integration and 
separation. In particular, popular forms of competition and entertainment expanded the 
scope of tolerance on the part of those who set the standards. Debating societies 
admittedly cultivated a routine of seclusion. At the same time, in the safe environment 
of their clubs, students were bound to recur to practices of integration to sustain 
debating as a collegiate practice. While norms of participation became flexible, the 
actual argumentation and its procedural routine came under the influence of a regime of 
political communication that controlled public discourse rather than embraced the 
participatory liberty that debating societies practised. 
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Chapter Five 
Dialectic Responsibility 
Debate as a Rescue Mission  
Introduction 
Audience participation in nineteenth-century New Zealand debate was an issue of 
control and regulation. The actual procedure of argumentation, dialectic, paralleled this 
trend. The idea of dialectic in New Zealand was predominantly influenced by its 
opposition to rhetoric, Matthew Arnold’s concept of “conduct” and the late-Victorian 
belief in the Darwinian principle of selection. Students extended this theoretical 
framework in the practice of debate. Adherence to a debating protocol was thought to 
produce secure knowledge, certainty of opinion and to preserve the best social 
behaviour among students. Collegiate debate in New Zealand was believed to create a 
setting of secure social interaction because it warded off arbitrariness of conduct by 
coherence with the laws of nature. Control was also exerted on the level of 
argumentation. Exchange of arguments was conducted on the basis of formal patterns of 
fairness under the regulatory influence of a vague concept of eloquence. 
This chapter argues that student debate was marked by a strong desire for certainty 
that found its way into its organisation. Colonial circumstances were not exactly 
conducive to the creation of a sense of assurance. Natural conditions were often 
challenging. In 1886, the eruption of Mt. Tarawera illustrated the fickleness of New 
Zealand’s landscape.1At the end of the nineteenth century, the Long Depression 
between 1885 and 1895 left its mark on colonial society.2 Debating topics reflected 
these developments. The question of Australian Federation, for example, was essentially 
                                               
1 Mt. Tarawera is close to Rotorua on the North Island of New Zealand. The Tarawera eruption lasted 
four days in June 1886 and was a geological event that drew the attention of the scientific as well as 
general public (Bradshaw 1888, 213-225). The eruption changed the appearance of the local landscape 
and demonstrated with unparalleled force, the unpredictability of New Zealand’s natural environment. 
2 Mein Smith 2005, 93-99. Gardner and Belich ascribe the depression to the years between 1879 and 1895 
(Gardner 1992, 75-86 and Belich 2001, 32-8). 
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designed around economic considerations and conducted in a way that left little room 
for contradicting positions and public involvement. Additionally, economic 
argumentation drew its force from a late-Victorian belief in the reliability of statistical 
data for the prediction of future developments. The combination of epistemological 
certainty and standards of argumentative engagement gave rise to a version of dialectic 
that transformed debate into a systematic performance of set procedures. 
Initially, Habermas’s work provides the backdrop for assessing the social dimension 
of the practice and theory of dialectic. Habermas favoured dialectic as an unbiased 
means of knowledge production. The second part examines the meaning of conduct on 
the basis of norms of natural selection. The dichotomy of dialectic and rhetoric in New 
Zealand is explored to account for the significance of eloquence in debate. Eloquence 
and conduct in turn gave rise to discursive norms that dominate the nineteenth-century 
New Zealand debates on Australian Federation. 
 
Dialectic as “Dialogic Civility”3 
Nineteenth-century student debates and Habermas’s TCA promote the primacy of 
dialectic over rhetoric. While rhetoric is observed with suspicion, dialectic is heralded 
as the true form of dialogic discourse because it provides a point of reference for 
Habermas’s overall project of locating communication in a social context.4 Habermas 
and nineteenth-century discourse on debate link the practice of dialectic to norms of 
communication and codes of conduct to check the corrupting influence of rhetoric and 
bring out the full force of dialectic. As a consequence, both descriptions of dialectical 
communication mistrust the nonrational in situations of deliberation. In order to grant 
rational components of communication full influence, procedures of debate are designed 
                                               
3 The phrase is taken from Arnett’s article on this concept (Arnett 2001). 
4 Krüger observes that Habermas “after all refers to the procedural concept of argumentation as ‘dialectic’ 
and wishes to make the procedural concept of communicative rationality the basis of his critique of 
society” (Krüger 1991, 145). 
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to lead directly to consensus-formation and knowledge production. In the following, 
Habermas meets nineteenth-century Professor Haslam and together they generate a 
model of dialectic that is informative of the way students were handling debating 
procedures. Additionally, Haslam’s and Habermas’s perspectives are expanded beyond 
the boundaries of rationality on the basis of what Arnett calls “dialogic civility” (Arnett 
2001, 315), a metaphor “situated in embedded significant choice, relying upon 
invitation, not control” (317). 
Habermas systematically explains how dialectic applies arguments to social reality 
and helps to negotiate different standpoints in communication. For Habermas, 
“argumentation as a procedure” is the realm of dialectic and “a form of interaction 
subject to special rules” (Habermas 1984, 25). Once again, Habermas’s model is 
explicitly ideal and hypothetical. Accordingly, rules for argumentative procedures are 
based on a “hypothetical attitude” of language partners, who, for the moment, are free 
from strategic constraints, from “the pressure of action and experience” (ibid.). To 
engage in deliberation, participants in debate identify a claim and test “with reasons, 
and only reasons, whether the claim defended by the proponents rightfully stands or 
not” (ibid.). Habermas’s model does not seek to explain how this ideal version of 
dialectic is applied to realistic situations of disagreement, but how, for example, the idea 
of universal audience fits into this version of “‘procedural rationality’ by which we 
[can] judge the legitimacy of procedures for argumentation, agreements and 
compromises” (Goode 2005, 62). In other words, Habermas attempts to provide a 
regulatory standard for discursive interaction because “ordinary languages are imperfect 
and do not ensure lack of ambiguity” (Habermas 1988, 150).5 The point where 
                                               
5 Habermas accepts the flawed state of communication and ascribes it to the fact that “consensus is, in 
principle, possible” and not “because reaching an understanding is, in principle, necessary” (Habermas 
1988, 150). In other words, Habermas sees that discussions in practice are distorted because the regulative 
ideal of consensus is imposing standards on communication that it cannot meet. Nevertheless, consensus 
in real situations of debate is potentially possible as long as “the delicate balance between separation and 
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Habermas’s project becomes problematic is when he promotes the procedural pattern of 
argumentation to the ranks of normative “ritualised competition for the better argument” 
(Habermas 1984, 26). Despite Habermas’s insistence that languages are “inwardly 
porous” (Habermas 1988, 150), he insists that they can produce a universal normative 
standard that can then serve as a point of departure for ordinary use of argumentation. 
As a consequence, dialectic for Habermas functions as a “universally agreed-upon 
virtue system” (Arnett 2001, 319) that directs discursive behaviour.  
In 1884, Francis Haslam at Canterbury College in a lecture to the Dialectic Society 
preferred dialectic to rhetoric as a means to secure standardised knowledge production 
in debate. Like Habermas, Haslam regarded dialectic as a reliable instrument to control 
deliberation. He aimed at impressing on his students the Greek idea of dialectic as a 
“rule of conduct” (Haslam 1884, 13). Most significantly, Haslam coupled dialectic with 
the “welfare of mankind” (23). In the tradition of Socrates, he assigned to dialectic a 
universal and regulatory role for the production of knowledge: 
The mind of man, he [Sokrates] thought, naturally desired to discover not only 
what was good for you or me …  but what was good for mankind as a whole – 
what was eternally and unchangeably good, under all conditions and all 
circumstances. Otherwise, what footing has the mind of man better than the 
shifting sand. And this absolute good is only a form of absolute truth …  . 
(Haslam 1884, 11) 
Haslam’s argument came full circle when he concluded that the “one thing that we have 
learnt from Sokrates— that the search after truth, whether absolute or relative, is mainly 
valuable as a means whereby we may establish for ourselves and others, a rule of 
conduct. ‘Conduct,’ says Matthew Arnold, ‘is three-fourths of life’” (32). The last 
quotation was possibly taken from Arnold’s lecture “Literary and Science” (1883) 
delivered to an American audience and meant as a reply to Thomas H. Huxley’s lecture 
                                                                                                                                         
union” of individuals and their language use is accepted. Nick Crossley recently examined Habermas’s 
notion of “systematically distorted communication” (prevalent in Knowledge and Human Interest) and 
concluded that the concept eluded any definite understanding. Instead, it “remains overtly dependent upon 
a psychological frame of reference” (Crossley 2004, 89). 
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on “Science and Culture”.6 Arnold’s writing remained ambivalent when tackling what 
he called the “instinct for intellect and knowledge” and “our sense of conduct” (Arnold 
1885, 103). He commonly used the term conduct for what he termed behaviour or 
manners in other works. In The Yale Manuscript published in 1989, it becomes obvious 
that Arnold was struggling with the rigidity of his own faith and with what Haslam cited 
as the regulative ideal for dialectic.7 The Yale Manuscript suggests that Arnold 
understood conduct as a result of self-control and striving towards calm and balance. 
Whatever Arnold’s precise understanding of the phrase, Haslam’s notion of “rules of 
conduct” was directly linked to an ideal in which dialectic’s “fitting place in our own 
lives” (Haslam 1884, 3) was that of education. Haslam maintained that “properly 
speaking, education [and dialectic] should be nothing else than the scheme of our lives” 
(ibid.). As a consequence, in 1884, Haslam developed dialectic as an educational means 
to create universal norms of conduct for the cultivation of human intellect and the 
production of knowledge.  
Following the “discussion”, Habermas and Haslam believe in “universally 
unavoidable ‘presuppositions’ behind everyday language use” (Goode 2005, 64). 
Beyond this assumption, Haslam’s use of Arnold’s phrase suggests that nineteenth-
century discourse on dialectic was influenced by an idea of democratic civility towards 
each other. The attempt to control debate was embellished by a notion of integration 
that Habermas’s concept captures only marginally. Arnett’s category of “dialogic 
civility” allows for more freedom in speech and reveals dynamics designed to “lessen 
                                               
6 An earlier version of this address was published in The Nineteenth Century (August 1882) available to 
lecturers and students in New Zealand. The American version of the lecture was later published in the 
compilation Discourses in America (1885). Arnold identified instinct for conduct and beauty as the 
paramount faculties of human life that had to be addressed by the arts and natural sciences. Conduct and 
beauty secured civilisation in a liberal and humanist context. 
7 Arnold commented on his attempts to master his new found faith in behaviour in rather harsh terms: “By 
meditation & observation we attain a faith, & strike one day some good strokes in manners & behaviour: 
ha, say we, what a power conviction lends to our practice: the next day the nerves are wrong, the manners 
full of blunder & despicability, and the conviction, metamorphosed into consciousness, riding us like a 
nightmare. Nor is it true that after repeated failures, we stand” (Arnold 1989, 21). 
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fear in the public arena by giving diversity of ideas space within the public domain” 
(Arnett 2001, 328). As a result, the understanding of dialectic as control of discursive 
behaviour is enhanced by the suggestion that dialectic in nineteenth-century student 
debates also functioned as a mechanism of opportunity: that dialectic in debating 
societies created a “place of conversation that permits talking, requires listening, and 
invites reciprocal learning” (ibid.) where it was not permitted elsewhere. 
 
Survival of the Fittest: Dialectic, Conduct and Nature 
Initially, the students’ colonial setting provided them with a sense of freedom in 
debate that mainly stemmed from their naivety in practising debate. This inexperience 
was later transformed by a desire to control discursive behaviour to check corrupting 
influences by creating elaborate codes of conduct. Fear of uncontrolled discussion was 
commonly justified by reference to natural laws and conditions. In particular, during the 
1880s Darwinism influenced the discourse on intellectual improvement. Dialectic 
became coterminous with success in debate, the production of valid knowledge, codes 
of conduct and “harmony with nature”.  
During the 1880s in New Zealand, Socratic dialectic with its “apostolic spirit” 
(Haslam 1884, 23) was regarded as the benchmark of debating.8 Public involvement and 
a high-minded moral attitude were part of academic life and, as a consequence, part of 
collegiate debates. In 1878, students at Canterbury suspected rather than knew the 
connotations of the term “dialectic” when they adopted it as the name of their society. 
They nevertheless chose the term to mark the society’s unique standing.9 Dialectic, 
                                               
8 “This change in the direction of inquiry, leading as it did directly to an interest in the welfare of 
mankind interprets for us what has always seemed to me to be a most remarkable trait in the character of 
Sokrates and Plato. It accounts for what may be called their apostolic spirit. Up to their time men who 
imagined themselves to be possessed of knowledge greater than others has shewn no great desire to 
impart it, except insofar as it tended to their won glorification, or to the gratification of their born vanity 
to do so” (Haslam 1884, 23). 
9 In 1904, Charles Chilton recalled the circumstances that let to the adoption of the name: “A meeting was 
soon called, and it was unanimously decided that such a Society should be established forthwith; and 
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apart from its history, conveyed a sense of dignity and corresponded to a young 
colony’s desire to establish lasting traditions. Students at Otago University similarly 
located their activities within the context of dialectic when employing terminology like 
“dialectic prowess” (OUR, Sept. 1901, 99). Students were convinced that skill in 
dialectic could be taught. In 1893, Howell in his prize essay recited the aims of the 
Otago University debating society: “to teach us by practice how to speak” and to “teach 
us to know, honour, and respect each other” (Howell 1893, 133). For students at New 
Zealand’s colonial colleges, dialectic and conduct were, on the one hand, naturally 
given and, on the other, had to be advanced by careful training. 
In 1884, Haslam was convinced that conduct was a historical concept that evolved 
in reciprocity to natural laws. For Haslam, conduct and dialectic were man’s natural 
habitats: “[T]o admit that all rules of conduct, all conceptions of good, all distinctions 
between right and wrong are historical developments in obedience to certain laws, this 
is to put ourselves in harmony with nature” (Haslam 1884, 34). In other words, Haslam 
argued that man could identify natural laws that were applicable to the creation of 
discursive norms. Haslam’s conviction that man could place himself “in harmony with 
nature” was based on the assumption that nature was something external, an entity that 
could be observed and taken apart. Dunlap shows that settlers in New Zealand 
“understood their lands within a universal system of knowledge, a system that assumed 
the human intellect could understand this world from the outside, as an object” (Dunlap 
1999, 309). Nature, as it were, followed certain rules. According to Haslam, these rules 
needed to be adapted to meet the requirements of colonial life. A similar idea permeated 
colonial art. Mahar observes that landscape paintings were “valued as records of natural 
history” (Mahar 2005, 69) and “topographical landscapes …  implied the use-value of 
                                                                                                                                         
when one of the students who was studying Greek suggested the name ‘Dialectic Society’ it was readily 
agreed to as in harmony with the views of the founders, who were determined that theirs should be no 
common Debating Society – though probably the proportion of those who understood the exact meaning 
of the words was as small then as it is now”(Chilton 1923, 9). 
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the land through pictorial description” (68). Besides its apparent usefulness, “nature” in 
New Zealand acquired the status of a control mechanism for the intellectual 
characteristics of the colonial population. 
While the connection of nature and its laws with the norms of social conduct 
remained fuzzy in Haslam’s lecture and Arnold’s writings, Professor Hutton at 
Canterbury College encountered little difficulties in seeing obvious connections 
between the two concepts. In 1882, in the opening lecture Biology in our Arts 
Curriculum, Hutton insisted that the principle of selection, in other words, evolution, 
should be the basis of the Arts curriculum in New Zealand.10 Seen in an imperial 
context, Hutton’s and Haslam’s addresses represented the New Zealand version of 
Arnold’s and Huxley’s controversy in America and England. Hutton in the spirit of 
Darwinism argued that man differed from lower species in the ability to sympathise 
with other individuals. As a consequence, selection affected man in two spheres: 
sympathy and utility, the latter of which he shared with other species. Hutton followed 
the Darwinian theory of evolution when he observed: “By the action of selection 
through utility intelligence has been raised into intellect; by the action of selection 
through sympathy with our fellowmen, the moral sense has been developed, and ethical 
systems formed” (Hutton 1882, 101). The explanatory model that Hutton developed up 
to that point was based on familiar ground. Hutton then added a crucial social argument 
that elaborated his previous claim and extended the applicability of the theory of 
evolution: “through our sympathy with nature imagination has given birth to art; and 
our aesthetic faculties have been evolved by selection through the necessity for 
amusement, caused by the restless activity of the brain” (ibid.). Hutton was convinced 
                                               
10 Hutton meant to clarify the significance of biology for politics, history and ethics and declared: “I shall 
do so by demonstrating the constant action in all human affairs of the principle of selection, which, as you 
know, is one of the leading principles of biology” (Hutton 1882, 97). Hutton’s lecture was part of a 
number of lectures that addressed the need to revise science-teaching in schools and at university. In 
particular, Hutton’s colleagues T. Jeffrey Parker and George M. Thomson supported Hutton in his claims 
(Parker 1883, 1885; Thomson 1882). 
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that the principle of selection could provide a scientific foundation for history and 
politics.11 In the course of the lecture he discussed the idea that government by 
discussion provided the best long-term political form of representation because, 
according to natural selection, groups of animals needed “strength to resist enemies” 
and “flexibility of organisation” (103) to survive. Despotism was preferable in 
temporary bellicose situations; representative government was based on intellectual 
exchange, flexibility of opinion and designed for peaceful existence (104-5). From 
Hutton’s point of view, these two forms of government emerged in relation to the 
natural environment:  
Nations inhabiting rich, warm countries, which produce abundance of food, 
would be envied by their neighbours; and consequently could never afford to 
give up despotism …  But nations living in the bleak north, on land of which no 
one wished to deprive them, would develop government by discussion; the 
struggle for live against unkindly nature would strengthen the body, and 
government by discussion would invigorate the intellect. (104) 
If natural conditions were not conducive to the creation of an egalitarian administration, 
the cultivation of ideas and opinion could be furthered by education (101). In summary, 
processes of selection for man were, on the one hand, a natural given and, on the other, 
open to human intervention. Hutton in his lecture provided a framework that clarified 
the connection of human conduct and nature. In deciphering the laws of nature, men 
could master the selective processes s/he was exposed to through evolution. Hutton 
declared that “the principle of selection …  is everywhere; we cannot escape from its 
action” (Hutton 1882, 102). Most significantly, he concluded that in the Victorian era, 
people are “now conscious of it [the principle of selection], and hope, by the 
introduction of methodological intrinsic selection, hitherto unknown, to direct its 
                                               
11 History as a science was a popular issue in late-Victorian debates. In 1882, for example, students at 
Canterbury aimed at clarifying the question: “Is history capable of being treated as a science, in the sense 
in which biology is a science?” (MBL, minute book, 6 May 1882). The chairman, Rev. Flavell, 
commented that “he considered there was truth on both sides: on the one hand it was becoming more and 
more recognized that certain laws could be detected in the facts of History. The method of studying 
History was becoming more philosophic; while on the other hand the exercise of human volition of free –
will was constantly interfering with the operation of law in the sphere of human action” (ibid.). 
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movements” (105). In New Zealand’s intellectual discourse then, “harmony with 
nature” (Haslam 1884, 34) was not so much a passive mode of aesthetic appreciation of 
natural beauty, but an active mechanism for determining of man’s best chance of 
survival in nature. As man had to stem the tide of mental selection, Haslam’s promotion 
of dialectic as conduct was the answer to the newly discovered forces of evolution. In 
other words, students had a chance to contribute to the survival of the best intellectual 
qualities in New Zealand’s colonial society by adhering to codes of conduct in their 
interaction with each other.  
Hutton’s and Haslam’s opinions permeated student discussion. In 1899, the prize 
essay in Dunedin dealt explicitly with “The Influence of Natural Conditions in New 
Zealand on the National Character” (OUR, Sep. 1899, 82). The essay proclaimed that 
biology proved that “the physical characteristics of a country, all make themselves felt, 
to some extent, in the temperament of its people” (ibid.). The author proceeded to 
investigate the influence of nature on the indigenous populations of America and New 
Zealand. He concluded that within a lengthy timeframe, the environment would be 
bound to have an impact on its inhabitants; however, New Zealanders did not have to 
fear exposure to these effects. This interesting synopsis was based on the observation 
that New Zealand was too similar to Great Britain to cause any lasting alterations in the 
virtuous qualities of its colonisers: 
We are still Britons; and many centuries, at least, must elapse before ancestral 
predisposition gives place to environment as the paramount influence 
determining national character. This would be so even were the change of 
circumstances severe. From Great Britain to New Zealand the change is not at 
all severe, especially in climate, which is calculated to most strongly affected 
racial disposition; and the great characteristics of the Anglo-Saxons will always 
be exhibited by the people of this colony. (OUR, Sep. 1899, 84) 
As a civilised race in a young colony, the author held that the “estrangement from 
Nature which exists here must be trivial in comparison with the state of affairs in the 
large cities of the Old Country” (85). In other words, even though New Zealanders were 
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still part of the Anglo-Saxon race, their close proximity to untamed nature allowed them 
a considerable advantage compared to their cousins in England. The influence was of 
such a quality that New Zealanders could develop a more practical intellect and produce 
applicable rather than theoretical knowledge: 
[I]t must be remembered that the intellect, besides being primarily a means to an 
end, may be regarded to some extent as an end in itself. The faculty of 
generalisation and deduction is commonly looked upon by metaphysicians as 
that which differentiates the mind of man from that of the brutes, and as the 
highest and best phase of thought. This is just; but perfection does not consist in 
an undue development of the differentiating element, but in giving the various 
modes of mind their proper proportions. Viewed as a means to practical ends, 
there can be little doubt that the detailed and particular type of intelligence, here 
attributed to the country, is the superior. (OUR, Sep. 1899, 86) 
The author further mused that the practical element of New Zealanders’ intellect 
possibly resulted “from a so-far successful subordination of Nature” (112). In other 
words, the project of controlling the mechanisms of natural selection was proceeding in 
the right direction. As a consequence, the author of the prize essay emphatically 
concluded: “there is no strong reason to suppose that the characteristics which we have 
inherited from our ancestors will be permanently disturbed, in any great degree” (114). 
The essay ended with a presumption that corresponds to Belich’s interpretation of New 
Zealanders as “better Britons”: New Zealanders would not suffer any bad effects from 
their natural surroundings, instead they would improve their British virtues “in a spiral 
ascent” (ibid.) towards their glorious future in New Zealand.  
In 1902, another student, Utilitas, did not profess the same confidence regarding the 
future of debate. For him, the dialectic was the most valuable asset to secure the quality 
and survival of deliberation at New Zealand’s colleges. The original objective to 
promote “fellowship” among students was put under strict constraints. Utilitas scolded 
fellow debaters for their frequent use of “burlesque.” He called for “careful definition, 
orderly arrangement of material, clear and forceful putting of points” (CCR, June 1902, 
11). Utilitas based the demands on the argument that “the aim of education is to make 
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us of service to each other in the strong life of our manhood” (12). As a consequence, 
the author did not ask for more enthusiasm and individuality among members. He 
instead sought to secure the success of a debate through the “quality of the speeches” 
and “the general conduct of the discussion” (11). From his point of view, “a lowering of 
the standard of debate” was not acceptable.  
At the same time, students questioned the supposedly advantageous effect of norms 
in debates. Resistance grew in a student community that was assured of itself and no 
longer struggled for its survival. In 1903, the Marte Nostro editorial complained that 
“every debate is the same. None of the students show any originality” (Appendix 9). 
The author granted that “it is good to keep to the same general rules from year to year 
…  without them, there would be no unity among us” (Appendix 9). Instead, the over-
formalisation of debate and college life, deprived of any substantial information, 
became the target of the magazine’s criticism. The author called for individuality 
because without it “any society comes gradually to be conducted with an increasing 
monotony which makes progress impossible” (Appendix 9). Rules preserved the 
superficial order “but within these general rules, individuality should have full play” 
(Appendix 9). Marte Nostro based its criticism on the argument that progress was vital 
for society in general and that it was made possible by “active spirit” and “freshness” 
(Appendix 9). In other words, individuality and progress were pivotal to the debating 
society’s success. 
By the turn of the century, other less optimistic ideas had infiltrated the previously 
dominant belief in human progress and the taming of nature. Knowledge and nature did 
not seem to keep their promise of certainty, harmony and predictability. Likewise, the 
Arnoldian instinct of conduct, never a very specific category, was claimed by scientific 
discourse to account for the evolution of man’s intellectual and moral capacities. 
Frequent discussions of the academic curriculum did not help to clarify the question of 
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social responsibility and learning. In debate, certainty of knowledge and procedure 
defended its dominant position. Individuality and belief were neglected. This 
development was further nourished by the nineteenth-century dichotomy of dialectic 
and rhetoric, which led to an emphasis on elocution— a technical fusion of rhetoric and 
dialectic. 
 
Eloquence and Elocution: The Best of Dialectic and Rhetoric 
In the nineteenth century, rhetoric and dialectic were predominantly characterised 
by what van Eemeren et al. term “the conviction-persuasion duality” (Eemeren et al. 
1996, 189). Rhetoric was the domain of persuasion and strategic interests.12 Dialectic 
was the supposedly neutral form of argumentation that produced reliable knowledge and 
convinced individuals of its validity.13 In New Zealand, the dichotomy of rhetoric and 
dialectic was bridged by eloquence— a concept that traditionally described the high 
standards of rhetorical practice. In the United States, eloquence had a similar function 
but was eclipsed by elocution in its emphasis on the practical elements of public oratory 
and rhetorical delivery. The elocution movement did not come to New Zealand but its 
focus on speech making, mastery of the technical aspects of voice and gesture 
significantly interested students in New Zealand and shifted the emphasis on rational 
argumentation towards delivery. In 1895 in Dunedin, a “Wellwisher” who preferred to 
remain anonymous outlined that the purpose of a debating society was to “train its 
                                               
12 Even though Habermas regarded rhetoric and dialectic as a unity, he also associated rhetoric with 
strategic interests and favoured dialectic. Edgar makes this clear when he analyses Habermas’s notion of 
consensus: “Thus consensus brought about by overt threats of violence, by bribery or by the undefended 
resort to political or status hierarchies is not communicative action; it is, rather, strategic action, whereby 
one party treats the others as objects that can be manipulated, rather than as subjects with whom one 
communicates. Similarly, the use of rhetoric, precisely insofar as the rhetorician attempts to persuade an 
audience by means other than evidence and rational argument (and, indeed, thereby seeks to forestall the 
raising of problematic validity claims) is an example of strategic action” (Edgar 2005, 155). 
13 Professor Haslam made the binary opposition the theme of his lecture: “What Sokrates objected to was 
their [sophists’] method. For in their desire to persuade they lost their touch of the art of convincing men. 
They called in the emotions to their aid, and no longer appealed to reason alone. They neglected to 
develop the positive side of Dialectic, and applied themselves to the cultivation of Rhetoric” (Haslam 
1884, 10). 
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members in the art of public speaking” (OUR, June 1895, 56). A few years later, the 
Otago Review called on students to promote the debating society “by their eloquence” 
and “inspire others to follow their good example” (OUR, May 1900, 8). In 1893, 
Howell enthusiastically professed that training in eloquence assisted students in 
affecting the New Zealand public forum: “In this society we are preparing ourselves to 
be speakers, preachers, lawyers, and orators, who are destined to move multitudes by 
the power of their eloquence, to direct the energies and govern the fate of their country” 
(Howell 1893, 133). The experienced political orator Scobie Mackenzie balanced 
Howell’s statement in his lecture and observed that eloquence was only forceful in 
combination with substantial abilities or knowledge. Parliamentary practice for 
Mackenzie was a fusion of eloquence and management skills, even though he made 
clear that eloquence was probably the weaker of the two: “It seems to me that the last 
two qualities [force of character and managing men in Parliament], or either of them 
alone, will, without eloquence, be found far more valuable than eloquence without these 
qualities” (Mackenzie 1895, 131). Knowledge and self-confidence were also crucial in 
yielding one’s speaking powers to the best advantage: “Courage is but another name for 
self-confidence, and self-confidence arises out of the consciousness that you are perfect 
master of your subject. ‘Knowledge of your subject,’ someone has said, ‘is the 
foundation of all eloquence’” (134). A few years later, a student in Dunedin confirmed 
Mackenzie’s opinion and argued that “debaters should be urged on by enthusiasm and 
fortified by knowledge. By enthusiasm we shall obtain brilliance and by knowledge we 
shall obtain solidity” (OUR, Oct. 1899, 131). Haslam’s notion of dialectic as conduct 
was reinforced by the idea that debating essentially consisted in training in public 
speaking. While the best of intellect and ethics was secured by proper codes of 
discursive conduct, the technical realisation of these norms in public was created by the 
teaching of eloquence.  
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Late nineteenth-century American discourse on the advantages of debating provides 
a context for the use of eloquence in New Zealand. In 1897, Ralph Curtis Ringwalt 
employed the conviction-persuasion divide to praise debating tournaments for their 
promotion of rational argumentation. He maintained that tournaments “arose in a natural 
reaction against the lax condition of the literary societies” (Ringwalt 1897, 633). In 
1900, George Pierce Baker (1866-1935) gave a lecture to the Association of Colleges 
and Preparatory Schools in Philadelphia.14 He focused his speech on the requirements of 
intercollegiate debating. Baker refrained from joining the chant for formalised and 
rational debate and, instead, called for the combination of oratorical, elocutionary and 
dialectic qualities in the training of debaters at American colleges.15 According to 
Baker, the process of instruction consisted in two stages. First, students “must be taught 
to respect close, analytical, judicial thinking, and to think thus for themselves. Secondly, 
they must learn to adapt their special material, whatever it may be, to any particular 
audience” (Baker 1901, 247). Baker intended to make his students “master[s] of 
persuasion” (254) and “to show them that even the after-dinner speech should have a 
central idea and plan, as well as freshness and individuality of presentation” (256). His 
regard for elocution led him to perceive of public discourse beyond the boundaries of 
conviction and persuasion. His understanding of debate and eloquence aimed at a 
balanced unbiased instruction for students that accepts useful aspects of elocution as 
well as practical elements of logic. Baker’s lecture went beyond the boundaries of the 
conviction-persuasion opposition and used both terms to describe the strength of debate 
for students’ education. 
                                               
14 Baker was a graduate from Harvard and remained there to teach in the English Department. Initially, he 
pursued studies of argumentation. In 1905, he started a class later called “Workshop 47” mainly 
concerned with instruction in dramatical performance. He became the teacher of Eugene O’Neill, Philip 
Barry, Sidney Howard and John Dos Passos. In 1925, Baker became professor in the history and 
technique of drama at Yale University. The information is taken from the Encyclopaedia Britannica 
online. 
15 Baker maintained that students at Harvard lacked general principles of public speaking and 
composition: “The effort of these men, then, lacks proof, moderation, fair-mindedness; it disregards the 
logical process, and the state of mind of the audience supposedly addressed” (Baker 1901, 247). 
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Having said this, during the course of his career, Baker developed a clear vision of 
rhetorical instruction that favoured an argumentative approach. Connors shows that 
Baker’s position was the result of the specialisation of rhetorical theory (Connors 1981, 
1985, 1997). Of the four modes of rhetoric: narration, description, exposition and 
argument, Baker concentrated on the last and in 1893 published Specimens of 
Argumentation, followed in 1895, by Principles of Argumentation. Connors argues that 
“it may indeed be said that Baker, in writing the first modern argumentation text, started 
in motion forces that would, 19 years later, result in the foundation of the Speech 
Association of America and the split-off from English departments of devotees of 
argument and the oral-discourse tradition that seemed to go along with it” (Connors 
1985, 59). Bordelon points out that despite his early focus on argumentation, Baker 
“sought a balance between an emphasis on emotions and persuasion by the older oral 
argumentative tradition and a stress on formal logic” (Bordelon 2005, 416-7).16 Baker 
could bridge the divide between dialectic and rhetoric, between conviction and 
persuasion, because he focused on the dynamics of argumentation and the 
individualistic dimension of articulation and delivery. In order to teach his students to 
create convincing arguments in debate, Baker wanted to maximise the effect of 
instruction and promoted two levels of training: practice in elocution and argumentation 
(Baker 1901, 250). Teachers of elocution worked on correcting the “delivery” of their 
arguments; Baker himself discussed the “analysis, evidence, rebuttal” (ibid.) of the 
speech. In order to promote the teaching of argumentation he also set out to redeem the 
reputation of elocution.17 Baker intended to preserve the individualistic core of public 
                                               
16 Clark and Halloran, for example, argue that “[t]he problems with Baker’s rhetoric, as with professional 
culture in general, is that when knowledge is commodified as specialization and professional 
communities claim the authority to develop and apply that knowledge, few rules of rationality can be 
found that will apply across this fragmented spectrum” (Clark and Halloran 1993, 23). While I agree with 
Clark and Halloran on the limitations of specialised discourse, Bordelon accounts for Baker’s 1901 
address and his attempt to combine argumentation and elocution.  
17 Baker made it clear that he regarded elocution as a new subject not as traditional practice. He 
emphatically distanced himself from popular instruction in elocution: “Please, understand me: by 
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speaking but at the same time, make elocution a subject of instruction in the 
technicalities of speaking and debating well: 
They [students] must be taught to assist themselves by pose and gesture, and to 
let their voices and faces respond to the subtlest shadings of their thought and 
the slightest emotional change. All this, too, they must be taught to do, not like 
other men of note, but in way that most express their individuality. …  When it is 
more general I am sure that elocution will recover from the evils attached to its 
friends. (253) 
In reforming elocution, Baker was part of a trend in American higher education that 
specialised training in public speaking. Cerling argues that “the concept of eloquence 
[as] responsible, civic-minded speech was fragmented and privatized by the people who 
were in charge of educating the brightest and best in American society. And the concept 
of public discourse as a civic activity crucially important to the well-being of a 
democratic society was never fully restored to a central place in American higher 
education” (Cerling 1995, 244). I would add that eloquence was fragmented because 
delivery was separated from narration, description and exposition in the process of 
rendering public speaking more scientific and reliable. As a result, instruction in, and 
practice of, debate increasingly consisted in two of these four aspects of eloquence: 
norms of delivery and rules for the development of arguments.  
In New Zealand, the notion of eloquence was not as precise as in America. 
Scientific discourse permeated New Zealand public discourse as in the United States but 
lacking the traditions of rhetoric, oratory and elocution made it impossible for New 
Zealand students to set eloquence in a similarly specialised context. Prior to Baker’s use 
                                                                                                                                         
elocution I do not in the least mean teaching a boy to gurgle and quaver, ‘I stood on the bridge at 
midnight,’ or to fill his lungs and shout ‘Blow, burgle, blow!’ In such work I have no interest …  I wish 
intensely …  that somebody would find a new name for elocution. Could that be done, we should get so 
much more from our college faculties, who are at present somewhat hide-bound on the subject of 
elocution” (Baker 1901, 252). Nan Johnson and Cmiel trace the dubious reputation of elocution to an 
overwhelming publication of manuals and text-books on elocution (Johnson 1991, 150-1, 1993; Cmiel 
1990). Johnson analyses three groups of handbooks: cross-over materials, papers by elocution lecturers 
and finally reciters. The first type was intended for use in colleges and schools, for readers and speakers 
in general. The second and third types of manuals were intended for the general public (Johnson 1993). 
Robb shows that what she terms the “elocutionary movement” strove to establish credibility for their 
studies on the basis of scientific research and methodology (Robb 1954, 184-200).  
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of the term, the elocution movement denoted a school of instruction that argued that 
refined speech could elevate the public status of a person (Cerling 1995, 60). New 
Zealand students readily adopted this feature to debate because it complemented the rule 
of social selection and continuous progress in the colony. The fact that, originally, 
elocution in America regarded expressive gesture, accent, inflection and intonation as 
“more effective than speech itself”(ibid.) did not enter the New Zealand idea of 
eloquence. Eloquence in the colony, without the problematic history it had experienced 
in America, developed into a means that easily traversed the gap between public 
speaking and rational argumentation. “Eloquent” properly captured the spirit of a lecture 
when it was described “as ‘characteristic, interesting, scholarly, clever, and interspersed 
with a sufficient amount of humour to make it exceedingly entertaining’” (OW, 19 April 
1994, 13). New Zealand’s debaters approached the practice of debates and the use of 
arguments with a pragmatic attitude that kept the final goal in mind. The Otago Review 
notices that if “ease of expression is not to defeat its purpose, it must be balanced by the 
cultivation of common sense. There is always a danger of refining the vital force out of 
an argument” (OUR, June 1898, 39). As a result, the persuasion-conviction dichotomy 
did not figure highly in students’ debates. Quite unintended, New Zealand students and 
professors put to action Baker’s theory of a balanced instruction in debate that discarded 
the stereotype of “good” conviction and “bad” persuasion. The cultivation of an 
argumentative style that secured the highest level of intellectual activity and moral 
principles lay at the heart of student debates in New Zealand. 
 
Australian Federation, Political Tactics and New Zealand’s Desire for Certainty 
In New Zealand, argumentation in debate was marked by a code of conduct that 
endorsed debate as an intellectually demanding and socially fair activity. Part of the 
student body, like the Barrackers’ Brigade, challenged the pro-and-contra pattern of 
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debate and increasingly questioned the reliability of those opinions that emerged from 
it. Their understanding of dialectic resulted in a form of debate that did not promote 
absolute truth but instead, portrayed knowledge, conviction and fairness as passing 
phenomena. Their procedures resembled those that van Eemeren in 1996 described as 
Aristotle’s view on dialectic: 
Arguing for and against a standpoint in a debate worked like this. First of all, 
although the discussion may have seemed to be about specific questions, it was, 
on closer inspection, about general questions. The opponent offered the defender 
a thesis in the form of a question like ‘Must this man be punished?’ By way of 
this specific question (and the subsequent questions and answers) a general 
question was raised, for example, ‘Is virtue teachable?’ The defender could reply 
in the affirmative or in the negative. Depending on the answer the opponent had 
in mind, he then had to attack either the thesis ‘Virtue is teachable’ or the thesis 
‘Virtue is not teachable.’ Arguments pro and contra recurred continually 
throughout the course of the debate. Once the defender had been committed to a 
thesis by his answer, the attacker would pose a further question, and so on. 
(Eemeren et al. 1996, 38) 18  
The difficulty in analysing student procedures of argumentation in New Zealand is to 
identify the general underlying question that guided their discussion. As with the core 
proposition that ‘virtue is not teachable,’ New Zealand students operated with general 
statements that upheld their argumentation and gained their relevance from the changing 
pool of social knowledge. The preference among student debaters for stock topics—
academic dress, the Australian Federation, cremation, women’s franchise— reflected 
this tendency. American contemporary research in the history of rhetoric shows that the 
analysis of a particular debate or series of debates reveals contextual information that 
otherwise would be neglected. 
                                               
18 Socrates in Meno is concerned with the definition of virtue as either knowledge or belief. Meno begins 
by asking Socrates whether virtue is teachable. In order to answer the question, Socrates first seeks to 
define what virtue truly is, he looks for a definition. Socrates, holding true to his dialectic principles, 
determines that virtue is either knowledge or belief. If it were knowledge, it would be teachable; if it were 
belief, it would not be. Socrates’ conclusion stems from his argument that knowledge is teachable because 
it consists of rational definitions and facts. In contrast, beliefs (also called divine dispensation by 
Socrates) are not based on premises of certainty. Scott argues that Socrates ended his exchange with 
Meno by subscribing to a disjunctive view: that virtue is both knowledge and true belief. (Scott 2006, 
177) 
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In 1990, Zarefsky, for example, set out to identify pivotal issues of the Lincoln-
Douglas debates by concentrating on a contextual analysis of their argumentative 
procedure.19 His research led to new insights into the American history of ideas in 
general and Lincoln’s career in particular. In other words, Zarefsky demonstrated that 
the debates were crucial for Lincoln’s political growth. The debates publicly defined 
Lincoln’s political agenda and moreover, established debates as an instrument of 
populist persuasion in American politics. Zarefsky was able to complete his analysis 
because he assumed that the debates were essentially public events: 
What is particularly important about the debates is that they were a sustained 
public discussion of the issues most troubling the nation. To focus on public 
discussion is to say that the speeches were not abstract philosophical theses. 
They were attempts to reach and persuade audiences, who brought to the 
discussion their own predispositions and concerns. The argumentation is 
pragmatic, as each candidate attempted both to make his views palatable to the 
audience and also to modify the audience’s view of itself and of the issues. 
(Zarefsky 1990, x) 
Zarefsky presents the dialectic of these debates as intrinsic to the rhetorical landscape of 
ante-bellum American politics. He argues that “[t]he Lincoln-Douglas debates deserve 
their exalted historical position not for the reasons often given but because they so 
clearly demonstrate the possibilities for discussion when a fundamental issue is 
transformed in the crucible of public debate” (222). He identifies four types of 
arguments that were employed by the two opponents to tackle their audience: 
conspiracy, legal, moral and historical argument (xii). The Lincoln-Douglas Debates 
were not merely the result of eloquence or effective argumentation; they were possible 
only because of the combination of strategic argumentation and the force of rhetorical 
display in the wake of a paradigm shift in American politics.  
In the nineteenth-century New Zealand context, student debates on the issue of 
Australian Federation reflected a significant political event that had the potential to 
                                               
19 The debates took place in 1858 in the course of the senatorial campaign in Illinois in which “Lincoln 
was the officially endorsed opponent” (Zarefsky 1990, 43) of Stephen A. Douglas.  
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change the future of the colony. Clearly, its scale was different from the Lincoln-
Douglas debates. None of the participants had yet launched a political career, nor were 
any of the debaters eventually assassinated. The resolution of not joining the Federation 
was not prompted by a declaration of war. The controversy regarding Federation in New 
Zealand did not establish debate as a political means but it did give rise to a certain 
notion of what New Zealand as a colony and nation should become. Federation claimed 
the attention of New Zealanders from the 1880s. Students, it seems, were very much 
interested in the question. As early as 1883, Louis Cohen read a paper on colonial 
federation to students in Christchurch. The same year in Dunedin, students determined 
that federation and independence would not benefit the colony. The debates coincided 
with the Intercolonial Convention in Sydney. In 1883, Premier Harry Atkinson and Sir 
Frederick Whitaker attended the meeting as the New Zealand delegates. The convention 
resolved to put an end to French transportation of convicts to the Pacific. Furthermore, 
the assembled representatives wanted to voice their opposition to any further non-
British annexation of Pacific islands. The meeting drew up a draft Federal Council Bill, 
the reception of which in New Zealand and the Australian colonies was far from 
enthusiastic. Sinclair observes that even though Atkinson and Sir Frederick Whitaker 
supported the idea of federation, in parliament, “the idea was not received with much 
favour” (Sinclair 1986, 110). Nevertheless, in 1884 during election year, the Convention 
prompted New Zealand’s politicians to discuss the issue, mostly in terms of “the 
limited, mainly consultative arrangement of the Federal Council” (Sinclair 1987b, 91). 
While the issue did not meet with much enthusiasm among New Zealand politicians, the 
problem continued to spark students’ interest. 
In 1888, students in Canterbury were well aware of Australia’s “tendency to 
separation” and resolved that it should not be encouraged (MBL, minute book, 20 May 
1888). In Auckland, by contrast, students were in favour of imperial federation. Only 
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two years later, the Christchurch debaters reversed their decision and agreed that 
“Australian federation is practicable and desirable” (MBL, minute book, 9 August 
1890). Yet another conference on federation, taking place the same year in Melbourne, 
became the rationale of students’ discourse. The decision in favour of the proposition 
diverged from general sentiment. In 1890, former cabinet minister John Bryce professed 
that federation “is not a subject that is much spoken of in the colony or in which much 
interest is taken and I believe that that arises from the fact that it is instinctively felt that 
we should be making a very great mistake if we abandoned our independence and 
joined in federation with colonies so very distant from our own” (qtd. in Sinclair 1986, 
110).  
Appendix nine displays the records of the 1891 Auckland debate on Australian 
Federation. This particular debate was lost by the majority of two, suggesting that 
members rejected the idea of joined colonies of Australia and New Zealand. Students in 
Auckland included the federation issue in their syllabus because they were aware of the 
political changes at hand in the Pacific region. In March and April 1891, the National 
Australian Convention met in Sydney. The Australian colonies sent seven delegates 
each. New Zealand was represented by Sir Harry Atkinson, Sir George Grey and 
Captain William R. Russel, an outspoken opponent to the idea of federation. The 
Convention drafted a constitution that the respective colonies were supposed to 
approve. New Zealand did not even consider the proposal in Parliament. Sinclair reports 
that “[t]he three New Zealand representatives in 1891 were forbidden by resolution of 
parliament to commit New Zealand to joining a federation” (Sinclair 1987b, 93). After 
1891, by parliamentary choice, New Zealand was no longer represented at federal 
conferences.20 
                                               
20 Dalley and McLean also connect the federation question with New Zealand’s interest in creating a 
Pacific empire. In the 1890s, Seddon was “far from looking westwards to Australia” (Dalley and McLean 
2005, 220). Dalley and McLean show that Seddon was directing New Zealand’s interests towards 
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In 1895, students in Dunedin, by contrast, decided that New Zealand should not 
federate with Australia. Later in 1897, the tournament debate in Auckland was likewise 
decided in favour of non-federation. In 1899, Auckland debaters again discussed the 
issue of federation. Like their fellow students in Canterbury a new generation of 
Dunedin students did not hold firm to their previous beliefs. In 1900, the Otago 
debating society resolved that the time was “ripe for the entrance of New Zealand into 
the Australian Confederation” (OUR, Sep. 1900, 89). Again in 1901, students in 
Christchurch addressed the same question (the results of the debate were not recorded). 
Between 1899 and 1901, public discourse on federation in New Zealand gained a new 
impetus. With New South Wales as the last Australian colony deciding to join the 
federation, by June 1899 the idea was no longer a hypothetical construct but a tactile 
certainty. New Zealand had to react. Sinclair observes that the New Zealand Herald 
“published reports and letters every few days on the topic” (Sinclair 1986, 112). The 
Wellington Evening Post “campaigned in favour of federation for a few months” (113). 
Public meetings and debates among farmers and trade unionists took place (113, 116-7). 
Both groups discussed the issue based on the question whether they could compete with 
the Australian market.  
In 1900, public sentiment and a feeling of uncertainty were adequately addressed by 
New Zealand Premier Richard Seddon (1845-1906) (Dalley and McLean 2005, 220). 
Responsibility for the problem was officially transferred to the authority of the Royal 
Commission that was meant to investigate the advantages and disadvantages of 
federation.21 The official Federation Commission report of 1901 conveyed the 
                                                                                                                                         
annexation of Hawai’i and Samoa. Student debates show, what Sinclair also notices, that there was “little 
evidence of public interest in this aspiration” (Sinclair 1986, 121). Mein Smith maintains that “the idea of 
a ‘Pacific federation’, promoted in New Zealand, ran in tandem with Australasian Federation as a means 
to maintain imperial unity” (Mein Smith 1999, 401). 
21 The royal commission was founded in December 1900 and composed of ten prominent citizens, 
presided over by Colonel Albert Pitt (1841-1906). The group set to work on January 17 in 1901 and held 
meetings in Invercargill, Dunedin, Christchurch, Wellington and Auckland. They also visited New South 
Wales, Tasmania, Victoria, South Australia and Queensland (Knox 1971-73, 5:1790). 
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impression that most New Zealanders were largely ignorant of the terms and conditions 
involved in the Commonwealth Constitution Act. The commissioners stated that the act 
“had not even been read by many of those who attended before your Commissioners, 
and its provisions, generally speaking, were imperfectly understood by many of those 
who professed to have considered the subject of federation somewhat attentively” 
(McIntyre and Gardner 1971, 265f). After more than eighteen years, on the first of 
January 1901, the Australian Commonwealth was officially launched without New 
Zealand.22  
On the one hand, this result is sometimes interpreted as an expression of New 
Zealanders’ lack of interest in the issue. Gibbons, for example, argues that political 
indifference in the question permeated public discourse: “[i]n the 1880s and 1890s 
federation with the Australian colonies had been discussed by New Zealand politicians, 
without much enthusiasm. Their apathy reflected that of the New Zealand public” 
(Gibbons 1992, 314). The frequency of students’ debates suggests the opposite. After 
1891, concern for the question did not cease nor did students stop to discuss the topic. 
Sinclair’s discussion of the federation debate demonstrates that, in particular between 
July and September 1899, the New Zealand public actively addressed the situation 
(Sinclair 1986, 112-4). Sinclair portrays this diversified public discussion as if it were 
the profession of the will of one nation. He holds that after 1891, “the general feeling 
was that ‘our destiny lies apart’” (Sinclair 1986, 110). By contrast, the results of the 
students’ debates slightly complicate his statement. They instead confirm Belich’s 
analysis that federation reflected the economic situation of the colony: “in the 1880s, 
                                               
22 Siegfried’s Democracy in New Zealand, originally published in 1904 in Paris under the title La 
démocratie en Nouvelle-Zélande, contains an interesting account of an outsider’s perspective on the 
political circumstances of the Australian Federation (Siegfried 1982, 333-348). New Zealand was 
portrayed as the loyal Pacific colony that preferred to associate and compare itself with England rather 
than with Australia. Siegfried was most likely familiar with the Royal Commission’s report because his 
argumentation as to why New Zealand did not join the Federation showed a remarkable resemblance to 
the reasoning of the commissioners’ statements. 
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New Zealand was a sinking ship looking to join a rising one. In the 1890s, the situation 
was reversed” (Belich 2001, 49).23 Mcintyre in Australia and New Zealand during those 
years of federation negotiations overtly contradicts Sinclair. He shows that New 
Zealand’s pragmatic treatment of the idea was conceived by Australians as an exception 
to the “compelling emotional force of the national project”: “Because federation was 
considered there [in New Zealand] primarily as a business arrangement, because the 
royal commissioners were so puzzled by the sentimental appeal of a national union, it 
fell flat” (Mcintyre 2002, 8). Student debates in New Zealand illustrate that 
argumentation was dominated by economic and political concerns. Thoughts of 
nationhood and identity, even of a separate New Zealand identity, did not enter their 
discourse. Their discussion were structured on the basis of rational arguments that 
defied any “sentimental appeal”. 
New Zealand students contested the idea of federation on the grounds of three 
groups of argument: economic considerations, political isolation and geographical 
distance. Participants in the 1891 debate did not use moral, legal or even historical 
arguments. Remarkably, they further neglected any arguments remotely related to the 
social demeanour of their Australian neighbours. They refrained from formulating any 
notions of colonial superiority or arguments based on New Zealand’s historical ties to 
England. They also did not allude to New Zealand’s moral obligation to Great Britain, 
even though they could easily have identified their colony with the “Britain of the 
South.” The previous chapters demonstrate that it was not beyond debaters’ abilities to 
go down this argumentative alley. Yet, Hunter observes that “[H]istorians have 
increasingly leaned towards arguments of sentiment, emotion or nascent nationalism as 
the main reasons for the Australian colonies’ agreement and the New Zealand decision 
to remain outside the commonwealth” (Hunter 2006, 76). The lack of all of these 
                                               
23 Belich actually reinforces this view and further maintains that “Australian federation shrank New 
Zealand to a quarter of its former size” (Belich 2003, 223).  
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arguments in students’ debates might indicate that certain aspects of federation could 
not have been addressed.24 The political parameters that the Seddon administration 
established for the federation debate were not advantageous for the cultivation of 
emotional arguments. Moreover, the code of conduct in collegiate debates preferred 
expressions of certainty and fairness to statements of doubtful rational quality. 
In August 1897, Christopher James Parr (1869-1941) (who had a few years earlier 
defended federation in a different debate) found himself on the other side of the 
controversy.25 After graduating from Auckland University, he had become a member of 
the Auckland Athenaeum debating society. In 1897, the Athenaeum and the university 
society staged their first recorded competitive debate on the question: “Should New 
Zealand federate with Australia?” (SCUA, minute book, 24 August 1897). Parr, together 
with Messrs. Carr and Naile, both former members of the university debating society, 
argued against the proposition and “after an extremely interesting debate, listened to by 
a large audience, the judges decided in favour of the Athenaeum Society.” In other 
words, what Parr as a student had lost by speaking in favour of federation in 1891, in 
1897, he gained by arguing against it only six years later. His previous exposure to an 
almost identical debating situation presumably assisted him in overcoming former 
argumentative shortcomings. 
                                               
24 Zarefsky puts forth a similar argument for the Lincoln-Douglas debates (Zarefsky 1990, 221). 
25 Parr is possibly best known for his achievements as minister of education and as high commissioner for 
New Zealand. In 1890, Parr found himself at the start of his political career and had just been admitted to 
the bar for one year. Parr was an effective solicitor and made £510 profit in his first year of practice in 
Auckland. His later career included positions as postmaster general and minister of telegraphs (1925). In 
1962, he became high commissioner for New Zealand in the United Kingdom. Bush describes Parr’s 
secret of success as a mixture of determination and conviction: “James Parr was a man of immense self-
assurance combined with a degree of pugnacity and a liking for self-promotion; he was capable of 
looking both suave and resolute. He abhorred vacillation, fence-sitting and honeyed words, and it was a 
blend of idealism, energy, determination and lucid persuasiveness which underlay his remarkable mayoral 
and ministerial achievements” (Bush, DNZB). 
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In 1891, students, on the one hand, came surprisingly close to the findings of the 
royal commission ten years later.26 On the other, they used arguments that were also put 
forth by the Australian Federation League, an association which favoured federation and 
set up branches in Christchurch and Auckland. Percy F. Battley, arguing against 
federation, was of the opinion that New Zealand was not likely to gain economically 
from federation.27 He did not know that the Commission’s report in 1901 concluded on 
the basis of statistical data (employed as infallible proof) that “the exports of New 
Zealand produce to the Commonwealth in 1899 amounted to only 8.4 per cent. of the 
total exports” (McIntyre and Gardner 1971, 267). Imports even amounted to the smaller 
number of 5.8 per cent. The report assumed that New Zealand would not be able to find 
new markets in Australia because the latter colony “would supply her own 
requirements” (268). Parr, in 1891 arguing in favour of federation in the students’ 
debate, by contrast, pointed out that “one-third of New Zealand’s exports went to 
Australia, and this under very large Customs duties” (Appendix 8). In 1897, a version of 
Parr’s argument recurred in J. Kennedy Brown’s pamphlet for the Federation League 
entitled “Should New Zealand Federate with the Australian Colonies? To Which the 
Answer is an Emphatic YES!,” in which he stated that Australia would provide an 
excellent market for New Zealand’s cereals and fruit.28 Brown lent his claims 
considerable weight on the basis of his own business experiences in the Australian 
colonies. Suggesting furthermore that free trade within a federate Tasman region 
“would double the exports” (Appendix 8) supported Parr’s argument in favour of 
Federation. Since 1879, free trade and protection arguments had been regular features in 
                                               
26 Appendix three provides a record of the debate from the minute book of the society as well as from the 
New Zealand Herald. Reference to this particular debate will henceforth refer to the text contained in the 
appendix. 
27 Like Parr, Battley became a solicitor in Auckland. Besides his acceptance to the bar, nothing else is 
known about his life. 
28 J. Kennedy Brown was the honorary secretary of the Auckland branch of the Federation League and a 
wealthy businessman who could look back on successful trades with the Australian colonies. Sinclair 
dismisses Brown as an “ebullient nonentity” (Sinclair 1986, 112; 1987b, 95).  
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student debates. The question of Federation in 1891 provided fresh grounds for their 
application. That a similar logic was employed by a public forum like the Federation 
League suggests that free-trade arguments were widely understood among a general 
public. Belich’s revision of the situation of the Australasian colonies illustrates that the 
economic arguments at the time did allow for ambiguous conclusions.29 Australasian 
imports, for example, had dropped from 35 to 17 per cent by 1890, exports even from 
46 to 17 per cent (Belich 2001, 49). Therefore, in 1891, Parr was using outdated figures 
when the decline in exports to Australia was already having an impact on New 
Zealand’s economy. In 1897, he would not have committed the same mistake. From the 
point of view of contemporary critics, correct facts were conducive to success in debate. 
Belich makes clear that even though trades figures were declining, New Zealanders 
were still confident of profiting from possible free-trade arrangements within a federate 
Australasian region: “The Australasian market was still important to New Zealand in 
that year [1900], and though free-trade sentiment in New South Wales gave some hope 
of minimising the economic damage non-federation would cause, it was clearly 
probable that there would be some” (Belich 2001, 50). Mr. Battley, arguing against Mr. 
Parr and for non-federation, interpreted the facts of a decreasing economic dependence 
                                               
29 Belich uses the term “Australasia” to refer to Australia and New Zealand as one political and economic 
entity in the Pacific region. “Coined by the French in the eighteenth century to include New Guinea, 
‘Australasia’ soon gained its modern meaning: Australia plus New Zealand. …  ‘Australasia’ was a very 
loose, vague and semi-tangible imagined community. But it was real; there were many links beyond the 
conceptual. All seven colonies were neo-Britains” (Belich 2001, 47). Mein Smith argues that “Australasia 
had come to mean the Australian colonies, New Zealand, Fiji, ‘and any other British Colonies or 
possessions in Australasia’” (Mein Smith 2005, 92) and Sinclair maintains that “the seven colonies 
formed a community in many different ways” (Sinclair 1986, 109). Mein Smith, Belich and Sinclair 
reverse Gibbons’ statement that “New Zealanders were not Australians or even ‘Australasians’” (Gibbons 
1992, 314). Moreover, in 1899, a student in Christchurch referred to the Australian colonies as “our inter 
Australasian colonies” (System of Education, manuscript A, MBL, 8) implying that New Zealand was 
integral to the British dominion in the Pacific region. Certainly, the address of Governor Jervois (1821-
1897) to the New Zealand Institute in 1884 lent the term some reality. In his speech, Jervois examined 
New Zealand’s defence and insisted that New Zealand’s military structure had to be placed in an imperial 
as well as Australasian context. He concluded in pointing out that New Zealand should become part of the 
imperial Australasian stronghold: “I venture to urge the measures I have suggested, in order that the 
country itself may be secure; that it may take its share in Australasian defence; and that it may do its duty 
as a part of the British Empire; looking forward to the time when New Zealand may become – as I believe 
she is destined to become – a proud member of a mighty federation of British peoples – able to hold their 
own against the world” (Jervois 1884, xli).  
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in his favour. He maintained that New Zealand was not receiving help from Australia 
and therefore, would suffer little from not joining. His version of the economic situation 
carried some weight in view of his victory in the controversy. 
The question of federation was associated with issues of political and economic 
isolation. In 1891, Parr compared New Zealand to Newfoundland and to the latter’s 
failure to join the Canadian Federation League. He sought to back his defence with 
political development within the Empire that could be interpreted to New Zealand’s 
disadvantage. Newfoundland, in 1891, was one of the four existent British colonies that 
had not subscribed to the Canadian Federation. In contemporary discourse, this North 
American constellation was used as an argument in favour of Home Rule in Ireland. 
Ironically, on 26 September 1907, Newfoundland (with New Zealand) became a 
dominion, assuming complete self-government. Mr. Parr showed considerable foresight 
in his argumentation. Battley was not inclined to take him up on his claim that New 
Zealand “would leave herself open to all sorts of insults” (Appendix 8). Instead, Battley 
contended that New Zealand would not isolate itself by refusing to join. He implied that 
the only isolation New Zealand faced was its political separation from England. Where 
Australia was concerned, using a Utilitarian argument, Battley was of the opinion that 
New Zealand simply could not be isolated from Australia because there was nothing 
material to be separated from. New Zealand did not receive any help from the 
Australian colonies and therefore, had nothing to lose. To lend his argumentation the 
necessary political authority, Battley quoted, like many of his contemporaries, Sir John 
Hall.30 Battley was trying to counterbalance Parr’s accusation of isolation with the cul-
de-sac argument that New Zealand was already isolated from Australia by sheer 
geographical distance and that this amounted to a practical barrier that should not be 
                                               
30 John Hall’s original statement was actually misquoted by Percy F. Battley. Hall said: “Nature had made 
twelve hundred impediments to the inclusion of New Zealand in any such federation in the twelve 
hundred miles of stormy ocean” (qtd. in Knox 1971-73, 5:1789). 
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crossed. New Zealand’s special natural setting once again proved to be an effective 
discursive asset: it reinforced notions of New Zealand’s uniqueness and national 
awareness. It furthermore conveyed the idea that Australia and New Zealand were 
separated by the laws of nature. These were irrevocable and represented an absolute, 
that is, scientific truth. While it was worth the effort to balance the principle of natural 
selection by trying to improve the intellectual and mental abilities of New Zealanders 
through education, the same was not true for the distance between Australia and New 
Zealand. Battley quoted Hall because his exclamation became an argument conferring 
certainty in a discourse that was recurrently changing its core tenets. In other words, the 
distance of twelve hundred miles could not be altered by any human will or force. 
It is striking that in the debate of 1891, not one debater explicitly appealed to 
national sentiment to argue against any active involvement in the Federation.31 Many 
students at the three university colleges had ties to Australia or moved to the Australian 
urban centres.32 In 1891, Charles Frederick Goldie (1870-1947), for example, was on 
the Auckland debating society’s committee and listened to Parr’s and Battley’s contest. 
That same year, Louis John Steele convinced Goldie’s father to permit Charles “to 
undertake further art training abroad” (Blackley, DNZB). The next year, “abroad” for 
Charles meant his first exhibition of still lifes in Sydney, after which he came back to 
New Zealand. Belich argues that the “Tasman Sea was more bridge than barrier” 
(Belich 2001, 50). The journey to Australia was in fact one of the most frequently made 
                                               
31 Mein Smith, for example, analyses the federation controversy of the 1890s in a context of national and 
imperial sentiment: “Imperialism and nationalism were not mutually exclusive; often in balance, they 
might present as Janus-faced. Indeed, imperialism could manifest as nationalism and vice versa, blurring 
the boundaries of identity. …  The ‘soul of the Empire’ for Jebb was ‘not one, but two’; the one the 
awakening patriotism of the native-born …  and the other the British imperial ‘life-task’ of spreading 
civilisation” (Mein Smith 2005, 92). I do not entirely agree with Mein Smith on this point because 
students’ debates suggest that self-perception of young New Zealanders was not fuzzy. As illustrated in 
chapter two, terms like empire, nationalism, patriotism, “old world” and “mother country” were not 
contradictory to students, instead, they were part of a contingent, perfectly reasonable argumentation. 
32 Arnold suggests that during the Exodus of the 1880s, when New Zealand lost approximately 20,000 of 
its settlers to the Australian territories, “one in ten of the high-school leavers of the 1870s had moved to 
Australia, mainly for urban careers, by the end of the 1880s” (Arnold 1987, 60). 
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among people in New Zealand. Charles Goldie (who in 1893 successfully enrolled at 
Académie Julien in Paris) exemplifies a young New Zealander’s career “abroad.” The 
Australian colonies frequently provided the first stepping stone for any career in 
Europe. Moreover, McGibbon demonstrates that New Zealand and the Australian 
colonies actually shared “a sense of isolation on the periphery of a culturally and 
racially alien region” (McGibbon 1991, 125). Students of all three colleges were torn 
when it came to a decision in favour or against federation, whatever the aspirations of 
the Seddon administration. The Boer War might have diverted any sense of failure at 
New Zealand’s refusal to enter; it certainly helped to drown any pro-federation 
sentiment in a wave of national war fervour.33 
In introducing this section on the procedure of debate, I quoted van Eemeren’s 
description of Aristotelian debates. Van Eemeren relates: “By way of this specific 
question (and the subsequent questions and answers) a general question was raised, for 
example, ‘Is virtue teachable?’” (Eemeren et al. 1996, 38). In case of the 1891 New 
Zealand student debate the specific question was clear: “Should New Zealand join the 
Australian Federation League?” (SCUA, minute book, 8 July 1891). The underlying 
propositions were less straightforward. From a slightly more general angle, students 
were trying to answer whether it were economically sensible to join a colonial 
federation that was independent of Great Britain. What was a colony’s significance in 
the British Empire? How could the long-term consequences of colonial federation be 
determined? Sinclair concludes that “the argument most frequently advanced against 
federation was not economic but political: that New Zealand would lose its right to 
speak directly to the imperial government; would lose its political identity, its 
independence, its right to nationhood” (Sinclair 1986, 119). Even if, as Sinclair points 
out, students used economic arguments to discuss more fundamental political issues of 
                                               
33 Mein Smith argues that “the Boer War in South Africa overshadowed” the activities of the Australian 
Federation League (Mein Smith 1999, 401). 
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nation-state, the essential question of their debate in 1891 was how the difference 
between dependence and independence could be understood in a colonial context.  
Recently, Zarefsky has analysed current patterns of strategic manoeuvring in 
American political rhetoric (Zaresfky 2006, 411-4). In reviewing how, after September 
11, the United States embarked on a “war on terrorism” and how since the 
argumentation has evolved, Zarefsky reveals a fundamental principle of strategic 
argumentation: 
What must be done in rhetorical argument, then, is not to challenge strategic 
manoeuvring directly, but to draw upon the specific case of it, if only ‘for the 
sake of the argument,’ and then to show that the opponent’s position weakens 
rather than strengthens the value that is being strategically manoeuvred. So 
rather than denying that the U.S. is in a war on terrorism, critics have argued that 
policies they do not like have the effect of weakening the U.S. in that war. 
(Zarefsky 2006, 413) 
Students in New Zealand employed a similar strategy. As the colony was not yet a 
member of the Australian Federation, Parr and Battley contested each other on grounds 
of “what if” assumptions. In other words, their entire discussion, as well as public 
discourse, transplanted the economic situation into the future. Federation politics were 
never directly criticised, only potential outcomes were declared undesirable. In 1900, 
one of the most influential public statements during the federation discussion came from 
Agent-General, William Pember Reeves. He was quoted declaring that the Australians 
“since they had already waited twelve years …  there was no reason why they should not 
wait another twelve months” (Sinclair 1986, 115) for New Zealand’s decision. He 
followed this opinion up with the even more suggestive argument that “New Zealand 
should have the right of entry on the original terms for seven years” (ibid.). The 
combination of these two announcements contributed to the final failure of the 
federation project for New Zealand. His statements were so effective because he 
successfully attacked the strategic positions of the Australian colonies. In implying that 
New Zealand might be ready to join the Federation in seven years time, he addressed 
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the topic from within. In other words, he argued that if the Federation was a done deal, 
New Zealand would be ready but at the moment was sorry to decline the offer because it 
would have a “weakening effect” on the Federation as well as New Zealand. Reeves 
was playing for time in the most effective way by accepting the Federation as a fact at a 
time when it was still in negotiation and by simultaneously nullifying its significance 
from a New Zealand perspective. 
Moreover, the project of becoming a nation might not entirely have been associated 
with a bright future. Mcintyre points out that even for the Australian Commonwealth, 
the project of nationhood was associated with a “fearful state of mind” (Mcintyre 2002, 
12). Students in New Zealand attempted to decide whether New Zealand could become 
an independent colony or state within the Empire or whether it had to bargain for 
independence from Great Britain at the cost of dependence on a federation with its 
Australian neighbours. Even arguments against federation on grounds of distance of the 
parliaments were reduced to a financial basis. In 1891, Mr. Battley argued that the 
prospective federate senate “would be a considerable distance away and some of our 
best men would be excluded by reason of expense” (SCUA, minute book, 8 July 1891).  
New Zealand students’ debates suggest that the decision against federation did not 
derive from lack of enthusiasm, tendencies of national sentiment and one-dimensional 
political interests. The public controversy was conducted on the basis of palpable 
strategic manoeuvring on the part of politicians like Seddon and Reeves. It was fuelled 
by arguments based on economic uncertainties that mostly affected farmers, workers 
and trade unionists.34 In 1899 and 1900, when public opinion became increasingly 
unpredictable, a regulatory instrument was put in place: the Royal Commission. 
                                               
34 Mein Smith sees race, “specifically, the notion of white race, one destiny” (Mein Smith 1999, 402) as 
the crucial issue that put off New Zealanders. The absence of race in students’ debates on federation 
suggests that it was not tied closely enough to the anticipated results of an Australian Federation. I agree 
with Mein Smith that New Zealanders shared the concept of an “Anglo-Saxon race” with Australians. 
While Australian public discourse employed the idea to promote federation in the Australian colonies, 
students in New Zealand did not adopt this particular argument in the discussion on federation.  
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Discussion quietened and the political establishment was free to support their final 
decision by the findings of a supposedly unbiased and objective government survey. 
While Sinclair relies considerably on the Royal Commission to support his argument 
that non-federation was the will of one nation, he admits that the report of the 
commission was far from clear. He acknowledges that the “analysis is not always 
precise”, that people who were interviewed “gave two or more occupations” and that “it 
is not always clear whether a person is pro, anti or non-committal” (Sinclair, 1987b, 
103, n23). The impression remains that the Royal Commission was a deliberate move 
on Seddon’s part to create the illusion that federation was against the will of a colony. 
Moreover, the fact that the Seddon administration felt the need for a commission does 
point towards a public controversy that was far from unambiguous. In other words, the 
federation issue gave the colonial government the chance to bring its population into 
line with the political will of a fraction of the intellectual elite. Collegiate debate on the 
issue evolved from this context of political tactics and control. The debates display little 
originality when viewed in this setting and their core argumentation resembled familiar 
claims that dominated political discourse at the time. Students were not captured by a 
national spirit rather they were spellbound by a political and argumentative strategy.  
 
Conclusion 
In late nineteenth-century New Zealand, the core task of dialectic in debate 
amounted to the negotiation of theoretical considerations of deliberation and the 
practical instantiation of these norms to the social reality of students. Along these 
standards of interaction, expectations of certainty were created, which resonated in 
contemporary public discourse in New Zealand; the federation question being only one 
example for the array of pressing topics. 
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The initial suggestion of this chapter that debating societies created a “place of 
conversation that permits talking, requires listening, and invites reciprocal learning” 
(Arnett 2001, 328) in a spirit of dialogic civility is more complicated than it might 
imply. The Australian Federation debate shows that students debating activities were 
embedded in a framework of economic fears and political strategies that made it 
difficult for them to escape common patterns of discourse. As a consequence they did 
not significantly “lessen fear in the public arena by giving diversity of ideas space 
within the public domain” (ibid.). At the same time, they provided a platform where 
exchange of opinions was potentially possible. Debate in New Zealand as an academic 
pastime aimed at merging two fields of inquiry, the theoretical and the practical; the 
potential of free communication arose from the combination of the two spheres.  
This rather trivial idea acquires a more profound reading when the practical aspect 
of debating is understood as the social relation among debaters and their connection 
with different levels of the world. Goode in his reading of Habermas points towards an 
angle of interpreting these relationships that adds another dimension to the practice of 
debate in nineteenth-century New Zealand: 
According to the theory of universal pragmatics, whenever we communicate 
(through language or through action), we unavoidably ‘take up relations’ to a 
number of ‘domains of reality: ‘the’ world of external nature; ‘our’ world of 
society; ‘my’ world of internal nature’; and to the medium of language itself. 
The distinction between ‘society’ and ‘nature’ is not one of institutions versus 
trees and birds. ‘Nature’ refers to the domain of facticity that comes into 
existence whenever we take up an ‘objectivating’ attitude to something [sic]. 
‘Society’ is constituted whenever we take up a first person plural orientation 
towards something. …  Every utterance, in this view, has a performative 
dimension or ‘illocutionary force’ even where this is hidden beneath the surface. 
Even a purely descriptive statement offers the hearer the possibility of new 
understanding of reality. (Goode 2005, 65) 
Nineteenth-century debating discourse established a dichotomy of nature and society 
that Goode sees in Habermas’s work. Dialectic as a theoretical concept provided the 
backdrop for students to form apparently objective perspectives on society. These 
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perspectives were negotiated in a political arena. Dialectic reinforced beliefs in the 
objectivity of knowledge and justified the applicability of these norms to social realities. 
The component of dialectic in debate entitled antithetical discourse to the authority that 
usually only scientific inquiry could claim. Debate thus acquired a claim to “facticity” 
that other forms of rhetorical interaction gradually lost at the end of the nineteenth 
century. 
Scientific legitimacy, however, could not substitute a need for social 
interconnectedness among students. Debating was meant to equip students with reliable 
means to determine universal truths with social relevance. Therefore, debating with its 
crucial dialectic component had a social edge that scientific inquiry lacked. Arnett 
expresses a similar idea when he maintains that a social component, that is, “a moral 
‘why’”, creates a sense of freedom: “Embedded freedom discovered in a moral ‘why’ of 
a petite narrative limits the horizon of possibilities of action and frames responsible for 
the Other and the historical moment” (Arnett 2001, 334). In other words, debating 
societies might deliberate a small social norm and address only a fraction of historical 
realities, although “such caution does not stop the exchange, but moderates the 
conviction level of the participants”. As a consequence, conduct in late nineteenth-
century New Zealand debate limited the exchange among students but did not end it. 
Zarefsky observes that “they [participants and listeners] engage in the act of shaping 
their world as they shape their language – even though, paradoxically, they are 
constrained by the very culture they create” (Zarefsky 1990, 245). As a consequence, 
the fusion of natural laws with social norms of conduct in debate, admittedly, restricted 
the applicability of student debates and at the same time, effectively reflected the 
fundamental influence of science and Darwinism on the structure of argumentation. 
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Chapter Six 
 
“Hair-Splittings and Inconsistencies”1 
Logic of Argument, Science and the Magic of the Unobservable 
 
Introduction 
 
Nineteenth-century New Zealand notions of what an argument should be were 
profoundly influenced by the scientific discourse of the time, in particular Mill’s 
inductive reasoning and Darwin’s theory of evolution. Induction was the dominant and 
supposedly fool-proof scientific method among scholars in New Zealand and often 
juxtaposed with the less reliable use of hypotheses. Darwinism dominated natural 
science, made its way into moral and political science as Social Darwinism and 
exacerbated the binarisms in popular understandings of religion and science, the 
supernatural and natural. Moreover, science at the end of the nineteenth-century was not 
an activity confined to the specialised few but a widely practised pastime, ubiquitous in 
popular public discourse, and as such was presented as spectacle as well as serious 
professional occupation. At the same time, “science” as a blurred conglomeration of 
various methods and practices was on the brink of breaking up into independent 
disciplines.  
New Zealand students were familiar with the dominant scientific methodology. 
Professors in Logic, Mental Science and Natural Science like Macmillan Brown, 
MacGregor, Parker, Hutton and Thomson incorporated inductive and deductive logic as 
well as fundamental ideas of psychology and Darwinism in their syllabi. Besides, public 
lectures on scientific subjects resonated in the newspaper press at the time and reveal a 
broad engagement with scientific discourse. Accounts of lectures were frequently 
printed and distributed in pamphlet form. In New Zealand, science at the end of the 
                                               
1 Carlile 1891, 645. 
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nineteenth-century was omnipresent. After all, students’ and professors’ perception of 
debate as an advantageous skill in politics stemmed from inductive reasoning: debate 
apparently fostered eloquence; eloquence was practised by politicians, and therefore 
debate had to be conducive to political participation and leadership. 
The following chapter will investigate the impact scientific methodology had on the 
logical structure of argument in, and the perception of, debate. The chapter starts with a 
brief examination of Habermas’s position on argument as product in discourse. From 
Habermas’s point of view, validity claims or arguments are essentially tied to the social 
reality to which they are applied. Furthermore, and particularly in volume two of TCA, 
he maintains that scientific methodology can significantly contribute to an 
understanding of human discourse. This connection will assist the second part of the 
chapter. The social relevance of their research ranked high for influential natural 
philosophers like Mill and Bain or scientists like Darwin and Herschel. New Zealand 
scholars like Thomson, Parker, Hutton and MacGregor adopted their particular idol’s 
point of view and as a consequence became entangled in public controversies on 
Creation Theory and Social Darwinism. Their work represents late-Victorian efforts to 
come to terms with the increasingly “scientistic” notion of life. Arguments in students’ 
debates similarly acquired a scientific element. The third part demonstrates how science 
in New Zealand was applied to phenomena of the unobservable and how, at the dawn of 
the twentieth century, this dichotomy of the real and unreal culminated in the 
acceptance of formalised scientific argumentation for the performance of debate. 
Eventually, this chapter shows that the smallest component of debate, that is, the 
argument, helped transform debate into a formalised exercise of logical prowess devoid 
of substantial content. 
 
  227 
Habermas and Toulmin – Redeeming Scientific Argumentation 
Jürgen Habermas’s ideas on argumentation theory are helpful for an analysis of the 
logical component of nineteenth-century argumentation because he places great 
significance on the connection between logic and scientific inquiry. On the one hand, 
his position helps to unveil motivations that directed the formalisation of late-Victorian 
New Zealand debate. On the other, Stephen Toulmin balances Habermas’s views and 
provides an alternative reading to the comparatively inflexible perspective of critical 
theory. Moreover, Habermas’s own interpretations are indebted to Toulmin’s early 
work The Uses of Argument (1958, 2003). The following brief discussion of 
Habermas’s and Toulmin’s standpoints on the function of logic and scientific inquiry in 
argumentation affords a framework that, applied to a historical context wholly removed 
from that in which it was articulated, emphasises core patterns of perception of 
argument in nineteenth-century New Zealand. 
Pre-eminent points of disagreement among nineteenth-century scholars of 
knowledge production involved doubts on the functionality of hypotheses, on the one 
hand, and an unwavering faith in the method of induction, on the other. I have shown 
that the epistemological certainty of facts was fundamental to New Zealand debate. In 
the following discussion, it will become clear that these facts had to be obtained through 
induction and on the basis of meticulous observation of human’s natural environment – 
including man himself. This paradigm of inquiry lent facts their reliable and supposedly 
scientific validity. The bias towards materialism in nineteenth-century natural science 
spread into the social sciences and even became embedded in the humanistic arts in the 
form of a “scientific” canon. Scientific materialism also shaped notions of logical 
argumentation so that facts were assigned a normative function in the social contexts to 
which they were applied. 
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Habermas in Discourse Ethics compares his search for a normative element in 
argumentation with the scientific principle of induction: “…  all studies of the logic of 
moral argumentation end up having to introduce a moral principle as a rule of 
argumentation that has a function equivalent to the principle of induction in the 
discourse of the empirical sciences” (Habermas 1990, 68). Habermas knows that 
normative validity claims can only be “analogous to a truth claim” (73) in science, but 
he nevertheless acknowledges that an essential degree of certainty needs to be 
maintained in practical discourse.2 Moreover, he proposes that the intrinsic moral 
element of communicative action “subject[s] practical discourse to constraints” (75) that 
mirror those limitations exercised by induction in theoretical scientific discourse. 
Toulmin requires this also, but he does not equate the normative components of speech 
with the regulative function of induction in scientific discourse: “Outside the betting-
shop, the casino and the theoretical physicist’s study, we may have little occasion to 
introduce numerical precision into our talk about probabilities, but the things we say are 
none-the-less definite or free from vagueness” (Toulmin 2003, 86). Toulmin prefers to 
count on the intelligibility of everyday discourse to decipher patterns of argumentation.3 
He abstains from constructing a discursive paradigm that ensures the “correct” outcome 
of dissent. Toulmin maintains that “an argument is like an organism. It has both a gross, 
anatomical structure and a finer, as-it-were physiological one” (87). Toulmin does not 
understand “organisms” as unreliable or ever-changing entities. For Toulmin, as for 
Habermas, “organisms”, that is, arguments remain discursive entities with material 
boundaries and stages of evolution. As a consequence, in Toulmin’s work argument is a 
flexible but also limited unit of communication.4 Admittedly, Toulmin’s arguments live 
                                               
2 Murphy discusses Habermas’s discourse ethics (Murphy III 1994, 112-118). Cronje 2001: 269-273 
3 After Uses of Argument, Toulmin with Rieke and Janik published An Introduction to Reasoning that 
deals with argumentation in “ordinary language and real-life issues” (Toulmin et al. 1979, 16). 
4 This idea of argument led Toulmin to the notion of argumentative fields, a concept that has been revised 
and largely abandoned today (Eemeren et al. 1996, 203-204). However, one of Toulmin’s legacies for 
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in a social context that provides room for communication without formalising the habits 
of discursive interaction. Habermas is less subtle in his descriptions of argument: 
[A]rgumentation can be viewed from a third standpoint: it has as its aim to 
produce cogent arguments that are convincing in virtue of their intrinsic 
properties and with which validity claims can be redeemed or rejected. 
Arguments are the means by which intersubjective recognition of a proponent’s 
hypothetically raised validity claim can be brought about and opinion thereby 
transformed into knowledge. (Habermas 1984, 25) 
From Habermas’s point of view, arguments serve a specific end, that is, to transform 
hypothesis into knowledge and to create an understanding between equal partners on 
grounds of “intrinsic properties”. This evokes nineteenth-century programmes of 
scientific inquiry in which the transition from hypotheses to knowledge was achieved 
by means of inductive techniques. Habermas goes further and insists that “all 
arguments, be they related to questions of law and morality or to scientific hypotheses 
or to works of art, require the same basic form of organization, which subordinates the 
eristic means to the end of developing intersubjective conviction by the force of the 
better argument” (36). In other words, Habermas advocates universal intrinsic properties 
regardless of the context in which an argument is uttered. If argumentation at large aims 
at mutual understanding, then Habermas is convinced he is able to identify the 
fundamentals of arguments. 
Based on Peirce’s speech act theory, Habermas enters a realm of linguistic analysis 
where Toulmin cannot follow.5 According to Habermas, an argument in communication 
always raises a validity claim. Equal partners in a speech situation react to this claim 
and attempt to determine its propositional content. This process encapsulates what 
                                                                                                                                         
argumentation is the notion of argument as a flexible reality that evolves in a discursive context and that 
challenges others depending on the context the argument is placed in. For Toulmin, arguments do not 
cause debate because of their intrinsic properties but because of their institutional setting— a notion that 
Habermas challenges. 
5 In TCA, Habermas criticises Toulmin for his perception of argument: “Toulmin does not push the logic 
of argument far enough into the domains of dialectic and rhetoric. He doesn’t draw the proper lines 
between accidental institutional differentiations of argumentation, on the one hand, and the forms of 
argumentation determined by internal structure, on the other” (Habermas 1984, 35). Toulmin, I would 
argue, also does not push the logic of argument far enough into the sphere of science, at least from 
Habermas’s point of view. 
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Habermas terms the “illocutionary force” of a rational claim: it describes the 
fundamental need of every argument to be criticisable. From Habermas’s point of view, 
criticism brings interlocutors together; we join a debate because we challenge a 
proposition raised by another.6 Therefore, the core of communicative rationality lies in 
the illocutionary force of arguments.7 
Brought together like this, on the basis of the intrinsic criticisability of their various 
claims, individuals are free to mould their conversation. For Habermas, this freedom 
consists in the fact that with each utterance a speaker has to give reasons for her choice 
of argument: “The scope for freedom is characterised by the fact that under the 
presuppositions of communicative action a hearer can reject the utterance of a speaker 
only by denying its validity. Assent means then that the negation of the invalidity of the 
utterance is affirmed” (Habermas 1987, 73). Communication ultimately ends when the 
speakers concur that all propositions have been tested, all reasons have been brought 
forth and all of them can subscribe to one true claim. Habermas expands the feasibility 
of this rather restricted version of communication when introducing four kinds of 
validity claims (all still with their basic illocutionary force) and their applicability in the 
different spheres of reality: an inner-subjective world of each individual, “the” 
objective-external world, and “our” social world.8 This reading of Habermas’s work 
                                               
6 Habermas 1984, 289-295 (Habermas on Austin’s understanding of illocutionary acts), 1987, 67-76 
(Habermas on the function of the illocutionary component of communicative action). 
7 Edgar 2005, 146-148; Crosswhite in Rhetoric of Reason likewise maintains that “Assertions are calls for 
response; they contain in themselves very specific invitations for questions and challenges. A claim made 
in the context of argumentation is not a monological asocial proposition but an event in a dialogue, a call 
for response. A claim is an assertion which contains an implicit plan of its own criticism” (Crosswhite 
1996, 59). 
8 In What is Universal Pragmatics, Habermas explains these four modes of validity: “The speaker must 
choose an intelligible (verständlich) expression so that the speaker and hearer can comprehend one 
another. The speaker must have the intention of communicating a true (wahr) proposition (or a 
propositional content, the existential presuppositions of which are satisfied) so that the hearer can share 
the knowledge of the speaker. The speaker must want to express her intentions truthfully (wahrhaftig) so 
that the hearer can find the utterance of the speaker credible (can trust her). Finally, the speaker must 
choose an utterance that is right (richtig) with respect to prevailing normative …  so that the hearer can 
accept the utterance, and both …  hearer can, in the utterance, thereby agree with one another …  respect to 
a recognized normative background” (Habermas 1998, 22-23). In TCA, Habermas insists that in order to 
reach understanding, individuals have to agree on all levels of validity: “Consensus does not come about 
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thus “consolidate[s] a notion of communicative competence as the ground of agents’ 
ability to act as competent social beings, and thereby to constitute and maintain social 
relations” (Edgar 2005, 151). 
The advantage of Habermas’s understanding of argument lies in his recognition that 
a claim’s social dimension supplies a force additional to that of mere isolated logical 
criticism. However, the logical structure that supports Habermas’s model hinders a 
multi-dimensional comprehension of arguments beyond “the narrow purview of ideal, 
argumentative speech” (Ingram 1987, 173). Instead, arguments as validity claims with 
illocutionary force remain confined to a formalised setting of debate that seems to be 
over-informed by scientific readings of argumentation and over-reliant on the force of 
truth and consensus for actual processes of communication. In other words, arguments 
in Habermas’s model of communication do not transcend the parameters of their 
creation. Habermas’s arguments, applying the metaphor of “organism” once more, 
relate to the discursive social world because they are developed based on the 
assumption that all meanings attached to them can potentially be identified. As a 
consequence, argumentation in Habermas’s understanding remains limited to a structure 
of logical criticism. On the one hand, this perspective helps to identify similar trends in 
nineteenth-century thinking.9 On the other, it might be disadvantageous for a study of 
alternative forms of arguments beyond the formation of criticism, warrant and proof. 
Contrary to this rationality-centred model of arguments, Sullivan suggests that 
organisms, and thus arguments, might not be “consciously aware of all the meanings 
that inform their actions and beliefs” (Sullivan 2001, 26). Sullivan maintains that 
organisms relate to their environment in “a multitude of physical, social, political, and 
                                                                                                                                         
when, for example, a hearer accepts the truth of assertion but at the same time, doubts the sincerity of the 
speaker or the normative appropriateness of his utterance … ” (Habermas 1987, 121). 
9 Cronje draws on exactly these points to identify dialectical and rhetorical procedures “in the truth-
seeking activities of real scientists” (Cronje 2002, 269). Her project parallels mine insofar as she takes 
Habermas’s insistence on the “functional synthesis” of rhetoric, dialectic and logic to understand 
discursive patterns in a “highly principled knowledge-building system” (ibid.) as science.  
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cultural environments” (158). Similarly, by restricting the functionality of arguments to 
a rational basis, it becomes impossible to perceive how debaters relate to the world 
through deliberation. While Sullivan speaks of skin as an organism as “more than a 
mere boundary …  as a site of transaction between inside and outside a body”, this 
chapter treats arguments as the “site” of discursive transaction— rational as well as 
nonrational. 
 
Hypotheses and Induction: Scientific Discourse and the Logic of Argumentation 
Toulmin observes that “men such as Kepler, Newton, Lavoisier, Darwin and Freud 
have transformed not only our beliefs, but also our ways of arguing and our standards of 
relevance and proof: they have accordingly enriched the logic as well as the content of 
natural science” (Toulmin 2003, 237). Toulmin shows that, since the scientific 
revolution, scientific theory and popular discourse have been inseparably linked. By far 
the most revolutionary scientific turn in the nineteenth century, Darwin’s and Huxley’s 
ideas made a lasting impression on New Zealand’s history of ideas. In particular, 
Darwin’s theory on the origin of life was closely identified with the discourse of a 
universal scientific method. Scientific debate at the end of the nineteenth century 
developed a pragmatic naturalism that emphasised the practical applicability of logical 
patterns of reasoning and regarded as consistent what had an equivalent in nature, that 
is, in reality. Stenhouse illustrates that disciples of Darwin like Frederick W. Hutton, 
Professor T. Jeffrey Parker in Dunedin and Professor Algernon P.W. Thomas in 
Auckland were “outspoken evolutionists” (Stenhouse 1990, 429) and accordingly 
promoted core aspects of his theoretical framework in the colony.  
Debating societies at the colleges often provided a venue for the contemplation of 
Darwin’s key arguments. In 1878, Hutton, then still in Dunedin, lectured to the society 
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on his favourite topic “The Origin of Life.”10 A few evenings later, the students held a 
debate based on Hutton’s lecture. In 1880, someone read a paper on “Darwinism” at 
Canterbury College. The same year, Hutton now professor in Christchurch, gave a 
lecture on “Knowledge and how it is acquired.” No record survives, but it can safely be 
assumed that he shared his views on scientific inquiry with his students. The next year 
in Christchurch, Mr. Irving introduced the discussion on “Evolution.” At the close of 
the evening, fifteen students were against and nine were in favour of the proposition 
(MBL, minute book, 24 April 1881). The same year, Professor Parker in Dunedin 
opened the debating session with a lecture on “The Ancestry of Birds and their 
distinction from Reptiles” (OW, 4 June 1881, 22).11 He summarised the principles of 
evolution, outlined the method of induction as central to any scientific explanation and 
left no doubt about his pro-Darwinian stance. In 1882, the Canterbury society held a 
session commemorating Darwin’s death. In 1890, Professor Bickerton (1842-1929) in 
Christchurch addressed the members of the society on “Modern Darwinism” (MBL, 
minute book, 30 Aug. 1890).12 A few years later, Professor Thomas in Auckland 
delivered his annual lecture on “Evolution” (SCUA, minute book, 4 Sep. 1902) as 
requested by the members of the society (SCUA, minute book, 8 Aug. 1902). 
In view of the number of lectures given to the three debating societies alone, partly 
explicitly requested by their members, it is impossible to understand the late-Victorians’ 
enthusiasm for infallible truths and their social application without noticing the impact 
                                               
10 In 1876, he participated in a lecture series addressing the same issue. In 1878, an already excited and 
informed public presumably was satisfied with the newspaper coverage of this particular lecture. The 
Evening Post, the ODT and the OW reported on the evening: ODT, 3 August 1878, 2; OW, 10 August 
1878, 16; Evening Post, 5 August 1878, 2. 
11 The following year, Parker lectured on “Charles Darwin” to the All Saints’ Literary and Debating 
Society (OW, 1 July 1882, 22). 
12 In 1874, Alexander William Bickerton, originally from England, came to New Zealand as founding 
professor for Chemistry at Canterbury College. In his capacity, he also gave public lectures with great 
success. In 1894, disputes at the College prompted Bickerton to improve the organisation of social life in 
Christchurch. As a follower of socialist ideas, he established a “Federative Home” at Wainoni that was 
based on the principles of communal life. Later in Bickerton’s life, Wainoni became a pleasure garden. 
Bickerton was also known for his cosmic theory, which was poorly received by contemporary scientists. 
During the Boer War, Bickerton openly attacked jingoism and “alienated much of his public support” 
(Parton DNZB). The biographical information is based on Parton in DNZB, Burdon 1956, Baker 2004. 
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Evolution and its epistemological foundation had. The Dialectic Society welcomed the 
addition of scientific topics to their already varied programme. At one of their meetings 
in 1898 two scientific essays were read and discussed: “one by Mr. Inglis on the ‘Solar 
System,’ and the other by Mr. Cradock on ‘Nature in Harness.’ Both proved 
exceedingly interesting, possessing in common the uncommon virtue of setting forth in 
an untechnical way facts new to the audience. …  [I]t is well that something of this sort 
should be introduced into the Dialectic programme” (CCR, Oct. 1898, 10). Debates, 
lectures and essays were always embedded in a network of cultural contexts that 
challenged and transcended supposedly scientific unequivocal facts. Conducive to this 
environment was a nineteenth-century understanding of science that was far removed 
from the present scientific divisions. 
Francis Reid’s valuable and much needed study of the history and cultural context 
of science in general and the New Zealand Institute in particular, investigates what 
exactly colonial science amounted to in the unique and remote setting of New Zealand. 
Contrary to Stenhouse’s opinion that in the 1880s “colonial science” was a coherent 
concept and “that the colony’s scientific research and discussion” (Stenhouse 1999, 71-
72) took place in the four main branches of the New Zealand Institute, Reid quite 
rightly points out that until now the understanding of nineteenth-century colonial 
science has rested on inadequate definitions. My research shows that scientific discourse 
was not confined to the domains of the Institute; instead, the reality of science in the 
nineteenth century amounted to an accumulation of science-labelled activities without 
little or no disciplinary and institutional boundaries: 
The division between professionally paid and unpaid men of science did not 
correlate with the general acceptance of rejection of their work or with their 
intellectual standing. The labels ‘amateur’ and ‘professional’ do not describe the 
complex relations between scientific thinkers, and the title ‘scientist’, which was 
rarely used by contemporaries, is also unhelpful: because a cross section of the 
settler elite engaged in the development of science it is difficult for the historian 
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to know who should be included and who excluded by the label ‘scientist’. (Reid 
2007, 5) 
Moreover, for Reid, scientific thinking in New Zealand was international rather than 
national and avoided, due to a lack of precise definition, the exclusionary terminology 
of modern science (8). Dear in his work on the history of western science suggests the 
term “natural philosopher” to account for the unique combination of theoretical 
philosophy and practical science (Dear 2006, 2).13 Furthermore, the public image of 
science created by those involved in its practice, to a large extent, depended on 
individual ambitions. Utilitarian argumentation suited the cause when financial 
concerns had to be discussed; in order to elevate membership levels at the Institute, an 
egalitarian and liberal approach was emphasised (Reid 2007, 186). The middling strata 
of New Zealand’s society, a population that was literate, had access to self-improvement 
facilities like literary and debating societies and, above all, embraced mobility on 
grounds of strong ties with England, with recurrent frequency discussed scientific topics 
and— even more significantly— scientific methodology. Their discourse was ongoing 
and their interest in scientific method relentless. In other words, part of the New 
Zealand public was actively negotiating the separation of arts and science and coming to 
terms with how reliable scientific knowledge could be produced. Even though the New 
Zealand University as managing body of the colleges imposed scientific categorization 
on its teaching, Reid and Dear accurately depict the atmosphere of the wider public 
discourse on science in New Zealand.14 Enthusiasm for and uncertainty about scientific 
                                               
13 Dunlap, like Dear, shows that the term “scientist” came into use only in the second half of the 
nineteenth century: “strict usage, therefore, would require us to call Newton a ‘natural philosopher’ and 
Darwin a ‘naturalist’ (which is in fact what he was called and what he called himself)” (Dunlap 1999, 6). 
I acknowledge Dear’s and Dunlap’s argumentation and henceforth, the term “natural philosopher” will be 
used for New Zealand scholars who dealt with scientific-related issues. 
14 The typical division of the college curriculum prescribed a distinction of physical and natural science. 
Natural sciences included anatomy, physiology, zoology, botany, mineralogy and geology; the physical 
sciences consisted in heat and radiant heat, electricity and magnetism, sound and light, astronomy and 
meteorology (NZUC, 1880). The university’s system of order represented a transitory stage towards a 
twentieth- and twenty-first century canon of scientific subjects.  
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methodology are phrases that best describe the underlying dynamics of students’ 
debates and lectures on Darwinism and related natural phenomena.15 
In 1876, the recently arrived natural philosopher Frederick Wollaston Hutton (1836-
1905) took part in a lecture series on scientific methodology and Evolution.16 His fellow 
lecturers were all church men: the Anglican bishop Samuel Nevill and the Presbyterian 
Robert Gillies. Another clerical member, Rev. William Salmond, was among the 
audience. From the beginning, Hutton found himself in gross disagreement with Gillies, 
who gave the first lecture on Haeckel’s History of Creation (1868)17, and Nevill, who 
held the closing lecture.18 During the debate following Gillies’s paper, Hutton argued 
with Salmond whether Evolution or the Special Creation Theory provided the better 
ground for explaining the global natural state of development. Salmond, clinging onto 
Special Creation theory, fiercely criticised Hutton’s position in the course of the 
evening but announced afterwards that Hutton was capable of bringing “great 
knowledge out in a perfectly lucid and clear way, and convincing those who desire to 
pick holes almost against their will” (ODT, 19 October 1876, 2). Hutton, in his own 
contribution to the series, related his views on “The Inductive Method as Applied to the 
Theory of Descent.” He combined Bacon’s trial by crucial instances with Mill’s method 
of difference in order to prove that only Evolution could account for the particularities 
                                               
15 Stenhouse, moreover, points out that, in the case of Darwinism, Dunedin became the focus of attention. 
He concludes that “the far south almost monopolised evolutionary controversy suggests that New 
Zealand, though small, contained sufficient regional diversity to render problematic nationwide 
generalisations about science and religion” (Stenhouse 1999, 66).  
16 Biographical information on Hutton can be found in Chapter two. Hutton’s fascination with and active 
contribution to the theory of evolution started very early in his career in 1860 with his review of Darwin’s 
Origin of Species published in the British journal Geologist. Darwin was so pleased with Hutton’s 
criticism that he wrote to him “congratulating him on ‘the highly original, striking and condensed manner 
with which you have put the case. …  I am much pleased to see how carefully you have read my book, 
and, what is far more important, reflected on so many points with an independent spirit.’” (qtd. in 
Stenhouse 1990, 422)  
17 The lecture was entitled “The Pedigree of Man” (OW, 9 September 1876, 3). 
18 This information is based on Stenhouse 1990, 424-427, 1999, 73-75; OW: 2 September 1876, 3; 9 
September 1876, 3 & 17; 30 September 1876, 3; ODT: 23 August 1876, 3; 20 September 1876, 3; 18 
October 1876, 2-3; 19 October 1876, 2. 
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of New Zealand’s flora and fauna.19 The argument put forth Evolution as a hypothesis 
that could best account for New Zealand’s natural phenomena. In conclusion, Hutton in 
1876 combined the strictly inductive methodology of Bacon and Mill with the 
hypothetico-deductive approach20 of Darwin. Moreover, his lecture demonstrated that 
he was a thorough naturalist who placed absolute confidence on the scientific reliability 
of observation.  
Beginning with the foundation of the New Zealand University, students were 
exposed to the issue of induction.21 In 1888, members of the Canterbury College 
Dialectic Society received their share of Hutton’s scientific views when he delivered his 
retiring address as president of the society. In the lecture entitled Scientific Theory: Old 
and New, he talked about the failures of past scientists and the advances of modern 
scientific inquiry with regard to logical reasoning. Hutton argued that he and his 
contemporaries were better equipped to deliver valid scientific truths than their 
predecessors because new technologies had improved their quality of observation. Even 
beyond the uncontested supremacy of sciences in an industrial age, Hutton felt the need 
to explicitly elevate the method of induction to the highest ranks of scientific inquiry: 
“We must therefore have recourse to other means of verification, and we find this in the 
inductive method of logic, which as it can be applied to theories in every branch of 
                                               
19 Mill’s method of difference was based on Bacon’s idea of crucial instance. Mill reasoned that a 
phenomenon A is under investigation in two different instances I and II. Both instances are exactly the 
same except for one characteristic. If A occurs in I and II, then, Mill concludes, that one characteristic is 
the effect, cause or necessary constituent of the cause of A (Mill 1891). 
20 The phrase is, in fact, a twentieth-century term that refers to those scientists who endorse hypotheses to 
arrive at explanation of specific phenomena. Snyder explains that hypothetico-deductive methodology 
essentially relies on two principles: “First is the claim that the only evaluative criterion for hypotheses is 
that they entail true empirical consequences. …  The second characteristic of hypothetico-deductivism 
involves a claim about how scientific hypotheses are to be invented or discovered. …  Indeed, on this 
view, hypotheses are typically characterised as resulting from nonrational guesswork” (Snyder 2007). 
Darwin’s Origin was based on possibilities that were regarded by critics like Richard Owen (1804-1802) 
and Samuel Wilberforce (1805-1873) as guesswork and nonrational (Dear 2006, 102-104). 
21 The New Zealand University Calendar lists numerous examination questions on the topic. In 1879, for 
example, students sitting for the B.A. degree and the senior scholarship application were confronted with 
questions like: “What is the difference and the connection between Deductive and Inductive reasoning?” 
or “Classify the fallacies which may occur in the employment of the various Inductive methods.” (NZUC, 
1879, lxxx) 
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science, is commonly known as scientific method” (Hutton 1888, 8). Induction, as 
understood in nineteenth-century logic, described “the process of inferring a general law 
from the observation of particular instances” (OED s.v. “induction”). In 1881, Professor 
Parker, himself a Darwinist, in his lecture on birds and reptiles also defended a doctrine 
of scientific method “by which we arrive at all conclusions …  by induction and 
verification” (OW, 4 June 1881, 22). Alexander Bain defined induction in contrast to 
abstraction: “In abstraction, a single isolated property, or a collection of properties 
treated as a unity, is identified and generalised; under Induction, a conjunction, union, 
or concurrence of two distinct properties is identified” (Bain 1868, 143-144).22 In other 
words, if the source of heat is the sun, if bodies expand in heat, then the proposition “the 
sun expands bodies” is an induction. Contrary to Bain’s seemingly uncontroversial 
definition and Hutton’s supposedly straight-forward depiction of induction as the 
fundamental scientific method, nineteenth-century natural philosophers disagreed 
strongly on the topic. 
Hutton, early in his career was actually aware of the problems associated with a 
purely inductive method. In 1860, when still living in England, his favourable review of 
Origin of Species caused Darwin to reply to him: 
Darwin was delighted with Hutton’s review. He wrote to his friend J.D. Hooker, 
the eminent botanist, that Hutton was ‘one of the very few who see that the 
change of species cannot be directly proved, and that the doctrine must sink or 
swim according ... as it groups and explains the phenomena.’ Hutton had 
correctly understood the hypothetico-deductive logic of the theory, and its 
formulator was pleased. (Stenhouse 1990, 422) 
In other words, Hutton realised that Darwin had based his line of reasoning on (not yet) 
provable hypotheses.23 Darwinism and, as a consequence, induction pointed towards a 
                                               
22 Bain defined deduction only in conjunction with induction: “When an Inductive generality has been 
established, the application of it to new cases is called Deduction” (Bain 1868, 145). 
23 One hypothesis was that species “emerged through transformation from older species” (Dear 2006, 96), 
that the change from one species to another was gradual. The other was the principle of natural selection 
that found its way into Spencer’s Social Darwinism. What Darwin originally said was that “individual 
organisms routinely display slight variations as compared with others of the same species …  . These 
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conundrum for natural philosophers like Mill and Bain. Science was meant to exercise a 
rigorous regime of truth though induction, whereas simultaneously Evolution suggested 
that hypotheses offered the best available explanation of man’s natural environment. 
Therefore, the straight inference from observation (the real) to generalised law (the 
abstract) was actually at jeopardy at the end of the Victorian era. In view of Hutton’s 
strong Darwinian sentiment and his acknowledgement of the hypothetic-deductive 
approach, his insistence on induction as the true scientific method reflects a pragmatic 
perception of science characteristic of the New Zealand academic context.  
Hutton’s statement of 1888 further made clear that induction was coterminous with 
logic and predictability. Alexander Bain’s work helps to enlighten this connection 
further. In the introduction of Mental and Moral Science, Bain identified two world-
perspectives that informed the understanding of the principle of induction and in a wider 
context, reason: the object-world and the subject-world: “There is nothing that we can 
know, or conceive of, but is included under one or other of these two great departments. 
They comprehend the entire universe as ascertainable by us” (Bain 1868, 1). The 
paramount characteristic that distinguished object- from subject-world was extension. 
Bain accepted that the “object-experience is also in a sense mental” but the only 
scientifically permissible descriptions of the immaterial mental functions were feelings, 
volition and thought kept in the straightjacket of science. Bain’s work suggests that he 
intended to transcend the Cartesian dichotomy of material and immaterial, body and 
soul, by means of a more elaborate framework of mind, brain, body and new 
psychological terminology. This initial self-imposed binary opposition of a subject-
object-world confirms that he did not escape Descartes’ ubiquitous presence. The entire 
book was dedicated to ascribing logical categories to something that otherwise had no 
extension, was thus immaterial and in empiricist terminology, accordingly 
                                                                                                                                         
variations usually correspond to some greater or lesser ability of the organism to cope with its 
circumstances of life …  ” (ibid.). 
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unobservable. The only way the unobservable could be perceived, at least for Bain, was 
by a detour via the material. In connection with Hutton, this implied that induction as 
logical method was the closest one could come to casting an immeasurable but equally 
existent natural phenomenon into a tangible, perceivable mould. It was thus not 
surprising that Hutton in 1888 argued that correct and thorough observation served as a 
guarantor for proven scientific statements. Even if something seemed to be wholly 
unconnected to familiar occurrences and as nonrational as Darwin’s hypotheses, 
thorough observation and generalisation would eventually provide the required proof of 
its existence and render it “real”. For Hutton “the best of all tests is the fulfilment of 
predictions, because by this means we get rid of all personal bias in observing” (Hutton, 
1888, 8). In other words, if a theory predicted future events then its validity had to be 
accepted even though an unobservable principle like the gradual transformation of 
species was at the root of it. By predicting the future, scientific theories acquired a God-
like status and elevated man, their creator, to the ranks of the ideal. Scientific theories 
with the help of an infallible scientific methodology could achieve something that man 
alone could not: they could predict the unobservable future and capture the 
unobservable present. In 1888, Hutton was yearning for a level of objectivity that made 
science immune to failure. 24  
                                               
24 He had in fact developed a hierarchical methodological framework of scientific proof that incorporated 
Bacon’s test of crucial instances and Mill’s method of difference. According to Hutton, the inductive 
procedure by which absolute certainty was to be obtained consisted in two components: a five-stage 
method of arriving at a hypothesis and a four-step model of verifying that hypothesis; all in all, a highly 
formalised system of scientific argumentation. A hypothesis was established when facts were collected by 
observation. Instances of observation were moulded into an empirical law that attempted to propound a 
“mere statement of a sequence of phenomena without any explanation” (Hutton 1888, 8). This tentative 
statement would then be paraphrased by means of a hypothesis that had to be tested against rival 
hypotheses. With Bacon’s “crucial instances” this working hypothesis could be tested for its likelihood to 
succeed logically. In 1876, for example, Hutton used the example of “the woodpecker of the La Plata 
pampas, which never so much as saw a tree” (Stenhouse 1990, 425) to demonstrate that Special Creation 
could not explain why the woodpecker existed in the first place. By checking the hypothesis against 
particular phenomena, it acquired certain real qualities. The hypothesis was “saying” something about the 
natural phenomena it related to. Eventually, it had to be verified in four steps: the method of difference, 
which compared the phenomenon with similar instances in which it did not occur; the proof against 
gradation, suggesting that the contested phenomenon actually passed into another, already familiar one; 
an explanation obtained by other hypotheses which were entirely different from the investigated 
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The two theorists who, in Hutton’s eyes, could provide the required scheme of 
verification were Sir John Herschel (1792-1871) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). 
Mill, in particular, excited the attention of the New Zealand scientific elite and 
university students. In 1880, in the examination of the senior scholarship for the New 
Zealand University, applicants had to answer the question: “Is it admissible (with Mill) 
to call an inference from Particulars to Particulars by the name of Induction?” (NZUC, 
1880, lxxxix). William Carlile25— member of the New Zealand Institute like Hutton—
read several papers contemplating Mill’s epistemological system.26 As for Hutton, 
consistency seemed to be Carlile’s preferred reprimand of contemporary science. His 
lecture of 1891 began with the exclamation that “to find anything like consistency, 
indeed, he [the scholar] would have to go back to the philosophers of the pre-Kantian 
age” (Carlile 1891b, 644). Carlile criticised Mill for his “hair-splittings and 
inconsistencies” (645); Alexander Bain27 was equally quickly discarded for not being 
coherent in his logical approach. Carlile, very much like Hutton, was interested in a 
clear-cut system for logic that knew only two classes: “truths of pure mathematics”, of 
everything abstract, and “truths of matter of fact” (ibid.), in other words, truths of 
experience.  
The fact that Carlile, on the one hand, was interested in a simple logical system, and 
on the other, appalled by Mill’s apparent inconsistencies was not entirely surprising in 
                                                                                                                                         
phenomenon; and finally the proof of prediction, which in essence meant that a valid hypothesis was 
sound if it could predict future occurrences. 
25 Nothing is known about William Carlile except that he was an ordinary member of the Wellington New 
Zealand Institute. 
26 In 1887, Carlile as a new member began his scientific lectures with accounts of “some deep-seated 
fallacies” quoting Aristotle and Plato in order to arrive at Huxley’s evolutionist concept. In 1891, Carlile 
felt confident enough to offer a thorough analysis of Mill’s opinion on “necessary truths.” Only three 
years later, Carlile’s paper on “The Humist Doctrine of Causation in its Relation to Modern Agnosticism” 
caused considerable debate among members of the Institute in Wellington because the argument became 
entangled in religious implications of mind as the supreme force in nature (TPNZI,1894, 646). In 1895, 
Carlile came back to the same question— what is the mind— only to set it into a large social and political 
context (Carlile 1895). Carlile’s texts were exemplary of a nineteenth-century tendency to, on the one 
hand, discriminately set apart science and ordinary existence; and, on the other, apply principles of 
“natural law” in everyday circumstances.  
27 For a discussion of Alexander Bain’s works and their impact on nineteenth-century New Zealand 
debate see Chapter four. 
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view of Mill’s complex work. Donovan points out that Mill’s views on induction were 
connected to his lifelong project to combine Newton’s mechanistic laws and scientific 
certainty with normative implications in order to make sense of social developments in 
British society. “Mill directed his studies towards discovering a way to apply the laws 
of Newtonian science to what he liked to call the ‘moral sciences,’ a term that reflects 
not so much a conviction as a hope, and perhaps an expectation, of what the study of 
man and his institutions might become” (Donovan 1981, 182). Mill, to this extent, 
exemplified all that was universal in the notion of late nineteenth-century natural 
philosophy. Indeed, the separation of science and philosophy was established only in 
the second half of the century. For mid-nineteenth-century scientists and/or natural 
philosophers “doing things and understanding things thus became increasingly folded 
into one” (Dear 2006, 11). Mill found himself in the middle of this process. Mill 
insisted on the paramount function of truth for human society and his System of Logic 
was designed to clarify the formal side of this key factor. His conviction, however, was 
not immutable and his confrontation with the natural philosopher William Whewell 
(1794-1866), a debate that was later reviewed in New Zealand, revealed inconsistencies. 
The Mill-Whewell debate exemplified the dichotomy between the real and the 
unreal and the rational and nonrational. Mill, according to Snyder, rejected those aspects 
of inductive reasoning that accepted conclusions about unobservable phenomena. 
William Whewell embraced induction, accepting the possible existence of the 
unobservable. Because he agreed that scientists could generate knowledge about 
phenomena that they could not observe, Whewell, unlike Mill, could formulate claims 
about potentially unperceivable entities like molecules and light waves (Snyder 1997, 
1). As a consequence, Whewell was frequently accused of accepting “nonrational 
guesswork” (2) as the foundation for his scientific inquiries because the notion of 
experiment and observation was inseparable from the belief in scientific facts. Snyder 
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and Jacobs show that Whewell was not placing undue confidence on hypotheses derived 
from other sources than fact but that he was, in fact, accounting for the possibility of 
unobservable causes. Mill was, to say the least, not clear on the notion of unknown 
causes, which, for him, were “synonymous with ‘fictitious’” (Jacobs 1991, 75): 
Mill criticizes Whewell for allowing ‘no logical process in any case of 
induction, other than . . . guessing until a guess is found which tallies with the 
facts.’ Mill is not objecting to the method of conjecture, but to Whewell’s 
(supposed) failure to deal adequately with conditions of verification” (83). 
In other words, scientific intelligibility was determined, for Mill, by the way arguments 
are proven. According to him, hypotheses could be verified, but Mill did not pinpoint 
“how hypotheses about unobservables, whether (in his view) ‘known’ or ‘unknown,’ 
are proven” (77). Likewise the transition from “unknown” to “known” remained 
unclear. Mill’s difficulties with hypotheses did not spring from a rejection of hypotheses 
per se but rather from an unremitting belief in the intelligibility of scientific inquiry. For 
Mill, science did not take the path of Aristotle’s teleological attempts of clarifying why 
natural phenomena went a certain way. On the contrary, science, since the scientific 
revolution, had addressed the question how natural phenomena progressed.28 Therefore, 
Whewell’s idea that unknown and unobserved causes could explain how something in 
the real world occurred was unacceptable to Mill. Something that could not be observed 
in the first place, could not serve as a basis for further inquiry into the nature of its 
development. In the New Zealand context, Hutton, Parker, Thomson and Carlile, like 
Mill, did not reject hypotheses but they rejected the possibility of hypotheses that were 
based on the unknown. 
                                               
28 Peter Dear in The Intelligibility of Nature traces the idea of intelligibility in science. For the conflict 
between the Aristotelian and the mechanical understanding of science see especially 16-24. 
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Donovan shows that Mill was aware that logic presented only one aspect of 
knowledge production. He makes clear that Mill was unable to traverse the gulf between 
scientific standards of truth and social constituents of human existence: 
However profound or universal it may turn out to be, truth has no inherent 
power by which it can command assent from men’s minds; nor are men’s minds 
naturally equipped with any special faculty for discerning truth. Such truth as 
mankind processes owes more to exceptional insight than to any systematic 
process whatever, although the law of induction can provide a regular and 
systematic account of what has already taken place without their aid. (Donovan 
1981, 187) 
Mill, it appears, was acutely aware of the difficulties connected with the application of 
inductive reasoning in social contexts. In later life, in his critical essays on poets like 
Coleridge he confirms that the “noisy conflict of half-truths” and “antagonist modes of 
thought” (qtd. in 187) are the foundation of the power of truth. In On Liberty Mill also 
maintained that truth did not “naturally recommend itself to mankind”: “It is a piece of 
idle sentimentality that truth, merely as truth, has any inherent power denied to error of 
prevailing against the dungeon and the stake” (qtd. in 188). 
In 1881, the Dunedin student Ebenezer S. Hay (? – 1887) identified Mill’s sentiment 
in his own study of Wordsworth.29 He applied Mill’s doubts to his own increasing 
scepticism on the relation of religion and science: 
[H]e [Mill] remarked that the more their views (utilitarianism) prospered, there 
would be more need of Wordsworth. Poetry that blossoms in fields so widely 
apart must strike its roots deep in the human affections,  
In this iron time 
Of doubts, disputes, distractions, fears, 
 
When a deadly warfare is raging between science and religion, there are those, 
confident in the result, can lose themselves in Wordsworth and forget it … . (Hay 
1881, 13) 
                                               
29 Ebenezer S. Hay’s essay was the first contribution to a New Zealand debating society that I have found. 
Little is known of his life. As a practising lawyer in Dunedin he published poetry under the nom de plume 
“Fleta”. The only biographical sketch in the Otago Witness suggested that his death was untimely and his 
life characterised by his passion for poetry (“Biographical: Fleta” in OW, 27 May 1887, 28). 
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For Hay, art offered an escape from binary oppositions like science versus religion, 
material versus immaterial, real versus unreal or rational versus nonrational. For other 
students the getaway was provided by a fascination with the unreal and the 
unobservable in the form of magic lanterns, spiritualism or telepathy. 
 
Mental Science and the Passion for the Unobservable 
Complementary to science-informed logic, debate in New Zealand was influenced 
by a paradigm that enhanced immeasurable and unobservable qualities. When people 
like Hutton, Parker, Thomson or von Haast wanted to base inquiry on a secure footing, 
others embraced inexplicable phenomena as the backdrop for their discourse. People in 
Britain, America and New Zealand dealt with the mind as object of investigation to an 
increasing extent. The emergence of psychology as a discipline in its own right, the 
interest in phenomena like telepathy, hypnosis or spiritual mediums gave shape to their 
passion for everything outside the sphere of tangible phenomena. In New Zealand, the 
scientific component of arguments was challenged by an assembly of supposedly 
supernatural or inexplicable technologies and phenomena. However, their impact was 
limited and by the end of the new century, induction had superseded hypothetico-
deductive notions of argumentation. 
Students in New Zealand were confronted with ‘evidence’ of the unobservable that 
was a combination of supernatural spectacle, technical display and scientific curiosity. 
Students in Christchurch were particularly interested in discussing Spiritualism and 
hypnosis. The debate of 1881 on the question: “Is belief in spirituality entirely founded 
on delusion?” (MBL, minute book, 30 July 1881) was decided in the negative by a 
majority of one. The following year students attempted to clarify whether “Science is 
incompetent to explain the well authenticated experiences of Spiritualism?” (MBL, 
minute book, 9 Sept. 1882). This time the audience decided by a large majority that 
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science had the capacity to account for these phenomena. In 1891, in the ensuing debate 
to Robert Laing’s paper on hypnosis, students were sure “that the facts of hypnotion are 
not explicable by any known natural or scientific law” (MBL, minute book, 16 May 
1891). Another component of the unobservable proved to be the notion of telepathy or 
thought transference. In 1884, after hearing Robert Laing’s paper on “Thought 
Transference,” students agreed, with a significant majority, “that there is sufficient 
evidence to show that thoughts can be transferred from brain to brain without the use of 
any of the five senses” (MBL, minute book, 27 Sept. 1884).30 
In 1894, Marion S. W. White at Otago University College came back to the topic of 
Spiritualism and wrote an article on “A Spiritualist Séance.”31 In her account she 
expressed the wish “to embrace the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the mental 
science of South Australia” (White 1894, 135). She had received an invitation by the 
Adelaide Psychological Society, formerly the Adelaide Spiritualists’ Society, to attend a 
‘meeting’. Announcements of séances and demonstrations of thought transference by 
“Psychological” societies were also common in New Zealand newspapers. Based on her 
experiences in Australia, White described the entire evening as a mixture of religious 
ritual and private performance.32 She emphasised her role as an eyewitness. She not 
only wanted to become “acquainted” with spiritualist procedures, she wanted to 
observe: “For some time we had been watching as well as we could in the dim light the 
contortions of a tall man directly opposite us” (135, italics mine). After observing the 
outbursts of several members, White professed: “Business, so to speak, now became 
brisk; indeed, so brisk that we felt as if we had seen enough of spiritualism for one 
                                               
30 In 1885, Laing gave the same paper to the Christchurch branch of the New Zealand Institute (TPNZI, 
1885, 425). 
31 Neither Southern People nor DNZB provide any biographical background on White. In 1888, Marion 
White won the prize essay of the debating society. Page mentions White as “a first-year student who 
would feature largely in the publication [of the Review] throughout her student days” (Page 1992, 108). 
32 Concluding her remarks she wrote: “Apparently, then, this exhibition takes the place of a religious 
service; this cult is to them instead of a religion” (White 1894, 137). 
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evening” (136, italics mine). Considering the already poor visual conditions, the 
evening took an unexpected turn, “a young spiritualist turned the lamp very low, leaving 
the room so dark that we could distinguish nothing except the outlines of the figures” 
(136-137). White described her relief at leaving the séance room with the words: “we 
found ourselves under the pure high South Australian stars” (137, italics mine). White 
might have felt almost polluted by the poor artificial lighting conditions in that room 
and the natural glow of stars reconciled her spirits.  
White significantly combines her visual impressions with comparisons to technical 
inventions in order to depict the scene that took place in front of her: 
But Peter [a ghost] seemed to feel much as an honest countryman does the first 
time he tried to speak through a telephone. The instrument is there, the other 
man is there to listen, but what on earth is he to say? His inhospitable cut at us 
seemed to exhaust his inventive powers, and though he scrawled over a few 
more yards of paper, the medium was fain to confess that he said nothing more. 
(White 1894, 136) 
The members of the society were moreover “performers” who excited the attention of 
an “audience” and she did not know whether “the performers themselves believe in their 
own performance” (137). White’s report shows how new technical apparatuses were 
used to perceive and describe the unobservable and how the terminologies of leisure and 
entertainment helped to unravel the relation of rational and nonrational, natural and 
supernatural, real and unreal. 
The nineteenth-century use of the magic lantern and photography is possibly the 
best technical manifestation of late-Victorian interest in observation of the real and the 
unreal. Not only were the last outposts of the unknown used to circumscribe scientific 
methodology but also technological inventions reinforced the magical element in debate 
and lectures. The fascination with the unknown was reflected in a passionate interest in 
the unseen, in the spectacle. The magic lantern in an academic and educational 
environment very tamely transformed science into spectacle. Simon During, for 
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example, analyses how optical inventions such as magic lanterns and photography 
influenced the perception of spiritual phenomena (During 2002, 259-287). Morus 
highlights science as spectacle and observes that optical illusions in general were part of 
the late-Victorian obsession with “seeing and believing science” (Morus 2006, 101).33 
By the end of the nineteenth century the use of magic lantern slides had become 
common in lectures to the debating societies as well as the larger public.34 Compare the 
following newspaper comment on Dr. Don’s lecture to the Otago debating society:  
The lecture was illustrated by a large number of magic lantern views from 
photographs taken mainly in the alpine districts of New Zealand and in 
Colorado. Towards the end of the lecture several pairs of views were shown, 
taken before and after the Tarawera eruption, and the whole change on the face 
of the country thus illustrated was almost incredible. (OW, 28 May 1896, 36)35 
Photography attempted to make visible the un-experienced and unseen. In bringing 
“proof” of natural phenomena to the lecture room, images conveyed a sense of the 
scientific real; they transplanted the audience’s eyes to the place of spectacle and made 
them bear witness to “incredible” circumstances.  
Morus quotes the natural philosopher David Brewster to illustrate the significance of 
human vision for the understanding of the role of observation in science: 
According to Brewster, the eye was ‘the most remarkable and the most 
important’ organ for understanding the relationship between mind and matter. 
                                               
33 Fred Nadis in Wonder Shows analyses a similar paradigm but focuses specifically on the magical power 
of science in connection with the American spiritualist movement (Nadis 2005, 113-137).  
34 In 1894, The Otago University Review was proud to recall the use of magic lantern images in a lecture 
on Northern Italy: “Professor Gibbons, M.A., then conducted his audience through the larger towns of 
Northern Italy. His lecture was illustrated by upwards of 36 lantern views. …  under the able guidance of 
the lecturer, the audience were carried along with an interest that never flagged. …  The lantern was well 
managed by Messrs Marden and Boydell, and the thanks of the society are especially due to Mr. 
Wilkinson, of the School of Mines, for the large amount of time and trouble that he spent in the 
preparation of the slides” (OUR, Aug. 1894, 78). Graham mentions the phenomenon in her study of New 
Zealand settler society: “Notice of scientific and literary lectures would arouse ‘great expectations’ of 
their speakers; sessions illustrated with lantern slides were a popular form of entertainment for all sections 
of the population” (Graham 1992, 133). 
35 Mt. Tarawera is close to Rotorua on the North Island of New Zealand. The Tarawera eruption lasted 
four days in June 1886 and was a geological event that drew the attention of the scientific as well as 
general public (Bradshaw 1888, 213-225). Bradshaw quoted von Hochstetter (a reknown scientist and a 
close friend of von Haast) who was an eye witness to the event: “’During two clear nights I watched the 
eruption from these vents, and could distinguish them against the sky with a powerful binocular 
telescope; but I never observed any illumination of the ascending steamclouds … .’” (qtd. in 219, italics 
mine). Tarawera became the focus of national attention because reports like von Hochstetter’s made it 
seem real even for those who read about it in the remote parts of the country. 
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As he expressed it, the eye was ‘the sentinel which guards the pass between the 
worlds of matter and spirit, and through which all their communications are 
interchanged.’ (Morus 2006, 102)36 
With the invention of photography, the function of the eye as mediator between matter 
and spirit was obscured by the introduction of an additional level of perception. What 
the eye could not perceive directly, the camera could capture and the magic lantern 
could project.  
The late-Victorian focus on observation, at least in New Zealand, nevertheless 
subtly differentiated between magic lantern imagery and Spiritualist photography. On 
the one hand, the public acceptance of magic lantern slides as scientific proof and 
illustration (like Dr. Don’s images) accepted the technical superiority of the camera but 
still trusted visual perception. On the other hand, photographs as confirmation of the 
existence of the supernatural denied the supposedly manipulative intervention of the 
photographer and the responsibility of the mechanical apparatus that took them. Cortés-
Rocca in her analysis of spectre photographs maintains that responsibility for the 
pictures was ascribed to an entity beyond the control of the machine or the cameraman: 
“It would seem then that photographic ghosts were subjects with the power to appear in 
the images rather than objects of representation. Thus, ‘spirit photography’ refers to the 
photographs produced by spirits, rather than to the ensemble of images in which they 
are represented” (Cortés-Rocca 2005, 156). As a consequence, magic lantern shows 
represented one end of the spectrum of the unobservable that still assumed the 
reciprocity of matter and spirit, of the material outside and the immaterial inside, and 
above all the reliability of visual perception. Images of the supernatural instead 
transcended this paradigm of observation and split open the relation of matter and spirit 
                                               
36 A similar sentiment surfaces in William Paley’s work on English natural theology. He ascribed to the 
eye such a complex and perfect design that only God could have created it. Human vision was not only a 
question of matter and spirit; it also addressed issues of divine creation. Moreover, Darwin acknowledged 
Paley’s influence on his early work but eventually rejected Paley’s perspective: “he [Darwin] recoiled in 
horror from the idea that God had expressly designed the ichneumon wasp to lay its eggs inside the body 
of a living caterpillar for its larvae to devour when they hatched.” (Stenhouse 1990, 437) On Paley’s 
impact on Darwin also see Dear 2006, 93-94. 
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by introducing an unknown element that questioned the scientific validity of human 
sight.37 The implementation of photographic technology in the New Zealand cultural 
sphere challenged the scientific beliefs so effectively propagated by natural 
philosophers because the inductive argument— the human eye cannot see ghosts, the 
camera captures what the eye perceives, therefore a photograph cannot show ghosts—
did not apply. The technicalities of photography accordingly must have appeared to 
Victorians infinitely more complex than rational worldviews suggested. 
The enthusiastic interest of students in questions of spiritualism, telepathy and 
hypnosis similarly points towards a desire to clarify what was according to prevalent 
doctrine not accountable. In 1993, Ellwood published the only comprehensive study of 
New Zealand alternative spiritualism. Together with Lineham he acknowledges that the 
heyday of nineteenth-century Spiritualism coincided with a new emphasis on 
Rationalism, and, I would add, inductive thinking, in the 1870s and 1880s (Ellwood 
1993, 4; Lineham 1985). Séances, lectures, and debates on spiritualism, hypnosis and 
telepathy were very much en vogue in New Zealand.38 Ellwood mentions that in the 
1860s, Spiritualism in New Zealand first appeared in Dunedin and prompted the 
establishment of the Spiritual Investigation Society that resembled the Society for 
Psychical Research in England.39 Even though spiritualist experiences escaped any 
standards of scientific intelligibility, they have proven remarkably resistant to rationalist 
criticism.40 Stenhouse points out that in the nineteenth century “New Zealand did not 
                                               
37 Derrida in Specters of Marx maintains that “the specter is a paradoxical incorporation, the becoming-
body, a certain phenomenal and carnal form of the spirit. It becomes, rather, some ‘thing’ that remains 
difficult to name: neither soul nor body, and both one and the other” (Derrida 1994, 6). 
38 The “American connection” was established by several notable spiritualists. In 1873, the American 
Spiritualist J.M. Peebles and E.C. Dunn publicly practised their mediumship in the colony (Ellwood 
1993, 32-35). The same year, John Duff in Auckland published his reply to Rev. Hill’s lecture on 
Spiritualism, insisting on a scientific investigation of mediums and séance sessions (Duff 1873). In 1878 
and 1879 Emma Hardinge-Britten, for example, an Anglo-American Spiritualist lectured in Australia and 
New Zealand (Ellwood 1993, 35-36). 
39 Ellwood 1993, 30.  
40 Ellwood mentions that in 1986 the New Zealand census “yielded 2,679 self-professed adherents of the 
Spiritualist church, up from 2,403 in 1981 and only 1,725 in 1976” (Ellwood 1993, 250 n1) Compared 
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have anything like the same social pressures for purely nominal religious conformity 
that Britain had” (Stenhouse 1985, 46).  
Recently, numerous scholars have traced the cultural impact of telepathy, hypnosis 
and mesmerism as well as spiritualism in Britain and America.41 Carroll sets out to 
“make sense” of American Spiritualism in the 1840s and 1850s and approaches 
Spiritualists as “rational people in search of a religion that answered their religious 
questions and satisfied their spiritual needs” (Carroll 1997, 2). Furthermore, he analyses 
Spiritualist societies in connection with the political atmosphere of republican freedom 
and romantic individualism. Owen focuses on the role of women in the rise of 
Spiritualism in Victorian England. Thurschwell examines the studies of paranormal 
phenomena by the Society of Psychical Research and concludes that they were 
perceived in the context of a model of evolving communication. Thought transference 
and “leaps of knowledge and affect are often imagined in terms of simultaneously 
supernatural, technological and spatial connections” (Thurschwell 2001, 149). Unlike 
the telegraph that demonstrated the technical superiority of the age, telepathy could 
bridge distance without technological interference. Lockhurst in particular demonstrates 
how the study of telepathy was linked to Victorian maturing science, literature and 
popular culture, in particular, through the work of the Society of Psychical Research.42 
He shows that the enthusiasm for telepathy was based on a fusion of cultural influences 
                                                                                                                                         
with America, “the fundamentals of Spiritualism, clairvoyance and voice mediumship, remain firmly in 
place in Spiritualist churches throughout New Zealand” (28). Stenhouse ascertains that in 1874, “less than 
one quarter of the population attended church …  and the proportion of regular attenders never rose above 
30 percent during the entire nineteenth century” (Stenhouse 1999, 64). 
41 Carroll 1997, Lockhurst 2002, Thurschwell 2001, Owen 2004, Bown et al. 2004.  
42 Lockhurst, like Thurschwell, shows how imperialism and the records of the Society of Psychical 
Research suggest that the strict notions of telepathic instances and scientific verification did not apply to 
the periphery of the Empire (Lockhurst 2002, 154-160). He uses an essay on ‘Thought-Reading’ 
published by the Society of Psychical Research in 1882 to illustrate this point for New Zealand: “The 
second was told by Thomas Woolner, sculptor and one of the founding members of the Pre-Raphaelite 
Brotherhood, who had been stricken in Oxford Street by the thought of a friend in New Zealand, a 
thought that oppressed him for over two hours. ‘And surely when the next mail or the next mail but one 
arrived, there came the horrible news that at that very day and hour (allowance being made for longitude) 
his friend had been made prisoner by the natives of New Zealand, and put to slow death by frightful 
tortures.’” (154) 
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that went beyond the confines of scientific observation into the realms of imperial 
politics, women’s rights and gothic literature. The fascination with psychic phenomena 
like telepathy arose from an increasing tension between a technical reality and a 
spiritual worldview. Richardson in his study of British Romanticism and the Science of 
the Mind makes transparent the connections between early brain science and the literary 
works of the English Romantics.43 All of these authors observe that “key tenets of the 
new psychology were seeping into the mainstream, helping to transform notions of 
subjectivity, of culture, and of character” (Richardson 2001, 93). The problems 
surrounding the relation between mind and matter and the new scientific focus on 
researching the human brain helped to shift the belief in the ideal towards a materialistic 
and analytical framework for understanding human nature. 
Members of the New Zealand Institute employed phrases like “mysterious 
therapeutic agent”44 and “mind-stuff” to describe phenomena like hypnosis and thought 
transference. The foundation of the Canterbury dialectic society coincided with a 
controversy about the dualism of mind and matter in the New Zealand Institute. In 
1879, Frederick Frankland read a paper before the Wellington Philosophical Society 
that prompted a controversy that lasted until 188145. Frankland’s paper was entitled “On 
the Doctrine of Mind-Stuff” and dealt with Psychology as the only “concrete science” 
(Frankland 1879, 205). Frankland argued that “all the properties of material objects, as 
                                               
43 Patricia Murphy (2006) studies science’s impact on the construction of women in texts outside the 
traditional canon of nineteenth-century literature. 
44 Two years earlier, E. A. Mackechnie focused on the therapeutic qualities of hypnosis in his paper “A 
Mysterious Therapeutic Agent” (1889). His paper revealed a sympathetic reading of the phenomenon. He 
quoted The Nineteenth Century as the source of his critical information – a magazine that students in New 
Zealand had access to. Mackechnie not only dealt with hypnosis but scrutinised “extraordinary cures, 
famous séances, and wonderful clairvoyant visions” (Mackechnie 1889, 122). The article made clear that 
Mackechnie relied on scientific inquiry to cast light on processes of hypnosis. He pointed out that 
psychology was still perceived in a rather hostile fashion and concluded that “surely such persons err. The 
reverent study of the glorious perfection of Creative Will is man’s true homage. He therein recognises, 
however imperfect the revelation may be, some of the attributes of the universal man” (128). For 
Mackechnie, scientific methodology advanced knowledge of the human condition and helped capture 
mechanisms of the mind in a practical, empiricist and rational way. Science, for Mackechnie, elevated 
man rather than degrades him by association with his primeval origin. 
45 Richmond 1879; Thomson 1881. 
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investigated by the physical sciences, are capable of being analysed into possibilities of 
feeling, or relations among possibilities of feeling” (205). As a consequence, he 
concluded that the only “concrete realities” or “things-in-themselves” were reducible to 
sensual perceptions, hence superior stance among the sciences. In his lecture, Frankland 
disestablished the traditional separation of mind and matter by postulating that 
everything was “mind-stuff”. He insisted that there were not any “intelligences 
unconnected with any brain” and that “the supposed dualism of matter and spirit is an 
illusion” (Frankland 1879, 215). One of Frankland’s objectives was to deconstruct and 
reject the “essence of spiritualism and theology” (ibid.) and to embrace the fact that the 
theory of mind-stuff complemented the mechanistic worldview. Frankland’s ideas 
might appear obscure and far-fetched but the concept of “mind-stuff” and more 
importantly the solution to the mind-matter problem were seriously discussed in New 
Zealand. 
His critics Richardson and Thomson opposed Frankland’s view. In particular, 
Thomson focused on the dualism of reason and emotion. His statements encapsulated a 
sentiment representative of New Zealand’s scientific stance and scholarly insistence on 
the reliability of induction. In rejecting the notion that all is feeling, Thomson 
maintained that “a higher faculty informs us of the contrary. This faculty we call reason, 
and which is seldom at one with our feelings, but more often at variance; further, 
sometimes in diametrical opposition” (Thomson 1881, 109). Thomson illustrated his 
opinion with the example that “feelings tell us that the sun has risen” when in fact 
reason shows us that it is “atmospheric refraction creating the deception” (ibid.). 
Thomson here equated feelings with mistaken observations which rational intervention 
could correct. In the following passage he moreover summarises the elements that I 
have identified as contributing to the notion of the unreal: 
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And to the ideal part of man’s nature I give incomparably the higher place. It is 
by this ideal or ethereal nature that man weighs the sun as it were in balance; 
that he predicts by many years the position of the stars in the heavens; that he 
anticipates eclipses and other astronomical phenomena; that he scientifically 
navigates the great ocean, and that he by his designs overcomes space and time 
by the railway and electric telegraph. Thus man is gifted with an attribute far 
outside of gross narrow feeling, as truthful and transcendent in its 
comprehensiveness as the latter is misleading and misguiding. …  This gift of 
mental conception places man in his pre-eminent position in nature, and is that 
ethereal part of his being which being truthful is undying and immortal. 
(Thomson 1881, 110) 
Thomson, to give his claim scientific validity, drew heavily on what Hutton called “the 
best of all tests,” that is, prediction, “because by this means we get rid of all personal 
bias in observing” (Hutton 1888, 8). Moreover, Marion White’s statement that the stars 
in the South Australian sky had a soothing effect on her when leaving the séance in 
Adelaide acquires an even more fundamental meaning in connection with Thomson’s 
statement. The stars represented to her the counterpart to artificial light and spectacle; 
they implied truthfulness and reality. Susan Wells in Sweet Reason employs a similar 
metaphor to describe the reassuring force of natural laws for public discourse: “If the 
starry skies above us no longer proclaim what is true about the natural world, there is no 
moral law which speaks reliably within us about how we ought to act in the domain of 
the social” (Well 1996, 182). Marion White felt this “reassuring force” of the real, the 
natural, when stepping outside the séance apartment.  
The last instance of the manifestation of scientific spirit and the contemplation of 
the unobservable that shall be dealt with in this chapter is the introduction of mental 
science and philosophy to the curriculum of the three colonial colleges in New Zealand. 
Sinclair describes the subject as “a mixture of logic, ethics, and psychology” (Sinclair 
1983, 79); a description that misses the cultural context in which it arose. Turtle tracks 
the development of mental science and philosophy in an Australasian context and 
discovers that in comparison to Britain’s late academic acceptance of psychology “its 
Australasian counterpart may be seen as a relatively more significant protagonist in the 
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early regional development of these disciplines” (Turtle 1988, 224). Mental Science in 
New Zealand at least was compulsory for gaining a B.A., B.Sc., Honours, M.A. and 
Master of Science degree since the foundation of the New Zealand University as an 
administrative body.46 The subject comprised logic, psychology, ethics and history of 
philosophy. Examination papers throughout the years required students to write one 
paper in psychology or ethics and another in deductive and inductive logic. The subject 
was made redundant only in the mid-twentieth century when it was replaced by 
psychology.47 The subject’s history represents remarkably well how the late-Victorian 
fusion of scientific methodology and explanations of the unobservable gained a foothold 
in New Zealand middle-class society. 
From 1870 to 1886, Duncan MacGregor in Dunedin was professor of Mental and 
Moral Philosophy, a chair that was the result of a compromise between the Presbyterian 
Church and the city’s interests. The arrangement consisted in the church paying 
MacGregor’s salary and the College ensuring his academic standard (Sullivan 2005, 
30). MacGregor, when accepting the post, maintained that knowledge was relative and 
that he was particularly interested in “our mental phenomena and the accompanying 
molecular movements in the nerve centres” (qtd. in Morrell 1969, 39). In Scotland, he 
had supplemented his degree in philosophy with a qualification in medicine. In 1886, he 
became, with the help of his friend and former student Robert Stout, Inspector-General 
of Lunatic Asylums, Hospitals and Charitable institutions in New Zealand, combining 
his work with an outspoken support for the scientific investigation of the mentally ill 
(Morrell 1969, 41).48 Under his influence, mental philosophy acquired a considerable 
medical focus.  
                                               
46 See: NZUC 1879 – 1902. 
47 After 1957, psychology became an independent subject at Auckland (Sinclair 1983, 202). 
48 With respect to MacGregor’s scientific approach towards treatment of the mentally ill, it is worth 
considering how, in the United States, magic lantern images became part of the moral treatment at 
hospitals and soul asylums (Haller and Larsen 2005). Even though beyond the scope of this thesis, the 
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MacGregor’s position in Dunedin was by no means uncontroversial. Again, 
Dunedin proved to be the breeding ground of dissent. In 1878, he published an article in 
favour of Social Darwinism in the New Zealand Magazine and subsequently found 
himself in the middle of a controversy with Rev. Copland, a dispute that lasted until 
MacGregor’s resignation in 1885 (Sullivan 2005, 45). Rev. Copland, who considered 
Social Darwinism insufferable, criticised MacGregor, using rather impolite language. 
As a consequence, the controversy caused a clash of religious and scientific beliefs 
among members of the Otago University Council that questioned MacGregor’s position 
as chair of mental and moral philosophy.49 Even though the Copland-MacGregor case 
was publicly seen as a farce (46), the Hutton lecture series of 1876 displayed a similar 
friction that only ended amicably because of Hutton’s well-mannered eloquence. 
Dunedin’s university staff publicly promoted science, and in particular Darwinism, as a 
benchmark for dealing with daily affairs.50 In MacGregor’s case, he held that the human 
psyche (the unobservable) was best explored by medical investigation. Spiritual 
concerns had to conform to empiricist logic and methodology. 
The later notorious Joseph Penfound Grossmann was among the first students in 
Canterbury to graduate with a degree in Mental Science. In 1906, he became professor 
of the same subject at Auckland University after the chair had been neglected for 
sixteen years (Sinclair 1983, 79). In 1901, the New Zealand Illustrated Magazine 
maintained that since 1890, “the departure of Professor Posnett Political Science and 
Mental Science have practically ceased to be taught at the Auckland College, and the 
Council is at present unable, owing to the want of funds, to institute regular lectures in 
                                                                                                                                         
fusion of lantern shows and moral reformation in medical institutions should be worth exploring for a 
New Zealand context. 
49 For another confrontation (1876) on the issue of religion and evolution between Rev. Copland and Rev. 
A. R. Fitchett at the YMCA in Dunedin see Stenhouse 1999, 66-68. For Stenhouse’s view on the 
Copland-MacGregor controversy see Stenhouse 1999, 69-70. 
50 Up until 1891, for example, Huxley’s and Martin’s “Practical Biology” was the required textbook 
(AUCC 1884, 1887-1891). 
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those important subjects” (NZIM, Nov. 1901, 138). In reviewing the examination 
questions, Sinclair maintains and the Calendars confirm that mental science combined 
experimental science with philosophy with “much emphasis on definitions of a 
dilemma, enthymeme, inference, deduction, induction, and so on” (Sinclair 1983, 85). 
He also acknowledges that papers on logic suggested the influence of John S. Mill. All 
in all, Grossmann’s teachings seemed to draw heavily on his studies in Canterbury 
under Brown who emphasised Mill and Bain. Sinclair also notes that “a concern for 
‘animal rights’” (84) was in fashion. Comparative papers on the animal and human 
mind were in fact frequent contributions to the TPNZI and daily newspapers addressed 
the concerns of groups like the Society for the prevention of cruelty to animals.51 
In the 1880s, at Canterbury College, where Professor Macmillan Brown held the 
chair, the subject combined linguistics, literary theory, logic, early psychological 
research and philosophy. His version of mental science was most likely influenced by 
Alexander Bain’s work on Mental and Moral Science of 1868.52 One question in the 
Honours Examination of 1879, for example, required students to “Distinguish and 
Compare the provinces of Imagination and Logic” (CCC, 1880, xxvi). In 1882, 
Professor Brown listed the following questions for the pass examination of Mental 
Science and Logic: 
4) Illustrate the fallacies that arise from the use of metaphorical language …  
6) How is deduction related to induction, and what different views have been 
taken of the relation? …  
11) What is meant by connotative names, quantification of the predictable, 
enthymeme, indirect mood, and immediate inference? (CCC, 1883, xxxi)  
Brown’s instructions suggest that he was imposing on his students the difference 
between predictable knowledge production by recourse to clear methodology and 
                                               
51 In TPNZI see for example Carlile 1891a, and Purnell 1896, 1899. For articles on animal issues see 
Papers Past: keywords Vegetarianism, Society + Animals.  
52 Rylance argues that Alexander Bain’s textbooks were the most successful in the new discipline of 
psychology. He maintains that “for Victorian readers, its appeal was that of the new, the exciting, the 
controversial” (Rylance 2004, 241). Bain had the necessary authority as one of the few representatives of 
psychology who held an academic chair at Aberdeen (significantly in philosophy and literature).  
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unpredictable use of language that had no logical foundation. Brown’s goal was to teach 
his students the detrimental effects of logical fallacies in argumentation.53 In 
comparison, Brown’s interest in mental science lay in the ethical and moral aspects of 
human reasoning whereas MacGregor’s concept paralleled a contemporary trend for a 
more serious ‘purely’ scientific approach and his own enthusiasm for medical research.  
Mental science provided students with a methodological tool kit for inquiries into 
the regions of what Bain called “scientific psychology” (Bain 1868, 2). Brown, 
Grossmann, and MacGregor taught their students structured thinking based on the 
conviction that the human mind (and brain) functioned on grounds of induction and 
deduction, and that aspects like intellect, will and feeling could be rationalised by an 
appropriate selection of logical instruments. At the same time, lessons in mental and 
moral science identified epistemological boundaries without yet fully recognising 
methodological differences of separated academic disciplines. Only by our modern 
standards does mental science in New Zealand appear as a melting pot or hodgepodge 
of disciplines; as a late-Victorian subject it stands for a transitional state from a 
humanist to a science-focused curriculum. Out of arguments about scholarly 
methodology individual subjects of the academe emerged. Mental science, to this 
extent, was the product of a society confronted with the challenging findings of 
Darwinism and resolved to harness the power of the unobservable through scientific 
methodology and in pursuit of that end, to exploit technologies of visual display as 
mediators of scientific proof.  
 
                                               
53 Professor Hutton, in his 1888 lecture, likewise talked about the “fallacies” of old theories that inductive 
reasoning and thorough observation could have prevented. Twenty-first century American debating 
manuals still argue that fallacies are the one vice that should be avoided in any debate. The possibility of 
ruling out failures in argumentation, scientific or otherwise, still dominates theories of debate. Freeley & 
Steinberg 2005, 172-183.  
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Conclusion 
By the end of the millennium, the three New Zealand debating societies had 
changed the syntactic form of their debating topics from an open question into a motion. 
In 1883, the Dialectic Society at Canterbury College was the first to adopt the new form 
without much ado and with the intention to give debating a more professional and 
serious shape. In the same year, the society, for example, determined to automatically 
obtain the copyright for any essays presented to the society and that this “would be 
strictly enforced this session” (MBL, minute book, 21 April 1883) in order to create a 
coherent record of the society’s proceedings. The alterations in Auckland and Dunedin 
coincided with the introduction of debating tournaments which put forth propositions in 
the form of a motion. Debaters in Auckland unanimously passed a motion proposing 
“that in future subjects for debate should be framed in the form of a motion” in order to 
change the rules. In 1899, students debated the question “Is cremation advisable?”, to 
which they agreed (SCUA, minute book, 28 June 1899). After 1900, they were 
confronted with the more straightforward proposition “that Cremation is more desirable 
than Internment” (OUR, June 1901, 39). After hearing “arguments from science and 
fact” and considering the “sentimental aspect” of the proposition, the evening ended “in 
a comparatively easy victory for the advocate of cremation” (ibid.).  
This alteration of the debating style in late-Victorian New Zealand marked the 
beginnings of modern debating forms under the influence of scientific argumentation. 
The transition from question-pattern to what Habermas’s terms constative speech acts 
amounted to a significant epistemological modification of debate as a means of 
negotiating different points of view. Habermas understands constative speech as a 
proposition with which “the speaker refers to something in the objective world, and in 
such a way that he would like to represent a state of affairs” (Habermas 1984, 325). No 
values should then be attached to the nineteenth-century proposition “that Cremation is 
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more desirable than Internment” (OUR, June 1901, 39); but from a modern twenty-first 
century perspective they are. The popular American Debaters Guide maintains that 
propositions in the form of “that …  ” relate positions of value: “That is, it is a statement 
that asserts the value or worth of something or that some course of action should be 
followed – some new policy should be adopted” (Ericson et al. 2003, 5).54 As a 
consequence, the motion on cremation suggested to the members of the debating society 
that internment was the less advantageous form of burial and that cremation carried 
values that internment did not. In contrast, the question whether cremation was 
advisable, instead of demanding instant criticism, invited arguments on both possible 
answers: yes or no and left room for contemplation of values. 
The introduction of these normative constative propositions was another level of 
transformation of nineteenth-century New Zealand debate into a formalised and publicly 
irrelevant form of discussion. Van Eemeren et al argue that today “the prevailing view 
is that argument is a distinctively public process. The point is not that reasoning or other 
psychological processes are unimportant, but that arguers are actors on a public stage, 
their performances are publicly available” (Eemeren et al. 1996, 199). By this standard, 
modern academic debate would score very low on a scale for public relevance. 
Arguments in academic debate were not at all like Toulmin’s organisms; they were 
perceived as a mechanistic tool kit or apparatuses that could be adjusted to suit a 
particular cause. As such they reflected the scientific sentiment of the time. Debating 
propositions that were formulated in that-phrases instead of questions reflected the 
formalisation of argumentation that ironically abandoned the deliberative qualities of 
debate for a chance to state normative values. Hutton’s idea, that “by this means we get 
rid of all personal bias in observing” (Hutton 1888, 8), has proven, at least from a 
                                               
54 Ericson’s et al manual is one of the most popular in America and in publication since 1961. 
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twenty-first century, unsuccessful. His belief, it appears, is proof to the force of fallacies 
and the prevalence of the unobservable in argumentative speech.  
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Conclusion 
Meeting Adjourned 
 
This thesis started out from the premise that collegiate debating societies in New 
Zealand were established in the belief that they would contribute positively to the 
development of colonial public discourse. Chapter one showed how literary and 
debating societies in New Zealand emerged from a context of mutual improvement. In 
Chapters two and three I argued that the practice of debating societies was replenished 
by notions of rational recreation that fused acceptable entertainment with desired forms 
of knowledge production. In particular, during the late 1870s and 1880s, collegiate 
debating was marked by a laissez-faire attitude that freely combined amusement with 
educative ideals about absolute universal truths. Students experimented with genres like 
poetry, drama and essay, and added features like Olla Podridas, mock trials and 
parliamentary debates. Scholars of rhetoric and logic like Richard Whately and 
Alexander Bain significantly influenced students’ debating style. At the end of the 
century, students introduced nationwide inter-collegiate debating tournaments, which 
altered both the understanding of the role of the audience and modes of proceedings 
within the societies. The controversy over the instructive nature of debating 
competitions, for example, brought to the foreground essential differences in the 
perception of debate’s educative potential. In this discussion, notions of individual 
success and community spirit were reconciled in an attempt to combine the idealistic 
educational standards of the 1870s and 1880s with the competitive spirit of the 1890s. 
Chapter six demonstrated that over the course of thirty years, collegiate debating was 
exposed to the influence of science, which prioritised the validity of an argument rather 
than the dialectical and rhetorical components of deliberation. Furthermore, for New 
Zealand’s leading natural scientists, observation in experiment provided the basis for 
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the construction of reliable arguments. By means of this empirical emphasis, 
hypothetical argumentation was neglected in favour of inductive reasoning and debate 
became a means of testing and authenticating intellectual trends in colonial society. As 
a consequence of these developments, the societies gradually came to neglect their role 
as cells of opinion formation in the public forum. Throughout this thesis, I have applied 
the dichotomy of ideal and real to this gradual loss of discursive relevance 
demonstrating that societies were transformed into places where public knowledge was 
verified not invented. 
 
The Bridging of Ideal and Real: Historical Scholarship in New Zealand 
The late-Victorian intellectual elite in New Zealand promoted an ideal of education 
which they firmly believed would elevate the mental and social life of the colony. 
Collegiate debating was established as a part of this ideal vision of colonial education. 
The country’s environment and the strenuous realities of colonial life impacted on the 
cultivation of learning among the New Zealand’s settlers. In combining full-time 
employment with their academic interests, students had constantly to negotiate a 
balance between the requirements of an academic ideal and their daily affairs. In New 
Zealand, the survival of Mental Science long after European institutions had separated 
psychology and philosophy was partly caused by a conservative insistence on an 
outdated arts curriculum based on a supposedly ideal academic world. At the level of 
debate, genres were combined to accommodate the high standards set by ideal rational 
discourse and actual instances of its performance. When Marion White deliberately 
exposed herself to the experience of a spiritualist séance in a closed room with a friend 
as her only ally, her scientifically-informed faith in “the real” allowed her to access the 
unreal and the irrational in a form that proved amusing despite its dubious setting. As 
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we saw in Chapter three, Arthur Norris, before joining the clergy in New Zealand, 
ventured out to South Africa to place himself in the middle of what lay outside the 
reverent and spiritual. Once in action, he freely digressed from factual, almost detached, 
descriptions of his bellicose environment to the real emotions of home aroused by a 
familiar religious tune. Scobie Mackenzie theorised about the ideal debater on the basis 
of his real and immediate familiarity with the colonial political arena. He put forth ideal 
notions of fair and non-vulgar deliberation to develop his version of New Zealand 
political eloquence. Thus physical experiences provided an opportunity to adjust the 
perception of settler reality. Debaters realised that ideal concepts were substantiated by 
events such as the Boer War. 
In New Zealand, the war experience in particular made students sceptical about the 
desirability of audience participation and the reliability of the public’s judgement. 
Students became aware that the “mob” was upon them and that argumentation had to be 
saved from the arbitrariness of public enthusiasm. The war also strengthened notions of 
competition and victory. In debate, New Zealanders’ perception of the Boer War 
mirrored popular trends that contributed to the establishment of intercollegiate debating. 
The tournaments, like the war, promoted forms of athletic competition. As Chapter 
three revealed, the ideals of truth and educative value still served as a justification for 
staging debating competitions, but the presence of a winner and physical display of 
esprit de crops were the truly attractive features of the new form of debate. Prior to 
their emergence, students created forms of debating practice that gave rise to such 
hybrid-forms as Olla Podridas, when students recited and performed poetry but still 
voted on the most amusing piece. Mock trials likewise translated ideal procedures of 
advocacy into a theatrical display of jurisdiction. In 1902, Christchurch students spent 
an enjoyable evening in this fashion: “The story told by the injured lady and the 
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witnesses proved most entertaining, the order of the court being seriously imperilled on 
many occasions by the uncontrollable laughter of the audience” (LT, 19 May 1902, 5). 
The significance of an audience for students diminished in proportion to their 
experience with modern forms of popular entertainment. In reviewing the changing 
practice of student debate in terms of the relations between the ideal form and the 
actuality, this thesis shows that rhetorical analysis holds the key to understanding the 
essentially discursive nature of history in the New Zealand colony. 
In the Introduction I pointed towards Gibbons’, Stenhouse’s and Reid’s 
contributions to a New Zealand historical scholarship that embraces a thematic and 
discursive rather than chronological and factual perspective. Some New Zealand 
historical works, while providing essential background material for events that shaped 
the colony’s future, do not venture beyond the familiar territory of chronological 
historical writing. Sinclair, Belich and Fairburn published general histories which evoke 
the impression that New Zealand’s colonial past is complete and is either understood in 
terms of nation-building processes, the dynamics of recolonialisation, or atomisation of 
the New Zealand public.1 Admittedly, some of these scholars have produced significant 
scholarship that complicates the picture they create in these general approaches and take 
into account the relevance of settler communities within a global context.2  
This thesis necessarily focuses on New Zealand’s intellectual history from a mono-
cultural vantage point because of its subject that was mainly (though not exclusively) 
practised by young educated Pakeha in the colonial period. It is also inspired by the 
need to build on a shift of emphasis in colonial studies away from a national focus to 
accommodate the broader implications of debating culture in New Zealand. In order to 
provide a basis for further research, I decided early on to focus on the activities of a 
                                               
1 Sinclair 1987a, 1987b, 1987c, 2000; Belich 1996 and 2001; Fairburn 1989. 
2 Belich 2003 and in his forthcoming book The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-world; 
Fairburn 2006. 
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small fraction of debating societies and to demonstrate how their members, as citizens 
as well as Victorians, made their way through the dominant ideas and historical events 
of their time. Nineteenth-century institutionalised higher education and research in New 
Zealand were the pet projects of a white European intellectual elite (Reid 2007, 186-7). 
Collegiate debating societies in New Zealand emerged from this threshold of British 
inter-colonialism and higher education and, consequentially, were dominated by a 
Pakeha worldview.  
Other scholars have analysed New Zealand’s past in terms of Pakeha culture and 
have set it into relation with overseas developments. Donald Akenson, for example, in 
Half the World from Home points out that a bicultural reading of New Zealand history 
“leads to a lumping of all white settlers into a spurious unity” (Akenson 1990, 6). 
Akenson shows that, despite cultural differences between Irish, Welch and Scottish 
settlers, they formed a “‘British’ culture” (193-5). This partly explains why Sinclair’s 
thesis of a national identity is demonstrated without first taking a detour through 
notions of “fellowship”, esprit de corps, terms like Anglo-Saxon and concepts like 
Akenson’s “‘British’ culture.” Debaters, for example, constituted a community on 
different levels. They identified with their debating societies, with their college, their 
country of origin, or New Zealand as the place to which they had migrated. Events of 
imperial dimension like the Boer War did not suddenly condense these different layers 
into one national sentiment. Moreover, political constructs like the Australian 
Federation affected New Zealand’s public forum not only as a national issue but rather 
as a point of focus for public communication. National meaning was ascribed to these 
events by a political body that directed the affairs of the country. It would be 
overstating the case if the strategic actions of an administration were to be taken as a 
confirmation of a widespread nationalistic attitude. Similarly, settlers from Wales, 
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England, Ireland and Scotland did not generate a New Zealand national spirit once they 
settled in the colony; instead, they gradually created a concept of “British culture.” 
Akenson’s study of these settler groups is complemented by Bade’s project that recalls 
the story of German settlers in New Zealand and Fraser’s research on Irish testaments 
made in New Zealand (Bade 1993, Fraser 1995). Brooking and Coleman also show that 
Scottish migrants had a diverse influence on New Zealand settler culture (Brooking and 
Coleman 2003). These studies display a diversity of European settlers’ loyalties and 
complicate the picture of Pakeha settler communities. Akenson, Bade and Fraser 
support the claim made in this thesis that New Zealand national identity did not 
immediately arise from participation in imperial endeavours like the Boer War or the 
Federation movement. At the same time, these studies of Pakeha colonial communities 
point towards areas of research that this thesis could not address.  
One of these further implications surfaces when considering the bilingual 
background of colonial settlers. To what extent did the diversity of migrant 
backgrounds influence the practice of argumentative discourse in a New Zealand 
setting? Collegiate debating societies, for example, had some members with a bilingual 
upbringing. Oscar T.J. Alpers, for example, the son of Danish immigrants who 
proceeded to become a successful student of English under Macmillan Brown, did not 
speak a word of English when he came to the colony. Alpers was one of the most 
prominent members of the Dialectic Society at Canterbury College. Likewise, Heinrich 
von Haast, son of the influential German scholar Julius von Haast, was an active 
member of the Dialectic Society and educated bilingually. These two examples suggest 
that bilingualism and multiple cultural backgrounds led to a diversity of literary and 
debating societies that accommodated different languages. In the United States, 
Wiesepape shows that Texas immigrants of German, Swedish, Norwegian and Danish 
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descent each founded literary clubs like Die Prairie Blume (The Prairie Flower) that 
enabled them to sustain their cultural heritage (Wiesepape 2004, 4). New Zealand’s 
rhetorical culture possibly experienced a similar diversity of non-collegiate literary and 
debating societies that combined English discursive styles with those of other 
immigrant countries like Germany, Denmark or France. 
The understanding of debating discourse is further expanded if a Maori-Pakeha 
perspective is applied. Relatively recent scholarship in New Zealand history adopts a 
bicultural point of view. Judith Binney is representative of this branch of scholarship.3 
She treats Pakeha and Maori as offering coexistent but also inherently different 
approaches towards recording the past (Binney 2001, 4). While her research shows that 
Maori histories merge Christian and Maori elements, she nevertheless does not consider 
nineteenth-century Maori and Pakeha conceptual worldviews as interwoven.4 In the 
context of nineteenth-century debate, Sir Apirana Ngata remains the only known Maori 
member of the three collegiate debating societies. Prior to attending Canterbury, he 
obtained his secondary education from Te Aute College run by John Thornton, a 
Pakeha missionary. Even though Ngata was encouraged to cherish his racial 
background, the question remains to what extent Maori oral traditions influenced his 
debating encounter at Canterbury. On the one hand, considering his upbringing, Ngata 
was familiar with the traditions of korero. On the other, his prize essay The Past and 
Present of the Maori is a perfect example of Alexander Bain’s teachings of paragraph 
structure and analytical argumentation. Binney discusses the “‘in-between’ lives” 
(Binney 2006, 93) of nineteenth-century Maori-Pakeha descendents. In her contribution 
to Ballantye’s and Moloughney’s volume she traces the biographies of several 
“individuals of dual descent” who “became important ‘brokers’ between worlds in late 
                                               
3 Binney 2001, 2005, 2006, 2007.  
4 Keenan, for example, develops a similar perspective in relating Maori histories (Keenan 2000, 41).  
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nineteenth and early twentieth-century New Zealand” (116). Applied to Ngata’s case, 
his rhetorical skills represent an instance of a Maori dual existence in two significantly 
different discursive spheres. Stafford and Williams show that Ngata in writing the poem 
“A Scene from the Past” “owns the corresponding Victorian forms, but is able to insert 
into them indigenous content. In doing so, Ngata is adopting the role of a Victorian 
scholar, performing acts of high-minded preservationism” (Stafford and Williams 2004, 
36). Moreover, Ngata’s writing further defies categorisation because it “oddly echoes 
the practice of white colonial writers, also caught between worlds not easily 
accommodated to each other and aware of the distance” (33). Furthermore, influences 
of Maori-Pakeha terminology on the rhetorical culture were reciprocal and constantly 
shifting. The Auckland Girls’ Korero Club suggests that the Maori concept, to some 
extent, found its place in Pakeha debating culture. Like Alpers and von Haast, Ngata 
moved between two transitional discursive cultures.5 Additionally, settlers of different 
nationalities endeavoured to establish forms and structures of exchange of discourse 
like literary and debating societies that accommodated their particular linguistic 
backgrounds. These examples of mono and bi-cultural contexts of debaters, not only in 
the academe but in the public forum of the colony, provide fresh perspectives on how 
the rhetorical culture of New Zealand might be further explored.  
The dichotomy between the ideal and real further determined how argumentation 
was empirically tested by students. Attempts at bridging the divide did not end with the 
expression of their thoughts in the debating room or on the printed page of their college 
Reviews. Arthur Norris discussed the Boer war effort in a secure debating environment; 
he had physically experienced what the war was like, and returned with impressions 
that he put in writing and published for the benefit of his fellow debaters. Marion 
                                               
5 I am aware and agree with Stafford and Williams that “[i]t is tempting, but dangerous, to discover 
analogies rather than the familiar binaries in the situations of colonizer and colonized; the processes are 
neither analogous nor opposed, but fluent and complicated” (Stafford and Williams 2004, 33). 
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White, in a similar fashion, discussed Spiritualism during her evenings at the debating 
society, then went to Australia only to relate her thoughts in writing to her student 
audience in New Zealand. The process of debate and argumentation was organic and 
occasionally permeated the public forum despite attempts to confine debate to 
competitive deliberation. Moreover, these discursive patterns of communication and 
contest within the overwhelmingly European intellectual elite suggest that nineteenth-
century Pakeha communication was dynamic, in the sense of diverse, multi-layered and 
unstructured. While written documentation dominates historical research on Pakeha 
culture in New Zealand, debating societies make visible a missing link in the process of 
colonial knowledge production. Students’ debates shaped discourse, as did printed 
publications. The story of nineteenth-century New Zealand is written in an inter-
colonial web of written and oral discourse and close attention needs to be paid to both 
Maori and Pakeha rhetorical cultures. 
 
A Final Word on Certainty 
Professor Hutton in New Zealand declared predictability the crucial test for the 
certainty of a scientific claim. At the end of the nineteenth century, students adopted a 
standard of scientific certainty that rendered debating discourse predictable. Susan 
Wells in coming to terms with Habermas’s work observes that if science loses its 
epistemological claim to certainty, “[n]othing in the structure of political discourse, 
nothing external to it in the social world, nothing in the relations of speakers to one 
another, guarantees that in public discourse the better reason will prevail over the 
worse” (Wells 1996, 182). Wells maintains that in our post-modern world, science 
adopts a normative function and anchors discourse in the public forum. The beginnings 
of this global trend are visible in nineteenth-century New Zealand debate and in 
  271 
American manuals of debate in the twentieth century. As late as 1947, Ewbank and 
Auer, for example, felt compelled to dedicate a separate section to the issue of “The 
Technique of Discussion and Debate and the Scientific Method” (Ewbank and Auer 
1947, 15-22). They concluded that “the scientific method cannot be applied, in toto, in 
the solution of public problems. Rather, it is the discussion and debate technique based 
upon scientific procedures which should be applied to the democratic processes of 
social inquiry and judgement” (20). As a consequence, debate is regarded as an 
instrument of scientific reason in the public forum. Based on this line of reasoning, Pratt 
and Church in New Zealand can treat debate as an uncontroversial interactive means of 
democratic discourse that employs scientific evidence to convince its participants of 
some valid truths.6 
While the fusion of debate and scientific method has advantages for public 
discourse, it also draws on the conviction that science will render deliberation more 
effective and that a combination of debate and science will secure a better 
representation of opinions in the public forum. In New Zealand, this conviction stems 
from the nineteenth-century belief that an argument constructed on the basis of 
induction was best suited for verifying propositions. Elster argues that this assumption 
might turn out to be an illusion: “It is far from obvious that the goals of optimizing 
representation and optimizing deliberation always work in tandem. In fact, it would be 
wishful thinking to assume that this is always the case: it is only by accident that one 
institutional arrangement will maximize two different objectives” (Elster 1998, 13). In 
the tripartite structure of debate— rhetoric, dialectic, and logic— the last gained ground 
and unduly promoted the unit of argument to the centre of deliberation. This resulted in 
                                               
6 The Introduction began with Pratt’s and Church’s statements (Pratt 2004, 223; Church 2004, 159). 
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a perspective that was suspicious of the epistemological value of audience participation 
and debate practised outside the norms of “conduct.”  
This caution regarding audience reliability was based on the ideal notion that 
rationality dominated the unity of rhetoric, dialectic, and logic. Cronje argues, and I 
agree, that “the synthesis of rhetoric with dialectic, and logic in argumentation has a 
rationalising function. When any one of these three functional aspects of rationality 
breaks down, all three break down (in mutually reinforcing ways). This breakdown, in 
turn, results in the loss of the binding and bonding force of claims” (Cronje 2002, 272). 
While Cronje’s statement is correct for a theoretical understanding of rationality, I 
argue that in nineteenth-century New Zealand debate, aspects of these three elements 
break down and re-emerge in a continual pattern of change. Earlier on, this thesis 
accepted Zarefsky’s call for a better dialogue between ideal and real readings of 
argumentative engagement. In this spirit, I believe that the combination of rhetoric, 
dialectic and logic provides a convenient ideal structure for rhetorical analysis but that 
the simultaneous existence of the three spheres is never fully realised in actual debate.  
Between 1878 and 1902, students in New Zealand not once addressed these three 
aspects at the same time. The 1901 controversy on debating tournaments heralded the 
procedural advantages of the new mode but considerations of audience change and 
argumentative style never entered the discussion. During the Boer War and the time of 
Australian Federation, students became aware of audience as an incalculable aspect of 
public discourse but they neglected the idea that the argument itself exerted a 
considerable influence on audience behaviour. To be sure, ideas of audience, argument 
and debating procedure appear in students’ discourse repeatedly, but their unity in 
debate is imagined rather than real. In other words, a debater can strive to do justice to 
the three aspects of deliberation, but the actual debate will consist in the constant 
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shifting among them and will possibly always cause “agitation” over an evening’s 
debate (Rose Ilbert, diary, 27 Aug. 1900).  
As a consequence, certainty in nineteenth-century New Zealand debate was a 
regulative ideal that counter-balanced unsettling experiences of uncertainty and the 
unpredictability of discourse. At the same time, students’ early attitudes towards their 
debating adventure, in particular their efforts to combine amusement with rational 
deliberation, demonstrate that uncertainty was fully embraced: students leapt over desks 
to accept prizes or spontaneously added a few “vocal selections” (OW, 7 June 1892, 19) 
to the presentation of English poetry in the absence of the debater. New Zealand 
nineteenth-century debating societies represented a refreshing assemblage of idealistic 
as well as pragmatic attitudes towards their discursive genre; they moreover 
demonstrate that nothing is certain in discourse and that not even scientific 
methodology can remedy that fact. A strong desire for discursive certainty leads debate 
into the illusory category of normative discourse, when, in fact, debate itself is not 
normative but is rendered normative by the conditions under which it is practised. 
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Appendix 1 
Attendance Figures 
Collegiate Debating Societies, 1878-1902 
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YEAR CCDS OUDS AUDS 
1878   31   
1879 15 46   
1880 21 21   
1881 31 32   
1882 26 22   
1883 33 29   
1884 38 27   
1885 39 45   
1886 42     
1887 40   20 
1888 46   13 
1889 61   9 
1890 67     
1891 83 20 36 
1892 109     
1893 89 60   
1894   103 0 
1895     0 
1896     0 
1897     13 
1898     24 
1899     19 
1900     25 
1901     20 
1902     20 
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Appendix 2 
Habermas 
Tripartite Structure of Argumentation 
 
 
Discipline Argumentation 
Levels of Abstraction 
Argumentation 
Structure 
Fundamental 
Intuition What is 
Argumentation 
Rhetoric Process 
Delineates the general 
pragmatic 
presuppositions of 
argumentation as 
specifications of an ideal 
speech situation. 
Aims at convincing a 
universal audience 
and gaining general 
assent for an 
utterance. 
Dialectic Procedure 
Delineates a form of 
interaction that is subject 
to special rules and aims 
at identifying the better 
argument. 
Aims at ending a 
dispute about 
hypothetical validity 
claims with a 
rationally motivated 
agreement. 
Logic Products 
Contains arguments that 
are convincing in virtue 
of their intrinsic 
properties. 
Aims at grounding or 
redeeming a validity 
claim with arguments. 
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Appendix 3 
Auckland University Debating Society 
Debate: Is one man, one vote a desirable measure? 
 
Minute Book, 5 May 1892 
“A debate on the question ‘Is one man, one vote a desirable measure?’ was then 
opened by Mr. E. K. Mulgan in the affirmative. Mr. Mulgan pointed out that this 
measure generally follows on free education. He claimed that it is beneficial because it 
tends to elevate by growing responsibility because it increases the bond of fellowship 
between man and man and brings home to each that he is a useful unit in the 
community. He said that in England free education had been wrung from a reluctant 
government + now the people are demanding his measure. The restrictions on the 
franchise are growing less + less. Every individual as a unit should have a voice in the 
government and some control over the taxation and other such matters. 
He admitted that it does give a share of the power to irresponsible persons but 
denied that the number is as large as it is generally represented to be. He claimed 
further that there is no good measure which could be substituted for the one under 
discussion. Plurality of votes based on a property qualification he characterised as 
another name for slavery. Its effect would be to debar many intelligent from taking any 
part in the affairs of the state. He admitted that the measure is not a faultless piece of 
legislation, but claimed that for honesty and fairness it is the best. 
Mr. Tunks opened in the negative. He said that in a representative form of 
government while it is necessary that the representation should be as wide as possible, it 
is also necessary that the nature of the suffrage should be borne in mind. He pointed out 
that the quality of the government depends upon the quality of the representatives, + 
that again upon the way the voters regard their privileges and claimed that the suffrage 
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should be regarded as a sacred trust to be exercised for the good of the state + not as a 
personal right. Accordingly, it is the duty of the state to limit its possession to those best 
calculated to exercise it properly. He admitted that within certain limits all should have 
a voice but denied the right to an equal voice. He contended that those unable to read + 
write, drunkards, all who had within a certain time compounded with their creditors or 
become bankrupt + undischarged bankrupts should be excluded from the suffrage and 
advocated a plurality of votes based upon an educational, residential or property 
qualification. This he claimed had more of fairness + justice in it than to rank all men as 
equal when they are not.” 
 
The majority of the members voted against the proposition. 
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Appendix 4 
Auckland University Debating Society 
Debate: That the Influence of the Stage is and has been for good  
 
Minute Book, 30 June 1892 
“Mr. Gillies opened a debate in the subject ‘that the influence of the stage is and has 
been for good’ He referred to the origin of the stage, pointing out that it had its 
beginning in the mystery and morality plays, which had for their object the religious 
instruction of the people. He contended that as a method of amusement, to relieve the 
tension of the mind from business matters, and as a means of instruction the influence 
of the stage is undoubtedly for good. Mr. Galway opened in the negative. He admitted 
the general attractiveness of the stage. He contended that there was a difference 
between the influence of the drama and that of the stage, though they may have had a 
common origin. The drama is a form of literature, the stage merely includes acting as a 
whole, and he contended that the stage has had a deteriorating influence on the drama. 
The drama is a very condensed form of literary composition very suitable for character 
study and requires great study; as acted it gives no time for study and is merely for 
amusement. Only such drama as is kept distinct from the stage had kept its merit. The 
stage excludes real character and so must present distorted and imperfect phases, and 
give us false notions. The more delicate phases for human life and character can be 
appreciated by reading but it is degradation to approach them in the way it is done on 
the stage. 
Another serious objection is that actors are called upon to express feelings which 
they do not really appreciate and so live in an atmosphere of unreality. 
Mr. Mueller concluded that the acting of plays was an inducement to study and 
aided the memory and is therefore educational. He said that those of decry the stage are 
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prejudiced. Because it has had a bad influence on same cases it does not follow that it is 
bad in all cases.” 
 
The majority of the members voted in favour of the proposition. 
  280 
Appendix 5 
Otago University Debating Society 
Debate: Adoption of Academic Dress 
  
Otago Witness, 29 June 1893, 15 
“An interesting debate took place on Friday evening at the fortnightly meeting of 
the Otago University Debating Society, the subject discussed being the adoption of 
academic dress by the students of the university. Mr T. K. Sidey, B.A., LL.B , occupied 
the chair, and there was a large attendance, upwards of 80 members being present. The 
leaders on the affirmative side were Messrs A. H. Adams and W. J. Strong, and on the 
negative side Messrs T. Coutts, B.A., and I. V. O. Bertram. Subsequent speakers were 
Messrs M'Nickle, Riddell, Strachan, Richardson, Platts, Bossence, Marshall, and 
Salmond. At the conclusion of the debate a vote was taken, which resulted in a narrow 
majority against the adoption of academic dress. Prior to the debate a short musical 
programme was gone through, a piano solo being contributed by Miss Barron, a song 
by Mr J. Montgomery, and a recitation by Mr J. Orkney.” 
 
G.P. Howell, Ourselves (Prize Essay), 1893  
Abstract 
“The first debate of the year was well argued and keenly contested, and it elicited 
sentiments and speeches that would do honour to any society. Signs of honest feeling, 
of deep principle, of love of freedom, and of desire of patriotism, were exhibited by 
various speakers; and the whole debate was illuminated by spirited allusion, sarcasm, 
and intermittent humour. A goodly number of speakers returned with sharpened 
weapons and renewed eagerness to the conflict. Consequently the debate was of an 
extensive character, only a few minor questions being omitted, such as ‘Would gowns 
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inflict pain upon sensitive natures?’ For if they would do so it would be better to 
sacrifice personal appearance and the dignity of the awe-aspiring mortar board, than 
injure the feelings of a fellow-student, for care of the feelings of others is a mark of true 
esprit de corps. A considerable amount of earnestness was displayed during the 
discussion, and tended to enhance the interest. Nothing is so productive of spirit and 
liveliness as earnestness; nothing is so delightful to the audience as to become aware 
that the whole of the speaker’s soul is thrilling through his words, and making them 
flow, like the speech of aged Nestor, more sweetly than honey” (Howell 1893, 134). 
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Appendix 6 
Otago University Debating Society 
Debate: Should Women be admitted to the Medical Profession?  
 
Otago University Review, August 1891, 87-8 
“This Society has at last emerged from the condition of lethargy which was 
unfortunately its chief characteristic during the earlier part of the session; the first proof 
of its awakened activity being a debate on the subject, ‘Should Women be admitted to 
the Medical Profession?’ which was held in July 31st. This subject has more than 
ordinary interest to the students of this University in consequence of the action of the 
authorities with regard to the admission of ladies to the Medical School, and this no 
doubt accounted for an attendance much larger than usual. 
…  
The real business of the evening began with Miss Fraser’s speech. Miss Fraser 
combated the idea that women are unfit, either physically or mentally, for the work of 
the medical profession. She asserted the real necessity for women physicians, and 
attacked the conduct of men in reserving for themselves the lucrative occupations, 
while relegating to the other sex those which, though not less exacting, are less 
remunerative. 
Mr Sidey maintained the opposite opinion, contending that he and his supporters 
had a higher ideal of womanhood than those who wished the professions to be the field 
for an indiscriminate competition between the sexes. He illustrated his position by 
frequent quotations, and made reference to the difficulties in the way of providing 
suitable medical training for women, as exemplified in particular by the case of Otago 
Medical School. Messrs Hendry and Little followed – the one in support of Miss Fraser, 
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the other of Mr Sidey; and in the general discussion which next took place, Messrs 
Baldwin, Mouat, Platts, Anderson, and Tennant were conspicuous. 
On a vote being taken, it was found that a majority were in favour of admitting 
women to the medical profession; but a second division – the result of a suggestion by 
Mr Sidey – proved conclusively that the prospect of having lady medical students at the 
University is not viewed with much favour by the majority of students.”  
 
Otago Witness, 6 August 1891, 18 
“The subject for debate was, "Should women be admitted to the medical 
profession?" The affirmative was upheld by Miss Fraser, M.A., who was supported by 
Mr Hendry, B. A. It was by them maintained that both mentally and physically women 
are capable of performing successfully the duties of the medical profession. Messrs 
Sidey, B.A., LL.B., and Little, M.A., took the negative side, dwelling chiefly on the 
difficulty of providing suitable medical training for women, and on their physical 
disabilities for such a profession. Other speakers on the question were Messrs Baldwin, 
Mouat, B.A., Anderson, Tennaat, B.A., and Platts. When the leaders had replied, a vote 
was taken, with the result that it was decided that women should be admitted to the 
medical profession by the substantial majority of 21. On the motion of Mr Sidey, a 
division was afterwards taken on the question as to whether women should be admitted 
to the Medical School of Otago as at present constituted. This was decided in the 
negative by an overwhelming majority.” 
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Appendix 7 
Intercollegiate Debating Tournament 1901 
Debate: That the modern spirit of militarism is not favourable to true progress 
 
Canterbury College Review, October 1901, 18-19 
“Wednesday was cold and wet, and the three following days it snowed hard, so we 
were lucky in getting Tuesday so beautifully fine. On Wednesday most of us took the 
opportunity of going over the University and seeing what was to be seen. The debate 
duly came off in the evening in the Chemical Lecture Theatre. Dr. Marshall was in the 
chair, and the room was filled. After a couple of songs, the Chairman announced the 
conditions of the debater, and Mr. Gurthrie led off against us, moving ‘That the modern 
spirit of militarism is not favourable to true progress.’ The succeeding speakers were 
Messrs. Prideaux, Bedford, Scott, Hercus, and Hall, in that order. The judges, Dean 
Fitchett and Messr. Wilson and Chapman, gave their vote in favour of Otago, on the 
ground of superior enunciation. There is no question that they were absolutely right in 
their decision. The Otago speakers paid far more attention to literary style, and took far 
more favourably with their elocution; and the result contrasted most favourably with 
our more colloquial, rambling, and careless style of arguing.” 
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Appendix 8 
Auckland University Debating Society 
Debate: Should New Zealand join the Australian Federation League? 
 
Minute Book, 8 July 1891 
“Mr. Parr spoke in the affirmative. He shewed the proposed constitution of the 
league and claimed that a Federal Senate could govern better than isolated parliaments. 
One third of the exports of N.Z. went to Australia and this under large custom’s duties. 
Federation with Free Trade would double the exports. Mr. Parr also shewed how foolish 
some ideas against Federation were, not sparing in his remarks, some New Zealand 
M.N.Rs, - Mr. Battley spoke in the negative. He contended that N.Z., not drawing any 
help from Australia, would not isolate herself by refusing to federate. The Senate would 
be a considerable distance away and some of our best men would be excluded by reason 
of expense. He also pointed out the difficulties there were in the way of a final court of 
appeal. 
Several members including Messrs. Tunks and Meyers and the Secretary spoke. 
Professor Thomas then summed up and put the question to the meeting. There was a 
majority of two for the negative.” 
 
New Zealand Herald, 9 July 1891, 4 
“A meeting of the University College Debating Society was held in the College 
library last night. There was a good attendance. The secretary, Mr. Barber, made some 
announcements, and professor Thomas, who presided, called upon Mr. Parr to prove 
that New Zealand should join the Australian Federation League. He showed first what 
the constitution of the League was, and claimed that the Federation Senate could better 
deal with subjects that would come under its power than different Government could 
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do. He showed that one-third of New Zealand’s exports went to Australia, and this 
under very large Customs duties. He claimed that Federation with freetrade would 
double the exports, and would help us as a wealth-producing country. He pointed out 
the mistake Newfoundland made in refusing to join the Canadian Federation League, 
and if New Zealand refused to join the Australian Federation she would be isolating 
herself, would leave herself open to all sorts of insults. Mr. Battley spoke in the 
negative. He contended that New Zealand would not isolate herself, because she did not 
draw any help at present from Australia, and she would not have any connection with 
England. He pointed out the difference in population, and that New Zealand would only 
be comparatively sparsely represented. The seat of the Federal Government would be a 
considerable distance from New Zealand. Our best men would be excluded by the 
expense and time occupied in attending Government. He also touched on the difficulties 
in the way of a final Court of Appeal. In conclusion he quoted Sir John Hall’s statement 
when he returned from the Federal Convention that ‘In the 1200 miles separating New 
Zealand from Australia there were 1200 reasons why New Zealand should not join the 
league.’” 
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Appendix 9 
Auckland University College 
Marte Nostro: The Auckland University College Chronicle 
 
Editorial: October 1903, 1, no.2: 4 
“And this is what usually happens at these debates. One student mounts the platform 
and discourses at length on a subject concerning which he probably knew nothing until 
he consulted the Encyclopaedia Britannica. His great endeavour is to use as little 
material as possible in the time allotted to him. Then a second student rises, uses the 
‘you’re another’ style of argument for a few minutes, and afterwards proceeds to 
expound another limited view of the subject. A few other students rise in their turn and 
engage in a species of sham fight in which the comic (?) element predominates. When 
the audience have no more views to put forward, the two chief speakers wind up the 
proceedings by making dispassionate remarks about the other speakers of the evening 
and the debate is over. Every debate is the same. None of the students show any 
originality. The most they can do is to show a passing interest in the subject under 
discussion, and that interest is too faint to stimulate their brains to any activity.  
Besides these debates, there are occasional Christian Union Addresses, which 
interest a few of the students, but the majority stand aloof. 
…  
Certainly, this year has been a little more exciting than usual. The Easter Carnival 
roused the students in a marvellous manner. It seems to have stimulated the active side 
of the student’s character, for there has been more interest shown in sports this winter 
than there ever has been before. But there is still room for a little additional interest in 
the general progress of the College. Perhaps, however, a few students will manage to 
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develop a little individuality during long vacation and give the rest of us the benefit of 
the year. To say the least of it, it would be a pleasant change.” 
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